Jizang’s Anti-realist Theory of Truth: A Modal Logical Understanding of Universal Affirmation through Universal Negation

Abstract

1 Jizang’s Anti-realist Theory of Truth: A Modal Logical Understanding of Universal Affirmation through Universal Negation Sangyop Lee Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies, Universität Heidelberg sangyoplee@alumni.stanford.edu In the writings of the Chinese Madhyamaka master Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 CE) we often see arguments that run as follows: Because there is nothing that is obtained (wu suode), there is nothing that is not obtained (wu suo bu de).1 Because everything is equally wrong (bing fei), it is possible for everything to be equally right (bing shi).2 The dharmakāya … although it is without speech (wu yan), there is nothing it does not say (wu bu yan).3 Although there is nothing that exists, there is nothing that does not exist. Therefore, both self (wo) and non-self (wu wo) are taught.4 This distinctive logic of deducing universal affirmation from universal negation is often cited as an example of the influence of Daoist monism on Chinese Buddhist thought. Jörg Plassen, for example, points out that similar arguments are employed in the writings of xuanxue 2 thinkers such as Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249 CE) and Guo Xiang 郭象 (252?–312 CE), and traces their origin further to ancient Daoist literature.5 He furthermore writes that such claims of universal affirmation and universal negation are designed “to overcome all dichotomies” and “lead back to an underlying unitary source.”6 Matsumoto Shirō, one of the main proponents of Critical Buddhism,7 similarly argues that this unique logic was possible on the basis of Jizang’s subscription to a Daoist-style emanationist monism, and concludes his analysis as follows: Thus, [in Jizang’s thought,] all statements are recognized as equally true to the extent that they are all references to the ineffable one substance (fukasetsu no tanissha 不可説の単一 者) that is named as “principle” (li 理), “way” (dao 道), and “source” (yuan 源). And the differences between all philosophies, all [systems of] thought, and all arguments are reconciled under the premise of this monistic substance.8 To elaborate, Matsumoto thinks that Jizang’s seemingly paradoxical universal affirmation is supported by his monistic metaphysics, according to which the phenomenal world of multiple existents emanated from the singular ineffable substance. Since any statement about a phenomenal existent thus indirectly corresponds to some aspect of this singular transcendent reality, all statements about anything equally share a certain degree of truthfulness. More recently, Yasuo Deguchi refined this kind of monist reading of Jizang’s philosophy by proposing that Jizang’s paradoxical arguments could be an indication that he was tinkering with some type of dialethism (i.e. the view that there are true contradictions).9 More specifically, Deguchi proposes that Jizang’s philosophy could be understood in relation to Nishitani’s theory of emptiness (śūnyatā; kong 空), according to which emptiness is the monistic level of reality 3 that transcends the ordinary dichotomy of affirmation and negation. Deguchi furthermore compares Jizang’s embrace of contradictions to Nishitani’s exploration of the possibility of “true contradictions” that correctly describe the transcendent, monistic level of reality and make it accessible to us. The present paper, however, argues against these readings of Jizang, which I propose to refer to as the “transcendental monist” interpretation. I will show that Jizang’s deduction of universal affirmation from universal negation does not have to be based on the premise of some monistic totality that transcends ordinary reason and language, and that it is possible to understand this deduction without introducing any dialethic logic or the notion of “true contradictions.”10 I begin by showing that one of the competing theories of truth in Jizang’s time was the realist correspondence theory espoused by the group collectively referred to as the Chengshi masters (Chengshi shi 成實師), the major philosophical rival of Jizang’s Madhyamaka School in medieval China.11 I then discuss why such a theory of truth was at odds with Jizang’s thought. As I argue, Jizang’s Madhyamaka philosophy closely approached what modern scholars call the “semantic” or “anti-realist” interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness, which, on the basis of the refutation of the validity of the very notion of mind-independent reality, denies the possibility of there being ultimately true statements...