Metaphysical Monism Research Articles

Models and monism

AbstractIn this paper, I critically examine the monist interpretation of the logic-as-model view that Erik Stei puts forth in Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence. I will argue that, in addition to the three dimensions presented in the book, there is a fourth dimension on which pluralism in logic could arise, namely epistemological pluralism. An example of such a form of pluralism is model pluralism, being the idea that we need multiple models to fully account for the subject matter of logic. Such a form of pluralism is well-recognized and widely acknowledged in (model-based) science. I argue that if we endorse the logic-as-model view, then we should also recognize such a form of model pluralism in logic. While model pluralism is consistent with metaphysical monism — the idea that there is ultimately only one extra-systemic logical consequence relation — it does put pressure on the idea that there is one uniquely best model that fully captures that phenomenon.

The Role of Metaphysical Monism in the Construction of the Paradigm in the Religious City

The research discusses the development of an urban approach that acts as an orienting paradigm for the design in the religious city. Here comes the question about adopting metaphysical monism as an intellectual paradigm capable of formulating a formal paradigm of the religious town so that the city is not affected by undesirable transformations. To highlight the research problem, which stated: (there is no clear vision for the process of building a formal paradigm in the religious city based on the dominant intellectual forces), based on which the goal of the research was determined in making a theoretical framework for the intellectual and formal paradigm to extract the indicators defined by the forces controlling the formation of the holy city. The research was based on a hypothesis: (The paradigm is achieved in the religious city through the control of intellectual and formal indicators of the forces of metaphysical monotheism). Three study samples are elected for validation: local, regional and international. The research results revealed an almost complete absence of the formal religious paradigm, despite its intellectual solid untapped indicators in the local city.

Mexica Monism and Daoist Ethics in the Philosophy of Gloria Anzaldúa

Critical scholarship regarding the philosophy of Gloria Anzaldúa has proliferated in recent decades, especially in the fields of feminist theory, phenomenology, and epistemology. However, there is little analysis of the metaphysics which undergird their work and make possible their views on identity, experience, and community politics. First, this article will explore the significance of Anzaldúa’s ‘nos/otras’ and its relation to Mexica (Aztec) monistic metaphysics. Such a concept resists an us/them construction of the world because it situates the other as us: the Spanish word for ‘we’ is ‘nosotros’ and holds the ‘other/otros’ as its root, which Anzaldúa feminizes to ‘otras’. Second, we will compare Daoist and Mexica metaphysics, two monist systems, and unpack the moral implications for spirituality. Doing so, we will see that according to Anzaldúa’s monistic view, we are affected by each other’s spirit and have an obligation to be spiritually active in the world. This claim is found throughout Anzaldúa’s philosophy and is the key to understanding the spiritual implications of her work. Lastly, we will apply such a view to sexual trauma and see that Anzalduan metaphysics lays out a path of recovery. If sexual violence is the severing of trust with others, then Anzaldúa’s understanding of how the world is constructed gives us a way to re-establish trust with ourselves, each other, and our communities.

‘In the Beginning’: Three Catholic Insights into Hinduism: Vasco Da Gama, Saint Francis Xavier and Roberto De Nobili

Before the landing of Vasco Da Gama and his seamen, India did not remain an isolated world: during the 4th century B.C., Alexander the Great reached the Indus. During the Middle Ages, Indian themes enjoyed a remarkable expansion in the West. In the mind of the Portuguese discoverers, the concept of an eastern Christianity created by Saint Thomas the Apostle was a deciding factor. Elsewhere, the Moslem abrahamised Hinduism: this was another source of confusion. The apostle of India, Saint Francis Xavier (1506-1552) belonged to the pre-Tridentine period: therefore, he demonised Hinduism. His meetings with the Brahmans were rather confrontational. But, with Roberto de Nobili (1577-1658) the Christian mission took an alternative path. We must take into account the struggle for indianising Christianity, conceived by Father De Nobili. Unfortunately, this enterprise evaded the key-problem of Hindu esotericism and metaphysical monism.

THE CASE OF SCHELLING’S LIBERTARIAN ANARCHISM. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURMOUNTABILITY OF THE PARTICULAR WILL IN THE YEARS 1809-1810

This paper refers to the connection between the metaphysical duality of ground and existence and inner dynamic of the particular will of man. We will analyse how the metaphysical monism, which Schelling attributes to Spinoza and later to Hegel, is responsible for the abolition of the freedom of the human individual, because it does not account for the existence of evil, and consequently reduces it to the existence of a higher order reference system that over and predetermines the individual (1). We will first scrutinise the principles of separation and union, ground and understanding from the human point of view, namely as the will of ground and love, as particular and universal will (2). The will of man reveals itself as the culmination and model of the will that permeates nature, an essential aspect of the process of God’s revelation and becoming. The link between the principles of separation and union shows us the difference that Schellingian thought establishes between man and God, the real and the ideal. While God, or the purely ideal principle, precedes the separation in a logical-ontological sense, the will of man remains always in an indissoluble tension between the principles, since it is unable to overcome the opposition between good and evil that is characteristic of freedom. The good remains one of the results of human freedom and thus of the particular will of man. The good lies for Schelling not in the simple actualization of the general, but in the moment ineradicable particularity needed for the attainment of a real and effective principle (3). It is to this insurmountability of the particular will in the process of the constitution of man that our proposal of Schelling’s libertarian anarchism refers. The connection of this thesis with the critique of the State is also discussed (4).

Jizang’s Anti-realist Theory of Truth: A Modal Logical Understanding of Universal Affirmation through Universal Negation

1 Jizang’s Anti-realist Theory of Truth: A Modal Logical Understanding of Universal Affirmation through Universal Negation Sangyop Lee Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies, Universität Heidelberg sangyoplee@alumni.stanford.edu In the writings of the Chinese Madhyamaka master Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 CE) we often see arguments that run as follows: Because there is nothing that is obtained (wu suode), there is nothing that is not obtained (wu suo bu de).1 Because everything is equally wrong (bing fei), it is possible for everything to be equally right (bing shi).2 The dharmakāya … although it is without speech (wu yan), there is nothing it does not say (wu bu yan).3 Although there is nothing that exists, there is nothing that does not exist. Therefore, both self (wo) and non-self (wu wo) are taught.4 This distinctive logic of deducing universal affirmation from universal negation is often cited as an example of the influence of Daoist monism on Chinese Buddhist thought. Jörg Plassen, for example, points out that similar arguments are employed in the writings of xuanxue 2 thinkers such as Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249 CE) and Guo Xiang 郭象 (252?–312 CE), and traces their origin further to ancient Daoist literature.5 He furthermore writes that such claims of universal affirmation and universal negation are designed “to overcome all dichotomies” and “lead back to an underlying unitary source.”6 Matsumoto Shirō, one of the main proponents of Critical Buddhism,7 similarly argues that this unique logic was possible on the basis of Jizang’s subscription to a Daoist-style emanationist monism, and concludes his analysis as follows: Thus, [in Jizang’s thought,] all statements are recognized as equally true to the extent that they are all references to the ineffable one substance (fukasetsu no tanissha 不可説の単一 者) that is named as “principle” (li 理), “way” (dao 道), and “source” (yuan 源). And the differences between all philosophies, all [systems of] thought, and all arguments are reconciled under the premise of this monistic substance.8 To elaborate, Matsumoto thinks that Jizang’s seemingly paradoxical universal affirmation is supported by his monistic metaphysics, according to which the phenomenal world of multiple existents emanated from the singular ineffable substance. Since any statement about a phenomenal existent thus indirectly corresponds to some aspect of this singular transcendent reality, all statements about anything equally share a certain degree of truthfulness. More recently, Yasuo Deguchi refined this kind of monist reading of Jizang’s philosophy by proposing that Jizang’s paradoxical arguments could be an indication that he was tinkering with some type of dialethism (i.e. the view that there are true contradictions).9 More specifically, Deguchi proposes that Jizang’s philosophy could be understood in relation to Nishitani’s theory of emptiness (śūnyatā; kong 空), according to which emptiness is the monistic level of reality 3 that transcends the ordinary dichotomy of affirmation and negation. Deguchi furthermore compares Jizang’s embrace of contradictions to Nishitani’s exploration of the possibility of “true contradictions” that correctly describe the transcendent, monistic level of reality and make it accessible to us. The present paper, however, argues against these readings of Jizang, which I propose to refer to as the “transcendental monist” interpretation. I will show that Jizang’s deduction of universal affirmation from universal negation does not have to be based on the premise of some monistic totality that transcends ordinary reason and language, and that it is possible to understand this deduction without introducing any dialethic logic or the notion of “true contradictions.”10 I begin by showing that one of the competing theories of truth in Jizang’s time was the realist correspondence theory espoused by the group collectively referred to as the Chengshi masters (Chengshi shi 成實師), the major philosophical rival of Jizang’s Madhyamaka School in medieval China.11 I then discuss why such a theory of truth was at odds with Jizang’s thought. As I argue, Jizang’s Madhyamaka philosophy closely approached what modern scholars call the “semantic” or “anti-realist” interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness, which, on the basis of the refutation of the validity of the very notion of mind-independent reality, denies the possibility of there being ultimately true statements...

Monism, Spinoza’s Way

AbstractMonism, characterized by Jonathan Schaffer as the thesis that the cosmos is the one and only basic actual concrete object, has been the subject of a great deal of recent interest. Spinoza is often taken, rightly, to be an important forebear. This article seeks to explain the distinctive content and basis of Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics and to compare it to contemporary Monism. It then argues that although Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics is not strictly a version of Monism as defined, it has a number of theoretical advantages that make central aspects of it worthy of serious consideration.

Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and experience

In this paper, I compare various theories of perception in relation to the question of the epistemological and ontological status of the qualities that appear in perceptual experience. I group these theories into two main views: quality externalism and quality internalism, and I highlight their contrasting problems in accounting for phenomena such as perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations (the “problem of perception”). Then, I propose an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism and which conceives of the subject and the object of perceptual experience as essentially related to one another (hence relationism) in a process of co-constitution out of fundamental qualities (hence qualitative relationism). I lend support to this view by drawing on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, which I complement with a form of neutral monism. I argue that the investigation of the temporal structure of perceptual experience leads us to find at its heart a qualitative process that is more fundamental than the two relata of perception and that gives rise to them. Then, I extend this account of perception into a general theory of intentionality and experience and I develop its implications into a neutral monist metaphysics.

Vide Spinozam, or Burchard de Volder between Cartesianism and Heterodoxy

Abstract In this article, I intervene in a long-standing debate over the alleged assumption and teaching of Spinozist ideas by the Dutch philosopher and scientist Burchard de Volder (1643–1709). I discuss De Volder’s position with respect to three main topics (necessitarianism, substance monism, and biblical interpretation), as well as the use his student Jacob Wittich made of De Volder’s ideas in Wittich’s highly controversial De natura Dei (1711). Eventually, I argue that De Volder was certainly a sympathizer of Spinoza, accepted necessitarianism, and considered Spinoza a reliable interpreter of Descartes in physics, even if he did not accept Spinoza’s monist metaphysics, nor his biblical hermeneutics.

On the Systematicity of Academic Philosophy

AbstractIn this paper, I will discuss the significance of the idea of system as applied to academic philosophy. Firstly, I will distinguish systems from other types of totalities, such as sets, aggregates and structures, and then present a definition of system and analyse the basic constituent components of any system. I will subsequently apply the proposed idea of system and its internal modulations to philosophical systems to account for the different ways of understanding academic philosophy as systematic philosophy. To end, I will argue that the systematicity of academic philosophy does not necessarily imply any dogmatism, doctrinarism or metaphysical monism.

Explanatory Basis of Metaphysics and the Prospect for a Complete Description of Everything that Exists

The article deals with the problem concerning the principles of the metaphysics explanatory basis, which provide the achievement of the goals in this most general, most abstract, and, at the same time, the most debatable field of knowledge. Different kinds of explanatory basis in metaphysics are analyzed – cosmic mereological monism, structural cosmic monism, cosmic modal monism, natural substance monism, transcendent substance monism, existential monism, abstract monism as well as the similar kinds of metaphysical pluralism including atomism and space-time pluralism . The implausibility of pluralism and its inefficiency for solving the problems of metaphysics is argued, while for metaphysical monism the need for its clarification as a grounding force is stated. The conception of super-monism is proposed. It is based on the logic of fundamental reality which differs from generally accepted formal logic in that it lacks logical laws, primarily the law of contradiction. The fundamental reality is defined as pure being which is identical with a difference, identity, existence, and the existing. By the identification of the various, this reality is defined as one. By identity with distinction, this reality is defined as the ground of all world diversity. Being which is expressed in terms of difference and identity is reflected in the metaphysical formula, which is proposed as the only tool for describing everything that exists at the extremely abstract level.

Antropološko-ontološki retorički modus monističke metafizike Pekićeve "Jedinstvene priče"

Given the typological interpretations of Pekić's literary work within the context of myth and logocentric structure deconstruction, the aim of the paper is to delve into the ultimate source of Pekić's literary rhetoric intertwined with his monistic metaphysics and philosophy of cosmogony and energism. The aforementioned material represents a rhetorical mask of a sort, in term of Paul de Man's 'text resistance' most frequently leading towards the so called process of 'misreading'. Hence, the introductory segment of the paper elaborates on Pekić's rhetorical mode representing the foundation of his metaphysical philosophy, as well as his anthropological and ontological issues of temporality. Considering the fact that Pekić's opus is voluminous, the works hereby selected serve to illustrate the paper theses as the following: the 'matrix-story' (Argonautika), certain segments of Anthropological Trilogy and New Jerusalem. The aforementioned selection is made due to Pekić's essentially different rhetorical modes in regards to his previous literary legacy.

Untangling the Complexities of Radical Enlightenment

Untangling the Complexities of Radical Enlightenment John D. Eigenauer (bio) Steffen Ducheyne, editor Reassessing the Radical Enlightenment New York: routledge, 2017 xii + 318 pages; isbn: 9781472451682 in the world of enlightenment studies, one of the most exciting and controversial fields of inquiry has been that of the Radical Enlightenment. The term Radical Enlightenment gained significant scholarly attention with the 1981 publication of Margaret Jacob's The Radical Enlightenment—Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans. After that, the field exploded with the publication of four massive volumes on the topic by Jonathan I. Israel: Radical Enlightenment (2001), Enlightenment Contested (2006), Democratic Enlightenment (2011), and Revolutionary Ideas (2014). The theory behind this term roughly divides Enlightenment thinkers into two categories: radical and mainstream (or moderate). According to Israel, radical Enlightenment writers follow a line of thinking that parallels Spinoza's: a materialistic metaphysics, atheism, and antimonarchical politics. This theory has been contested for two reasons. First, not all scholars agree that extreme political views follow from radical metaphysics (such as substance monism) and, second, some think that Enlightenment thinkers cannot be so easily divided into these camps. Reassessing the Radical Enlightenment is offered as an attempt to evaluate this tension. The book brings together an international group of scholars who both address the concept of Radical Enlightenment and attempt to sort out difficult issues presented by various stances toward the concept. It begins with several essays that orient the reader to the debate. Naturally enough, Israel opens the volume with an explanation of the complexities and nuances of understanding Radical Enlightenment within the context of intellectual history, social history, politics, and culture. He does [End Page 153] this not only to provide an introduction but also to demonstrate that the concept of Radical Enlightenment emerges from the use of what he calls the "controversialist strategy"—the discovery of tensions among members of society or societies on many levels that reveal underlying ideological allegiances. Absolutely key to his essay is the effort to dissuade readers from thinking that the Radical Enlightenment is a purely intellectual movement best studied by historians of ideas and best explained in terms of intellectual history—a common accusation against his work. In this sense, his essay is a defense of the idea of Radical Enlightenment as a structural concept that helps us understand the tremendous complexity of the evolution of human freedom in all its forms: emancipation, the rule of law, citizenship, equality, the pursuit of happiness, the right to education, the right to pursue truth, and the formation of republics that separate church and state. Margaret Jacob disagrees that this is Israel's focus. Her essay insists that Israel has missed the point about Radical Enlightenment by relying too heavily on abstruse writings centering on Spinoza's philosophy at the expense of social discourse and the role of British writers such as John Toland and Isaac Newton. Harvey Chisick's essay does a nice job of accurately describing the tension between Israel's and Jacob's views through a deft presentation of the political and philosophical ideas of Baron d'Holbach, suggesting that Israel inappropriately ties metaphysical monism to political radicalism. His presentation reveals that it is not so much that Israel discounts the complexity of Radical Enlightenment as that he insists too strongly that materialism implies radical politics. And by demonstrating that thinkers such as d'Holbach and Voltaire could differ markedly in their metaphysics while agreeing on a goal of widespread social justice, Chisick reinforces the blurry nature of the lines between radical and moderate Enlightenment thinkers. In terms of truly presenting the essence of the debate, Chisick's essay is quite important. The second third of the book discusses the "Origins and Fate of the Radical Enlightenment." Because of the primacy of Spinoza in Israel's understanding of the origins of the Radical Enlightenment, the first three essays in this section deal in different ways with Spinoza. The first is a complex and subtle essay on Spinoza's materialism (and ensuing radicalism) in which Nancy Levene offers an orientation to competing interpretations of Spinoza's monism. This essay is an orientation in the sense that it describes these interpretations; however, her explanations will probably be clear...

Evil as Privation in Neoplatonism. Simplicius and Philoponus in Defense of Matter

The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism.

Evil as Privation in Neoplatonism. Simplicius and Philoponus in Defense of Matter

The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism.

La "normatività" tra etica e metafisica

The Author’s aim is to highlight the limits of monist metaphysics which underpin the paradigm of Secular Humanism. In fact, all forms of monism consider good and evil either as internal momentums to the logic of development of the world, or as mere illusions within the evolutionary process. Can tragedies as the Holocaust be interpreted by such a monistic approach? The distinction between ‘polar opposition’ and ‘logic of contradiction’ is introduced by Romano Guardini. This is based on a creationistic metaphysic and it is useful to show that our practical-moral investigation is legitimated only by a theist approach. By considering good and evil as two aspect with mutual implications, monistic logic risks to weaken both freedom and human responsibility within human history.

And Yet He is a Monist: Comments on James Kreines, Reason in the World

AbstractI critically discuss Kreines’s arguments against readings on which Hegel holds some version of metaphysical monism. In section 1, I address Kreines’s claim that Hegel’s revised version of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Dialectic implies a rejection of metaphysical monism. I argue both that the argument that Kreines ascribes to Hegel does not itself rule out monism, and that there are serious exegetical problems with the way Kreines understands Hegel’s diagnosis of the antinomies and his critique of the metaphysics of the understanding. In section 2, I discuss additional reasons that Kreines gives for seeing Hegel as rejecting metaphysical monism. In particular, I argue that Hegel is much more optimistic about the intelligibility of nature than Kreines thinks: to a substantial degree, the basic structure of nature, including the laws of mechanics, is open to explanations that are ultimately based on a monistic principle.

'Artisten - Metaphysik' as a Model of Metaphysical Monism − A Way of Understanding ⟪The Birth of Tragedy⟫

'Artisten - Metaphysik' as a Model of Metaphysical Monism − A Way of Understanding ⟪The Birth of Tragedy⟫

Mechanism and materialism in early modern German philosophy

ABSTRACTThe paper focuses on the gradual separation between materialism and mechanism in early modern German philosophy. In Germany the distinction between the two concepts, originally introduced by Leibniz, was definitively stated by Wolff who was the first to provide a definition of the new philosophical term Materialismus, and of the related philosophical sect. In the first part I describe the initial identification of mechanism and materialism in German philosophy between the last decades of the seventeenth century and 1720. Mechanism is here mostly conceived within a monistic metaphysics of body, which refers mainly to Hobbes and to some (unfaithful) interpretations of Spinoza’s pantheism. This tight connection between a mechanical explanation of nature and the Deus sive natura issue leads to a negative judgement on mechanism and its materialistic implications, both charged with a form of more or less explicit atheism. In the second part I describe the gradual emancipation in Germany of mechanism from materialism according to the distinction between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ materialism. In the third and final part, I sketch the first appearances of the entry ‘materialism’ in the philosophical encyclopaedias of early modern Germany, pointing out the by-then clear distinction between this metaphysical issue and the mechanical claim.

MIND WITHIN MATTER: SCIENCE, THE OCCULT, AND THE (META)PHYSICS OF ETHER AND AKASHA

AbstractThe intersection between quantum theory, metaphysical spirituality, and Indian‐inspired philosophy has an established place in speculative scientific and alternative religious communities alike. There is one term that has historically bridged these two worlds: “Akasha,” often translated as “ether.” Akasha appears both in metaphysical spiritual contexts, most often in ones influenced by Theosophy, and in the speculative scientific discourse that has historically demonstrated a strong affinity for the brand of monistic metaphysics that Indian‐derived spiritualities tend to foster. This article traces the relationship between these groups with special attention to the role of Indian concepts and terminology. More specifically, it argues that Akasha‐as‐ether comes to operate in a manner that bridges gross matter (of which the individual mind is part and parcel) with the notion of a subtle material and transpersonal mind—a version of panpsychism allowing for a coherent quantum monism.