Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine

Abstract

Why did Hitler reoccupy the Rhine in 1936, when Germany was still weak? On Saturday, 7 March 1936, Adolf Hitler marched German troops into the hitherto demilitarized zone on the Rhine's left bank and in doing so launched his boldest 'Saturday Surprise' to date. Against the more cautious advice of his generals, Hitler risked embroiling Germany in a war at a time when her military might was insufficient to repel a French retaliation. A French counterattack and victory would have been a major setback for Germany's revisionist aims and a serious defeat for Hitler's young regime. Yet no French countermeasures occurred, no strong western responses were forthcoming, and Hitler's success raised him to new heights of popularity with the German people. What led Hitler to take such bold action? Historians have often asserted that Hitler merely sensed Allied weakness. Unlike his generals, who studied French troop strength and counted numbers of divisions in the field, Hitler employed his intuition and instinctively sensed the democracies' reluctance to act. Hitler did indeed possess intuition, but was his instinct the principal factor in his decision to reoccupy the Rhine? There is no question that Hitler intended from early on to cast off the shackles of Versailles and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone represented an essential step in that process. It was a goal shared by most German leaders. Yet to march troops into the Rhine before German rearmament had reached parity with France was generally considered unwise. The German Foreign Minister, however, Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, consistently urged the Chancellor onward. When others in Hitler's inner circle proved reticent, Neurath remained steadfast in his conviction that France would not retaliate. In doing so he took a considerable risk with regard to his own political career. Neurath's assurances were based not merely on his own political instincts, but upon accurate intelligence on French political and military leaders. Trusting in the accuracy of his ministry's reports, Neurath felt emboldened to encourage the Rhine coup. Gottfried Aschmann, Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Press Division, obtained sensitive information on French political and military attitudes towards a German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone. His report of 10 January 1936 to Legation Adviser Gustav Braun von Stumm quickly found its