Marriage Market Research Articles

Брачное поведение женщин-мигранток из стран Центральной Азии

The results of a study of the features of matrimonial behavior of migrant women from Central Asian countries are presented in this article. The conclusions are based on the analysis of statistical data on the number of marriages between citizens of different States in the Russian marriage market. Marriage in the migration process is a widespread phenomenon. In some countries, the proportion of marriages with foreigners reaches 30—40 % of the total number of marriages. In Russia, the share of marriages complicated by a foreign component is 6,5 %. Of these, the largest number of marriages were concluded by citizens of Ukraine. The countries of Central Asia — Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan — occupy the second, fourth, sixth, and ninth positions in the list, respectively. Citizens of Turkmenistan are much less active in getting married in Russia. In our country, number of marriages with foreign men is significantly higher than foreign women. However, this ratio is not met among citizens of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: more marriages are performed by women than men. The total marriage rates among migrants were calculated to determine the intensity of marriage by foreigners from Central Asian countries. The highest value of the total marriage rate of migrants is observed among citizens of Tajikistan, the lowest is among citizens of Turkmenistan. At the same time, the total marriage rate among women from Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan exceeds that of men. It is meaning that women from these countries are more likely to marry in Russia. The vast majority of marriages with a foreign component — 96 % — are between foreigners and Russians. The remaining 4 % of marriages are those in which both the bride and groom are foreign citizens. Citizens of Central Asian countries if they marry someone other than a Russian, choose their compatriot in the vast majority. It should be noted that the practice of marriage in the country of emigration is not limited only to marriage migration. It is not uncommon for people who come to the country for employment, education, or other aims to find life partners and register relationships. However, we should not exclude the widespread adoption of a pragmatic approach to marriage, in which migrants consider to marriage as an opportunity to be legalized in the country of immigration in a simplified manner, faster and easier to obtain citizenship. Therefore, the development and implementation of state regulation measures in this area is particularly relevant.

Where did it go wrong? Marriage and divorce in Malawi

Do individuals marry and divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the economic attractiveness of a person's marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model of consumer‐producer households that is applied to rich data from Malawi. Using revealed preference conditions for a stable marriage market, we define the economic attractiveness of a potential match as the difference between the potential value of consumption and leisure with the new partner and the value of consumption and leisure in the current marriage. We estimate this marital instability measure for every possible pair in geographically defined marriage markets in 2010. We find that the marital instability measure is predictive of future divorces, particularly for women. We further show that this estimated effect on divorce is mitigated by the woman's age, and by a lack of men, relative to women, in the marriage market, showing that these factors interact with the economic attractiveness of the remarriage market. These findings provide out‐of‐sample validation of our model and evidence that the economic value of the marriage market matters for divorce decisions.

College as a Marriage Market

Recent descriptive work suggests the type of college education (field or institution) is an important but neglected pathway through which individuals sort into homogeneous marriages. These descriptive studies raise the question of why college graduates are so likely to marry someone within their own institution or field of study. One possible explanation is that individuals match on traits correlated with the choice of education, such as innate ability, tastes or family environment. Another possible explanation is that the choice of college education causally impacts whether and whom one marries, either because of search frictions or preferences for spousal education. The goal of this paper is to sort out these explanations and, by doing so, examine the role of colleges as marriage markets. Using data from Norway to address key identification and measurement challenges, we find that colleges are local marriage markets, mattering greatly for whom one marries, not because of the pre-determined traits of the admitted students but as a direct result of attending a particular institution at a given time.

One-Child Policy and Marriage Market in China

This study analyzes the effect of one-child policy on marriage market in China, and focuses on leftover situation, marriage age, and the age differential between husband and wife. Taking age of 30 as a cut-off point, the one-child policy has increased the leftover proportion about 1.2%, with 1.8% on men and 0.6% on women. Although the problem of urban leftover women has made eye-catching of the general public, the problem of the leftover men is much more serious than that of women: with the former arising from the true over-supply of men while the latter due to the matching process. The one-child policy on marriage age is positive and significant, no matter for urban, rural residents, or migrants, but the effect is smaller in the urban area, which is consistent with the fact that the sex ratio is more balanced in urban area. This policy also increases the age differential between husband and wife on the whole; however, it is positive and significant for the male-head families but negative for the female-headed families.

College as a Marriage Market

Recent descriptive work suggests the type of college education (field or institution) is an important but neglected pathway through which individuals sort into homogeneous marriages. These descriptive studies raise the question of why college graduates are so likely to marry someone within their own institution or field of study. One possible explanation is that individuals match on traits correlated with the choice of education, such as innate ability, tastes or family environment. Another possible explanation is that the choice of college education causally impacts whether and whom one marries, either because of search frictions or preferences for spousal education. The goal of this paper is to sort out these explanations and, by doing so, examine the role of colleges as marriage markets. Using data from Norway to address key identification and measurement challenges, we find that colleges are local marriage markets, mattering greatly for whom one marries, not because of the pre-determined traits of the admitted students but as a direct result of attending a particular institution at a given time.

These Newcomes: William Makepeace Thackeray and Novelistic Particularity

Through a sustained close reading of William Makepeace Thackeray's 1855 novel The Newcomes, this essay examines three analogous types of particularity in the novel: the particularity of loved ones in the social network, of fictional persons in the literary work, and of the individual text. Drawing on recent sociological and network readings of Victorian narrative, I argue that Thackeray's plot about relationships in the marriage market is reflected (on the level of form) by the structural relation between characters and text, and (on the level of the reading experience) by the affective engagement of the reader to the novel. As characters encounter problems in replacing old relations (former lovers, deceased spouses, estranged relatives) with new ones, the novel raises analogous questions about the replaceability of characters as textual constructs or fictional persons, and of the novel itself as one experience among multitudes on offer in the nineteenth-century market. A tension between the continual or particular experience of an individual novel and the felt historical pressure of novels en masse registers in the text itself as a formal and narrative problem, one that leads us suggestively toward recent methodological debates about intimate and distant reading.

Marriage Market and Labor Market Sorting

We build a novel equilibrium model in which households' labor supply choices form the link between sorting on the marriage market and sorting on the labor market. We first show that in theory, the nature of home production – whether partners' hours are complements or substitutes – shapes marriage market sorting, labor market sorting and labor supply choices in equilibrium. We then estimate our model on German data to assess the nature of home production in the data, and find that spouses' home hours are complements. We investigate to what extent complementarity in home hours drives sorting and inequality. We find that the home production complementarity – by strengthening positive marriage sorting and reducing the gender gap in hours and labor sorting – puts significant downward pressure on the gender wage gap and within-household income inequality, but it fuels between-household inequality. Our estimated model sheds new light on the sources of inequality in today's Germany and – by identifying important shifts in home production technology towards more complementarity – on the evolution of inequality over time.

A Fixed- Effects Study of Twenty Norwegian First-Marriage Cohorts

Decisions to divorce could be affected by a number of characteristics of the local community.Community characteristics may be barriers to divorce (e.g. strong social control) or increasethe attractiveness of divorcing (e.g. through access to a good remarriage market), but ourknowledge of such influences is sparse. This study examines the impact of severalcommunity-level factors that may influence a couple’s risk of divorce: Socioeconomicconditions, the local marriage market, and the normative climate. Discrete-time hazardmodels with community-level fixed effects are estimated using a register-based data set of allNorwegian first marriages contracted 1980-2000 that includes longitudinal information onboth the community and the couple level. Results show that higher average education, anunbalanced marriage market, and population density drive divorce rates down but thateconomic conditions do not matter for divorce risk. Estimates obtained from regular modelsare markedly different than those obtained with the fixed-effects approach.

Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign

Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign

Chasing Fate & Fortune in the Borderland: Cross-Border Marriage & Migration at the Malaysian-Thai Frontier

This article examines the feminization of migration at the Malaysian-Thai frontier through the lens of cross-border marriages between Malaysian men and Thai women (predominantly of Malay ethnicity). Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the Malaysian city of Kota Bharu, Kelantan, it explores the migration process as a hopeful endeavor in seeking “fortune” in several senses of the word: employment and economic prospects (Mal. rezeki), and opportunities for marriage (Mal. jodoh, or “fated union”). Second, it illustrates how Thai women’s reported use of magical means such as love magic and sorcery in their search for jodoh and rezeki inspires both fear and desire among Malays. Thai women’s seductive and supernatural prowess, I argue, constitutes a crucial but understudied capital for navigating a precarious labor and marriage market where their employability and (sexual) desirability overlap, allowing them to subvert existing narratives of female cross-border marriage migrants as victims of precarity.

College as a Marriage Market

College as a Marriage Market

The Downton Abbey Effect: 18th and 19th Century British Aristocratic Marriages and Agricultural Prices

In the four decades leading up to World War I, a significant proportion of British aristocrats married daughters of newly rich American business magnates. I provide a quantitative economic analysis of this phenomenon in the deeper context of British aristocratic marriages during the 18th and 19th centuries. I show that the decline in agricultural prices, particularly acute during the British agricultural depression of the late 19th century, by reducing the income of aristocratic landed estates at the same time as it reduced the income of landed families, led to richly dowried American brides being substituted for brides from British landed families, the traditional source of brides entering the aristocracy. I also show that this was part of a wider phenomenon of aristocratic substitution of foreign brides for landed brides during the whole of the 19th century, as well as the substitution of daughters of British businessmen for daughters of landed families in aristocratic marriages during both centuries, when agricultural prices declined. The results are consistent with a theory of positive assortative matching in the aristocratic marriage market with lump-sum transfers, where cash-constraints are placed on lump-sum transfers (dowries) from the landowning families of potential brides in periods of agricultural downturn.

Marriage Market Signaling and Women’s Occupation Choice

Marriage Market Signaling and Women’s Occupation Choice

Adverse Selection in the Marriage Market: HIV Testing and Marriage in Rural Malawi.

Asymmetric information in the marriage market may cause adverse selection and delay marriage if partner quality is revealed over time. Sexual safety is an important but hidden partner attribute, especially in areas where HIV is endemic. A model of positive assortative matching with both observable (attractiveness) and hidden (sexual safety) attributes predicts that removing the asymmetric information about sexual safety accelerates marriage and pregnancy for safe respondents, and more so if they are also attractive. Frequent HIV testing may enable safe people to signal and screen. Consistent with these predictions, we show that a high-frequency, "opt-out" HIV testing intervention changed beliefs about partner's safety and accelerated marriage and pregnancy, increasing the probabilities of marriage and pregnancy by 26 and 27 percent for baseline-unmarried women over 28 months. Estimates are larger for safe and attractive respondents. Conversely, a single-test intervention lacks these effects, consistent with other HIV testing evaluations in the literature. Our findings suggest that an endogenous response to HIV risk may explain why the HIV/AIDS epidemic has coincided with systematic marriage and pregnancy delays.

Erratum: Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market

Previous articleNext article FreeErratumErratum: Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage MarketPierre-André Chiappori, Sonia Oreffice, and Climent Quintana-DomequePierre-André ChiapporiColumbia University Search for more articles by this author , Sonia OrefficeUniversity of Exeter and Institute for Labor Economics Search for more articles by this author , and Climent Quintana-DomequeUniversity of Exeter and Institute for Labor Economics Search for more articles by this author Original articleFatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage MarketPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreAlfred Galichon pointed out to us an error in our paper “Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market” (Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque 2012). The properties derived in the theory section (sec. III) are not sufficient to validate the empirical strategy developed in the following section; the latter requires more specific assumptions.The issue can easily be described in the TU (transferable-utility) case (sec. III.B). We use the same notation as in the initial paper. In particular, women (men) are characterized by a vector (X,ε)∈ℝL×ℝK ((Y,η)∈ℝK×ℝL), where X (Y) is a vector of observable female (male) characteristics and ε (η) is a random vector reflecting female (male) unobservable attributes. Proposition 2 actually implies that, for any stable matching, the conditional distribution of the female index I(X), given the male characteristics Y, depends only on the male index J(Y), and conversely. This property can be used to empirically estimate these indexes even in the most general framework, a possibility explored in forthcoming work.However, under the hypothesis made in the initial paper, this property does not necessarily extend to individual characteristics themselves. The issue here is that in this context, generic uniqueness of the stable matching does not hold for index models. The argument goes as follows. Consider a stable matching, and take any X¯ matched with some Y¯; define the sets 𝕏¯={XsuchthatI(X)=I(X¯)} and 𝕐¯={YsuchthatJ(Y)=J(Y¯)} (which, under standard smoothness assumptions, are included within (L−1)- or (K−1)-dimensional manifolds). Then any one-to-one, measure-preserving mapping from 𝕏¯ to 𝕐¯ generates a stable matching. In other words, while the index structure constrains the mapping between indices, the matching within sets of individuals with the same index is fully indeterminate. In particular, it is always possible to find stable matchings for which the conditional distribution of some (or all) of the components of vector Y, given X, does not depend only on I(X).To be valid in a continuum context, the empirical strategy adopted in the paper requires more specific assumptions regarding the stochastic structure of the model. For instance, one may use the normal quadratic model of Chiappori, McCann, and Pass (2017), which can be estimated through ordinary least squares regressions (or SURs [seemingly unrelated regressions]) of individual characteristics on the spouse’s. Alternatively, one may omit the stochastic vector η, take K=L, and assume that the surplus takes the additive form,S(X,ε;Y)=s(X,Y)+Y′ε,where the function s(X, Y) is, moreover, linear in Y:(1)s(X,Y)=Y′⋅Ψ(X)for some mapping Ψ from ℝK to ℝK. Then the utility v(Y) of male Y satisfies(2)DYv(Y)=Ψ(X)+ε,where DYv denotes the gradient of v. If the mapping Φ:Y→DYv, from ℝK to ℝK, is invertible, then equation (2) can be written as(3)Y=Φ−1(Ψ(X)+ε),which is a multidimensional transformation model (see, e.g., Chiappori, Komunjer, and Kristensen 2015). In the specific version where the surplus s is bilinear and the distributions of (X, ε) and Y are normal, then both Ψ and Φ are, moreover, linear:Ψ(X)=Ψ¯X, Φ(Y)=Φ¯Y,where Ψ¯ and Φ¯ are K×K matrices. The relationship (3) becomesY=AX+Φ¯−1ε,where A=Φ¯−1Ψ¯.If ε is independent of X, this relationship, which is a particular case of Chiappori, McCann, and Pass (2017), can be estimated by SUR.Finally, if the surplus is indexed in X,s(X,Y)=Y′⋅ψ(I(X)),then equation (3) becomesY=Φ−1(ψ(I(X))+ε).We still have a transformation model that moreover depends on X only through I(X). In particular, the conditional distribution of Y, given X, depends only on I(X); and in the linear case, the matrix A is of rank 1.NotesWe thank Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanié for their comments. Errors are ours.ReferencesChiappori, Pierre-André, Ivana Komunjer, and Dennis Kristensen. 2015. “Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Transformation Models.” J. Econometrics 188 (1): 22–39.First citation in articleCrossrefGoogle ScholarChiappori, Pierre-André, Robert McCann, and Brendan Pass. 2017. “Multidimensional Matching.” Working paper, Columbia Univ.First citation in articleGoogle ScholarChiappori, Pierre-André, Sonia Oreffice, and Climent Quintana-Domeque. 2012. “Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market.” J.P.E. 120 (4): 659–95.First citation in articleLinkGoogle Scholar Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 128, Number 12December 2020 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/710838 Views: 2026Total views on this site HistoryPublished online October 22, 2020 © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.Related articlesFatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market19 Jul 2015Journal of Political Economy

Demographic change and increasing late singlehood in East Asia, 2010–2050

Background: Marriage is a central institution for social reproduction in East Asia. Until the 1970s and 1980s, marriage across much of East Asia was early and universal. In recent decades, though, this pattern has begun shifting to one of later and less marriage. Objective: We explore the long-term implications for universal marriage patterns of future demographic change in marriage markets in the context of prevailing marriage norms by projecting trends in late singlehood (ages 45 to 49) in four East Asian societies (China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan). Methods: We estimate forces of attraction to characterize marriage matching norms by age and education across these different societies by drawing on large-scale population data. Next, we develop counterfactual scenarios in which we apply contemporary norms to future population structures in these societies, as well as scenarios based on more gender-symmetrical matching norms to examine how populations who have never been married by ages 45 to 49 would evolve. Results: Our projections indicate that in the coming decades there will be a substantial increase in late singlehood across all these societies relative to their 2010 levels. These increases in singlehood are driven by forthcoming demographic changes in the marriage market that intensify the effects of prevailing matching norms. These increases are notable in Taiwan and South Korea, where recent data indicate generalized weak propensities to marry in current norms. While a shift toward greater gender symmetry in matching norms would reverse gender gaps between men and women in nonmarriage, it would have little impact on the overall projected proportions of singles by ages 45 to 49. Conclusions: If prevailing norms in each of these contexts continue, the universality of marriage will be substantially eroded in the coming decades, even if norms become more gender symmetrical. The extent to which nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing emerge in the future will determine how marriage will influence fertility trends, population growth, aging, and social reproduction. Contribution: For the first time, we project the implications for universal marriage of recent shifts in marriage norms and demographic change in East Asian countries.

Des mariages à tout prix ? Genèse, contestation et régulation du marché de la rencontre (1840-1940)

Depuis le début du xix e siècle jusqu’à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la société française assiste à l’invention d’un marché de la rencontre. L’émergence de ce marché se heurte à une solide contestation morale : les agences matrimoniales sont perçues comme une dangereuse extension des activités marchandes à la sphère intime. L’article entreprend de montrer que cette critique de la marchandisation est profondément paradoxale pour la société du xix e siècle, puisque l’émergence de ce marché ne s’accompagne pas d’une dérégulation des rencontres amoureuses et d’un désencastrement du choix du conjoint au sens où l’entendrait Eva Illouz, mais qu’il s’appuie, au contraire, sur un écosystème du choix du conjoint très largement dominé par les cadres sociaux, économiques et familiaux. Puisque le critère économique est la première règle d’appariement des couples bourgeois, les agences matrimoniales ne sont pas coupables de l’intrication de l’argent avec l’intimité, mais seulement de la rendre visible. Dès lors que cette exhibition nourrit la contestation du marché, elle conduit également marchands et clientèle à élaborer des stratégies diverses pour rendre acceptables aux yeux de la morale autant l’intrication économie/intime que le poids de l’économie dans les critères de choix du conjoint.

The Health Consequence of Rising Housing Prices in China

China has experienced a rapid boom in real estate prices in the last two decades, leading to a substantial increase in living costs and heavy financial burdens on households, which may subsequently induce health problems. This paper examines the health consequence of rising housing prices by exploiting spatial and temporal variation in housing price appreciation linked to individual-level health data in China from 2000 to 2011. Using an instrumental variable approach, we find robust evidence that increases in housing prices significantly raise the probability of residents having chronic diseases. This negative health impact is more pronounced among individuals from low-income families, households that purchased rather than inherited or were allocated the home, and individuals with a rural registry. Exploring various possible channels, we find that marriage market competition exacerbates the negative health effects, particularly for males and parents with young adult sons. We also find evidence that housing price appreciation induces negative health consequences through increased work intensity, higher mental stress, elevated tobacco use and reduced sleep time. This paper underlines the unintended health consequences of the real estate market prosperity.

Surplus men and scarce women: The impact of mating competition on the desire for sons in China*

AbstractWe conducted this research to explore the possible factors shaping son preference, with a view to understanding the persistently high male/female sex ratio. Using data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) and the Population Census of China, we find a significant impact of regional sex ratio on people's preferences for the sex of their future children. Specifically, the extent of son preference decreases with the increase in the male/female sex imbalance in the local area. We also find that sex imbalance has a positive impact on a wide range of outcomes that capture the pressure on males to enter marriage markets, such as regional housing prices, the number of houses owned, and family economic status. This result is consistent with the view that greater sex imbalance exerts larger pressure on men in the marriage market, leading to changes in son preference. Omitted variable bias is addressed by using climate changes in the month preceding the fertilization period as an instrument for sex ratio. Instrumental sex ratio negatively impacts son preference, offering strong support for our hypothesis.

Gender Violence and the Price of Virginity: Theory and Evidence of Incomplete Marriage Contracts

Abstract This paper builds and tests a model of marriage as an incomplete contract that arises from asymmetric virginity premiums and examines whether this can lead to social inefficiencies. Contrary to the efficient households hypothesis, women cannot prevent being appropriated by men once they enter marriage if they command lower marriage market opportunities upon divorce. Because men cannot or do not commit to compensating women for their lower ex post marriage market opportunities, marriage is an incomplete contract. Men may seek to lower women’s ex ante “market wages” in order to induce entry into joint production. Inefficient or abusive marriages are less likely to separate. Equalizing virginity premiums may reduce domestic and non-domestic violence. Female circumcision and prices women pay doctors to appear virgin before marriage in many countries suggest asymmetric virginity premiums continue to exist. Evidence from China and the US suggest asymmetric virginity premiums persist over economic development. Asymmetric virginity premiums are strongly positively correlated with female but not male virginity premiums. I use variation in religious upbringing to help estimate the effect of virginity premiums on gender violence in the US. The OLS relationship between virginity premiums and female reports of forced sex may be biased downwards if shame is associated with abuse and this shame is greater for women with higher virginity premiums. But the OLS relationship for males might not be biased downwards. Asymmetric virginity premiums are positively correlated with men forcing sex on women and paying women for sex. The model complements a growing empirical literature on inefficient households and human rights abuses, visible manifestations of female appropriability across time and space.