Mental Model Theory Research Articles

The modulation of disjunctive assertions

The theory of mental models postulates that disjunctions of the sort, A or B, where A and B are sensible everyday clauses, have a core meaning that allows an inclusive interpretation, referring to three possibilities: A and not-B, not-A and B, and A and B. The meaning of the clauses and knowledge can modulate this meaning by blocking the construction of at least one model of a possibility-for example, "Rui is playing tennis or he is surfing" blocks the model of Rui doing both activities. This theory is implemented in a computer program. Three experiments investigated the core interpretation and interpretations in which the contents of the clauses should block the model of A and B (as in the preceding example), the model of A and not-B, or the model of not-A and B. In Experiment 1, the participants listed the possibilities for each of the four sorts of disjunction. The results corroborated the predicted modulations. In Experiment 2, these predicted interpretations governed the conclusions that participants accepted from disjunctions and categorical premises. In Experiment 3, the predicted interpretations yielded reliable effects on the conclusions that the participants drew for themselves. We relate these results to theories of reasoning.

A Priori True and False Conditionals.

The theory of mental models postulates that meaning and knowledge can modulate the interpretation of conditionals. The theory's computer implementation implied that certain conditionals should be true or false without the need for evidence. Three experiments corroborated this prediction. In Experiment 1, nearly 500 participants evaluated 24 conditionals as true or false, andthey justified their judgments by completing sentences of the form, It is impossible that A and ___ appropriately. In Experiment 2, participants evaluated 16 conditionals and provided their own justifications, which tended to be explanations rather than logical justifications. In Experiment 3, the participants also evaluated as possible or impossible each of the four cases in the partitions of 16 conditionals: A and C, A and not-C, not-A and C, not-A and not-C. These evaluations corroborated the model theory. We consider the implications of these results for theories of reasoning based on logic, probabilistic logic, and suppositions.

Illusions in Reasoning

Some philosophers argue that the principles of human reasoning are impeccable, and that mistakes are no more than momentary lapses in "information processing". This article makes a case to the contrary. It shows that human reasoners commit systematic fallacies. The theory of mental models predicts these errors. It postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities to which the premises of an inference refer. But, their models usually represent what is true in a possibility, not what is false. This procedure reduces the load on working memory, and for the most part it yields valid inferences. However, as a computer program implementing the theory revealed, it leads to fallacious conclusions for certain inferences--those for which it is crucial to represent what is false in a possibility. Experiments demonstrate the variety of these fallacies and contrast them with control problems, which reasoners tend to get right. The fallacies can be compelling illusions, and they occur in reasoning based on sentential connectives such as "if" and "or", quantifiers such as "all the artists" and "some of the artists", on deontic relations such as "permitted" and "obligated", and causal relations such as "causes" and "allows". After we have reviewed the principal results, we consider the potential for alternative accounts to explain these illusory inferences. And we show how the illusions illuminate the nature of human rationality.

There Can be a Syntax of Thought Related to Logical Forms

Abstract Nowadays, a very important theory, the mental models theory, is demonstrating that it is able to explain most of the results in reasoning experiments reported by the cognitive science literature. However, this has a consequence. The mental models theory is mainly focused on content and meaning, and its theses can lead to reject the idea that syntax plays a role in the human mind and that reasoning is logical. But, in this paper, I try to show that it is possible to accept the basic framework of the mental models theory and, at the same time, to continue to claim that there are syntactic and formal logical processes coherent with the way our mind works. To do that, I argue that, even accepting that the mental models theory describes correctly the processes why certain combinations of possibilities are detected, it can be stated that the relationships between such combinations indicated by the theory are consistent with, for example, the modal axiomatic system K.

Mental models, communication, and engagement in marine projects

AbstractIn a hypothetical decision-making situation in which a unique truth exists and each party’s aim in acquiring knowledge is to approach the truth, argumentation would be unnecessary because the best scientific theory would win the argument. Likewise, if truth is irrelevant and a perfect persuasion method is available, argumentation would also be pointless, because arguing parties, each possessing the perfect recipe, would lead a third party to switch sides endlessly. In the real world, argumentation matters because a unique truth rarely exists, information can be uncertain or vague, aims are often ambiguous if not contradictory, and acquiring knowledge can have other purposes besides approaching the truth. Marine scientists are increasingly expected to contribute to complex decision-making by providing not only scientific evidence, but also impact in the form of effective communication and persuasion. Here we review insights from different disciplines on how humans organise knowledge, beliefs, opinions, assumptions and worldviews, how these interrelate and how they affect decision-making as well as the reception of information. By focussing on the theory of mental models and the Causal Layered Analysis we also show how the structure underlying the organisation of scientific and non-scientific knowledge can be reduced to a fairly common framework. We conclude by reviewing some tools a marine scientist can employ in a stakeholder engagement process in order to better understand the audience to which scientific information needs to be delivered.

Chrysippus’ Indemonstrables and the Semantic Mental Models

According to standard logic, only one of the five indemonstrables proposed by Chrysippus of Soli is actually indemonstrable. The other four schemata are demonstra­ble in that logic. The question hence is, if four of them are not really indemonstrable, why Chrysippus considered them to be so. Lopez-Astorga showed that, if we ignore standard propositional calculus and assume that a current cognitive theory, the mental logic theory, truly describes human reasoning, it can be explained why Chrysippus thought that all of his indemonstrables were so basic. However, in this paper, I try to argue that the mental logic theory is not the only framework that can account for that. In particular, I hold that another important reasoning theory at present, the mental models theory, can offer an explanation in that regard as well.

Model-based learning: a synthesis of theory and research

This article provides a review of theoretical approaches to model-based learning and related research. In accordance with the definition of model-based learning as an acquisition and utilization of mental models by learners, the first section centers on mental model theory. In accordance with epistemology of modeling the issues of semantics, ontology, and learning with models as well as structural aspects and functions of mental models (such as simplification, idealization, analogy, simulation) will be discussed. Starting with early theoretical approaches in the realm of cognitive science, the emphasis will be on recent theoretical developments in the field of reinforcement learning that distinguish between model-based and model-free learning. These new theoretical approaches confirm, to a large extent, the early theories of mental models but they also contribute new insights in age-related aspects of model-based learning. The second main section of the article provides a review of basic and applied research on model-based learning. A short overview of basic research on mental models aims at sketching an “overall picture” followed by a more detailed description and discussion of findings in the field of instructional research, especially with regard to K-12 STEM education and the support of model-based learning through teaching and technology.

Logical reasoning versus information processing in the dual-strategy model of reasoning.

One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based strategies such as mental model theory and statistical strategies underlying probabilistic models. The dual-strategy model, proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b), which suggests that people might have access to both kinds of strategy has been supported by several recent studies. These have shown that statistical reasoners make inferences based on using information about premises in order to generate a likelihood estimate of conclusion probability. However, while results concerning counterexample reasoners are consistent with a counterexample detection model, these results could equally be interpreted as indicating a greater sensitivity to logical form. In order to distinguish these 2 interpretations, in Studies 1 and 2, we presented reasoners with Modus ponens (MP) inferences with statistical information about premise strength and in Studies 3 and 4, naturalistic MP inferences with premises having many disabling conditions. Statistical reasoners accepted the MP inference more often than counterexample reasoners in Studies 1 and 2, while the opposite pattern was observed in Studies 3 and 4. Results show that these strategies must be defined in terms of information processing, with no clear relations to "logical" reasoning. These results have additional implications for the underlying debate about the nature of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record

Discounting and Augmentation in Causal Conditional Reasoning: Causal Models or Shallow Encoding?

Recent research comparing mental models theory and causal Bayes nets for their ability to account for discounting and augmentation inferences in causal conditional reasoning had some limitations. One of the experiments used an ordinal scale and multiple items and analysed the data by subjects and items. This procedure can create a variety of problems that can be resolved by using an appropriate cumulative link function mixed models approach in which items are treated as random effects. Experiment 1 replicated this earlier experiment and analysed the results using appropriate data analytic techniques. Although successfully replicating earlier research, the pattern of results could be explained by a much simpler “shallow encoding” hypothesis. Experiment 2 introduced a manipulation to critically test this hypothesis. The results favoured the causal Bayes nets predictions and not shallow encoding and were not consistent with mental models theory. Experiment 1 provided qualified support for the causal Bayes net approach using appropriate statistics because it also replicated the failure to observe one of the predicted main effects. Experiment 2 discounted one plausible explanation for this failure. While within the limited goals that were set for these experiments they were successful, more research is required to account for the pattern of findings using this paradigm.

Inferential basing and mental models

In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less empirically risky.

A Mental Models Perspective on Designing Information Visualizations for Political Communication

Information visualizations (InfoVis) in the context of political communication are designed to convey a broad understanding of socio-political data and their multitude of intricately connected variables to the public. A cognitive framework to explain and empirically study how users acquire and organize their internal representations gained from InfoVis systems with multiple perspectives is still missing. In this paper we discuss the theory of mental models and its consequences for the design and research of InfoVis interfaces. Especially for multidimensional data, it is a challenge to design accessible and conceptually consistent InfoVis interfaces to support the local and global coherence of the recipients’ mental models. In this paper we exemplarily show how specific design features, i.e. advance organizers, narrative visualizations, seamless transitions, and multiple coordinated views can accomplish this in the field of political communication and its complex data.

The Problems of the Mental Logic with the Double Negation: The Necessity of a Semantic Approach

Abstract The double negation has always been considered by the logical systems from ancient times to the present. In fact, that is an issue that the current syntactic theories studying human reasoning, for example, the mental logic theory, address today. However, in this paper, I claim that, in the case of some languages such as Spanish, the double negation causes problems for the cognitive theories mainly based on formal schemata and supporting the idea of a universal syntax of thought in the human mind. Thus, I propose that, given those problems, semantic frameworks such as that of the mental models theory seem to be more appropriate for explaining the human inferential activity.

The importance of being relevant?

AbstractInspired by the belief that cognitive and pragmatic models of communication and discourse processing offer great potential for the study of Audiovisual Translation (AVT), this paper will review such models and discuss their contribution to conceptualising the three inter-related sub-processes underlying all forms of AVT: the comprehension of the multimodal discourse by the translator; the translation of selected elements of this discourse; and the comprehension of the newly formed multimodal discourse by the target audience. The focus will be on two models, Relevance Theory, which presents the most comprehensive pragmatic model of communication, and Mental Model Theory, which underlies cognitive models of discourse processing. The two approaches will be used to discuss and question common perceptions of AVT as being ‘constrained’ and ‘partial’ translation.

Logic, Pragmatics, and Types of Conditionals

Johnson-Laird and Byrne distinguished ten kinds of conditionals. Their framework was the mental models theory and they attributed different combinations of semantic possibilities to those ten types of conditionals. Based on such combinations, the mental models theory has clear predictions for reasoning tasks, including those kinds of conditionals and involving reasoning schemata such as Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, the affirming the consequent fallacy, and the denying the antecedent fallacy. My aim in this paper is to show that the predictions of the mental logic theory for those reasoning tasks are exactly the same as those of the mental models theory, and that, therefore, such tasks are not useful to decide which of the two theories is correct.

Some arguments that the mental logic theory needs to clarify to continue being an alternative to the mental models theory

Undoubtedly, the mental models theory has become an important theory in cognitive science. This theory can predict and explain most of the experimental results that the literature of that field shows. This fact can lead one to think that human mental processes are essentially semantic and that the syntactic approaches can no longer be held. In this way, in this paper, I try to analyze a framework based on formal rules, the mental logic theory, which also seems consistent with the experimental results, and review some of the reasons that its proponents often give in order to prove that it is worth continuing to consider it as an explicative alternative to the mental models theory. However, I show that such reasons can be questioned from the mental models theory and that, therefore, they need to be explained in a clearer way.

Does Aristotelian logic describe human reasoning? Valid syllogisms and canonical models

In the case of quantified propositions, the mental models theory distinguishes between canonical and noncanonical models. While people identify the canonical models in an immediate, rapid, and easy way, the noncanonical models cannot be detected without reflection and cognitive effort. In this paper, I try to show that all of the valid syllogisms in Aristotelian logic can be considered to be correct by resorting only to the canonical models of their sentences. In this way, I argue that this means that Aristotelian logic can be a useful criterion to explain, describe, and even predict people’s conclusions from quantified assertions.

Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction

The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties.

Against Philo’s interpretation of conditional. The case of Aristotle´s thesis

There is an Aristotelian thesis that can be considered controversial. That is the thesis related to a denied conditional with only one propositional variable and in which, in addition, one of its clauses is also denied. While the thesis is not a tautology, people tend to accept it as true. Pfeifer’s approach can account for this fact. However, I try to show that this problem can also be explained from other alternative frameworks, in particular, from that of the mental models theory, that of López-Astorga based on the pragmatic phenomenon of conditional perfection, and that of the mental logic theory. Likewise, I indicate the difficulties regarding Aristotle’s thesis of the mental models theory and López-Astorga’s proposal, and conclude that the account of the mental logic theory is the strongest alternative to Pfeifer’s explanation and that what is clearly obvious is that conditional should not be materially interpreted.http://dx.doi.org/10.15304/ag.35.2.2542

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning.

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., & Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62-88. doi: 10. 1037/0033-295X.106.1.62], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.

Mental models and humorous intent

In this paper the concepts of humorous intent and meta-motivational states are integrated in Van Dijk's mental-model theory. It is assumed that, when they communicate, people present public mental models of (aspects of) situations to others, which are not necessarily identical with their private mental models. Recipients are aware of this, and using their mind-reading skills in interaction, they do not only try to infer a speaker's public mental model, but they also try to re-construct the speaker's private mental model. Perceived discrepancies give rise to the re-construction of a speaker's a priori intent by the recipient. Humorous intent is defined as a form of a priori intent, which can be manifested in a playful manipulation. Such a manipulation can be detected by the recipient when a public mental model appears to be a tweaked version of a private mental model and when the public mental model appears to be presented in a playful or para-telic mental state. In the case of unintentional humour by very young children, a fantasy mental model can be constructed to make a manipulation and humorous intent plausible. In three examples the theory is applied to demonstrate its potential.