Abstract

IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to examine North Korean threat perceptions in context of Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory. This theory argues that states actually react to perceived threat rather than to power, and aim to balance it. North Korea, as surrounded by four powers-China, Russia, Japan, and United States (U.S.)-perceives U.S. policy toward itself, and strengthening of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation, as posing serious threatening challenges. To balance this threat, North Korea has developed an alliance system with People's Republic of China (PRC) based on common ideology,1 anti-Japanese sentiment, and anti-U.S. sentiment. Geographically, North Korea shares an 800-mile-long frontier with China. Historically, China and Korea have had shared relations, symbolized by a hierarchical tributary system. In this age-old relationship, China enjoyed role of big brother to Korea's brother. Culturally, ideologically, and socially, North Korea belonged to Chinese zone of influence. Common threat perceptions alone would have argued for a cooperative arrangement between these two countries. China was vast, powerful, economically strong, and therefore dominant party. Hence, it was a partnership not between equals, but between two unequal states-one strong and powerful and other a client.The Korean Peninsula, Hub of Balance of Power in East AsiaMuch of Korea's history is the story of its struggle, not always successful, to maintain its independence against external pressures.2 Contrary to its name, Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is located within one of world's most heavily militarized areas. There is little depth between DMZ and capital cities of Pyongyang, which is about 125 km north of DMZ, and Seoul, which is approximately 40 km south of DMZ. Following consolidation of Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, United States perceived that consequences of a South Korean defeat would be highly detrimental to its own political and strategic interests. Chinese leaders had concluded that intervention in Korean War would temper and caution Washington, whereas inaction would embolden it. Thus, Korean War of 1950-1953 reminded China of importance of Korea to its national security. The Korean War ended, but peninsula remained divided at Demilitarized Zone.Threat Perceptions until 1979: The North Korean PerspectiveThe U.S. Threat. North Koreans harbor a very deep grudge against United States for two main reasons: division of Korea and American occupation of southern part of Korea from 1945 to 1948. North Koreans also resent other American actions taken since 1953, mutual security agreement with South Korea, and maintenance of 36,000 American troops in South Korea. As United States treated North Korea as a mere satellite of Soviet Union, relationship between United States and North Korea developed to take form of ideological confrontation; that is, capitalism versus socialism. From Pyongyang's point of view, a long and unbroken period of American nuclear hegemony in East Asia was inter- preted as a clear threat to its security. North Korea is only country in developing world that has faced a direct threat from a superpower's nuclear weapons from its very inception.3 During Korean War, President Truman (at behest of General Douglas MacArthur, who in July 1950 suggested a plan to use atomic bombs) seriously considered using nuclear weapons, but other allied nations objected.The South Korean Threat. The hostility between North Korea and South Korea is not only mutual but evenly matched. The North Korean version of history argues that Democratic People's Republic (DPRK) in north is only legitimate government representing entire Korean people, and that it was American imperialism and its creature, South Korean regime, that prevented unification. …

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