Mating Game Research Articles

Evolution of Co-operation When the Strategies are Hidden: The Human Mating Game

AbstractDefection is frequently seen in co-operative systems [1-3]. Game theoretical solutions to stabilize cooperation rely on reciprocity and reputation in iterated games[4-5]. One of the basic requirements for reciprocity or reputation building is that the strategies of players and the resulting payoffs should be open at the end of every interaction. For games in which the strategies and payoffs remain hidden, these stabilizing factors are unlikely to work. We examine the evolution of cooperation for hidden-strategy games using human mating game as an example. Here faithful parenting can be considered as cooperation and extra-pair mating (EPM) or cuckoldry as defection. Cuckoldry may get exposed only occasionally and the genetic benefits of cuckoldry also remain hidden from the players. Along with mate guarding, social policing is enabled in humans by language and gossiping. However, social policing can be invaded by second order free riders. We suggest that opportunistic blackmailing, which is unique to hidden strategy games can act as a keystone strategy in stabilizing co-operation. This can counteract free riding and stabilize policing. A game theoretical model results into a rock - paper – scissor (R-P-S) like situation with no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Simulations result into a stable or stably oscillating polymorphism. Obligate monogamy is an essential trait in the co-existence. In a gender difference model too, polymorphism is seen in both genders but with different traits predominating in the two genders. The model explains intra-gender, inter-gender as well as cross cultural variability in mating strategies in humans.

Evolution of Co-operation When the Strategies are Hidden: The Human Mating Game

Defection is frequently seen in co-operative systems [1-3]. Game theoretical solutions to stabilize cooperation rely on reciprocity and reputation in iterated games[4-5]. One of the basic requirements for reciprocity or reputation building is that the strategies of players and the resulting payoffs should be open at the end of every interaction. For games in which the strategies and payoffs remain hidden, these stabilizing factors are unlikely to work. We examine the evolution of cooperation for hidden-strategy games using human mating game as an example. Here faithful parenting can be considered as cooperation and extra-pair mating (EPM) or cuckoldry as defection. Cuckoldry may get exposed only occasionally and the genetic benefits of cuckoldry also remain hidden from the players. Along with mate guarding, social policing is enabled in humans by language and gossiping. However, social policing can be invaded by second order free riders. We suggest that opportunistic blackmailing, which is unique to hidden strategy games can act as a keystone strategy in stabilizing co-operation. This can counteract free riding and stabilize policing. A game theoretical model results into a rock - paper – scissor (R-P-S) like situation with no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Simulations result into a stable or stably oscillating polymorphism. Obligate monogamy is an essential trait in the co-existence. In a gender difference model too, polymorphism is seen in both genders but with different traits predominating in the two genders. The model explains intra-gender, inter-gender as well as cross cultural variability in mating strategies in humans.

Computational Experiments With the Fuzzy Love and Romance

The paper report some experiments on the issue of human mating games and sexual preferences in the perspective of population and some macro-social realms. The notions of love, romance, fidelity, and sexual attractiveness are those comprising the theory to human intra-species evolution but yet still rare to be employed to understand human social, economic, and cultural studies in terms of sociology or economics. The paper did experiments on those issues, on the possible relation between population growth, power-law distribution of wealth, and some other relevant points to our realization of evolutionary theory of sexual selection. The paper expects to open an alternative bridge of our advancement in human evolution and the complexity of the social system.

SPIDER SEDUCTION REQUIRES UV LIGHT

WHEN SOME SPIDERS desire a little romance in their lives, they use ultraviolet light as the aphrodisiac. Biologists in Singapore and England have now added the ornate jumping spider Cosmophasis umbratica to a growing list of critters—including parrots, butterflies, and fish—that rely on UV reflection and fluorescence to socialize ( Science 2007,315,481). What makes these spiders' use of UV light stand out—besides the afterglow—is that UV reflectance and UV-induced fluorescence are employed on a sex-specific basis. Without UV wavelengths, these spiders get no love. Males reflect UV light off scales on their faces and bodies during the mating game, whereas females have sensory organs called palps, typically used to capture prey, that fluoresce bright green when excited by UV light. In the absence of UV light, the success rate for consummating courtships decreases, explains senior author Daiqin Li of the National University of Singapore. Although he suspected the jumping spider might ...

Mating games: cultural evolution and sexual selection

In this paper, we argue that mating games, a concept that denotes cultural practices characterized by a competitive element and an ornamental character, are essential drivers behind the emergence and maintenance of human cultural practices. In order to substantiate this claim, we sketch out the essential role of the game’s players and audience, as well as the ways in which games can mature and turn into relatively stable cultural practices. After outlining the life phase of mating games – their emergence, rise, maturation, and possible eventual decline – we go on to argue that participation in these games (in each phase) does make sense from an adaptationist point of view. The strong version of our theory which proposes that all cultural practices are, or once were, mating games, allows us to derive a set of testable predictions for the fields of archaeology, economics, and psychology.

Aggressive, or Just Looking for a Good Mate?

In her article “Strong personalities can pose problems in the mating game” (News Focus, 29 July, p. [694][1]), E. Pennisi discusses whether aggressiveness, which helps individuals survive, can also impair reproductive success. Extremely aggressive female fishing spiders are mentioned as an example. Fishing spiders are closely related to lycosid spiders. Lycosid individuals are active hunters, and the females are bigger and more aggressive than males. Schizocosa malitiosa is a common Uruguayan lycosid. In this species the male performs a conspicuous display ([1][2]), then struggles with the female, their front legs in contact. Mount takes place only if the male is allowed to climb on top of the female. Males that fail are actively chased away and occasionally cannibalized. Recent work on S. malitiosa , where virgin females were exposed to males ([2][3]), shows that the most aggressive females, which rejected and attacked three or four males consecutively until finally accepting one, hatching a higher number of spiderlings than “docile” females, which succumbed to their first partner. Are the females showing uncontrollable aggressiveness or instead estimating their partners' condition? The benefits of boldness in hunting and defending territories could be of use in mate selection, with well-nourished females being more choosy, selecting males that can probably transmit the “good-persuader” condition to progeny. 1. [↵][4]1. F. G. Costa , Rev. Brasil. Biol. 35, 359 (1975). [OpenUrl][5] 2. [↵][6]1. A. D. Aisenberg, 2. F. G. Costa , Ethology 111, 545 (2005). [OpenUrl][7][CrossRef][8][Web of Science][9] [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.309.5735.694 [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #ref-2 [4]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1 in text [5]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DRev.%2BBrasil.%2BBiol.%26rft.volume%253D35%26rft.spage%253D359%26rft.atitle%253DREV%2BBRASIL%2BBIOL%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [6]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2 in text [7]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DEthology%26rft.volume%253D111%26rft.spage%253D545%26rft.atitle%253DETHOLOGY%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.1111%252Fj.1439-0310.2005.01077.x%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [8]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=10.1111/j.1439-0310.2005.01077.x&link_type=DOI [9]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=000229427900001&link_type=ISI

Insights into the mating games

A paper published last month in Proceedings of the Royal Society has caught the attention of science journalists throughout Europe. The paper's author, Richard Wagner, describes to Graham Tebb how an interest in snakes led to a study of colonial breeding in birds and to fundamental insights into female control of sexual behaviour.

Dinosaur curators plot mating game.

Dinosaur curators plot mating game.

A good man is hard to find: Marriage as an institution

This paper presents a model of marriage as an institution that changes the incentives of a mating game between men and women. Unlike other models of the family, decisions to invest in children are not contractible ex ante, but must be sub-game perfect given that intimacy and pregnancy are sequential. Marriage and divorce, which are publicly observable, create costs for exiting a match; informal relationships do not. Providing an institution which makes a match observable, marriage, improves incentives for men to invest costly unobservable effort in their children.

Females on top in spider sex

Losing the mating game can mean losing your life, if you are a male St Andrew's Cross spider. .

Mating strategies as game theory: Changing rules?

Human behavior can be analyzed using game theory models. Complex games may involve different rules for different players and may allow players to change identity (and therefore, rules) according to complex contingencies. From this perspective, mating behaviors can be viewed as strategic “plays” in a complex “mating game,” with players varying tactics in response to changes in the game's payoff matrix.

Fast and loose

The speedy evolution of human sperm could be an attempt to stay one step ahead in the mating game, explains John Whitfield.

A Good Man is Hard to Find: Marriage as an Institution

This paper develops a model of marriage as an institution that changes the incentives of a mating game between men and women. Unlike other models of the family, decisions to invest in children are not contractible ex-ante, but must be sub-game perfect given that intimacy and pregnancy are sequential. Marriage and divorce, which are publicly observable, create costs for exiting a match; informal relationships do not. Providing an institution which makes a match observable--marriage--improves incentives for men to invest costly unobservable effort in their children. The model accounts for several stylized facts about marriage, including better outcomes, on average, for children within marriage, and women's preferences for marriage over informal relationships. It also suggests why societies may impose costs for divorce and out-of-wedlock child bearing; the penalties can increase the average welfare of children. The model highlights the tensions surrounding these policies. Exogenous penalties are not Pareto-improving, even among the young; some children are strictly worse off with higher penalties even if the aggregate welfare of children increases.

Strategic Mating with Homotypic Preferences

We determine equilibrium acceptance strategies in a class of multi-period mating games where individuals prefer opposite sex partners with a close parameter type (one-dimensional homotypic preferences). In each period unmated individuals are randomly paired. They form a couple (and leave the pool) if each accepts the other; otherwise they continue into future periods. We consider models with a fixed cohort group (without replacement) and also steady-state models (with replacement). Unlike the job-search model of McNamara & Collins involving type preferences (maximizing individuals), we find no segmentation of the populations at equilibrium, rather continuous changes of strategy. We find some similarities and some differences with the Kalick–Hamilton simulation model of attractiveness matching in a dating context. In general, we find that at equilibrium all individuals become less choosy (in accepting potential mates) with time, and that individuals with more central types are choosier than those with more extreme types.

The mating game: pollination and fertilization in flowering plants

Recent work has revealed signaling molecules that control pollination, including small peptides that mediate pollen recognition and glycoproteins that support pollen tube growth. The polarized growth of pollen tubes requires a calcium-mediated signal cascade, and cues derived from the haploid and diploid ovule cells guide pollen tubes to the eggs.

The mating game

A proposed engineering project may be regarded as a sequence of predetermined tasks, with each task being of predetermined length. Alternatively, a proposed engineering project may be regarded as being similar to a game of chess, in which there are an unknown number of unknown moves, with each move being an attempt to make some progress from whatever mess exists as a result of previous moves. The author discusses an imaginary scenario between an engineer wishing to enter a chess tournament who asks management to fund the venture. An imaginary conversation between the engineer and two managers regarding the proposed venture is given.

Playing the field in the mating game

Playing the field in the mating game

Fantasy worlds: The depiction of women and the mating game in men's magazines in the 1950s

(1998). Fantasy worlds: The depiction of women and the mating game in men's magazines in the 1950s. Journal of Australian Studies: Vol. 22, Australian masculinities, pp. 116-124.

The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life.

Why does popcorn cost so much at the movies? When does it make sense not to recycle? Why are laws against polygamy detrimental to women? Steven E. Landsburg examines everything from taxes, unemployment and illiteracy to the mating game, the death penalty and environmentalism to solve the puzzling questions that occur in daily living. Both controversial and humorous, The Armchair Economist demystifies the economics of everyday behaviour, and shows how the laws of economics can reveal themselves in surprising ways. Put your convictions to the test with The Armchair Economist.

The mating game: what happens when sperm meets egg.

The mating game: what happens when sperm meets egg.