Metaphysical Doctrine Research Articles

Is the experience of pain transparent?

I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other similar experiences like itches, tickles, orgasms, hedonic valence, etc., are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence they constitute empirical counterexamples to representationalism. Given that representationalism is a general metaphysical doctrine about all experiential phenomenology for good reasons, I conclude that representationalism about phenomenal consciousness is false. Then, I outline a general framework about how the introspection of phenomenal qualities in perceptual experience works in light of the transparency datum, but consistent with the rejection of strong transparency. The result is a form of qualia realism that is naturalist and intentionalist (weak representationalist), and has close affinities to the adverbialist views developed in the latter part of the last century. I then apply this framework to pain experiences and their bodily locations.

Muḥyī l-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī’s Personalist Theory of the Sharīʿa

While Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) continues to receive much attention within the academe as a preeminent Sufi philosopher, his jurisprudence, by contrast, rarely elicits the same attention, despite the prominent mention of the Sharīʿa throughout his many works. This paper provides an exhaustive overview of his sophisticated legal doctrine in terms of his legal methodology and substantive law. An analysis of his legal epistemology would situate him within the ‘scripturalist’ stream of legal theorists, commonly associated with the Zāhiri school. However, while Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) certainly influenced Ibn ʿArabī’s legal doctrine, the Shaykh’s jurisprudence remains markedly original in that it is ultimately rooted in an overarching metaphysical doctrine. This is evident in his personal reframing of ijtihād as a personal process of spiritual refinement, as opposed to a methodical process of ratiocination, which leads him to develop a distinctively personalist theory of legal pluralism that transcends the limitations of school conformity.

Вчення Садр ад-Діна Ширазі про буття

The article examines the metaphysical doctrine of being of the great Iranian philosopher and theologian Sadr ad-Din Shirazi, who fundamentally renewed philosophy in Islamic world. The following aspects of this doctrine are considered: (1) primacy and hierarchy of being; (2) the distinction between the concept of being and the reality of being; (3) the difference between being and entity; (4) the difference between being and quiddity. The article shows the similarity of Sadr ad-Din Shirazi’s doctrine and certain Thomas Aquinas’s conceptions, especially his doctrine of the act of being (actus essendi). Both philosophers elaborated the ontological difference between being and entity (Sein und Seienden). Therefore, they can not be included in the “oblivion of being” tradition (Seinsvergessenheit) which is the main feature of the history of European metaphysics, according to Martin Heidegger.

Donald C. Williams’s defence of real metaphysics

ABSTRACTIn the middle of last century metaphysics was widely criticized, ridiculed, and committed to the flames. During this period a handful of philosophers, against several anti-metaphysical trends, defended metaphysics and articulated novel metaphysical doctrines. Donald C. Williams was one of these philosophers. But while his contributions to metaphysics are well known his defence of metaphysics is not and yet it played a key part in the development and revival of metaphysics. In this paper I present his defence of metaphysics in its historical context. I also show how his defence is relevant in response to recent attacks on metaphysics.

Spirituality in the Philosophical Thought of Seyyed Hossein Nasr

Spirituality for Seyyed Hossen Nasr is an inner reality that becomes a religious central in Islam. It is the esoteric dimension hidden in the reality of exoteric Islam. That view on spirituality brings Nasr to the philosophical thought that cannot be separated from religious metaphysical doctrine. Nasr argues that philosophy is more than just a ratio but also the activity of intellect that can reach the meta-cosmic nature to find the essence of truth namely the universal and eternal truth that lies behind the physical and relative truth. The philosophical efforts to find this truth are a combination of the optimizing potential of reason and intellectual intuition. Nasr refers to ḥikmah or wisdom as a kind of philosophy that combines logic and intellectual intuition. That philosophical view brings Nasr on a dualistic view of nature which not only has a cosmic dimension as such but also has a meta-cosmic dimension. This dualistic view is his fundamental reason in formulating the concept of metaphysical cosmology as a solution to the crisis of modern science that has caused a variety of ecological damage due to the secular vision. 
 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v20i2.812

Conceptos trascendentales, reflexión y juicio. Sobre el § 12 de la Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

<p class="p1">El presente trabajo ofrece una reconstrucción de la posición que Kant elabora en el § 12 de la Kritik der reinen Vernunft, con el objetivo de incorporar en su propia concepción la temática nuclear propia de la doctrina de los atributos trascendentales del ser elaborada por la tradición metafísica. El alcance sistemático de la recontextualización llevada a cabo por Kant se comprende cuando se pone en conexión la temática del § 12 con la concepción kantiana relativa a los presupuestos reflexivos del juicio, tal como ésta aparece desarrollada en el texto de la “Anfibología de los conceptos de reflexión”. En tal sentido, el este artículo constituye la continuación natural de uno anterior en el cual se discute la concepción que Kant elabora en la “Anfibología”. La interpretación ofrecida aquí apunta, entre otras cosas, a poner de relieve que los criterios lógicos que Kant tematiza en el § 12 cumplen funciones regulativas que orientan procesos de tipo reflexivo, entre los cuales destacan particularmente aquellos que subyacen a la formación originaria de conceptos empíricos.</p>

Стросон і Кант: дескриптивна метафізика як концептуальна передумова аналізу «Критики чистого розуму»

The article reveals peculiarities of conceptual analysis of the “Critique of Pure Reason» by British philosopher Peter Strawson. The author claims that this analysis depends on the methodological assumptions and conceptual language of Strawson’s previously published large-scale study (“Individuals…”, 1959). The author confirms Barry Straud`s point that Strawson`s project depends, to some extent, on the descriptive metaphysics of “Critique of Pure Reason”. Strawson`s metaphysical doctrine is based not only on the Kant`s doctrine of subjective forms of space-time (this thesis, in fact, is the limit of Stroud’s approach), but also on some subjects of Kant`s transcendental logic. In particular, it relates to Strawson`s analysis of: (a) the intellectual structures, that actively shape our understanding of the world; (b) the functioning of logic-grammatical forms that provide predication of experience; (c) the transcendental unity of “I” and of the difference between personal and formally-analytical aspects of “I”. Based on “The Bounds of Sense...” (1966) and later Strawson’s articles dealing with the philosophy of Kant, the author proves that: (1) Strawson’s «analytical model» of transcendental argument is based on Kant's transcendental psychology; (2) the modalities of understanding of the transcendental idealism depend on understanding of relation between things in themselves and phenomena i.e. depend on the empirical realism according to Kant; (3) Kant’s sensual intuition suggests, as Strawson has shown, the possibility of other spatial-temporal forms of subjective intuition, which are constitutive for another kinds of experience.

Colloquium 5 Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato’s Critique of ‘Platonism’ in the Sophist and Statesman

The Eleatic Stranger plays a central role in all reconstructions of Plato’s “Platonism.” This paper is a study of the literary form of the Sophist and Statesman and its significance for interpreting the Eleatic’s account of the nature of philosophy. I argue that the Eleatic dialogues are best understood through a comparison with the source-texts in the Odyssey that Plato used in their composition. I show that the literary form of the Sophist is a straightforward reworking of the encounter of Odysseus and his crewmen with Polyphemus the Cyclops; and that the form of the Statesman is a somewhat more complex reworking of the narrative in which Odysseus and those loyal to him oppose Antinoös, leader of the Ithacan suitors. The comparison reveals that the Eleatic Stranger is no way Plato’s spokesman. On the contrary: by casting the Stranger in the role of Polyphemus and the Cyclopean Antinoös, Plato intends the Sophist and Statesman to be read as an explicit critique of the metaphysical and political doctrines that have since come to be identified as Platonism. In Plato’s characterization, the Eleatic Stranger is neither a philosopher nor a sophist. He is an intellectual—the sort of person who professes to be a philosopher and is often mistaken for one.

Glückl von Hameln, Announcer of Jewish Emancipation and of the Jewish Novel in Germany

Zichronos, by Glückl von Hameln, a memoir written by a Jewish matriarch from Hamburg at the end of the 17th and at the beginning of the 18th century, under the impact of sabataism and of the War of 30 Years, anticipates a new German-Jewish literary topos by means of the perplexities and doubts it represents. This topos is no longer based on the certainties of the religious doctrine and of traditional wisdom, but on the perception that an abyss exists between the world as it is and the world as it should be. Thus, literature searches for ways to bridge the distance between metaphysical doctrines and human realities, or represents the increasing estrangement and alienation ensuing from this distance. Key works of German-Jewish Literature in the 19th and 20th centuries face this abyss and represent it in a variety of ways. Glückl von Hameln’s autobiography can be understood as a prelude to this genre, founded on incomprehension, perplexity and nostalgia for a world impregnated with sense

Žingsniai link antifizikalizmo

Santrauka. Ontologinis fizikalizmas yra tezė, kad visi egzistuojantys objektai – individai, savybės, įvykiai, būsenos – yra tik fiziniai esiniai. Dažnai teigiama, jog šią doktriną labai stipriai remia šiuolaikinis mokslas. Fizikalistai, be kita ko, dažniausiai įsitikinę, kad jų metafizinę doktriną logiškai tiesiogiai galima išvesti iš pačių mokslinių teorijų. Negana to, jie yra linkę teigti, kad ir kiti jų filosofinio požiūrio elementai, to­kie kaip fizinės plotmės priežastinio uždarumo principas ar neperteklinio priežastinio sąlygojimo taisyklė (the no-overdetermination rule), taip pat tiesiogiai išplaukia iš mokslinių teorijų. Savo tekste pateikiu kai kuriuos argumentus už antifizikalizmą, pagal kurį ontologinis fizikalizmas yra neteisingas, o jo pagrindimas atrodo ne toks optimistiškas, kaip fizikalistai yra įpratę manyti. Mano argumentai kvestionuoja labai paplitusią nuomonę apie fizinės srities kauzalinio uždarumo principo teisingumą ir negalimybę jo panaudoti bet kurioje antidualistinėje argumentacijoje. Taip pat išreiškiu tam tikrą skepticizmą dėl energijos tvermės ir virsmo dėsnio bei neperteklinio priežastinio sąlygojimo taisyklės kaip fizikalistų argumentavimo strategijų priemonių. Paskui kaip antifizikalinės metodologijos iliustraciją apibūdinu metodologinį dualizmą – tipišką metodologinį požiūrį, visuotinai priimtą kognityvinių mokslų, neuromokslų ir psichologijos. Pabaigoje trumpai ir schemiškai pristatau penkis pavyzdinius argumentus prieš fizikalizmą. Bendrasis šio teksto tikslas – parodyti, kad fizikalizmas, nors ir didžiai populiarus tarp šiuolaikinių filosofų ir vis dar gali girtis moksliniu palaikymu, iš tikrųjų turi grumtis su daugeliu teorinių keblumų, kuriuos fizikalistai ilgainiui įpratę ignoruoti. Nors aš nepristatau jokio pozityvaus argumento už patį dualizmą, mano pastangos vis dėlto gali būti interpretuojamos kaip netiesioginė argumentacija už kiekvieną pažiūrą, kuri oponuoja fizikalizmui.

Lockean Matter and its Discontents

Materialism/physicalism purports to be a significant metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reality, being the standard position in many contemporary philosophical debates. It is my view that this doctrine is misguided, a remnant of the categories of the 17th century. To argue for my position, I examine Locke’s commitment to corpuscularianism – a prevalent view about the nature of matter in the early scientific period – and the erroneous conclusions he draws from it. This historical reflection serves me to make a broader point: we do not anymore hold a strict conception of the material or the physical for good reasons, while these terms have no place in our technical subjects of inquiry. I conclude that materialism and any ontological position which depends on it are of no consequence.

Predication or Participation? What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?

Predication or Participation? What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?

THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION OF BASIC SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS IN PARTICULAR: FORMAL-ETHIC AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The aim of the paper is to carry out historical-philosophical and linguistic analysis of ethical and metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle on corruption in general; to discuss of formal-ethical view on the problem of corruption in basic scientific researches; to define the place and role of fundamental scientific researches in knowledge-based economy taken as a whole, and Boston Chart, in particular. Methods. The methods involve the historical-philosophical and logical-linguistic analysis of texts; creation and studying of the elementary discrete mathematical model of the researched moral phenomenon at the level of artificial language of two-digit algebra of the natural right and morals; use of such conceptual and figurative tool of the economic theory as Boston Chart. Results and scientific novelty. The definition of the concept «basic scientific research» is given for the first time; the concept includes time parameter and knowledge of utility (the practical importance) of results of this research. Practical significance. The submitted definition (criterion) gives a possibility to establish at any moment of time definite borderline between the basic and the applied scientific search (the line undergoes change in the flow of time). The effective criterion of basic scientific researches offered by the author, and also exact specifying of their place and role in lifecycle of knowledge as goods in market economy (at the conceptual level of the Boston Chart) allow to designate an urgent problem of corruption of the scientific sphere in a new perspective. Along with some additional conditions, this new evidence could help to solve the problem.

INFORMAL PROOF, FORMAL PROOF, FORMALISM

AbstractIncreases in the use of automated theorem-provers have renewed focus on the relationship between the informal proofs normally found in mathematical research and fully formalised derivations. Whereas some claim that any correct proof will be underwritten by a fully formal proof, sceptics demur. In this paper I look at the relevance of these issues for formalism, construed as an anti-platonistic metaphysical doctrine. I argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that all proofs are fully formalisable, if formal proofs are required to be finitary, but that, on a proper view of the way in which formal proofs idealise actual practice, this restriction is unjustified and formalism is not threatened.

Utility Monsters for the Fission Age

AbstractOne of the standard approaches to the metaphysics of personal identity has some counter‐intuitive ethical consequences when combined with maximising consequentialism and a plausible (though not uncontroversial) doctrine about aggregation of consequences. This metaphysical doctrine is the so‐called ‘multiple occupancy’ approach to puzzles about fission and fusion. It gives rise to a new version of the ‘utility monster’ problem, particularly difficult problems about infinite utility, and a new version of a Parfit‐style ‘repugnant conclusion’. While the article focuses on maximising consequentialism for simplicity, the problems demonstrated apply more widely to a range of ethical views, especially flavours of consequentialism. This article demonstrates how these problems arise, and discusses a number of options available in the light of these problems for a consequentialist tempted by a multiple occupancy metaphysics.

Development Ethics, Gender Complementarianism, and Intrahousehold Inequality

Development ethicists see reducing intrahousehold gender inequality as an important policy aim. However, it is unclear that a minimalist cross‐cultural consensus can be formed around this goal. Inequality on its own may not bring women beneath a minimal welfare threshold. Further, adherents of complementarian metaphysical doctrines may view attempts to reduce intrahousehold inequality as attacks on their worldviews. Complicating the justificatory task is the fact that familiar arguments against intrahousehold inequality, including those from agency and self‐esteem, depart from premises that complementarians reject—premises about the value of independence or the moral irrelevance of gender. I propose that development ethicists should offer complementarianism‐compatible arguments against the norms and practices constitutive of intrahousehold inequality. I develop arguments against two intrahousehold inequality‐supportive practices that depart from complementarian premises. Specifically, I argue that patriarchal risk and gender schemas that devalue women's labor prevent men from discharging complementarian duties to promote women's welfare.

Presentism meets black holes

Presentism is, roughly, the metaphysical doctrine that maintains that whatever exists, exists in the present. The compatibility of presentism with the theories of special and general relativity was much debated in recent years. It has been argued that at least some versions of presentism are consistent with time-orientable models of general relativity. In this paper we confront the thesis of presentism with relativistic physics, in the strong gravitational limit where black holes are formed. We conclude that the presentist position is at odds with the existence of black holes and other compact objects in the universe. A revision of the thesis is necessary, if it is intended to be consistent with the current scientific view of the universe.

On an Intermittent Subject in Jean-Luc Nancy

This essay traces the motif of the "subject" across selected works in Jean-Luc Nancy's oeuvre. From the late 1970s to the 2010s, Nancy has pursued, from multiple points of view, the deconstruction of the metaphysics of the subject. In some important texts, this deconstruction has proceeded by way of an analysis of National Socialist ideology usefully construed as an ultimate form of subject metaphysics. I argue that these texts provide us with important insights not only into the philosophical structure of Nazi ideology but also into the political characteristics of metaphysical doctrines of the subject. (Along the way, I also indicate some limitations of Nancy's discussions of Nazi ideology, concerning certain Christian motifs and anti-Semitism in relation to representation and subjectivity.) And yet Nancy's thinking about the subject is not only negatively or destructively directed. It also involves the repeated attempt to articulate a notion of subjectivity marginally beyond the metaphysical, ideological inscription of the subject qua substantial, self-totalizing, and autonomous presence. In Nancy's work, the subject in a new sense--which I characterize as intermittent--appears as radically multiple, exterior to itself, temporally dispersed, relational, and linguistically involved. This essay pursues the intermittent conceptual development of such an intermittent subject from the earlier, more negatively inflected analyses of the fascist metaphysics of the subject around 1980 to the more constructively oriented thematizations of representation, listening, and faith in the writings from the 1990s into the twenty-first century.

Una nota acerca de la "mística" del Maestro Eckhart

Este artículo trata de explicar en qué sentido Eckhart puede ser considerado un “místico”. La conclusión final es que la “mística” de Eckart debe interpretarse no como algo teológico, sino como una doctrina metafísica, a pesar de su inspiración teológica.

Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience

David Lewis is a natural target for those who believe that findings in quantum physics threaten the tenability of traditional metaphysical reductionism. Such philosophers point to allegedly holistic entities they take both to be the subjects of some claims of quantum mechanics and to be incompatible with Lewisian metaphysics. According to one popular argument, the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement, any realist interpretation of quantum theory is straightforwardly inconsistent with the reductive conviction that the complete physical state of the world supervenes on the intrinsic properties of and spatio-temporal relations between its point-sized constituents. Here I defend Lewis's metaphysical doctrine, and traditional reductionism more generally, against this alleged threat from quantum holism. After presenting the non-separability argument from entanglement, I show that Bohmian mechanics, an interpretation of quantum mechanics explicitly recognized as a realist one by proponents of the non-separability argument, plausibly rejects a key premise of that argument. Another holistic worry for Humeanism persists, however, the trouble being the apparently holistic character of the Bohmian pilot wave. I present a Humean strategy for addressing the holistic threat from the pilot wave by drawing on resources from the Humean best system account of laws.