Maritime Territorial Disputes Research Articles

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND CONFLICT IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: THE CASE OF THE MARITIME CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKIYE AND GREECE

In the Eastern Mediterranean, there are maritime territorial disputes between different states, particularly Türkiye and Greece. This study examines the impact of economic interdependence on the ongoing disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, focusing on t

중국의 회색지대(Gray Zone) 전략과 우리 군의 대응 방안

In this article, I discuss China’s Gray Zone strategy, which involves increasing their naval power and using asymmetric tactics to become a rising maritime power. After examining this strategy, I then discuss the sources of conflict between South Korea and China, as well as our military’s response plan. The article also mentions that although South Korea and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, there are still many unresolved issues between two countries. Especially, issues such as the demarcation of the western sea border, development of the continental shelf, marine scientific research activities, and marine environmental conservation are still unresolved. Meanwhile, China is increasing its naval power and pursuing a Gray Zone strategy at sea using its Coast Guard(CCG) and Maritime Militia(PAFMM). Gray zone refers to the ambiguous middle ground between war and peace, and it refers to an indeterminate intermediate zone that does not belong to a specific area. China is pursuing a strategy that undermines the existing order by using gray zone operations in the maritime gray zones of countries with maritime territorial disputes and un-demarcated maritime boundaries in the East China Sea and South China Sea. By using non-military means, China is pursuing a “fait accompli” strategy through numerical superiority, gradualism, and repetitive activities while preventing the situation from escalating into armed conflict. China uses its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia as the main means of its gray zone strategy, which are essentially China’s second naval force and perform various missions on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. In Korea, there are many factors that cause conflicts with China in the ocean, such as the undefined Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) boundary and illegal fishing by Chinese vessels. China pursues a gray zone strategy to gain an advantageous position in future negotiations with Korea. Therefore, the Korean military must establish the following measures to protect its maritime interests. The response strategy below is based on a correct understanding of the gray zone strategy, which is part of China’s asymmetric strategy. First, in the event of a maritime dispute with China, governance should be established to integrate and operate available assets. Second, a cooperative system should be established to prevent accidental conflicts between Korea and China. Third, a naval forward base in the West Sea should be built to curb China’s eastward movement. Fourth, strategies should be sought to respond in conjunction with allies. Fifth, the military’s countermeasures and tactics for responding to the gray zone strategy should be developed.

Signals, Deterrence, and the Quad

Signals, Deterrence, and the Quad Ketian Zhang (bio) The United States and its allies have the capability to deter China, and have successfully done so, from their worst-case scenario—a major militarized conflict. However, three factors reduce the effectiveness of their deterrence: the lack of clear signals, excessive media exposure, and divergent interests among Quad members. The Quad can be useful, but only if the United States maintains well-defined signals of commitment while clarifying the stakes. As it currently stands, the Quad does not successfully deter Chinese actions in territorial disputes. China has not shied away from using military coercion in its land border disputes with India. In June 2020, for instance, Chinese and Indian troops clashed violently along the disputed land border in the Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides.1 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told India to "stop transgressions into China-controlled territories" and to "refrain from actions changing the status quo along the border," representing a clear indication of coercive intent.2 Moreover, although China prefers to utilize nonmilitary—or so-called gray-zone—coercion in maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, such coercive measures can themselves be destabilizing.3 This essay assesses factors influencing the likelihood of successful deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region by using China's land and maritime territorial disputes as examples. It addresses two questions: what signals of resolve are necessary for effective deterrence, and does the Quad enhance [End Page 43] deterrence? Finally, it uses the Sino-Indian border and South China Sea disputes to illustrate the conditions under which deterrence can be effective. The Need for Clearer Signals The United States and its allies have the capability to potentially deter China's territorial challenges. However, clearer signals of resolve and reassurance are necessary to achieve successful deterrence. First and foremost, the United States should set clearer red lines; otherwise, the signals sent to China are mixed and ineffective. For example, during its first term, the Obama administration was not sufficiently clear in signaling red lines to China regarding Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. A 2013 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences report on China's regional security environment stated that the implementation of U.S. rebalancing "had a problem of divergence between willingness and capability," citing the lack of U.S. commitment during the Scarborough Shoal incident of April 2012.4 This lack of clear U.S. red lines led Beijing to proceed with large-scale land reclamation activities in late 2013 and 2014. One Chinese scholar this author interviewed who was often in conversation with the then South China Sea section of China's State Oceanic Administration noted that "China first started reclamation at the Johnson South Reef and was watching the reaction from the international society carefully; it proceeded with large-scale reclamation after realizing that there was not much of a reaction internationally."5 By "international," this interviewee meant the United States. The U.S. response in 2014 was relatively muted: Washington did not call out China's land reclamation from the outset. Instead, the White House and, importantly, President Barack Obama himself remained silent. Obama's second term, however, saw the drawing of clearer red lines. During the November 2015 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila, Obama called on China to halt its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea.6 He subsequently warned Beijing in March 2016 that there would be "serious consequences if China reclaimed land [End Page 44] at the Scarborough Shoal."7 Local Chinese government documents from 2013 noted explicitly that China would implement land reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal.8 Yet following Obama's 2015–16 warnings, subsequent government documents cease to mention reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal. This suggests that without the clear red line from the United States, it is quite plausible that China would have proceeded to reclaim the Scarborough Shoal, making this episode a successful case of U.S. deterrence. The Trump administration pressed Beijing to halt militarization of the South China Sea, but Trump himself did not issue a clearly stated red line. This lack of clarity could have had adverse effects. Chinese analyst...

Rising Seas and Uncertainties: Establishing Static Maritime Borders to Ensure Equity in the Face of Sea Level Rise

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1994, establishes international maritime boundaries that are measured from the “normal baseline” where the ocean meets the coast. However, UNCLOS does not account for changes in the normal baseline that are expected to occur as a result of climate change-induced sea level rise. These uncertainties leave room for maritime territorial disputes that threaten the political and economic resources of small island developing states (SIDS) and developing coastal nations. Here, we discuss the impacts of sea level rise on maritime boundaries with a focus on equity for SIDS and developing coastal nations. These nations, though they contribute the least to climate change, experience its effects most drastically and are the least equipped to adapt. To safeguard against the inequities that are expected to result from rising sea levels, we recommend a science-informed, diplomatic effort to address this issue: that the International Maritime Organization introduce an international convention to establish static maritime baselines. This approach would freeze maritime boundaries, allowing all island and coastal nations to retain their existing oceanic zones and entitlements. Establishing a static baselines promises to mitigate the disproportionate effects of climate change on SIDS and represents a necessary step in the push for international equity in the face of climate change.

THE LIMITS OF A LABEL: FRAMING EASTERN ASIA’S TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS FOR A U.S.-AMERICAN AUDIENCE

This article explores limits to the framing power of several important short terms and phrases typically used within eastern Asia’s international politics. It conceptualises these labels as terminological frames. As frames, these terms/phrases help to set agendas, categorise, emphasise certain perspectives while excluding others from view, and ultimately shape opinions about controversial issues within international politics. Yet, I argue, the limits of frames have been insufficiently explored, especially as frames are taken to new audiences whose understanding of the broader discourses associated with the issues are weaker than that of the original audience. Do these terms still produce framing effects outside of eastern Asia? The study relied on a short survey of 800 U.S.-Americans. Respondents answered differing versions of questions relating to eastern Asian maritime politics in order to ascertain whether the wording and labels used affect evaluation of political issues. Specifically, the survey sought to determine whether use of East Sea vs. Sea of Japan, Northern Territories vs. Southern Kurils, and South China Sea vs. East Sea affected views of maritime disputes and issues relating to Korea, Japan, Russia, China/Taiwan, and Vietnam. It also explored whether an increasingly central phrase in eastern Asia’s maritime territorial disputes—“inherent territory”—presented a stronger claim than other possible phrases claiming territory. Survey results showed no statistical difference through use of one term or label over another. Thus, a certain type of limit to the power of these terminological frames was found. Nevertheless, the survey additionally demonstrated that producing framing effects required only a slight addition to the terminology, confirming the ease of framing international political issues to partisan effect.

Maritime Territorial Disputes in Asia and the Relaxation of Cold War Tensions: The Case of Dokdo and the 1965 Japan-Korea Normalization Agreements

Abstract This article continues the legal and historical inquiry into the dispute between Japan and Korea over Dokdo, an island that sits in the sea between the two nations, by examining the 1965 normalization agreement between Japan and Korea. Japan has argued that the agreement, in which Japan provided economic aid to Korea, settled all outstanding claims stemming from World War II between the nations, including those over territory. We analyze the meaning of international agreements by combining traditional international legal analysis with U.S. archival records, the standard tools of diplomatic history. Our conclusion from these materials is consistent with our earlier work on the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The face of the 1965 Agreement does not mention Dokdo. There are no supplemental materials to the agreement from the parties that expressly address the island. Under standard approaches to international legal interpretation, we cannot read a text to resolve an issue that it does not specifically address. Because it did not seek to change the legal status of the island, the 1965 Agreement merely requires that the analysis fall back to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which itself did not seek to change the status quo as it existed before 1905. American diplomatic materials confirm this reading of the 1965 Agreement. The United States played an all-important role in Asian security affairs. After the Korean War, U.S. leaders in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations wanted Korea and Japan to cooperate on security issues. American leaders believed that rehabilitating Japan and encouraging Japanese aid to Korea would reduce U.S. defense burdens in Asia and support more self-sufficiency on the part of its two closest Asian allies. The U.S. sought to defer any issues that might disrupt an agreement. The United States had pursued a similar kick-the-can-down-the-road strategy in the 1951 Peace Treaty. Dokdo became one of those intractable issues that the United States successfully excluded from the 1965 Agreement and left its resolution to the future.

Classification of Maritime Disputes and Modern Legal Means of their Resolution

A review of scientific articles published over the past 15 years in leading foreign scientific journals on international law demonstrates the gradual improvement of legal means for the settlement of maritime disputes between the states.Aim. Identification of the features for application of the law of the sea norms targeted on the resolution of maritime disputes that develop in the modern international system.Tasks. Development of the classification of maritime disputes, analysis of the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities competent to resolve maritime disputes, characterization of the provisions of international agreements and customs of the law of the sea in the resolution of maritime disputes by the International Court of Justice of the United Nations (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (PCA).Methods. Discourse analysis of the most authoritative publications on the issue of resolving maritime disputes, a formal legal analysis of the norms and customs of maritime law, as well as a comparative legal study of judicial and arbitration practice in resolving interstate maritime disputes. Law enforcement practice on maritime disputes allows to characterize the subject of modern interstate maritime disputes; critically assess the fairness of decisions of international courts; to analyze the problems of enforceability of judicial and arbitral awards in the framework of the procedures for the settlement of maritime disputes provided for in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.Results. Reasonable decisions of the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague are usually implemented by the states parties to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Protection of the marine environment as well as prompt release of ships and crews from arrest have become a modern legal reality due to the effectiveness of the legal mechanism for resolving interstate maritime disputes. Territorial maritime disputes cause significant difficulties at all stages of their resolution, which is due to their political nature and the efforts of states to protect their national interests.Conclusion. The resolution of maritime territorial disputes requires more flexibility from the parties, an international agreement between the parties to the dispute on the procedure for its consideration, as well as the use of conciliation procedures to work out a compromise solution to the dispute.

Maritime Territorial Disputes in Asia and the Relaxation of Cold War Tensions: The Case of Dokdo and the 1965 Japan-Korea Normalization Agreements

Maritime Territorial Disputes in Asia and the Relaxation of Cold War Tensions: The Case of Dokdo and the 1965 Japan-Korea Normalization Agreements

Maritime Territorial Disputes and Diplomatic Negotiations in the Northeast Asian Sea: Focusing on the Case of Korea-China Maritime Delimitation Negotiations

Maritime Territorial Disputes and Diplomatic Negotiations in the Northeast Asian Sea: Focusing on the Case of Korea-China Maritime Delimitation Negotiations

The Philippines maritime forces and its maritime military power projection capabilities: unfulfilled ambitions?

ABSTRACT The Philippine Navy is among the weakest of the naval forces in the Southeast Asia region, and its power projection capabilities are very limited. It is surprising how the Philippines, an archipelago country involved in maritime territorial disputes, could ignore the development of its maritime forces. As a result, the position of the Philippines in regional territorial disputes is weak. This study analyses the factors which have led to this situation, the PN modernisation process, and Filipino maritime power projection capabilities. The text is divided into three parts. The first defines the term “power projection” (or “force projection”). The second analyses the Philippines’ security challenges. Later, the potential and modernisation of the Philippine Navy, as well as its maritime power projection prospects, is analysed. The study concludes with findings. This study employs descriptive methodology and uses data from readily accessible sources to assess critically the conditions of this naval force.

Maritime Territorial Disputes and China’s Soft Power in East Asia

ABSTRACT Territorial disputes over the East and South China Sea have been an issue of growing policy concern in East Asia in recent years. These maritime territorial disputes, as the authors argue in this study, constitute a contextual factor undermining China’s soft power in East Asia. More specifically, this study quantitatively demonstrates that all else equal, citizens are less likely to take a positive view of China’s influence on their respective countries with maritime territorial disputes with China than in countries without such disputes with China. This key result suggests a clear international distributional implication of maritime territorial disputes overlooked in the existing literature on China’s soft power. This study cautions against one-sided views on a China’s soft power whether purely optimistic or skeptical, in contemporary political analyses.

From Panda to Dragon: An Analysis of China’s Maritime Actions and Reactions in the East China Sea and Their Implications since 2012

Abstract In the 21st century, China’s rise has been shifting global and regional geopolitical scenarios. Faced with its growth and fears of being perceived as a threat, China sought to associate its economic and political emergence with the preservation of the current international system, emphasizing speeches about a peaceful development and harmonious world in which it would be an actor who wants to grow and accommodate the world order. However, changes in the balance of power and its continued rise have caused China’s behaviour to change in its own region, especially regarding maritime disputes and affecting other countries’ perceptions. By applying Neoclassical Realism, this paper analyses the Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century, elucidating its behaviour in terms of the country’s action and reactions regarding the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and shows the perceptions of other countries to that behaviour. The article concludes that perceptions concerning the balance of power, Chinese capabilities, nationalism, regime legitimacy, and on leadership images affect the intensity of Beijing’s responses and foreign policy about maritime territorial disputes. Also, the article shows that China’s growing assertiveness in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea is pushing countries that have territorial disputes with China to grow closer.

Man, Land and Sea: Local Populations in Territorial and Maritime Disputes before the International Court of Justice

Abstract The International Court of Justice routinely resolves territorial and maritime boundary disputes between States. Such disputes often carry repercussions for the lives and livelihoods of local populations living on the territories of the State litigants. This analysis seeks to examine the extent to which State litigants’ concerns for the impact of maritime disputes or territorial disputes on their local populations are factored into the Court’s decision-making process. It also seeks to identify reasons for the Court’s approach in such disputes, and to explore the potential role of the principle of equity in such contexts.

Marine journals, maritime territorial disputes and science-diplomacy

Marine journals, maritime territorial disputes and science-diplomacy

Maritime CBMs as Soft Deterrence in Northeast Asia: A Sea of Paradox and its Remedies

Sources of conflict exist in Northeast Asian waters, ranging from maritime territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, to friction over maritime airspace within air defense identification zones (ADIZs), and in the great power competition between the United States and China. Sources of cooperation, such as anti‐piracy coordination, also exist in these waters. These two seas coexist despite their incompatible nature. How to guarantee maritime security in the region had been examined primarily through the concept of deterrence, which relies on a coercion‐led mechanism. A functional balance of military capabilities can play a pivotal role in preventing disputes from escalating into military conflict. Without proper transparent measures, however, states in the region can face a security‐dilemma in the form of an unstoppable arms race. Thus, military armament should be supported by confidence armament for maritime security in Northeast Asia. When hard deterrence is implemented simultaneously with maritime confidence‐building measures (MCBMs) as a soft deterrence, which is a voluntary‐basis mechanism, maritime security is more likely to be guaranteed. Likewise, when both military and confidence‐building measures are made simultaneously, the logic of smart deterrence is more likely to be successfully manifested, contributing to making regional stability more sustainable.

한국과 일본의 NPO 최종소비지출의 단위구조와 산업간 연계

한국과 일본의 NPO 최종소비지출의 단위구조와 산업간 연계

Power Dynamics and Ocean Conflict Management：environmental Impact Scenarios in the Maritime Disputed Areas

Little research has sought to understand environmental conditions in areas characterized by maritime territorial disputes. In observing bilateral dispute cases through the angle of the environment, this paper posits the existence of five different environmental impact scenarios reflecting states’ behaviours in maritime conflict resolution. Using an international relations perspective, this research synthesizes realism, the idea of relative power with deterrence theory to build an analytical framework to explain the logic behind states’ actions in the context of militarized maritime conflicts. Two cases—the South China and the Aegean Seas—are discussed to examine this framework.

한국 언론기사를 대규모 역사데이터로 활용한 동북아 해양영토분쟁 분석

한국 언론기사를 대규모 역사데이터로 활용한 동북아 해양영토분쟁 분석

Maritime Boundaries Revisited. De-bordering of the Taiwanese-Japanese Neighborhood in the Context of (Re-)Bordering Tendencies in the Region of East and South China Seas

The presented article maps processes of bordering, de-bordering and re-bordering in East Asia with maritime borders and territorial claims as the central elements of the analysis. The key question of the investigation is why some maritime territorial disputes are amplified when other are silenced in the region? The author concentrates on two island states, Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan), testing de-bordering of their neighborhood. This process is taking place however in the context of (maritime) border claims and disputes in the region of East China Sea and South China Sea, with numerous actors involved in the game of controlling space and setting new borders there. It is assumed that to understand the dynamics of the de-bordering processes between the two states, their neighborhood’s analysis has to be framed by historical developments, interests’ configurations as well as the collective spatial memory/identity component. Moreover, the attempts to intensify cross-border cooperation need to be settled, among others, in the changing geopolitical situation in the region and the growing power of China. Conceptually the paper tries to interpret developments using both neo-realistic and constructivist approach to international relations as well as theoretical models of the (still emerging) field of border studies.

Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea

Abstract Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—“killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.