Military Attitudes Research Articles

Use and Disuse of Contextual Primes in Dynamic News Environments

This study reexamines the news priming effects of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Suggesting an alternative approach to those used in previous studies, this study assesses individuals' use and disuse of a contextual prime (i.e., the air war) in dynamic news environments. With a short-term, quasi-experimental approach considering the air war as a prime stimulus, a path analysis suggests robust evidence of the short-term accessibility effects of priming. More importantly, as suggested in Martin's (1986) set/reset model, this study extends priming effects beyond the simple hydraulic patterns of accessibility effects. It reveals that both attitudes toward military action and attitudes toward a diplomatic solution were used in subsequent judgments of the president's job performance and handling of the war. The associations between attitudes toward a diplomatic solution and subsequent judgments were even stronger than those between attitudes toward military action and the same subsequent judgments, despite the clear prowar primes of news discourse in the air-war context. This pattern was more greatly intensified among those in the high news attention group than those in the low news attention group.

Canadian peacekeeping: Proud tradition, strong future?

Peacekeeping has a place of pride in the Canadian national identity. Canadians feel that their nation is a natural leader in this international endeavour. How is this national identity expressed, and how has it come about? Is it justified? An answer to these questions requires a probe of Canadian public and military attitudes, a historical review of Canada's peacekeeping activities, and an examination of current Canadian contributions. The final question is: What is needed if Canada is to live up to the image of the proud and prolific peacekeeper?

The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy (review)

Reviewed by: The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy Jeremy Black The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy. By Randolf G. S. Cooper. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-521-82444-3. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvii, 437. $85.00. For too long, scholars waiting for the book of the subject have had to consult Randolph Cooper's 1992 Cambridge thesis "Cross-Cultural Conflict Analysis: The 'Reality' of British Victory in the Second Anglo-Maratha War, 1803-1805." The surprise about the book is that it contains so much additional material. What is on offer is a study of Maratha military culture, a narrative of what shaped British military attitudes towards the Marathas prior to the 1803 campaigns, a discussion and analysis of these campaigns, and a consideration of explanations for British victory. The latter is of particular importance given the role of these campaigns in meta-narratives of military history. Thus, Geoffrey Parker cited Wellington in support of his argument that the innovations in early-modern European warfare had important implications "for the military balance between the West and the Rest. Time and again, infantry volley fire enabled Western troops to defeat far larger numbers" (Historically Speaking, 4 [4 April 2003]: 13-14). Cooper will have none of this, not least because he is properly aware of the difficulty of establishing what happened and also its significance. The following indeed is of more general applicability: "In trying to reconstruct the Battle at Laswari it is very difficult to reconcile the conflicting first-person British accounts. A great deal of the problem has to do with fitting the jigsaw puzzle of personal stories and anecdotes together. The lack of a unified perception reflects the limited vision of individuals who were denied an overview of the tactical manoeuvring that took place that day" (p. 201). To Cooper, the argument for superior British training, discipline, and drill is a military variation on Social Darwinism, and he is critical of those he terms ethnocentric Western analysts, and the technological determinism he detects in the Military Revolution argument. Indeed, Cooper argues that the British lagged behind the Marathas in quality and quantity of artillery, and in artillery doctrine, and, instead, showed a preference for advancing under fire and the use of the bayonet. The role of British credit in 1803 in the North Indian military labour market is seen as more significant. This meant that no single indigenous power would be able to claim the lion's share of South Asia's military resources. The Maratha War of 1817-19 was largely a mopping-up operation intended to complete the East India Company's expansion of 1803-5 which had been brought to a halt by concern about the costs of the conflict. Cooper's work is also an instructive response to the simplification (and reification) of methods of warfare in some of the work constituting the "cultural turn" in military history. It is instructive to put the following critique [End Page 1257] of Wellington alongside glib references to Indian warmaking: "He had misjudged rather substantial parts of the South Asian military environment by seeking to transfer theories from one micro-environment to the subcontinent as a whole" (p. 137). In short, drawing on a wide reading of British and Indian material, and displaying a commendable ability to understand the different military cultures of the combatants, this important book will not only be the leading work on its subject, but also one of more general interest. Jeremy Black University of Exeter Exeter, England Copyright © 2004 Society for Military History

Unveiling South Africa's nuclear past

Research into South African apartheid-era nuclear weapons history has been severely hampered by longstanding secrecy laws, not to mention the destruction of most policy records. The recent declassification and release of a 1975 Defence Force memorandum recommending the acquisition of nuclear weapons, however, shows that important documents have survived. This document sheds new light on military attitudes about nuclear acquisition, and about the extent of the South African-Israeli alliance. It confirms that Israel had offered South Africa missiles, and may have offered nuclear warheads as well. While the release of the 1975 document is promising, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 and the convening of an interdepartmental Classification and Declassification Review Committee in 2002 do not thus far represent a decisive shift toward greater openness on apartheid-era history. The state's incentives for disclosure, controlled to avoid nuclear technology leakage, include the benefits of the lessons of the past to the global non-proliferation regime, contributing to South Africa's prestige and foreign policy agenda, and enhancing the country's democratic transparency.

Soldiers and civilians: the dilemma of Turkish democracy

The military in Turkey continues to wield powers that might be regarded as anomalous for a liberal democracy.' This article aims to shed light on the problematic nature of Turkish civil-military relations. It starts from the assumption that civil-military relations are power relations and for that reason they cannot be properly grasped if one side of the equation is sidestepped. Civil-military relations are power relations because they refer to a conflict about who will have the upper hand when it comes to contentious issues. As in any power relation it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to grasp why one actor behaved in the way it did without looking at the other actor(s). A corollary to that assumption is that neither civilian nor military attitudes occur in a vacuum but they are interdependent. Instead of treating them as a given independent, which has already been formed or crystallized prior to the relationship in question, it is more fruitful to regard them as products of constant interaction and a network of relations. They are to be seen as related and part of a process without, however, overlooking underlying traits which are less susceptible to change. It is this network which helps to shape mutual perceptions between civilians and soldiers.2 If this is not done, statements as to why actors acted in the way they did or why they hold definite views about each other are destined to remain partial. One of the chief claims of this article is that the Turkish army's perception of itself as the ultimate guardian of the state renders it difficult for soldiers fully to accept the principle of civilian supremacy. In other words, it is hard to argue that the Turkish military in its behaviour and attitudes is ready to accept civil control of the military. This apparently simple point is usually overlooked in those analyses which blame solely civilian politicians and institutions for military involvement in politics. It is also argued that the praetorian tendency of Turkish soldiers is severely limited. Although they have some deep reservations in respect of civil control, it would be unfair to suggest that they favour long-term military rule or pseudo democracy. Their attitude is at best ambivalent. On the one hand, soldiers value the democratic regime. But on the other hand,

Retour d’Afrique, portrait d’explorateur : autour de l’expérience d’Henry Morton Stanley

Back from Africa : Portraits of an explorer, Henry Morton Stlanley. Thanks to the portraits of Henry Morton Stanley, made under his control, a new iconographie type is born : the explorer in Central Africa. The widespread diffusion of photographs meant for individuals or magazines, their frequent reproduction on the front pages of his books of adventures, establish his reputation as a star in the society of his time. The first pictures of the explorer feature him as a big game hunter. Later, they underline the work of the reporter and scientist. Finally, the military attitude prevails ; his posture becomes swaggering and his clothes borrow more and more from military uniforms. The head-gear will remain the only distinctive mark of the explorer.

The Elite Media and the Military-Civilian Culture Gap

Even though some thoughtful studies exist on relations between the media and the military, most of them focus on the conflict over information security and control during wars, military operations, and entanglements abroad. What is missing is a detailed empirical study of whether the civilian and military media convey distinctive perspectives of and opinions about the military's attitudes and actions. Our purpose is to compare and contrast the depictions of military culture and any gaps with civilian culture by contentanalyzing three civilian and three military newspapers over the last six months of 1998. Overall, we find that both the civilian and the military newspapers are less monolithic and more diverse than we expected. Actually, each newspaper provides distinctive perspectives on and attitudes toward the military, which do not necessarily contribute to a civilian-military culture gap.

U.S. Military Attitudes Toward Post-Cold War Missions

In this article, we seek to determine whether officers support the post-Cold War's range of new missions and why. To this end, we examine the attitudes of U.S. officers at the command and staff colleges for each service branch. On average, we find that while officers support traditional missions more than new missions, they do support these new missions and believe they address the greatest dangers facing the U.S. We also find that officers are more likely to appreciate the importance of military participation in humanitarian assistance, antiterrorism, and drug interdiction when they serve in a noncombat role, and those who believe that their MOS leads to future career success are more likely to support peace enforcement and peacekeeping. Most significantly, officers' enthusiasm about new missions is linked to their beliefs about civilian attitudes. On average, officers believe that the president supports the entire range of missions. They see Congress and (especially) the public as more suspicious of new missions. Officers are most likely to support new post-Cold War missions when they also believe there is both congressional and public support for them.

Nationalism, National Security, and Amazônia: Military Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil

The end of the Cold War had profoundly affected Brazilian military thought, and, consequently, military planning and development, by the late 1990s. Recent evidence suggests that the Brazilian military is increasingly concerned with threats to national sovereignty putatively posed by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the most industrialized countries. Moreover, the Brazilian military sees such threats as likely to be clothed in the guise of "idealistic" concerns, including the protection of aboriginal (and other human) rights, and the protection of the environment. The traditional military preoccupation with the Brazilian Amaz6nia has clearly been intensified by these perceptions. While low-intensity conflict with traffickers in contraband and with guerrillas remains a central concern in military planning for the region, there is increasing discussion by key military officers of larger threats. Reinforced by NATO's attack on Yugoslavia, a new, post-Cold War era in Brazilian military thought appears to be taking shape, one in which defense against direct threats to national sovereignty, principally in the vast Amazon region, has become a central tenet. Brazil's new "Policy for National Defense," and its creation of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense, should be seen in this new context.

Distinctive Military Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-Selection versus Socialization

Recent reports have again raised questions about military culture and civil-military differences. This article examines panel data from the Monitoring the Future project's nationally representative samples of young men from the high school classes of 1976-1995. The study compares military recruits with their high school classmates who entered college or full-time employment, using "before-and-after" measures obtained during the senior year of high school and one or two years later. The largest disparities involved servicemen's preferences for greater military spending, and they reflected both selection (differences existing before the end of high school) and socialization (increased differences after enlistment). Servicemen were also more likely than civilian men to support greater military influence in the U.S. and were slightly more willing than their age-mates to employ U.S. military force; both reflect selection effects, with no consistent evidence of socialization. On the whole, these patterns of military attitudes have changed very little across the two decades studied.

British Military Information Management Techniques and the South Asian Soldier: Eastern India during the Second World War

This article examines the dissemination of military propaganda and the operation of censorship structures within the Indian Army ‘units’—a term used in historically contemporary documentary sources to denote regiments, divisions or battalions—serving in the eastern provinces of the subcontinent during the Second World War. Instead of presenting propaganda as merely being misleading information, this work operates with Philip Taylor's interpretation of it being a combination of ‘facts, fiction, argument or suggestion’, and concentrates instead on unravelling its form and the intent behind its deployment. Moreover, the often artificial distinction between ‘propaganda’ and ‘counter-propaganda’ is avoided, since the many wartime British public relations projects in South Asia that were aimed at contradicting particular enemy claims were very frequently represented as having other concerns. Particular attention is devoted to describing the military's attitudes towards policies of propaganda and information between 1942 and 1945, as these years saw Eastern India, defined in wartime official documents as being comprised of Assam, Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, the eastern districts of the United Provinces and the sparsely populated frontier areas bordering Burma, develop into an important base of operations against the Japanese armies located in Southeast Asia.

Switzerland, National Socialist Policy and the Legacy of History

This article addresses, on the one hand, the relationship between National Socialism’s foreign and economic policies, and on the other, Swiss models of behaviour in dealing with Nazi Germany. It also examines post-war explanations of this period in Swiss memory and historiography. The first part of the article recapitulates some aspects of National Socialist policy and economic ideology, in particular the project of a ‘Germanised’ Europe and a racial ‘Greater Germany’. Antisemitism is an important factor in this context. The second part of the article then considers three features of the Swiss state of affairs in terms of how the National Socialist ideology of Lebensraum was perceived: military matters, economic issues and attitudes towards refugees. What emerges is that the state of knowledge concerning these three features varies greatly. Furthermore, after the war, the bearers of responsibility in Switzerland found themselves confronted by the Swiss relationship to National Socialist crimes, the nature...

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and the Problem of Violence

This article asks why some attempts at democratization trigger a military intervention while others end peacefully. The author argues that the cause of violence lies in a miscommunication within the government rather than in an intransigence of the opposition. A formal model is analyzed in which opposition, reformers, and military bargain over the extent of democratization. The reformers are better informed than the opposition about the military's attitude toward reforms. Consequently, the opposition treats the behavior of the reformers as a signal about the military. In this model, violence occurs only when the reformers are misinformed about the military. The author tests this result against historical evidence from Hungary and Poland. In 1956, both countries attempted to liberalize their dictatorships. Yet, Soviet military intervention occurred only in Hungary. The author traces the difference in the outcomes to different inferences drawn in the two countries about the Soviet attitude toward reform.

Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine

Why did Hitler reoccupy the Rhine in 1936, when Germany was still weak? On Saturday, 7 March 1936, Adolf Hitler marched German troops into the hitherto demilitarized zone on the Rhine's left bank and in doing so launched his boldest 'Saturday Surprise' to date. Against the more cautious advice of his generals, Hitler risked embroiling Germany in a war at a time when her military might was insufficient to repel a French retaliation. A French counterattack and victory would have been a major setback for Germany's revisionist aims and a serious defeat for Hitler's young regime. Yet no French countermeasures occurred, no strong western responses were forthcoming, and Hitler's success raised him to new heights of popularity with the German people. What led Hitler to take such bold action? Historians have often asserted that Hitler merely sensed Allied weakness. Unlike his generals, who studied French troop strength and counted numbers of divisions in the field, Hitler employed his intuition and instinctively sensed the democracies' reluctance to act. Hitler did indeed possess intuition, but was his instinct the principal factor in his decision to reoccupy the Rhine? There is no question that Hitler intended from early on to cast off the shackles of Versailles and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone represented an essential step in that process. It was a goal shared by most German leaders. Yet to march troops into the Rhine before German rearmament had reached parity with France was generally considered unwise. The German Foreign Minister, however, Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, consistently urged the Chancellor onward. When others in Hitler's inner circle proved reticent, Neurath remained steadfast in his conviction that France would not retaliate. In doing so he took a considerable risk with regard to his own political career. Neurath's assurances were based not merely on his own political instincts, but upon accurate intelligence on French political and military leaders. Trusting in the accuracy of his ministry's reports, Neurath felt emboldened to encourage the Rhine coup. Gottfried Aschmann, Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Press Division, obtained sensitive information on French political and military attitudes towards a German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone. His report of 10 January 1936 to Legation Adviser Gustav Braun von Stumm quickly found its

Attitude Change During College: Normative or Informational Social Influence?

Students from a small, tightly knit military college participated in a longitudinal study which assessed attitudes toward sociopolitical issues as well as military attitudes at entrance and three years later. A college-wide change in a conservative direction was predicted and observed (p < .001). While a normative influence explanation argues that peer group pressure is responsible for such attitude change, an explanation based on informational influence would argue that the knowledge communicated by faculty also plays a role. The results confirmed the existence of peer group influence on measures of military attitudes but not on measures of sociopolitical attitudes. Rather, and consistent with a process of informational influence, the academic major pursued by the students emerged as a significant predictor of change in sociopolitical attitudes, regardless of reference group identification.

The Chinese Military and Hong Kong

C hinese politics has two somewhat contradictory sayings: Party controls the gun, and regime comes out of the barrel of a gun. Either statement perhaps could be true during a particular period of time. What cannot be denied, however, is that the military has always been an important player in Chinese politics. The military is especially important in time of war or internal disorder. An obvious example was the military's role in the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989. But the military has also had an enormous impact on China's policy toward Taiwan and Hong Kong, taking a militant position on the reunification of these two areas with China.' It is not clear to what extent the military may have contributed to the Chinese government's refusal to renounce the possible use of force against Taiwan, or even against Hong Kong. In this article I will analyze the role of the military in the context of Hong Kong's reversion to China in July 1997. I will discuss five issues: the military's attitude toward Hong Kong, the stationing of forces in Hong Kong, the planning and training of the forces, the negotiations on which military bases the People's Republic of China (PRC) will take over, and the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Hong Kong after 1997.

Between Mars and Mammon; the East India Company and Efforts to Reform its Army, 1796–1832

The history of the East India Company's rule of India is marked by sporadic outbursts of civil-military conflict. It was not unknown in India for European officers to down tools and commit acts that bordered on outright mutiny. Perhaps this could be expected when, on the one hand, the Company, as a commercial body, sought to maximize its profits, while on the other, the army was essentially a mercenary force, ever grasping for a larger slice of the fiscal pie. If, however, we penetrate deeper into the labyrinth of their relations, we find that the issues at stake lose their simplicity. In the early nineteenth century, a third group came into play, further confusing the state of civil-military relations in India. The Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, which had incorporated military attitudes into the operating system of British India, had begun to assert itself. Through such spokesmen as Thomas Munro, John Malcolm, Charles Metcalfe and Mountstuart Elphinstone, an increasingly militarized rule of British India was put forward, angering the court of directors and allowing the officers to mask their private interest under the guise of the national interest. This ideology of militarism, however, must be firmly placed within the context of nineteenth-century British India for it bore little resemblance to those strains of militarism witnessed elsewhere.

The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918

This books explains why the British Army fought the way it did in the First World War. It integrates social and military history and the impact of ideas to tell the story of how the army, especially the senior officers, adapted to the new technological warfare and asks: Was the style of warfare on the Western Front inevitable? Using an extensive range of unpublished diaries, letters, memoirs and Cabinet and War Office files, Professor Travers explains how and why the ideas, tactics and strategies emerged. He emphasises the influence of pre-war social and military attitudes, and examines the early life and career of Sir Douglas Haig. The author's analysis of the preparations for the Battles of the Somme and Passchendaele provide new interpretations of the role of Haig and his GHQ, and he explains the reasons for the unexpected British withdrawal in March 1918. An appendix supplies short biographies of senior British officers. In general, historians of the First World War are in two hostile camps: those who see the futility of lions led by donkeys on the one hand and on the other the apologists for Haig and the conduct of the war. Professor Travers' immensely readable book provides a bridge between the two.

Review Essay : Old, Unhappy, Far-off Things: The New Military History of Europe

Military history has tended to emphasize politics, chronology, and great men The narrative often represents attempts to analyze rulers and generals in order to understand the reasons behind their decisions. This traditional approach all too often descends to the level of 'a chronicle of one damn battle after another'. In recent years a 'New Military History' has emerged that eschews narration of events and is primarily interested in the social and institutional context of warfare Its attention is not focused on battles, tactics, and weapons systems, but on social structures, military attitudes, relationships between officers and the rank-and-file, and on the interrelations between military and civil society This essay adumbrates the background for this new historiography, reviews some recent volumes which seek to reinvestigate the military history of Europe and sketchily relates these books to the study of the modern world system.

Democratiation in Brazil and Argentina: Some Reflections

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF SOUTH AMERICA COULD ALMOST be written in terms of military coups and returns to barracks. In Argentina, to take only the period since the Second world War, the military has relinquished power in 1946,1958, 1963, 1973 and 1983 (launching coups in 1955,1962,1966 and 1976). The military in Brazil, although less hyperactive than in Argentina, has relinquished power to civilians in 1945, 1955 and, incompletely so far, since 1982, while taking over government in 1954 and 1964. It seems therefore – rather paradoxically for some earlier writers on comparative politics (as was noted in the introduction) – that it is possible to speak of a military-civilian political system operating in much of South America. This features periods of military as well as civilian rule and operates largely because of a high degree of military self-confidence and the willingness of many civilians to contemplate military rule, even over a long period, with equanimity. A mere military coup, or return to barracks, need not imply a change in the political system itself. This point is not tautologous; the politica system may undergo genuine change, but only if civilian attitudes to the military (and willingness to accept military intervention) and military attitudes to civilian politics chan e fundamentally. Is there any sign that this has happened or is about to happen in the cases of Brazil and Argentina?