German Rearmament: Hopes and Fears

Abstract

G ERMAN political life today revolves about three main questions: i, the reunification of Germany; 2, absolute versus relative German sovereignty; 3, German rearma ment. To gain any clear picture of the whole it is necessary to un derstand each of the three components separately as well as their interaction in the framework of tension between East and West. This is not the place to discuss the problem of German sover eignty in detail. At first glance it seems essentially psychological, for every large nation with a history of its own would like to be master of its future. On close inspection, however, we see that the problem lies in certain rulings under international law, going back to the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam, which must not be vi olated if only for the sake of Germany herself. Yet they are the reason why, for instance, West Germany cannot for the time be ing establish unrestricted diplomatic relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc. Yalta and Potsdam provide no legal basis for the absolute sovereignty of West Germany so long as the four signatory Powers fail to agree. Politically-minded Germans have resigned themselves to the status quo most unwillingly, as is understandable enough con sidering their natural desire for equality of rights. The German people as a whole have an increasing understanding of the practi cal limitations of the situation. Thus the idea of relative sover eignty is, in principle, accepted. It is opposed only by politicians who tend to wishful thinking, whose consciousness of history dates only from the day of the German capitulation, and who forget to take account of causes and effects of the Hitler period. On the whole, however, this school of thought has its roots in nothing worse than provincialism, which although narrow and often misinterpreted abroad is not disreputable. Its advocates simply do not realize that Germany is not an island and that the German people cannot face the future by themselves. That was one of Hitler's early and fatal errors. The facts of the situation should thus rule out any discussion of Soviet offers for the national and military sovereignty of a united Germany, however tempting they sound. National sov