Military Intervention In Libya Research Articles

How Can We Criticize International Practices?

AbstractIn this article, we elaborate two distinct ways of criticizing international practices: social critique and pragmatic critique. Our argument is that these two forms of critique are systematically opposed to each other: They are based on opposing epistemic premises, they are motivated by opposing political concerns, and they pursue opposing visions of social progress. Scholars of International Relations (IR) who want to work with the conceptual tools of practice theory are thus confronted with a consequential choice. Understanding the alternatives can help them to be more self-reflexive in their research practices and intervene more forcefully in contemporary political debates. We illustrate these advantages through a discussion of the scholarly debate on the practices of multilateral diplomacy through which the United Nations Security Council authorized a military intervention in Libya in 2011.

NATO’s Military Intervention in Libya: Implications on Regional Security

The study sought to understand the justification of NATO’s intervention in Libya and implications on regional security. Qualitative research methodology was used in the study. Primary and secondary data sources were used to collect data. The findings of the study indicated that NATO’s military intervention in Libya was not justified and failed to promote peace and security. Research findings further showed that the intervention was based on self-interest. The intentions of NATO in Libya were far-fetched and heavily undermined the doctrines of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention. The research findings indicated that NATO intervened in Libya for regime change, imperialism and to benefit from the oil resource. Libyan citizens benefitted nothing from the intervention. The study argues that Libyans suffered economic, socio-political and religious effects. The intervention by NATO fuelled civil wars, violence, religious conflicts and terrorism.

Does Democratic Peace Theory Genuinely Envision Global Peace? A Critical Approach

Democratic Peace Theory has been one of the most hotly debated topics ever since the 1980s. From Kant to the present day, the meaning of Democratic Peace Theory has changed, while the theory nowadays claims in principle that democratic states wage war against each other less often owing to their institutions’ and citizens’ abilities to urge their governments to establish a peaceful foreign policy. At this point, the critical theory offers an alternative explanation for the behaviors of democratic countries. This study was designed as a theoretical discussion utilising the analysis of primary and secondary sources in the field, both in printed and electronic materials. Employing the viewpoint of the critical theory, this paper argues that Democratic Peace is the disguise of hegemonic relations and the product of the historical block. This study revealed that democracies are not pacifist actors in the international realm. As articulated by the critical approach, the study also puts forth that the concept of Democratic eace facilitates the expansionist ambitions of hegemonic powers in the international system by utilizing various humanitarian interventions and serves as a means to maintain imperialist peace. Empirical evidence from the military intervention in Libya further reinforces this argument. Thus, this study asserts the idea to be cautious against the propositions of the Democratic Peace Theory because any activities done in the name of spreading democracy may involve a hidden agenda and disrupt the internal stability of non-democratic countries.

Responsibility to Protect and the International Military Intervention in Libya in International Law: What Went Wrong and What Lessons Could Be Learnt from It?

The need to respond to the unfolding situation of mass atrocity crimes has become the subject of a longstanding discussion in international law, with no success in reaching an agreement on the legal status of such a right to respond. The use of coercive measures to protect endangered people remains one of the most challenging aspects of contemporary international law. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was introduced to respond to the grave cases of massacres, but this notion has remained more in the realm of political rhetoric rather than in international law. However, the notion of R2P was invoked by the states leading international intervention in Libya. This article aims to present a critique of the application and interpretation of R2P as a normative framework, with a focus on the complementary responsibility of the international community in the face of the humanitarian crisis in Libya and the way military intervention was carried out. Drawing on the lessons learnt from the international intervention in Libya, this article provides an assessment of the UN resolutions that authorised the military intervention in Libya and the conduct of the coalition partners prior to, during and in the aftermath of the intervention and suggests the manner in which this normative framework could be developed to help the international community to shoulder its responsibility for the protection of people, without undermining the core of international legal framework in the future.

Lessons Learned from Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya

As a new principle in the world, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an obligation on the part of the international community and on the part of the states to protect civilians from mass atrocities by doing several actions like giving international aids, reducing poverty, supporting peacebuilding, educating the population, until military intervention. However, military intervention under R2P norm in Libya produce a counterproductive result which then led the country into civil war. From this background, therefore, the purpose of this article is to examine the implementation of R2P in Libya into four types of lessons learned. The first lesson, R2P is corrupted by great powers that make the military intervention far from its mandate. The second lesson is the inconsistency practice from an R2P military intervention which led to the question of credibility of military intervention in Libya. The third lesson is diplomacy must be prioritized rather than military intervention since that there is an R2P success story without military intervention. The last is the recommendation to implement Responsibility while Protecting (RWP) principle in the R2P framework.Keywords: Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Libya, Diplomacy, Military Intervention, Responsibility while Protecting

The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: An Assessment of the Just Cause and Last Resort Criteria in the Case of Libya

ABSTRACTThere is a widespread assumption that, given the imminent threat of mass atrocities against the Libyan civilians – especially in Benghazi – and in the absence of non-military alternatives, military action against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi was a justified and necessary response. This paper challenges this widespread assumption. It argues that on the eve of NATO-led military intervention, there was no ‘clear evidence’ to suggest that the Libyan regime was on the verge of committing mass atrocities against civilians. This research also documents the range of political and diplomatic options open to the international community to engage with Gaddafi, all of which were sidetracked in favour of military action. Despite the brutality of Gaddafi’s rule, military intervention in Libya did not meet the Responsibility to Protect’s (R2P) ‘just cause’ and ‘last resort’ criteria. Far from being a successful application of R2P’s most coercive pillar, the Libyan case was a manifest misapplication of R2P's military component. An objective analysis of the Libyan crisis during February and March 2011 should have prevented the use of military force.

Strategic Narratives and Alliances: The Cases of Intervention in Libya (2011) and Economic Sanctions against Russia (2014)

Scholars of international communication recognize that strategic narratives are important for policymaking (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013) and scholars studying alliances suggest that communication is central to the formation and maintenance of alliances (Weitsman, 2010). This essay addresses how strategic narratives affect US alliance behavior—and hence international order—in two specific ways. First, alliance behavior can be affected by other allies’ narratives as demonstrated in the case of military intervention in Libya in 2011. Here the evidence suggests that the UK and France were able to use strategic narratives to influence the decision of the US to agree to military intervention in Libya by using narratives that could evoke a fear of abandonment. Second, alliance cohesion can be affected by narrative contestation by non-allies as demonstrated in the case of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. Russia has used strategic narratives in a new media environment in an attempt to elicit a fear of entrapment to counter the US attempts to coordinate alliance support for economic sanctions. In both cases, distinguishing between system, identity, and policy narratives give us a deeper understanding of narrative contestation today. This analysis adds to our understanding of the factors that affect alliances set within a new media environment characterized by a proliferation of sources and outlets and thus a more horizontal structure of information exchange.

Strategic Culture, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy: Finland’s Decision to Refrain from Operation Unified Protector

This article integrates literature on strategic culture with literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy, illustrating how the interaction of culture and domestic political calculation can influence government foreign policy on participation in international military operations. Empirically, the article investigates the decision made by the Government of Finland to refrain from participation in the military intervention in Libya in March–April 2011. The Finnish decision-making illustrates that domestic politics, in particular the factor of election timing, can strengthen the feeling among decision-makers that they should follow the country’s strategic culture. The article ends with theorization on the domestic political conditions under which decision-makers are more or less likely to deviate from strategic culture.

EU member state participation in military operations: a configurational comparative analysis

Contrary to what the EU’s image as a civilian power suggests, the EU member states have had 50,000–100,000 troops deployed outside their home countries for most of the post-Cold-War period. Although the vast majority of these troops were active in operations with a strong European presence, the member states’ patterns of military engagement differ significantly. This study provides a systematic analysis of the member states’ contributions to military operations. More specifically, it examines which (combinations of) conditions consistently led to participation in EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the Islamic State. Methodologically, it builds on most different similar outcome/most similar different outcome and qualitative comparative analysis. The results of the analysis show that four conditions account for the bulk of the member states’ patterns of military engagements: military resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade.

The French foreign policy U-turn in the Arab Spring – the case of Tunisia

As for many, the Arab uprisings of 2010–11 came as a surprise for France. After initial inactivity, followed by last minute support of the Tunisian regime, President Sarkozy took a U-turn by spearheading the military intervention in Libya and both Sarkozy and his successor Hollande announced a re-launch in the Franco-Tunisian relations. Starting from the assumption that France’s drastic foreign policy changes cannot be sufficiently explained by presidential change, we draw upon social-constructivist discourse-bound identity theory and provide a model for discursive legitimations of foreign policy changes. When the “permissive consensus” between the three discursive formations of the French foreign policy identity breaks up, drastic foreign policy turns may occur. By analysing the French policy actions and rhetoric towards Tunisia between 2007 and 2015, we show, however, that the sudden change tends to be rather ephemeral and that French foreign policy seems to be gradually returning to its pre-revolution approach.

The Law: Presidential Deception in Foreign Policy Making: Military Intervention in Libya 2011

How did a U.S.‐led, U.N.‐ approved military intervention to protect civilians in Libya end up enabling rebels to overthrow the Qaddafi regime? A variety of evidence shows that the Obama administration was dishonest in publicly describing its military purpose as solely humanitarian when it was largely directed towards regime change. Presidential deception prevented the emergence of alternative policies that might have avoided Libya's postwar chaos while obfuscating U.S. responsibility for that consequence. The essence of the deception is set forth below in contrasting statements by President Obama and former Central Intelligence Agency Director and Secretary of Defense Panetta.

The revolt against the West: intervention and sovereignty

Debates on intervention and sovereignty since 1945 can be summarised as a tale of two cities, San Francisco and Bandung, and of two countries, Rwanda and Libya. All are symbolic of different phases of these debates. The UN was born in San Francisco in 1945 with very little substantive participation by Asian and African governments. The great powers established a system in which they would determine when, where and how military interventions could take place. The 1955 Bandung Conference saw Asian and African countries seek to use new norms of intervention to regain their sovereignty. The 1994 Rwandan genocide, however, forced African countries to dilute notions of absolute sovereignty to allow military interventions for human protection purposes. The 2011 NATO military intervention in Libya did potentially irreparable damage to future UN-mandated interventions and was widely seen in the Global South as an abuse of the responsibility to protect (R2P).

Transitioning from military interventions to long-term counter-terrorism policy: The case of Libya (2011–2016)

The paper on Libya aims to analyse the military intervention in Libya, five years since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. In the context of this research project, Libya forms an interesting case study as it offers the possibility to evaluate a so-called ‘light footprint’ military intervention which is different from the approaches adopted both in Afghanistan and Mali. As we know now, the development of the country post-Gaddafi has defied expectations and has plunged the country into chaos and instability, allowing the so called ‘Islamic State’ to establish and strengthen its local foothold. The paper looks at the history and tribal composition of the country after which it delves into the decision-making process in some of the countries involved in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector under UNSCR 1973 (2011) and continues by assessing the transition phase and the complexities which have arisen following the fall of dictator Gaddafi. Finally, the paper assesses the outcome of the operation both inside and outside Libya and draws lessons and policy recommendations for future military interventions.

Telling stories of failure: narrative constructions of foreign policy fiascos

ABSTRACTThe contribution introduces narrative analysis as a discourse analytical method for investigating the social construction of foreign policy fiascos. Based on insights from literary studies and narratology it shows that stories of failure include a number of key elements, including a particular setting which defines appropriate behaviour; the negative characterization of agents; as well as an emplotment of the ‘fiasco’ through the attribution of cause and responsibility. The contribution illustrates this method through a narrative analysis of German media reporting on Germany's abstention in the United Nations Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 in March 2011 regarding the military intervention in Libya.

The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection

Resolution 1973, which authorised military intervention in Libya, marked the first time that the United Nations Security Council explicitly mandated the use of force against a functioning state to prevent imminent atrocity crimes. While some hailed the resolution and the subsequent intervention in Libya as a victory for the concept of the international community's “responsibility to protect” (R2P), others predicted its early death. This article argues for a more nuanced view on the impact of the Libya intervention on the debates on R2P. As we will show, the intervention in Libya demonstrated new areas of agreement and at the same time revealed persisting and new disagreements within the international community on the role of the use of force to protect populations.

What's in it for Us

Public support for military interventions is both critical to secure and invariably difficult to maintain. While foreign-policy specialists frequently underscore the importance of having a compelling strategic narrative to legitimise military intervention, most studies fail to explain how transmitted government narratives are actually mediated by the press and ultimately received by the public. Thomas Colley examines the public's response to the UK's strategic narrative on the 2011 military intervention in Libya, assessing the UK government's use of several strands in its messaging and exploring how these were mediated and received by the British media and public.

Proces targetingu na příkladu Libye

Protection of the civilian population against the Gaddafi regime, it was a clear UN mandate for military intervention in Libya in 2011. Not only a new approach to leading the fight against terrorism after 11 September 2001, but also requires a change in approaches to conducting combat operations coalition forces, as shown by the recent armed conflict in Libya, inevitably required a new perspective on the concept and approach to the process of targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and responding to them in accordance with operational requirements and capabilities of units, synchronization of NATO forces, particularly with regard to collateral damage with an impact on the protection of civilians. And Unified Protector operation is a clear example.

China's “Responsible Protection” Concept: Reinterpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes

This paper assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P's third pillar following the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals including the 2001 ICISS report and Brazil's “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by amalgamating and repackaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for humanitarian purposes, and should be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing's current stance on R2P. More broadly, China's RP and Brazil's RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention, and global governance.

The Impact of International Human Military Intervention in Libya on the Sovereignty of the State

This research aims at shedding the light on the impact of the international human military intervention in Libya on the sovereignty of the state, because there is ambiguity and unclear explanation for the meaning of that international human military intervention with regard for the basics first and its impact on the sovereignty second and their both relation to human rights. This situation could be attributed for the formality and the nature of the comprehension and application for them from one side and the imbalanced practice of it from the other side, we can infer that there is a wide gap for the unsuccessful approximate between the international military intervention for human reasons and the sovereignty principle. A situation that demands a successful proximity between them that must be done. The research held a description for the items of the international intervention and the international human military intervention, the new implications for the sovereignty concept and human rights, the impact of the international human military intervention in Libya on the sovereignty of the state, the international interventions reasons in the Libyan case and determining those hypotheses conjures with the research objectives. The researchers concluded that the intervention based upon protecting humanity is an international practice and that explains the issue legally and politically in a broad sense for any case of the programmed oppression practices against societies was the main reason for accepting the intervention for protecting civilians. The international intervention in Libya didn’t have a direct impact on the Libyan state sovereignty as a state with government, land, borders and population. The researchers inferred that the international intervention was regarded as a relative violation for the Libyan state sovereignty temporary, upon the fact, that the intervention became more accepted and less impact on the national sovereignty.

Global Power Shifts and Germany’s New Foreign Policy Agenda

The German government’s 2011 abstention from the United Nations Security Council vote on military intervention in Libya raised questions about Germany’s role in the international system. By abstaining, Germany broke with its Western allies and aligned itself with four of the BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Its ‘non-Western’ act unleashed a debate on the future of German foreign policy. This contribution aims to provide an understanding of Germany’s new foreign policy. It characterises some basic political developments, outlines recent German academic debates about the character of German foreign policy and provides an interpretation of the government’s New Players Concept (‘Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility’), which was adopted in 2012.