Military Demarcation Line Research Articles

Building Korean DMZ Metaverse Using a Web-Based Metaverse Platform

Metaverse is a compound word of “Meta” and “Universe”, meaning a world that transcends reality, a new virtual world. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, non-face-to-face further accelerated the activation of the Metaverse. The Metaverse has the attractiveness of arousing user interest, high service scalability, and the potential to combine multiple revenue models. Therefore, many industries are adopting the Metaverse. The Republic of Korea has been on a ceasefire, since 1953, after the Korean War. After the war, the DMZ was decided in an area of 2 km from north to south (total of 4 km), centered on the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). The DMZ area is the largest nature conservation area in Asia and a military area where public access is strictly restricted. The Ministry of Unification is trying to reduce tensions and establish peace in the DMZ area by raising the interest of Korean people, as well as people around the world, through the DMZ Metaverse application. The Korean government has its own e-Government framework and cloud operating environments. In order to adopt the Metaverse to Korean government agencies and operate them sustainably, it is essential to support the e-Government framework and the cloud environments. In this paper, the design features, architecture, models, and functions of OnTwins, a Metaverse platform serviceable in the Korean government IT operating environment, are elaborated in detail. The DMZ Metaverse public service built on the platform will also be introduced. Finally, after comparing it with other Metaverse platforms, future research directions are discussed.

6·25전쟁기 마오쩌둥(毛澤東)의 군사분계선 설정 전략

본 연구는 정전협상 논의 초기 시기(1951. 6.∼10.)에 정전협정을 조기에 마무리 짓고자 했던 마오쩌둥이 왜 군사분계선 설정을 조기에 마무리 지을 수 없었는지를 시계열적으로 살펴서 그 함의를 찾는 데 있다. 연구는 6·25전쟁 기 중국, 소련 내부에서 정전협상에 대한 논의가 이루어졌던 1951년 6월 이후로부터, 마오쩌둥의 ‘분사분계선 설정’에 대한 마오쩌둥과 스탈린의 상회관계동학을 다루고 있다. 6·25전쟁 기 전쟁후원국으로서의 소련과 전쟁지원국으로서의 중국의 정치지도자들은 스탈린-마오쩌둥 간에 서열적 관계가 형성되었고, 정전협상 초기 군사분계선 설정 논의 시기에 이르러서 보다 전략적인 형태로 나타난 면이 있다. 마오쩌둥은 ‘정전협상 의제’를 결정하고, ‘군사분계선 설정’ 논의를 시작하면 빠른시일 내에 정전협정을 체결할 수 있을 것으로 보았다. 그러나 그 과정이 순탄치 않았다. 마오쩌둥은 순망치한(脣亡齒寒)이라는 지정학적 관점의 대(對)한반도관에 기초해서 최적의 군사분계선을 설정하고자 하는 한편, 미군 폭격에 의한 군사적 피해를 최소화 하기 위해 조기에 38도선을 중심으로 군사분계선을 설정하여 정전협정을 체결하고자 하였다. 그러나 스탈린의 세계전략이 맞물려 정전협상 타결이 지연되는 상황 속에서 ‘미군과의 접촉선을 중심으로 군사분계선을 설정하되 서부지역에서의 전략적 지역 등을 확보’하는 전략으로 우회하여, 스탈린의 의도를 따르되 지정학적 이점을 확보함과 동시에 내적으로 조기정전 여건을 형성시키고자 한다.

Inter-Korean Health Care and Medicine Cooperation for Joint Response to Infectious Diseases

The purpose of this study is to examine the current status and problems of the North Korea s infectious disease response system during the Kim Jong-un era and to seek inter-Korean cooperation tasks in the health care and medicine field for joint response to infectious diseases. As can be seen from COVID-19, there are no borders on infectious diseases. Although the military demarcation line is blocked between the two Koreas, the dangers of moving large-scale areas of infectious diseases are increasing day by day. Accordingly, the necessity of inter-Korean cooperation in the field of health care and medicine for joint response to infectious diseases is raised. The existence of simultaneous threats between North and South Korea due to the COVID-19 incident can be a chance to change the paradigm of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. This study proposes the following as a task of inter-Korean health care and medicine cooperation for joint response to infectious diseases. First, systematizing inter-Korean cooperation in health care and medicine and preparing detailed standards, second, signing inter-Korean health and medical agreements, third, establishing a response scenario for each infectious disease, fourth, establishing a dedicated organization for infectious diseases and fostering professional manpower, and fifth, considering the sanctions against North Korea And establishing a cooperation and support system.

A History of and Recent Developments Concerning the Korean Peninsula Northern Limit Line (NLL)

Measures to ease tensions and prevent military conflicts adjacent to the Korean Peninsula Northern Limit Line (NLL) are an integral part of the ongoing reconciliatory efforts between the South and the North. Despite controversies over the validity of the NLL, it has served as a de facto maritime demarcation line in the absence of an agreed-upon maritime demarcation line under the Armistice Agreement. North Korea has persistently attempted to invalidate the NLL, while South Korea has supported the status quo of the NLL as a military demarcation line. The South and North have recently created a buffer zone across the NLL in the West Sea amid talks for North Korea’s denuclearization.

The Chinese Strategy for the Truce Talks of the Korean War : Focusing on the Negotiation of the Military Demarcation Line

The Chinese Strategy for the Truce Talks of the Korean War : Focusing on the Negotiation of the Military Demarcation Line

Future climate data from RCP 4.5 and occurrence of malaria in Korea.

Since its reappearance at the Military Demarcation Line in 1993, malaria has been occurring annually in Korea. Malaria is regarded as a third grade nationally notifiable disease susceptible to climate change. The objective of this study is to quantify the effect of climatic factors on the occurrence of malaria in Korea and construct a malaria occurrence model for predicting the future trend of malaria under the influence of climate change. Using data from 2001–2011, the effect of time lag between malaria occurrence and mean temperature, relative humidity and total precipitation was investigated using spectral analysis. Also, a principal component regression model was constructed, considering multicollinearity. Future climate data, generated from RCP 4.5 climate change scenario and CNCM3 climate model, was applied to the constructed regression model to simulate future malaria occurrence and analyze the trend of occurrence. Results show an increase in the occurrence of malaria and the shortening of annual time of occurrence in the future.

Seasonal Abundance of Culicoides (Diptera: Ceratopogonidae) Collected by Mosquito Magnet® in Northern Gyeonggi-do (Province), Korea

Biting midges (Culicoides: Ceratopogonidae) were collected by Mosquito Magnet® traps at the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) camp and Daeseongdong village inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and near the military demarcation line (MDL) separating North and South Korea and at Warrior Base (US Army training site) and Tongilchon 3 km south of the DMZ in northern Gyeonggi Province, Republic of Korea (ROK), from May-October 2010-2012, to determine their seasonal distributions. A total of 18,647 Culicoides females (18,399; 98.7%) and males (248; 1.3%) comprising 16 species were collected. Overall, the most commonly collected species was Culicoides nipponensis (42.9%), followed by C. erairai (29.2%), C. punctatus (20.3%), C. arakawae (3.3%), C. pallidulus (1.8%), and C. circumscriptus (1.4%), while the remaining 10 species accounted for only 1.1% of all Culicoides spp. collected. The seasonal distribution of C. nipponensis was bimodal, with high numbers collected during May-June and again during September. C. erairai was more frequently collected during June-July, followed by sharply decreased populations from August-October. C. punctatus was collected in low numbers from May-September with high numbers collected during October. C. erairai was predominantly collected from the NNSC camp (85.1% of all C. erairai collected) located adjacent to the MDL at Panmunjeom in the northernmost part of Gyeonggi-do (Province), while other sites yielded low numbers of specimens.

PRISM, 역거리가중법, 공동크리깅으로 작성한 1km 공간해상도의 남한 강수 자료에서 강수 분포의 비교

The purpose of this study is to compare precipitation distributions in precipitation data sets over South Korea produced by three interpolation methods. The differences of precipitation caused by interpolation methods is an important information when the interpolated precipitation data sets were used in researches such as ecological and hydrological modeling as well as regional climate impact studies. In this study, the precipitation data sets were produced by IDW(Inverse Distance Weighting) and Cokriging in this study and the PRISM(Precipitation-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model) data set obtained from Climate Change Information Center of Korea. The spatial resolution of the precipitation data is 1km. As a result, there was a great precipitation difference caused by interpolation methods in data of mountainous watersheds in general. Especially the difference of monthly precipitation was 10~20% or more in the mountainous watersheds near the Military Demarcation Line dividing North and South Korea, Mt. Sobaik, Mt. Worak, Mt. Deogyu, Mt. Jiri and Taeback Mountain Range. It means that a final result of a research can be affected by adopted interpolation method when an interpolated precipitation data set is used in the research for the these study sites.

강원도 양구군 해안분지의 지하수 사용과 전망

강원도 양구군 해안분지는 접경지대에 위치하며 지질학적 차별침식에 의해 형성된 특이지형이다. 최근 안보관광, 고랭지 작물특화 및 고원습지 등으로 일반인의 관심을 받고 있다. 한국전쟁 후 급격한 인구감소가 있었으나 2007년 이후 증가세를 보이고 있다. 연평균기온은 <TEX>$+0.016^{\circ}C$</TEX>/년 그리고 연강수량은 +10.41 mm/년의 속도로 증가하고 있다. 그리고 강수 증가량의 대부분은 6~8월 우기에 집중되는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 해안분지의 지하수 관정 수 및 이용량이 최근 꾸준히 증가하고 있으며 거의 대부분 논농사 및 고랭지 작물재배용이다. 기후변화시나리오에 따라 향후 기온이 더욱 상승하면 고랭지 작물재배가 어려워지고 또 여름 집중강우가 증가한다면 지하수함양 및 물관리에 어려움이 예상된다. 그러므로 해안분지의 지속가능한 지하수개발량에 대한 평가와 물의존적 농업형태에 대한 변화(작물전환)가 요구된다. The Haean basin is a unique geographical feature formed by differential erosion and it borders the military demarcation line. Recently the basin has become an interest of civilians due to security tour, highland vegetables and wetland. After the civil war, the population decreased but it has increased since 2007. The annual mean air temperature in the basin has increased with a rate of <TEX>$+0.016^{\circ}C/yr$</TEX> and the annual precipitation also has increased with a rate of +10.41 mm/yr. The precipitation occurring in June~August (wet season) occupied most of the total precipitation increase. In addition, recently the number of groundwater wells and its use have gradually increased and most of them are for agriculture including cultivation of rice and highland vegetables. If the air temperature further increases in the future according to the climate change scenarios, the highland vegetables cultivation will be difficult. Furthermore, if the rainstorm in the summer will be enforced, the groundwater recharge and water management will be aggravated. Therefore, an evaluation for sustainable groundwater development in the basin and a reform of the current agriculture (change of cultivating crops) depending on much water are essentially required.

The NLL: Moving from Negotiation and Confrontation to a Lasting Peace

NLL and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is a disputed maritime extralegal boundary in the Yellow (West) Sea, dividing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly referred to as North Korea, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), commonly referred to as South Korea. Initially imposed in 1953 as a temporary measure in response to concerns about ROK President Syngman Rhee threatening the Armistice (AA),2 it was also a restraint on the DPRK. original purpose of the NLL remains: it is a mechanism to separate the two Koreas. was necessary because the Armistice Agreement, although granting military control of the islands to the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command (UNC), did not give a clear position on the territorial waters surrounding the islands. Thus, the dispute includes both the legitimacy of the NLL itself and conflicting territorial claims to the waters surrounding the five islands. five islands are U-do, Sochong-do, Taechongdo, Paengnyong-do and Yeonpyeong-do.From a legal perspective, there are two major regimes that apply to the NLL dispute: the Armistice (AA) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). full text of Article 15 of the AA is as follows: This Armistice shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.3The DPRK is bound under the AA to respect waters contiguous to the islands as ROK waters, but the international norm of the time, 3 nautical miles, has since become 12 nautical miles. Regardless, the NLL reserves for the ROK waters that go beyond the definition of contiguous, using either the 3-or 12-nautical-mile norms.The right of the DPRK to dispute the NLL has been disputed. Roehrig argues that the DPRK did not lodge a formal protest until 1973, and cites the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.4 Article 11 of the agreement stipulates: The South-North demarcation line and the areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the Military Armistice of July 27, 1953, and the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.5Article 11 of the 1991 North-South Joint Declaration does not necessarily mean that the DPRK has lost the legal right to dispute the NLL. DPRK could plausibly argue, due to the ambiguity of the Article 15 of the AA, that it has been prevented from exercising its full jurisdiction over its own territorial waters. From 1953 to 1973, however, the DPRK failed to take clear action where the NLL was concerned. may not have been from acquiescence to the state of affairs as they were so much as acknowledgment of its weaker position in the aftermath of the Korean War. renewed aggression in 1973 was instigated in the hope of achieving a peace agreement with the U.S.,6 encouraged by the withdrawal from Vietnam.7 objective may also have driven the 1999 and 2002 clashes, with the DPRK applying pressure while simultaneously proposing negotiations with the U.S.8 differing positions of the U.S. and ROK on the NLL render it a useful area that the DPRK can exploit in an attempt to weaken their diplomatic relations.9It has been customary for the ROK and supporters of the NLL to argue that its compliance with the median line principle, commonly used in settling disputed maritime areas, makes it legal. Experts in the law however, have written that the NLL breaches a number of UNCLOS articles. Van Dyke, Valencia and Garmendia, using case studies, demonstrate that the median line principle does not mean the NLL complies with UNCLOS. Most striking is Article 76, which proclaims that states can't use straight baselines to cut offthe territorial seas of other states. …

Documenting the “Flower of Reunification”: Lim Su-gyeong and the memories of Korean border crossing

In 1989, 20-year-old South Korean college student Lim Su-gyeong crossed the Military Demarcation Line between the two Koreas while thousands of spectators around the world witnessed this controversial act. To this day, citizens of both Koreas cannot cross the border freely without both Korean governments’ permission, which is nearly impossible to obtain. Hence, when Lim visited North Korea, unbeknownst to the South Korean government, to participate in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students as a one-person delegation representing the League of South Korean University Students, she shocked many with her daring act, which eventually resulted in her imprisonment in South Korea. She was vilified for breaching the National Security Law, therefore causing a huge embarrassment to the South Korean intelligence community, but enjoyed a completely opposite reception in the North. Dubbed the “Flower of Reunification,” Lim was hailed by the North Korean government as a heroic martyr who sacrificed herself at the altar of Korean reunification. Every step of the journey of this unusual South Korean visitor was memorialized in the North Korean documentary film Praise to Lim Su-gyeong, the Flower of Unification ( Janghada, Tongilui kkot Lim Su-gyeong, Naenara Video Jejakso, Pyongyang, 1989), which challenges viewers accustomed to equating the North Korean brand of heroism almost entirely with the canonization of Kim leadership. How does this young South Korean female citizen figure in the long-standing North Korean tradition of identifying male leaders as the legitimate agents of national heroism? What can be gleaned from this North Korean documentary film about how the state remembers the trauma of partition? This article traces the journey of Lim Su-gyeong, one of the most controversial South Korean sojourners to have visited North Korea, as a way of exploring the politics of memory in North Korean documentary film. This article also poses challenges to the overwhelming tendency in scholarship concerning North Korea, which has focused on the figure of the founding father, Kim Il-sung, as the centripetal force of the national personality cult. In the process, the way the North Korean state envisions gender politics and the utopian notion of inter-Korean citizenship will be explored in tandem.

Why Robert Cox Has Been to the Military Demarcation Line?: The Structure Against Peace and Its Operational Pattern in the Korean Peninsula

Why Robert Cox Has Been to the Military Demarcation Line?: The Structure Against Peace and Its Operational Pattern in the Korean Peninsula

Gyeong-in Waterway puts Seoul back on the maritime map

Seoul in South Korea is once again a maritime port. The Korean War effectively severed the city's connection with the Yellow Sea in 1953 when the Han River estuary became part of the military demarcation line between North and South Korea. However, through some inspired planning and innovative engineering, a recently built flood-diversion channel has just been converted into an 18 km navigable shipping route from Incheon on the coast to the heart of the capital – complete with significant port and warehousing facilities at each end. This paper describes the evolution of Gyeong-in Waterway from a minor drainage channel to a major multi-purpose waterway.

Japanese Encephalitis Virus in Culicine Mosquitoes (Diptera: Culicidae) Collected at Daeseongdong, a Village in the Demilitarized Zone of the Republic of Korea

In total, 22,846 (17,793 culicines and 5,053 Anopheles spp.) female mosquitoes were captured by a Mosquito Magnet trap at Daeseongdong, a small village adjacent to the military demarcation line (center of the demilitarized zone) in northern Gyeonggi Province, Republic of Korea (ROK). Culicine mosquitoes were identified to species, placed in pools of up to 30 mosquitoes each, and screened for flavivirus using a SYBR Green I-based real-time polymerase chain reaction. In total, 51/660 pools positive for flaviviruses and confirmed by DNA sequencing of the NS5 region, were positive for Japanese encephalitis virus (family Flaviviridae, genus Flavivirus, JEV) (50 Culex tritaeniorhynchus Giles and one Culex bitaeniorhynchus Giles). The JEV maximum likelihood estimations (MLEs) (estimated number of viral RNA-positive mosquitoes per 1,000) for Cx. tritaeniorhynchus and Cx. bitaeniorhynchus were 9.7 and 0.9, respectively. This is the first report of a Cx. bitaeniorhynchus positive for JEV in the ROK. JEV is a local civilian and military health threat and a significant concern for nonimmune (unvaccinated) U.S. soldiers, civilians, and family members deployed to the ROK.

Has South Korea's Engagement Policy Reduced North Korea's Provocations?

IntroductionThe Korean Peninsula remains a hot spot in international security. A puzzling North Korea has turned its back on the world by its incessant pursuit of nuclear weapons, and despite recent reconciliatory developments, tension remains between the two Koreas that may erupt into military conflict at any time. One area with the greatest potential for conflict is in the West Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).2 South Korea is blaming North Korea for sinking one of its navy ships in the waters near the NLL in March 2010. More recently, South and North Korea exchanged artillery fire soon after North Korea fired on Yeonpyeongdo Island, near the NLL, in November 2010. The causes of these military remain a riddle. Though the NLL is considered a major factor, it alone is not sufficient to explain what brought the two Koreas into conflict.One interpretation posits that North Korea's provocative posture is attributable to South Korea's punitive policy against North Korea. The current Lee Myung-bak government has taken a hard-line policy toward North Korea, making its North Korea policy distinguishable from the unilateral engagement policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. The current government has emphasized reciprocity and thus has showed little tolerance against North Korea's provocations. With this shift in policy toward North Korea, fears of a new conflict with North Korea are growing. As a consequence, some critics now speak about the need to ease military tension in the Korean Peninsula by reintroducing a peace and reconciliation policy with North Korea.3 Then, it is relevant to ask whether the unilateral engagement policies of the Kim Dae-j ung and the Roh Moo-hyun governments have reduced North Korea's provocations in the West Sea.4With these concerns in mind, this paper challenges the widespread belief that conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems.5 The main argument here is that North Korea's NLL violations do not rise and fall based on South Korea's engagement or containment policy toward North Korea, but rather on North Korea's need to catch more marine products. In order to support the argument of this paper, the second section evaluates the inter-Korean reconciliation process and its impact on North Korea's NLL violations. The third section analyzes why North Korea's economic crisis in the 1990s was conducive to a rise in North Korea's NLL violations. A summary and some policy implications are given in the final section.The Inter-Korean Reconciliation Process and North Korea's NLL ProvocationsThe 1953 Armistice Agreement to end the Korean War included only the landbased military demarcation line (MDL), leaving a maritime border as an unsettled question among the concerned parties, including the U.S.-led United Nations, North Korea, and China. The United Nations military forces, with superior naval and air power, felt urged to control their operations in the West and East Sea, and thus the NLL was set up in 1953 by a unilateral measure of the U.S.-led United Nations military forces. From then on, the NLL became the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas, but the cease-fire did not end military on the Korean Peninsula and in its surrounding waters.6 Arguing for the need to redraw the maritime border, North Korea has instigated numerous provocations around the waters near the NLL by kidnapping or sinking South Korean fishing boats and navy vessels.As the Cold War drew to a close in the 1980s, a turning point was reached in the relations between the two Koreas. In 1991, South and North Korea signed the InterKorean Basic Agreement-the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North-opening a new era of inter-Korean economic cooperation. As for the NLL, the agreement provides that the decision on the maritime demarcation line is final, the nonaggression areas of the sea shall be those that have been followed by each side until the present time. …

North Korea and the Northern Limit Line

IntroductionWhen negotiators concluded the Korean War armistice in July 1953 bring an end the hostilities on the peninsula, one of the important dimensions of the agreeU.S. ment was delineating a border between the two Koreas. On land, this division was the military demarcation line (MDL) that is surrounded on both sides by a 2.5-milewide demilitarized (DMZ). Despite efforts specify sea borders, the armistice was silent on a maritime demarcation line. To address this issue, the United Nations Command (UNC) unilaterally declared a maritime border called the Northern Limit Line (NLL) separate opposing naval forces. Since that time, the NLL has been a source of contention, erupting into an armed clash in 1999 and again in 2002 when North and South Korean forces fought in the West Sea (Yellow Sea). Despite efforts solve the dispute, there has been little progress and the disagreement over the NLL remains a serious flashpoint for conflict between North and South Korea.If the issue ever went before an international tribunal for resolution, international law is probably in North Korea's favor; the court would likely move the line south but not as far as the DPRK wishes. However, this will not happen so long as North Korea remains a security threat the South; Seoul will not allow the matter be taken before a court. This article argues that the NLL will have a chance of being changed only through a political process that will not happen until the tension level and security concerns in the region decrease. North Korea will need promote a more stable security environment by moderating its sometimes provocative behavior while also continuing demonstrate its opposition the NLL. The remainder of this paper will address the origin of the NLL and the history of dispute, North Korea's interests in altering the line, and, finally, recommendations for how North Korea might proceed address the dispute.History of the Northern Limit LineThe Northern Limit Line was drawn at the end of the Korean War as a maritime boundary between the two Koreas in the West Sea. During armistice talks, negotiators settled on a land border, the MDL, and granted the UNC the rights five small islands on the west coast of Korea.1 Despite lying off the North Korean coast, the islands were under UNC control at the time of the armistice. However, negotiators could not agree on a maritime boundary due disagreements over the extent of North Korea's territorial sea. Moreover, South Korean President Syngman Rhee had made known his displeasure with the armistice and pledged continue the fight if given the opportunity.2 To ensure naval forces and fishing boats did not spark a renewal of the conflict, on August 30, 1953, the UNC promulgated the NLL. The line was drawn approximately mid-channel between the Ongjin Peninsula and the five islands under UNC/ROK control. For the next 20 years, little was said between the two Koreas regarding the NLL, and North Korea did not lodge any formal protests regarding the line.North Korea appears have made its first formal protest of the NLL in 1973, at the 346th Military Armistice Commission meeting where the DPRK representative proclaimed that the five islands under UNC/ROK control as specified in the armistice are in DPRK territorial waters. In addition, transit and from these islands would require North Korean permission.3 However, Pyongyang did not challenge ROK control of the five islands. In 1977, North Korea proclaimed two additional maritime zones: its 200-nautical-mile economic exclusion (EEZ)4 and a 50-nautical-mile military boundary zone. The designation of a military boundary was unusual and not in keeping with international law. According DPRK authorities, the purpose of the military was to reliably safeguard the economic sea zone and defend militarily the national interests and sovereignty of the country.5 The DPRK announcement also stated that within this and the sky above, foreign military vessels and planes are prohibited, and any civilian ships, excluding fishing boats, must obtain approval before entering the zone. …

The Gaeseong Incident and the Negotiation of the Military Demarcation Line in the Early Truce Talks during the Korean War

The Gaeseong Incident and the Negotiation of the Military Demarcation Line in the Early Truce Talks during the Korean War

The Reunification of Korea: Problems and Prospects

THE DIVISION of Korea ranks high among the world's seemingly intractable problems, though the issue tends to simmer beneath the surface of world political consciousness most of the time, only erupting occasionally with sufficient violence to command close attention. Yet the circumstances of the division, and the fact that it is embedded in a set of antagonistic alliances involving all the major powers-at a geographical point where the borders or crucial interests of all converge-make it essential that we examine the issue very carefully. The starting point of this article is the belief that unification is desired by most Koreans, North and South, that it is highly desirable in the overall interests of peace and stability in Asia, and finally-though many would dispute this-that it is a realizable goal. The analysis that follows is based on study of the available public record and reflection over a period of years on the Korean question, supplemented by talks with responsible officials concerned with the unification issue in Seoul in February 1980 and in Pyongyang in May 1980. Korea in 1980 had a population of approximately 54 million-37 million living in the South and 17 million in the North. In the aftermath of the Korean War of 1950-53, about 10 million people were separated from members of their family by the military Demarcation Line, with no contact or communication possible, neither direct nor by mail or telephone. The severance was the more deeply felt as the Koreans were deeply homogeneous, with a continuous existence as a united people going back at least 1300 years and a history of outstanding cultural achievement prior to the imposition of Japanese colonial rule in 1910. But, despite the weight of this common cultural tradition, sharp differences have accrued under the circumstances of division. The South, fiercely capitalist, is tied by treaty to the United States (1953) and Japan (1965), while the North, which is distinctly non-capitalist and is commonly described as either socialist or communist, has treaties with both China and the Soviet Union, both dating from 1961. The South still has about 39,000 U.S. troops plus a U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons stock

South Korea 1978: The Growing Security Dilemma

ON OCTOBER 27, the United Nations Command in Korea announced the discovery of a North Korean underground invasion tunnel in the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) near Panmunjom.' The rocky arch-shaped tunnel, which is about 1.7 kilometers long from the northern DMZ boundary or 435 meters into the southern sector from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), was the third North Korean-built tunnel to be discovered. The first and second tunnels had been discovered in November 1974 and March 1975, respectively, and at least a dozen more tunnels are believed to remain undetected. Considering its location and size-the tunnel was discovered less than 30 miles north of Seoul and was judged to be big enough for heavily armed troops to pass three or four abreast-the apparent purpose of the tunnel was for use as a link in the shortest invasion route to Seoul. The announcement of the tunnel's discovery was well timed to rebut the assessment made a few days earlier in Tokyo by the visiting Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo that there was currently no war tension on the Korean peninsula. The Teng-Fukuda statement on the Korean situation and the discovery of the North Korean infiltration tunnel were two contradictory manifestations that underscored the complexity and acuteness of South Korea's security dilemma in 1978. On the one hand, China's improved relationship with Japan and the United Stateo

The Viet Nam Constitution of 1956

When the forces of the French Union and those of the Viet Minh accepted a cease-fire at Geneva in July, 1954, the 17th Parallel was visioned only as a temporary military demarcation line. Nation-wide elections were to be held within two years to settle the political future of the country; and it was generally taken for granted that the entire area, from the Gate of Nam-Quan on the China border to the Point of Ca-Mau at the tip of the Indo-China peninsula, an area roughly equivalent in size to that of the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and West Virginia combined, with a population approximating 23 millions, would fall to Ho Chi Minh and his Communists. The device of a delayed election was accepted merely as a face-saving measure to enable the French to withdraw gracefully from the scene by handing over control of the South—and hence responsibility for its future—to a native government.That the 17th Parallel has become, instead, a political boundary separating the Republic of Viet Nam, embracing roughly the southern 40 per cent of the area and nearly half of the population, from the Communist “Democratic Republic of Viet Nam,” has been largely the work of a single man, Ngo Dinh Diem, and his closely knit group of assistants.