South Korea 1978: The Growing Security Dilemma

Abstract

ON OCTOBER 27, the United Nations Command in Korea announced the discovery of a North Korean underground invasion tunnel in the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) near Panmunjom.' The rocky arch-shaped tunnel, which is about 1.7 kilometers long from the northern DMZ boundary or 435 meters into the southern sector from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), was the third North Korean-built tunnel to be discovered. The first and second tunnels had been discovered in November 1974 and March 1975, respectively, and at least a dozen more tunnels are believed to remain undetected. Considering its location and size-the tunnel was discovered less than 30 miles north of Seoul and was judged to be big enough for heavily armed troops to pass three or four abreast-the apparent purpose of the tunnel was for use as a link in the shortest invasion route to Seoul. The announcement of the tunnel's discovery was well timed to rebut the assessment made a few days earlier in Tokyo by the visiting Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo that there was currently no war tension on the Korean peninsula. The Teng-Fukuda statement on the Korean situation and the discovery of the North Korean infiltration tunnel were two contradictory manifestations that underscored the complexity and acuteness of South Korea's security dilemma in 1978. On the one hand, China's improved relationship with Japan and the United Stateo