Mental States Of Others Research Articles

Social Competence in Adolescents with Different Level of Theory of Mind

The aim of this study was to explore the role of theory of mind - the ability to attribute mental states to other people to explain their behavior - in the development of social competence and prosocial behavior in adolescence. It is assumed that there is a difference in the manifestation of prosocial behavior and social competence in adolescents with different levels of theory of mind. Participants were 95 adolescents aged 12–15 years (M=13.8; SD=9.5; 46 girls). We used “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test to assess the social-perceptual component of theory of mind (assessment of the recognition of mental states by facial expressions) and the task of understanding higher-order false beliefs to assess the socio-cognitive component. We assessed the adolescent’s prosocial behavior during a group game of puzzles and calculated the ratio of the number of prosocial acts to time in seconds. Teachers assessed the social behavior of adolescents using a specially designed questionnaire. We also used a sociometric method to study the popularity of adolescents in the group. The results obtained testify to the different contribution of the socio-perceptual and socio-cognitive components of theory of mind to the development of social competence of adolescents. Adolescents who better understand the mental states of others and predict their behavior are more likely to act prosocially, are more persuasive and successful in mastering the school curriculum. Teachers are rated those who better recognize mental states by facial expressions as more helpful and popular among their peers. Adolescents with low level of theory of mind are rejected by their peers.

Why Theory of Mind Is Not Enough to Understand Others?

Theory of Mind (ToM), understood as the ability to intuit one's own mental states and those of others, has been extensively researched in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. The psychological literature shows a direct relationship between ToM and the (self) reflective capacity of consciousness, a product of the cognitive effort that implies the understanding of one's own subjectivity and that of others. In this sense, ToM has received a strong cognitive influence, sub-dimensioning other dimensions involved in the intersubjective process of mutual understanding. Based on the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of intuition in phenomenology, we propose in this paper that the process of understanding one's own mental states and the mental states of others constitutes, mainly, a pre-reflective and intuitive experience, and that it is only possible to move on to reflection at a later time. In short, with contributions from the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and phenomenological intuition, the aim is to complement the theoretical bases of ToM in psychology; a theory that, without incorporating elements of phenomenology, remains incomplete.

Challenges of measuring empathic accuracy: A mentalizing versus experience-sharing paradigm.

Empathic accuracy, the ability to accurately infer the mental states of others, is essential to successful interpersonal relationships. Perceivers can interpret targets' emotional experiences by decoding facial and voice cues (mentalizing) or by using their own feelings as referents (experience-sharing). We examined the relative efficacy of these processes via a replication and extension of Zhou et al. (Psychol Sci., 28, 2017, 482) who found experience-sharing to be more successful but undervalued. Participants estimated targets' emotional ratings in response to positive, neutral and negative images in mentalizing or experience-sharing conditions. Our analysis of absolute magnitudes of error showed similar levels of accuracy across process conditions (a non-replication of Zhou et al.); however, our exploratory analysis of directional variation across valence using raw scores revealed a pattern of conservative estimates for affective stimuli, which was accentuated in the mentalizing condition. Thus, our exploratory analysis lends conceptual support to Zhou et al.'s finding that experience-sharing represents the more successful process, and we replicated their finding that it was nevertheless undervalued. Extending Zhou et al., we also found that empathic accuracy was predicted by individual differences in fiction-exposure. Future research may further examine the impact of individual differences and stimulus properties in the employment of empathic inferencing strategies.

The Limits of Simulation for Understanding Mental Illness: Defending a Steinian Theory of Empathy

AbstractI defend Edith Stein's theory of empathy as an alternative to simulation theories of empathy. Simulation theories of empathy involve using one's own cognitive resources to replicate the mental states of others by imagining being in their situation. I argue that this understanding of empathy is problematic within the context of mental healthcare because it can lead to the co-opting and assimilation of another person's experiences. In response, I maintain that Stein's theory is preferable because it involves appreciating others’ experiences as it is for them, and this alternative account of empathy avoids the assimilation of the experiences of others.

Reasoning about mental states under uncertainty

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer the mental states of others, is integral to facilitating healthy social interactions. People can reason about the mental states of others even with limited or (sometimes) inconsistent information. However, little is known about how people make inferences about the mental states of others under uncertainty, and what features of information are important in aiding mental state reasoning. In the current study, we conducted three unique experiments that alter participant's uncertainty when engaging in ToM tests. In Experiment 1, we simultaneously manipulated both the amount and consistency of information available in social stimuli presented to 59 participants. In Experiments 2 and 3, we aimed to decipher which feature of social stimuli is more conducive to mental state reasoning. Experiment 2 manipulated only the amount of information available to 47 participants, while Experiment 3 manipulated only the consistency of information available to 46 participants. Using both frequentist and Bayesian statistics, results confirmed that manipulating the amount and consistency of information alters ToM performance. Exploratory analysis comparing the effects of the amount and consistency of information suggests that the effects of the consistency of information seem to be stronger than those of the amount of information. Taken together, all three experiments suggest that while both the amount and consistency of information are important features of social stimuli-the consistency of information available is more salient when inferring mental states of others. These findings are discussed in relation to information theory and have important implications for creating enriched social stimuli, which may enhance mental state reasoning in individuals with social deficits.

Mentalizing strategies for navigating the social world in adolescence

AbstractMentalizing—the ability to represent or infer the mental states of others—continues to develop into and throughout adolescence. Increased mentalizing sophistication during adolescence is thought to support the navigation of increasingly complex social relationships and contexts. However, developmental science has yet to aggregate the seemingly disparate findings from research relating mentalizing to functional outcomes, such as internalizing mental health concerns, into clear and comprehensive theories that explain individual variability during adolescence. In this review, we describe approaches that have been used to measure mentalizing during adolescence and propose a methodological framework to measure mentalizing as a multi‐dimensional process that continues to develop as a response to the environment during adolescence.

Shared consciousness and asymmetry

It is widely held that there is an asymmetry between our access to our minds and our access to others’ minds. Philosophers in the literature tend to focus on the asymmetry between our access to our mental states and our access to those mental states of others that are not shared by us. What if a mental state can have multiple subjects? Is there still an asymmetry between our access to our mental states and our access to those mental states of others that are also ours? In this paper, I discuss the implications of a case of shared consciousness—the case of the Hogan twins—for asymmetry. I start by clarifying the notion of asymmetry. Here I develop a characterization of asymmetry and argue that it is preferable to the standard approaches in the literature. I then present the twins’ case and argue that it does not threaten asymmetry. I close by drawing some lessons.

Systematic review and meta-analysis on the association between theory of mind and alcohol problems in non-clinical samples.

Deficits in theory of mind (ToM) found in individuals with alcohol use disorder (AUD) are often thought to result from prolonged heavy alcohol use. However, links between deficits in ToM and greater alcohol problems are often also present in non-clinical samples (e.g., adolescents and young adults) who may not have a similar long-lasting history of alcohol consumption as individuals with AUD. The current study is the first to systematically review and meta-analyze results from studies examining associations between lower ToM and greater alcohol problems in non-clinical samples. Evidence of reliable associations in these non-clinical samples would support the idea that deficits in ToM might also precede the emergence of AUD. PsycINFO, PubMed, and Google Scholar were searched according to our preregistered International Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (PROSPERO) protocol (CRD42021225392) and following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) methodology. We systematically reviewed sample characteristics and ToM measures in identified articles. We then meta-analyzed the findings of association between ToM and alcohol problems in non-clinical samples using random effects models. Nearly all studies used a measure of ToM that assessed the ability to infer the mental states of others based on eye region cues. Meta-analytic results demonstrated that lower ToM was associated with more alcohol problems (r=-0.16, k=6, CI=[-0.26, -0.04], p < 0.01, Q=15.55, I2 = 67.85), and there was significant heterogeneity across studies. Gender (ß=0.0003, CI=[-0.006, 0.007], z=0.09, p=0.93), age (ß=-0.008, CI=[-0.03, 0.01], z=-0.82, p=0.42), and study quality (ß=-0.10, CI=[-0.35, 0.15], z=-0.82, p=0.41) did not explain the heterogeneity. In non-clinical samples, lower ToM is associated with more alcohol problems, indicative of a small effect size. Future longitudinal studies are needed to explore whether socio-cognitive deficits may also serve as a risk factor for alcohol misuse.

I Am Bold, and Do Not Care for Social Norms: The Role of Faux Pas Recognition in the Relation Between Psychopathy and Aggression

ABSTRACT Psychopathy is found to be associated with aggression. However, the role of “understanding the mental states of others” in this relation is not clearly understood yet. The current study aimed to increase our understanding of a specific ability of understanding the mental state of others, namely recognizing a faux pas, and understand the relation of this “social misstep” in self-reported aggressive behavior. The sample consisted of 105 individuals from the community (both males and females) who were tested with the Faux Pas test and several self-report questionnaires assessing triarchic psychopathic personality traits and aggression. We found a positive relationship between the triarchic constructs and self-reported proactive and reactive aggression. Additionally, although all psychopathy constructs were negatively related to self-reported empathy, only the boldness trait was negatively associated with faux pas recognition. No mediation effect of faux pas on the relation between psychopathy and aggression was found. Current findings underline the importance of differentiating different Theory of Mind and empathic abilities in relation to psychopathy and aggression, which is essential to develop effective interventions.

Theory of mind profile and cerebellar alterations in remitted bipolar disorder 1 and 2: a comparison study.

The literature on social cognition abilities in bipolar disorder (BD) is controversial about the occurrence of theory of mind (ToM) alterations. In addition to other cerebral structures, such as the frontal and limbic areas, the processing of socially relevant stimuli has also been attributed to the cerebellum, which has been demonstrated to be involved in the above-mentioned disorder. Nevertheless, the cerebellar contribution to ToM deficits in bipolar patients needs to be elucidated further. To this aim, two tests assessing different components of ToM were used to evaluate the ability to appreciate affective and mental states of others in 17 individuals with a diagnosis of BD type 1 (BD1) and 13 with BD type 2 (BD2), both in the euthymic phase, compared to healthy matched controls. Cerebellar gray matter (GM) volumes were extracted and compared between BD1 and controls and BD2 and controls by using voxel-based morphometry. The results showed that BD1 patients were compromised in the cognitive and advanced components of ToM, while the BD2 ToM profile resulted in a more widespread compromise, also involving affective and automatic components. Both overlapping and differing areas of cerebellar GM reduction were found. The two groups of patients presented a pattern of GM reduction in cerebellar portions that are known to be involved in the affective and social domains, such as the vermis and Crus I and Crus II. Interestingly, in both BD1 and BD2, positive correlations were detected between lower ToM scores and decreased volumes in the cerebellum. Overall, BD2 patients showed a more compromised ToM profile and greater cerebellar impairment than BD1 patients. The different patterns of structural abnormalities may account for the different ToM performances evidenced, thus leading to divergent profiles between BD1 and BD2.

A narrative sequencing and mentalizing training for adults with autism: A pilot study.

Adults diagnosed with autism experience difficulties with understanding the mental states of others, or themselves (mentalizing) and with adequately sequencing personal stories (narrative coherence). Given that the posterior cerebellum is implicated in both skills, as well as in the etiology of autism, we developed a narrative sequencing and mentalizing training for autistic adults. Participants with an official autism diagnosis were randomly assigned to a Training group (n = 17) or a waiting-list Control group (n = 15). The Training group took part in six weekly sessions in groups of three participants lasting each about 60 min. During training, participants had to (re)tell stories from the perspective of the original storyteller and answer questions that required mentalizing. We found significant improvements in mentalizing about others’ beliefs and in narrative coherence for the Training group compared to the Control group immediately after the training compared to before the training. Almost all participants from the Training group expressed beneficial effects of the training on their mood and half of the participants reported positive effects on their self-confidence in social situations. All participants recommended the current training to others. Results are discussed in light of cerebellar theories on sequencing of social actions during mentalizing. Further improvements to the program are suggested. Our results highlight the potential clinical utility of adopting a neuroscience-informed approach to developing novel therapeutic interventions for autistic populations.

Evidence of Audience Design in Amnesia: Adaptation in Gesture but Not Speech.

Speakers design communication for their audience, providing more information in both speech and gesture when their listener is naïve to the topic. We test whether the hippocampal declarative memory system contributes to multimodal audience design. The hippocampus, while traditionally linked to episodic and relational memory, has also been linked to the ability to imagine the mental states of others and use language flexibly. We examined the speech and gesture use of four patients with hippocampal amnesia when describing how to complete everyday tasks (e.g., how to tie a shoe) to an imagined child listener and an adult listener. Although patients with amnesia did not increase their total number of words and instructional steps for the child listener, they did produce representational gestures at significantly higher rates for the imagined child compared to the adult listener. They also gestured at similar frequencies to neurotypical peers, suggesting that hand gesture can be a meaningful communicative resource, even in the case of severe declarative memory impairment. We discuss the contributions of multiple memory systems to multimodal audience design and the potential of gesture to act as a window into the social cognitive processes of individuals with neurologic disorders.

The relationship between theory of mind and executive functions in major depressive disorders: A review.

Patients suffering from major depressive disorder (MDD) experience difficulties in multiple cognitive and affective abilities. A large body of literature has argued that MDD patients show impaired executive functions (EFs) and deficits in theory of mind (ToM), the ability to infer the mental states of others. However, the relationship between ToM and EFs has been poorly investigated. The aim of this review is to provide an overview of studies that evaluated the association between ToM and EFs in patients with MDD diagnosis. A literature review was conducted to identify all published studies in which ToM and EFs measures were administered to individuals with MDD and in which the relationship between these two domains was investigated. Eleven studies were included, and for each study, we discussed the findings related to ToM, EFs, and the nature of the link between these two aspects. Most of the studies reported that patients with MDD, compared with healthy controls, showed significant impairments in both ToM and EFs abilities. Moreover, this review indicates the presence of a significant association between these two domains in MDD patients, supporting the evidences that executive functioning is important to perform ToM tasks. Although the results that emerged are interesting, the relationship between ToM and EFs in MDD needs further investigation.

Therapeutic Alliance as Active Inference: The Role of Therapeutic Touch and Biobehavioural Synchrony in Musculoskeletal Care.

Touch is recognised as crucial for survival, fostering cooperative communication, accelerating recovery, reducing hospital stays, and promoting overall wellness and the therapeutic alliance. In this hypothesis and theory paper, we present an entwined model that combines touch for alignment and active inference to explain how the brain develops “priors” necessary for the health care provider to engage with the patient effectively. We appeal to active inference to explain the empirically integrative neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite synchronous relationships through touch. Specifically, we offer a formal framework for understanding – and explaining – the role of therapeutic touch and hands-on care in developing a therapeutic alliance and synchrony between health care providers and their patients in musculoskeletal care. We first review the crucial importance of therapeutic touch and its clinical role in facilitating the formation of a solid therapeutic alliance and in regulating allostasis. We then consider how touch is used clinically – to promote cooperative communication, demonstrate empathy, overcome uncertainty, and infer the mental states of others – through the lens of active inference. We conclude that touch plays a crucial role in achieving successful clinical outcomes and adapting previous priors to create intertwined beliefs. The ensuing framework may help healthcare providers in the field of musculoskeletal care to use hands-on care to strengthen the therapeutic alliance, minimise prediction errors (a.k.a., free energy), and thereby promote recovery from physical and psychological impairments.

Evidence of assortative mating for theory of mind via facial expressions but not language.

Assortative mating is a phenomenon in which romantic partners typically resemble each other at a level greater than chance. There is converging evidence that social behaviours are subject to assortative mating, though less is known regarding social cognition. Social functioning requires the ability to identify and understand the mental states of others, i.e., theory of mind. The present study recruited a sample of 102 heterosexual couples via an online survey to test if theory of mind as measured using facial expressions (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test) or language (Stiller-Dunbar Stories Task) is associated with assortative mating. Results provide evidence of assortative mating for theory of mind via facial expressions, though there was no such effect for theory of mind via language. Assortative mating for theory of mind via facial expressions was not moderated by length of relationship nor by partner similarity in age, educational attainment, or religiosity, all variables relevant to social stratification. This suggests assortative mating for theory of mind via facial expressions is better explained by partners being alike at the start of their relationship (initial assortment) rather than becoming similar through sustained social interaction (convergence), and by people seeking out partners that are like themselves (active assortment) rather than simply pairing with those from similar demographic backgrounds (social homogamy).

Participation of visual association areas in social processing emerges when rTPJ is inhibited.

During a social evaluation, the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) plays an important role according to its contribution in making inferences about the mental states of others. However, what is the neural response if rTPJ function is inhibited during a mentalizing task? In this study, participants played the Dictator Game with two confederates: one playing cooperation (C) and other playing non-cooperation (NC) role and then they were scanned during a mentalizing test. However, we inhibited rTPJ using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) after they played the game and before they were scanned. In this test, participants read negative (Neg) or positive (Pos) personal situations and then they watched confederate's pictures. Images from the TMS group were compared against controls with no TMS stimulation. After statistical comparison, we found a significantly higher activity in right and left visual association areas (BA 18) during the NCPos > NCNeg condition in the TMS group compared with the No-TMS group. Same visual association areas have been described before when participants are processing visual emotional information or when making a fast social categorization. This could reflect a neural mechanism of socio - emotional categorization that emerges after rTPJ inhibition.

Does chess-playing relate to theory of mind? An examination of the interrelations among theory of mind, perspective-taking, and empathic concern in chess-players (¿El juego de ajedrez tiene relación con la teoría de la mente? Un análisis de las interrelaciones entre la teoría de la mente, la toma de perspectiva, y el interés empático de los jugadores de ajedrez)

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states such as thoughts, desires and intentions to oneself and others. ToM is important for social interactions because having an accurate representation of the mental states of others can guide social approaches. One strategy for promoting social thinking might be to engage others in chess. It seems likely that the ability to understand one’s own and others’ mental states could be important in understanding opponents’ views. The present study examined relations between two types of theory of mind (constructivist theory of mind and embedded false belief understanding), empathic concern and perspective-taking skills with chess-playing. Participants included 233 adults, ages 18 to 70 years (M = 26.27, SD = 11.73). Results of regression analyses indicated that frequency of chess-playing predicted performance on ToM measures, even with age, income, empathic concern and perspective-taking entered as simultaneous predictors. Study implications and applications are discussed.

Intentional Understanding Through Action Coordination in Early Triadic Interactions.

The ability to understand the behaviour of other people in intentional terms has been traditionally explained by resorting to inferential mechanisms that would allow individuals to access the internal mental states of others. In recent years, the second-person perspective has established itself as a theoretical alternative to traditional models. It argues that intentional understanding is an embodied, natural, and immediate process that occurs in situations such as face-to-face early dyadic interactions between adults and infants. In this article, we argue that the way in which the second-person perspective regards body and object is problematic. Based on psychological evidence that demonstrates the constitutive role of the body and objects for cognitive development, we propose the foundations of an ecological-enactive, semiotic and pragmatic model of intentional understanding. We argue that intentional understanding should be conceived as the skilful coordination of behaviours that subjects come to enact in interactive settings, following the dynamics of bodily and material practices that have acquired normative force over time.

A Brain-Inspired Theory of Mind Spiking Neural Network for Reducing Safety Risks of Other Agents.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly applied to complex tasks that involve interaction with multiple agents. Such interaction-based systems can lead to safety risks. Due to limited perception and prior knowledge, agents acting in the real world may unconsciously hold false beliefs and strategies about their environment, leading to safety risks in their future decisions. For humans, we can usually rely on the high-level theory of mind (ToM) capability to perceive the mental states of others, identify risk-inducing errors, and offer our timely help to keep others away from dangerous situations. Inspired by the biological information processing mechanism of ToM, we propose a brain-inspired theory of mind spiking neural network (ToM-SNN) model to enable agents to perceive such risk-inducing errors inside others' mental states and make decisions to help others when necessary. The ToM-SNN model incorporates the multiple brain areas coordination mechanisms and biologically realistic spiking neural networks (SNNs) trained with Reward-modulated Spike-Timing-Dependent Plasticity (R-STDP). To verify the effectiveness of the ToM-SNN model, we conducted various experiments in the gridworld environments with random agents' starting positions and random blocking walls. Experimental results demonstrate that the agent with the ToM-SNN model selects rescue behavior to help others avoid safety risks based on self-experience and prior knowledge. To the best of our knowledge, this study provides a new perspective to explore how agents help others avoid potential risks based on bio-inspired ToM mechanisms and may contribute more inspiration toward better research on safety risks.

Altruism under Stress: Cortisol Negatively Predicts Charitable Giving and Neural Value Representations Depending on Mentalizing Capacity.

Altruism, defined as costly other-regarding behavior, varies considerably across people and contexts. One prominent context in which people frequently must decide on how to socially act is under stress. How does stress affect altruistic decision-making and through which neurocognitive mechanisms? To address these questions, we assessed neural activity associated with charitable giving under stress. Human participants (males and females) completed a charitable donation task before and after they underwent either a psychosocial stressor or a control manipulation, while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging. As the ability to infer other people's mental states (i.e., mentalizing) predicts prosocial giving and may be susceptible to stress, we examined whether stress effects on altruism depend on participants' general capacity to mentalize, as assessed in an independent task. Although our stress manipulation per se had no influence on charitable giving, increases in the stress hormone cortisol were associated with reductions in donations in participants with high mentalizing capacity, but not in low mentalizers. Multivariate neural response patterns in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were less predictive of postmanipulation donations in high mentalizers with increased cortisol, indicating decreased value coding, and this effect mediated the (moderated) association between cortisol increases and reduced donations. Our findings provide novel insights into the modulation of altruistic decision-making by suggesting an impact of the stress hormone cortisol on mentalizing-related neurocognitive processes, which in turn results in decreased altruism. The DLPFC appears to play a key role in mediating this cortisol-related shift in altruism.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Altruism is a fundamental building block of our society. Emerging evidence indicates a major role of acute stress and stress-related neuromodulators in social behavior and decision-making. How and through which mechanisms stress may impact altruism remains elusive. We observed that the stress hormone cortisol was linked to diminished altruistic behavior. This effect was mediated by reduced value representations in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and critically depended on the individual capacity to infer mental states of others. Our findings provide novel insights into the modulation of human altruism linked to stress-hormone dynamics and into the involved sociocognitive and neural mechanisms, with important implications for future developments of more targeted interventions for stress-related decrements in social behavior and social cognition.