Maritime CBMs as Soft Deterrence in Northeast Asia: A Sea of Paradox and its Remedies

Abstract

Sources of conflict exist in Northeast Asian waters, ranging from maritime territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, to friction over maritime airspace within air defense identification zones (ADIZs), and in the great power competition between the United States and China. Sources of cooperation, such as anti‐piracy coordination, also exist in these waters. These two seas coexist despite their incompatible nature. How to guarantee maritime security in the region had been examined primarily through the concept of deterrence, which relies on a coercion‐led mechanism. A functional balance of military capabilities can play a pivotal role in preventing disputes from escalating into military conflict. Without proper transparent measures, however, states in the region can face a security‐dilemma in the form of an unstoppable arms race. Thus, military armament should be supported by confidence armament for maritime security in Northeast Asia. When hard deterrence is implemented simultaneously with maritime confidence‐building measures (MCBMs) as a soft deterrence, which is a voluntary‐basis mechanism, maritime security is more likely to be guaranteed. Likewise, when both military and confidence‐building measures are made simultaneously, the logic of smart deterrence is more likely to be successfully manifested, contributing to making regional stability more sustainable.