Marco Polo Bridge Research Articles

Shanghai

VHO CAN say that he really the Shanghai, particularly if he saw it-as I did-only in the last frenetic 18 months before the Communists took over? We used to say: is not a place but a state of If it was true then, it is infinitely more true today, when the city no longer exists as an objective referrent, but only as a subjective state of mind. You should have been there in the Shanghai was great. Every China hand knew that things had gone down hill since the good days. It made no difference when one had lived there. It was always the good that he lamented with a nostalgia that was all the more exquisite because it expressed a sense of fraternity with a favored elite who could share it, while excluding the benighted millions who could not. Like the flu, that interbellum malady isolated by Arthur Koestler, the Sino-syndrome had definite physiological symptoms-an asymmetrical twist in the corners of the mouth, a salacious squint in the eyes, followed by a distant ocular vacuity and even an incipient lachrymose weakness-when touched by specific stimuli such as mention of the Bund, the Glen Line Building, the Soochow Creek Bridge, Bubbling Well Road, the Race Course, the legendary Metropole, Sassoons, the lion's paw at the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank, the cantilevered dance-floor at the French Club, Hungjao, Monk's Brass Bar, or Blood Alley. In 1947, the old China hand remembered the 1941 Japanese takeover. In 1940, he recalled the sinking of the Panay; in 1935, he looked back fondly to the days before the Marco Polo Bridge incident and Henry Pu-yi; then back to the Kuomintang in 1927; and there are still a few who remember the really, truly before the

Was there a Far Eastern Munich?

One can perhaps draw a parallel between the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) incident of 7 July 1937 and the Sino-Japanese War which followed it on the one hand, and the later attacks and occupation by Japan of Indo-China, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines on the other. In all these cases the eventual full independence of these states was the only logical outcome of a growing national consciousness hastened by the Japanese invasion. It could now be argued that to have defended China as well as South East Asia against Japanese militarism, would have

A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

On July 7, 1937 a handful of Chinese and Japanese soldiers exchanged rifle-fire in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge about thirty miles from Peking. This, minor fracas precipitated a sequence of events that soon propelled Japan into full-scale hostilities on the mainland—a war that was significantly to influence the course of Japanese-American negotiation in the fateful months leading up to the Pacific War. Many historians have portrayed the China incident as the consequence of a conspiracy by the Japanese military and as a repetition of a pattern of aggression identical with that of the Mukden Incident of 1931. With this approach, the Sino-Japanese war presents little apparent difficulty to our ascertaining why the fighting at the Marco-Polo Bridge occasioned a major war. The culprit is the Japanese military.

From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II

From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II

From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II. By <italic>David J. Lu</italic>. Foreword by <italic>Herbert Feis</italic>. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 274. $4.75.)

Journal Article From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II. By David J. Lu. Foreword by Herbert Feis. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 274. $4.75.) Get access From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II. By Lu David J.. Foreword by Feis Herbert. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 274. $4.75.) Delmer M. Brown Delmer M. Brown University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 68, Issue 2, January 1963, Pages 469–470, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/68.2.469 Published: 01 January 1963

The Chinese Communists' Role in the Spread of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident into a Full-Scale War

The Chinese Communists' Role in the Spread of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident into a Full-Scale War

From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. Japan's Entry Into World War II

From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. Japan's Entry Into World War II

From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: A Study of Japan's Entry into World War II.

From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: A Study of Japan's Entry into World War II.

Marco-polo Bridge Incidents

Marco-polo Bridge Incidents

German Mediation in the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-38

When the marco polo bridge incident occurred near peiping on july 7, 1937, japan was not prepared to launch a long-term war with china. on the contrary, she was hopeful that a little military pressure would result in a local settlement providing for North China autonomy and economic co-operation with Japan, which she had been demanding for several years. When the incident developed into a fullscale war toward the end of July, she declared that her army was only punishing the anti-Japanese 29th Army and particularly its 37th Division. Even after the war spread to Shanghai in August, Japan still insisted that the military operations were undertaken with the limited purpose of urging the Chinese National government to reconsider and to correct its attitude toward Japan. Although these were absurd explanations, they did reflect to a certain extent the true intention of the Japanese government. On the one hand, a war with China would not be favorably received by the Japanese people. Financial, circles stressed that only a general settlement with China would bring economic prosperity to Japan. Even the General Staff, which had Russia in mind, advised against it. On the other hand, however, the young officers in the army, with War Minister Sugiyama as their leader, advocated war, at least a limited one. They felt that the rising nationalism and the growing unification of China must be checked before China would accept Japanese leadership.

The Diplomatic Prelude to the China War

IT SEEMs more than likely that the next major change the Far Eastern situation will be brought about by international diplomacy and politics rather than by a clear military decision between Japan and China. Indeed, throughout this war the background of international diplomatic maneuver has cast shadows on the military foreground of battle. There could not be a more appropriate time to restate the diplomatic prelude to the first clash of arms at the Marco Polo Bridge July I937 and to remind students of international affairs of the diplomatic contest that has throughout paralleled the military development of the war. Chinese history used to be made, as the old phrase had it, in the of Europe. In the summer of I937, however, the Chinese Government's decision to assert its sovereignty over North China, and to resist renewed Japanese aggression there, was the decision of Chinese Government leaders, not made on behalf of any foreign Power. The significance of this may be seen when the situation is compared with that twenty years previously, when the Chinese Government at Peking declared war on Germany at the behest of the Allied Powers, or with that i904, when Peking meekly submitted to the demand of Imperialist Powers that China remain neutral the war waged between Russia and Japan on Chinese territory. The chancelleries of Europe nevertheless played a not inconsiderable part paving the way for conflict. The diplomatic prelude to the hostilities which started four years ago was by no means simply a Sino-Japanese prelude. Various Western Powers interested China contributed to it. This does not necessarily mean that they deliberately aimed at provoking SinoJapanese war. Their diplomatic maneuvers, however, were of such great importance that an understanding of them is vital to a proper

Soviet-Japanese Relations Still Hanging Fire

Research Article| January 05 1939 Soviet-Japanese Relations Still Hanging Fire Kathleen Barnes Kathleen Barnes Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1939) 8 (1): 1–5. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023009 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Kathleen Barnes; Soviet-Japanese Relations Still Hanging Fire. Far Eastern Survey 5 January 1939; 8 (1): 1–5. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3023009 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.