Metaphysical Arguments Research Articles

Holism, Individuation, and Internal Relations

Holism, Individuation, and. Internal Relations D. J. CROSSLEY IF THEREIS one central doctrine of absolute idealism it is the doctrine of internal relations. In the context of discussion of ethical and social issues this displays itself as the thesis of holism. And this is only to be expected, for a constant focus of the critical attacks by the British Idealists is the atomism of classical empiricism; so we are not surprised to discover Bradley presenting the case for holism largely in terms of a polemic against individualism. In this paper I wish to investigate the argument for holism as it appears in the fifthchapter of F. H. Bradley's Ethical Studies, entitled "My Station and Its Duties." The holistic position Bradley is advancing is not without merit, and the problem he is addressing--the relationship between an individual person and the institutions into which he is born or to which he voluntarily commits himself--is a traditional problem for ethical and social theory of substantial consequence . However, much of Bradley's discussion proceeds at the level of the methodological and metaphysical problems involved in the theses of individualism and of holism, and it is these questions with which I am almost solely concerned. The first section discusses methodological and ontological individualism and concentrates on Bradley's attempt to discuss the problem at the methodological level, without recourse to metaphysical arguments. The burden of this section will be to illustrate why this attempt fails and to indicate the general nature of the case Bradley really wishes to make. That is, while he states that he is carrying on the debate at a methodological level-- or, at least, at some level divorced from metaphysics-- he is, nevertheless, really arguing against ontological individualism, which he apparently treats as prior to, and implying, methodological individualism. The second section explores the arguments for holism in greater detail and will conclude that the case for holism is made plausible by the arguments and examples presented, although they are not likely decisive. Finally, I shall argue that holism can be given theoretical support if we engage the issue of individuation, for the strongest philosophical argument for individualism rests on a thesis about the individuating of macroentities and this can be shown to involve insuperable difficulties and, indeed, to support Bradley 's case. I In more recent literature there has been considerable interest in the question of individualismas it pertains to historial studies and the social sciences. Usually the discussion originates at, and attempts to remain at, the level of methodology. Methodological individualists maintain that explanations of historical, social or political events can function only at the level of individualagents or persons and must, in [1831 184 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY principle, be reducible to these units in the final analysis; their opponents argue that it is at least logically respectable to advance explanations in terms of larger social and political wholes, or macrounits, and that in fact there are some activities, such as riots, which must be considered in this way. The latter position is thereby nominated "methodological holism." The debate is complicated by the transference to, or relapse into, other levels such as the ontological, the psychological, the ethical, etc. Holists are often suspected of employing, or of being on the verge of, untenable and fantastic metaphysical theses, such as treating macroentities as particulars; yet individualists in general seem most concerned to prove that macrounits are nothing but a collection of individuals, individuals being the ultimate or only entities and agents. In virtue of this, the further claim is advanced that all explanations must be reducible to the individualistic level in order to qualify as genuine and satisfactory explanations. Such a case is based on a thesis about the ontological priority of individuals rather than on logical or methodological considerations or priorities. In "My Station and Its Duties" Bradley gives a reasonably accurate portrayal of the general position of individualists. Their case rests on two basic beliefs which are intimately connected: that "individuals are real by themselves," and that "the community is the sum of its parts."1He quite rightlyrecognizes the former as a metfiphysical thesis rather poorly disguised as, or hastily asserted to be, "fact" (ES...

Freedom and God: The Meeting of East and West

Speaking for the theology of the East, Masao Abe says: ‘I do not see the ontological ground on which (in the West) being has priority over non-being’. Professor Abe is speaking of Tillich's assertion (in The Courage To Be, p. 34, 40) that there is an ‘ontological priority of being over nonbeing’, but Abe's question is more or less directed to the whole Western metaphysical tradition and illustrates the fundamental philosophical point at issue between the East and West. Nonbeing can be ruled out of consideration as Parmenides and Wittgenstein have done (what cannot be said clearly should not be spoken about). Or, like Plato and Tillich, being can be said to embrace both itself and nonbeing, even if this is not explained in detail very clearly. Yet the challenge of the East still stands: What embraces both being and nonbeing may not be ‘Being’ but ‘that which is neither being nor non-being’. If the East and the West are to meet metaphysically, we can no longer simply assume the priority of being over nonbeing. We must begin by considering the alternative of the East and then justify any choice between competing first principles by prior metaphysical argument.

Aristotle's Metaphysical Argument - Walter Leszl: Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Aristotle's treatment of types of equivocity and its relevance to his metaphysical theories. Pp. xiii+60i. Padua: Antenore, 1970. Paper, L. 9,000.

Aristotle's Metaphysical Argument - Walter Leszl: Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Aristotle's treatment of types of equivocity and its relevance to his metaphysical theories. Pp. xiii+60i. Padua: Antenore, 1970. Paper, L. 9,000. - Volume 23 Issue 2

Zoroastrianism and the Fire Symbolism in Moby-Dick

COMMENTING UPON THE Zoroastrians, in I836, Hawthorne's American Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge concludes with a judgment of their prime symbol: There is, in truth, nothing that can be seen or felt, which combines so many symbolic attributes of splendor, terror, and beneficence, as fire.' Whether the germinous seeds planted by Hawthorne during his Pittsfield companionship with Melville included any thoughts on the literary promise of these Orientals who worshipped with no unnatural idolatry,2 we still do not know, but there is adequate evidence that through a variety of generally well known sources Melville acquired a fair knowledge of their religion and used it with skill to strengthen the metaphysical argument of Moby-Dick. Aware of fire as an ancient and complex symbol associated with both creation and destruction, Melville not only takes advantage of traditional Occidental fire symbolism but also relates the fire symbols to the Zoroastrian religion. The Parsees, or Indian Zoroastrians, were known for their extraordinary religious orthodoxy. Melville intended his Parsee harpooner to be the orthodox follower of an orthodox faith, who in his unreasoning orthodoxy ironically reduces religion to ritual. In this matter of faith, Fedallah is both a foil to the rationalistic rebel Ahab and a reminder that orthodoxy, though on the lee shore of faith, is not without its dangers. The depth and logic of the fire symbolism is especially evident in the carefully designed relationship between the Parsee and Ahab, both questers and fanatics, both hunting the

Reality Theater in Chicago

A true theater is a fix, a mainline shot that infuses itself into reality, turning reality upside down, producing alterations in the structure and in the elements of the real. A grandiose claim. But is this not precisely what we have always been assured was the case in the Theater of Dionysus and in Shakespeare's Elizabethan theater? Is it disturbing that our authorities have inadvertently taught us the truth? Perhaps all real theater, and any real art, can only be revolutionary. Whatever is new ultimately must be a metaphysical argument. The Reality Theater that is evolving today cannot be stopped. It cannot be stopped because Mayor Daley exists on the same plane as all impersonations and fictions. The city of Chicago itself is in its way only a kind of ontological rhetoric, a hyperbole, a form of make-believe. If this statement seems far-fetched, it is only because we have chosen to believe in the metaphors of our rhetoric. Which is not to say that Mayor Daley and Chicago are not real-they are all too real, but it is the nature of that reality which needs examining. A Real theater can be achieved. It was the vision of this which turned Yeats to the ritualized forms of the Japanese Noh plays; and in the failure to translate successfully from the images in his mind to the concrete space of the stage lies, perhaps, a negative verification that the metaphor behind the vision was at least always true. Artaud was certainly right to this extent: a real theater must be a dangerous place, or else it is a meaningless one. The crucial mistake of Yeats was in his idea of where a theater had to be located; that it was necessary to be outside ordinary reality, in a special place and a special time, and that reality could come to it for enrichment. There can be no separation of the two: they must be coincident with each other, they have always to occur together. As far as the state of American theater is concerned, it is obvious that we have not had one for a long time. We have had moving plays, but this is a peculiarly formal issue, and plays which simply make us emote are not by that fact alone connected with formal issues at all. They cannot change anything, and a real theater must. We are going to have a theater, and it is going to be real. Broadway can never be taken seriously. It is too expensive. It can afford to cater only to the few, to those who demand to be entertained and who can afford to pay the price of entertainment. Then there are the many houses throughout the country which offer professional of classic plays. They are certainly related to theater and ought definitely to be supported, but they have affinities at best with an immediate past; essentially they belong to another age. Insofar as a true theater can be said to exist in this country at all, it is found off-off Broadway, where for the most part it speaks to and for a subculture of East Villagers whose psyches have been fashioned by the myths of a million grade-B movies and then acted out again after the movies in the kitchens of a billion immigrant families in Brooklyn and the Bronx. Harlow and Maria Montez are its divinities, and Gorilla Queen is perhaps its most serious expression. But there is another movement in the theater, as legitimate at least, and, I think, more likely to have serious historical consequences. Popularly it has become known as Guerrilla Theater, and companies have sprung up throughout America. For the most part they address themselves to issues connected with the non-war we are waging in Vietnam. Obviously it is only a matter of time before a broadly based Black Guerrilla Theater forms, interesting itself less in the war than in issues connected with the suppression of domestic freedom. In Chicago, a group of students at the University of Chicago have been attempting a variant of Guerrilla Theater, have put on some productions already and have a great many planned for the coming months. (Another company has formed at Northwestern University, but as of this writing I have no information about them. …

Awareness of God

‘PROOFS of God’ are under a cloud today, and whether the cloud can be dissipated or not, I am not going to try to dissipate it in this article. Modern thinkers have created a mental climate very unfavourable to metaphysics, but they have certainly not succeeded in disproving on principle the possibility of valid and fruitful metaphysical arguments even in the old transcendent sense of ‘metaphysics’. However, I must admit that in my opinion the best that can be said of arguments for the existence of God is that they give some intellectual support to the belief, not that they are really decisive. If this is so, it becomes of very special importance to consider whether those may be right who maintain that we can come to knowledge of or at least justified belief in God otherwise than by inference. I am not considering the views of those who base the belief solely on authority: argument would be required to decide whether we ought to accept an authority, and if so which. What I am referring to is the claim that there are certain 'mystical' and other religious experiences which can without argument adequately and rationally assure one of God's existence. Obviously from the nature of the case a man who makes this claim for himself cannot prove to others that he is right, but can any good reason be given to support the view that he is wrong? If not, the possibility remains that those who dispute with him are in a similar position to that of a tonedeaf man disagreeing with Beethoven about the value of music.

Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna's System

THE MADHYAMIKA SCHOOL, founded by NSigrjuna (2nd century A.D. ), has been known to modern scholarship since the time of Emile Burnouf, over a century ago. During the past six decades, it has been studied by Indian, European, and Japanese scholars, who have generally conceded that this school is crucial for the history of Indian philosophy, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Ndg;rjuna has been widely praised as a great dialectician. However, a large residue of bafflement has remained after each attempt to elucidate the true message of the Midhyamikas. This is inevitable in the nature of the case, since the pioneers have had to grapple with more or less corrupt texts in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese; to compare the Midhyamikas with their Buddhist, Naiyiyika, and Sirihkhya opponents, whose systems were almost equally ill-known; and to render the Mddhyamika texts intelligible in terms of Occidental philosophy. The most productive period of Mddhyamika studies commenced with the publication of Th. Stcherbatsky's The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana in 1927. The ontological problem, the question of the Absolute in the Midhyamika system, then became central. Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Stanislaw Schayer, and others debated this theme somewhat acrimoniously with Stcherbatsky. La Vallee Poussin's death and World War II interrupted the debate. The task of translating the Prasannapadt was continued by J. W. De Jong,' who also wrote the most lucid of all articles on the Midhyamika conception of the Absolute.2 T. R. V. Murti's The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, published in 1955, continued the work of Stcherbatsky and his opponent-colleagues, and brought the metaphysical phase of investigation to its point of maximum returns. The metaphysical debate has exhibited extreme variety of opinion, and the attempt to describe Midhyamika as an ism has led various people to call it nihilism, negativism, monism, relativism, irrationalism, criticism, and

V.—Polar Concepts and Metaphysical Arguments

V.—Polar Concepts and Metaphysical Arguments Get access C. K. Grant C. K. Grant Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 56, Issue 1, 1 June 1956, Pages 83–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/56.1.83 Published: 21 July 2015

Apologia Pro Vita Sua by John Henry Cardinal Newman, A Grammar of Assent by John Henry Cardinal Newman, The Idea of a University by John Henry Cardinal Newman

Apologia Pro Vita Sua by John Henry Cardinal Newman, A Grammar of Assent by John Henry Cardinal Newman, The Idea of a University by John Henry Cardinal Newman

L'Ascesa a Dio in Duns Scoto by Father Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M. (review)

BOOK REVIEWS511 VAscesa a Dio in Duns Scoto. By Father Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M. (Publicazioni dell'Universitd Cattolica Del S. Cuore. Serie Prima: Scienze Filosofiche , vol. 27). Milan: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero," 1943. Pp. vii, 122. Many of the valuable studies published abroad during the war are now available to students of this country. Among such books that deserve special mention is Bettoni's study on the Scotistic approach to the existence of God. His work takes up many a controversial issue among Scotists regarding Scotus' natural theology. The first chapter is devoted to Scotus attitude toward the argument from motion. For anyone familiar with the criticism of St. Thomas's prima et manifestior via both within and without the Thomistic school, this chapter will prove of especial interest. Like Paulus, Bettoni believes that the opposition between St. Thomas and Scotus has been exaggerated. First of all, both of these scholastics challenge the Averroistic exclusivism which regards physics alone as competent to prove God's existence. They agree, therefore, in attributing this task primarily to metaphysics. St. Thomas, however, tends to favor the argument from motion far more than Scotus does, principally because he understands Aristotle to be speaking of motion in a metaphysical sense. Scotus, on the contrary, understood motion according to the astrophysical Averroistic interpretation it had in his day. Hence the Subtle Doctor levels certain criticisms against the argument though he does not reject it entirely, contrary to what Chossat, Borgmann and others maintain. The weakness of the argument from motion lies in its inability to transcend the physical order. Hence it is inferior to the metaphysical arguments and, of itself, cannot give a true picture of God. Consequently, Scotus does not bother with developing the kineseological proof, but turns to the more fruitful field of metaphysics. According to Bettoni, Scotus maintains the essential validity of the Averroistic-Aristotelian approach and affirms his belief in the validity of the principle, "Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur." His analysis of this principle according to Scotus, seems to us to be rather weak. This controversial point, we believe, merits further study. Bettoni differs from Paulus, however, in insisting that while it may be true that the formulation of the argument from motion in the Summa theologica oí St. Thomas can be interpreted in a metaphysical sense, it is also quite true that it is open to a physical interpretation. In view of the tendencies of the times, it is easy to understand how even Thomistic interpreters, such as Cajetan, could see the argument from motion in that light. Scotus would have no difficulty, Bettoni declares, in accepting the argument in a metaphysical setting. Hence there is an essential unanimity of the two great scholastics on this question. In his second chapter Bettoni takes up another controversial question, namely whether or not Scotus admitted the Anselmian argument or was influenced to any great degree by it. He disagrees with Beimond, Borgmann, and others, who restrict the "coloratio" of the Anselmian argument to the problem of God's infinity and declare it is not involved in Scotus' proof for God's existence. Scotus, he argues, admits the validity of an inference of God's actual existence from the possibility of such existence, but he differs 512BOOK REVIEWS from St. Anselm in this that he demands that this possibility of existence be rigorously demonstrated and not merely taken for granted. Since an a priori demonstration of this possibility is out of the question for us in our present state of existence, Scotus has recourse to an a posteriori demonstration.. St. Anselm's mistake, then, was to regard his proof as a priori. Interesting as is Father Bettoni's interpretation, we wonder if he has not overlooked the technical meaning of "colorado." (See for instance, P. Boehner 's commentary on the Nature and Origins of Scientism in Franciscan Studies, V (1945), p. 314). In discussing the metaphysical proof for God's existence, Bettoni has occasion to correct some of the misconceptions of Gilson in regard to Scotus' natural theology. Readers will find chapters four and five interesting. The former gives a critical evaluation of the proof selected by Scotus. The latter...

Date and Stage Arrangements of the ‘Prometheia’

Although Professor Murray in his edition of Aeschylus' plays puts Prometheus between Persae (472 b.c.) and Septem (467 b.c.), many students nowadays show a tendency to place it in the last period of the poet's work. For instance Mr. W. F. J. Knight (J.H.S. lviii, 1938, p. 53) says:‘It is important to regard all the extant plays of Aeschylus, and at least some of the plays that are lost, as a single sequence of developing poetic thought. Accordingly, at the end, when Aeschylus solves the hardest problem of all, the marriage of Heaven and Earth, something like the Prometheia with a satanic Zeus might almost have been predicted…. In fact the metaphysical argument may even have some force in determining the date and authenticity of the Prometheia.

The Commutative Law of Addition, and Infinity

NEITHER Dr. Hilbert nor the reviewer make any suggestion that the commutative law of addition is best proved as a deduction from the laws of multiplication. But the laws of multiplication are so often treated as deductions from those of addition that it is interesting to have a case of the converse procedure. The fact that both these operations and their laws have been treated independently and in a strictly logical manner by Dedekind, Peano, and others is, of course, perfectly well known to all who have paid any attention to this part of mathematics. Whether Dedekind's critics have really avoided metaphysical arguments without at the same time making metaphysical assumptions is a question on which a difference of opinion is permissible.

The Human Nature Club Psychology of Reasoning

MR. THORNDIKE, already favourably known by his ingenious experimental studies of animal intelligence, has achieved a very fair measure of success in the bold attempt to compose an easy introduction to psychology in dialogue form. His little work is bright and interesting, and should be found an excellent introduction to the genetic study of mental plocesses. In particular, it is well adapted to be taken up as a first course preliminary to the study of Prof. James' great “Principles of Psychology.” In some respects Mr. Thorndike, perhaps, defers too much to the authority of his eminent countryman. When his book reaches a second edition he might do well to add to the chapter in which Prof James' well-known theory of the emotions is expounded some indication of the grave difficulties which beset the theory, and the flaws of the reasoning by which it is supported. Perhaps, too, he will see reason to modify the passage in which he repeats certain weak metaphysical arguments of the professor in favour of the immortality of the soul. Mr. Thorndike's one really weak point is his style. Dialogue, to be successful, should never be a direct imitation of actual speech, still less of a type of speech like that of Mr. Thorndike's characters, which is at onceundignified, ungraceful, and occasionally gravely inaccurate, as, e.g., when the brain is spoken of as “just a ‘lot’ of nerve-cells,” an expression as unfortunate as it is inelegant.

The Size of Atoms 1

FOUR lines of argument founded on observation have led to the conclusion that atoms or molecules are not inconceivably, not immeasurably small. I use the words “inconceivably” and “immeasurably” advisedly. That which is measurable is not inconceivable, and therefore the two words put together constitute a tautology. We leave inconceivableness in fact to metaphysicians. Nothing that we can measure is inconceivably large or inconceivably small in physical science. It may be difficult to understand the numbers expressing the magnitude, but whether it be very large or very small there is nothing inconceivable in the nature of the thing because of its greatness or smallness, or in our views and appreciation and numerical expression of the magnitude. The general result of the four lines of reasoning to which I have referred, founded respectively on the undulatory theory of light, on the phenomena of contact electricity, on capillary attraction, and on the kinetic theory of gases, agrees in showing that the atoms or molecules of ordinary matter must be something like the 1/10,000,000, or from the 1/10,000,000 to the 1/100,000,000 of a centimetre in diameter. I speak somewhat vaguely, and I do so, not inadvertently, when I speak of atoms and molecules. I must ask the chemists to forgive me if I even abuse the words and apply a misnomer occasionally. The chemists do not know what is to be the atom; for instance, whether hydrogen gas is to consist of two pieces of matter in union constituting one molecule, and these molecules flying about; or whether single molecules each indivisible, or at all events undivided in chemical action, constitute the structure. I shall not go into any such questions at all, but merely take the broad view that matter, although we may conceive it to be infinitely divisible, is not infinitely divisible without decomposition. Just as a building of brick may be divided into parts, into a part containing 1000 bricks, and another part containing 2500 bricks, and those parts viewed largely may be said to be similar or homogeneous; but if you divide the matter of a brick building into spaces of nine inches thick, and then think of subdividing it farther, you find you have come to something which is atomic, that is, indivisible without destroying the elements of the structure. The question of the molecular structure of a building does not necessarily involve the question, Can a brick be divided into parts, and can those parts be divided into much smaller parts? and so on. It used to be a favourite subject for metaphysical argument ammongst the schoolmen whether matter is infinitely divisible, or whether space is infinitely divisible, which some maintained, whilst others maintained only that matter is not infinitely divisible, and demonstrated that there is nothing inconceivable in the infinite subdivision of space. Why, even time was divided into moments (time-atoms !), and the idea of continuity of time was involved in a halo of argument, and metaphysical—I will not say absurdity—but metaphysical word-fencing, which was no doubt very amusing for want of a more instructive subject of study. There is in sober earnest this very important thing to be attended to, however, that in chronometry as in geometry, we have absolute continuity, and it is simply an inconceivable absurdity to suppose a limit to smallness whether of time or of space. But on the other hand, whether we can divide a piece of glass into pieces smaller than the 1/100,000 of a centimetre in diameter, and so on without breaking it up, and making it cease to have the properties of glass, just as a brick has not the property of a brick wall, is a very practical question, and a question which we are quite disposed to enter upon.