Mental models and humorous intent

Abstract

In this paper the concepts of humorous intent and meta-motivational states are integrated in Van Dijk's mental-model theory. It is assumed that, when they communicate, people present public mental models of (aspects of) situations to others, which are not necessarily identical with their private mental models. Recipients are aware of this, and using their mind-reading skills in interaction, they do not only try to infer a speaker's public mental model, but they also try to re-construct the speaker's private mental model. Perceived discrepancies give rise to the re-construction of a speaker's a priori intent by the recipient. Humorous intent is defined as a form of a priori intent, which can be manifested in a playful manipulation. Such a manipulation can be detected by the recipient when a public mental model appears to be a tweaked version of a private mental model and when the public mental model appears to be presented in a playful or para-telic mental state. In the case of unintentional humour by very young children, a fantasy mental model can be constructed to make a manipulation and humorous intent plausible. In three examples the theory is applied to demonstrate its potential.