Maritime Capabilities Research Articles

India’s Persian desire – analysing India’s maritime trade strategy vis-à-vis the Port of Chabahar

ABSTRACTSince the turn of the century, India has seen itself as the dominant maritime power in South Asia and has aspired to project this power across the Indian Ocean Region. The principle of a “net security provider” has, thus far, been most applicable in South Asia and around its littorals, but it is West Asia that will really test India’s diplomatic and maritime capabilities over the course of the coming years. West Asia has a complex structure of diplomatic and strategic intricacies, that India has to manoeuvre through, in order to achieve its interests. Adding to this, India has had to adopt a careful balancing act juggling its West Asian interests with those that it has elsewhere. The roles of trade, strategy, and ideology have never been as intertwined as they are in the contemporary age, and this region and the challenges it poses is the most complex weave India that is likely to face as it pushes forward into a new age of international relations. This paper addresses the bilateral realities of India and Iran in the context of India’s maritime strategy, and the geostrategies of other regional players such as China and Pakistan.

Indo-US Naval Cooperation: Geo-Strategic Ramifications for the Region

Rebalancing in Asia and India's strategic location has provided it with the benefit of being key ally of the United States (US). The convergence of interests of the two states culminated into a maritime partnership providing an opportunity to Indian Navy to develop its maritime capabilities for carrying out blue water missions. Such naval build up and alliance formation in the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) will be counterproductive, creating security dilemma for the regional states by threatening their national and strategic interests. Contrary to the assumption that such a development will create balance of power in the region, there are threats that these developments may cause conflicts, confrontation, and maritime cold war in the region. The study seeks to explore such dangers. It stresses that sustaining peace at sea hinges upon discouraging an arms race in maritime domain and promoting engagement and collaboration.

New evidence of megafaunal bone damage indicates late colonization of Madagascar

The estimated period in which human colonization of Madagascar began has expanded recently to 5000–1000 y B.P., six times its range in 1990, prompting revised thinking about early migration sources, routes, maritime capability and environmental changes. Cited evidence of colonization age includes anthropogenic palaeoecological data 2500–2000 y B.P., megafaunal butchery marks 4200–1900 y B.P. and OSL dating to 4400 y B.P. of the Lakaton’i Anja occupation site. Using large samples of newly-excavated bone from sites in which megafaunal butchery was earlier dated >2000 y B.P. we find no butchery marks until ~1200 y B.P., with associated sedimentary and palynological data of initial human impact about the same time. Close analysis of the Lakaton’i Anja chronology suggests the site dates <1500 y B.P. Diverse evidence from bone damage, palaeoecology, genomic and linguistic history, archaeology, introduced biota and seafaring capability indicate initial human colonization of Madagascar 1350–1100 y B.P.

Japan and Taiwan – a Strategic Convergence?

&lt;p&gt;Artykuł dotyczy współzależności strategicznych Japonii i Tajwanu. Są one konsekwencją z jednej strony wzrostu Chin, z drugiej coraz większej militarnej aktywności Japonii w regionie. Tajwan chcąc ochronić swój obecny status potrzebuje zbudowania silnej koalicji w regonie. Zachowanie status quo Tajwanu leży również w interesie Japonii, ze względu na jego położenie geopolityczne. Tajwan pełni rolę bariery pomiędzy Chinami a otwartym Pacyfikiem, będąc częścią tzw. pierwszego łańcuch wysp. Zatem przejęcie Tajwanu przez Chiny miałoby katastrofalne skutki dla Japonii, oraz zachwiałoby poważnie równowagę w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku.&lt;/p&gt;

The Reality of China's Maritime Capability

It is the policy of the Chinese Communist Party that the country should become a great maritime power. In this article, Martin N Murphy and Peter Roberts provide an overview of what this means militarily, where China is laying down a challenge to the US and its regional neighbours, where it is falling short, and what this has to do with Europe.

Back to the Gap

A resurgent Russian navy is increasingly active in the North Atlantic and around the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap. Magnus Nordenman argues that an effective response will require investments in high-end maritime capabilities, along with deeper cooperation among the US, the UK, Norway and others.

Role 2 Afloat in a Type 45 destroyer: return to contingency

AbstractRole 2 Afloat (R2A) is an established part of maritime capability whose teams have provided medical support to a number of deployed operations in the recent past. This article describes the capability and constraints of a limited R2A facility embarked on HMS DIAMOND in order to support Royal Marine and Royal Navy boarding teams during Operation LITTEN. The combination of having experienced medical staff, adjusting the medical equipment carried and planning for a limited scenario enabled a bespoke R2A capability to be established on a previously untested platform at short notice. It provides a model for similar future deployments.

The Measure of Britain's New Maritime Ambition

The United Kingdom is shifting back to a defence strategy with maritime capabilities at its heart. But further investment will be required to fulfil, and sustain, this new ambition.

The Western Indo-Pacific: India, China, and the Terms of Engagement

An active Chinese strategic presence in the Indian Ocean is no longer merely the stuff of speculation. India and other resident powers need to not only adjust to this reality but also exploit their geographic and diplomatic advantages to encourage China to operate in these waters cooperatively, not unilaterally. India could do this through a combination of further bolstering its own maritime capabilities, sustaining its capacity building for smaller island states, and deepening defense cooperation with such partners as the United States, Australia, Japan, France, and Indonesia. These steps could be augmented by the reinforcement of regional diplomatic institutions and visible efforts to engage China in security cooperation and dialogue, such as on transnational issues like search and rescue or noncombatant evacuations.This analysis begins with an assessment of China's expanding interests and presence in the Indian Ocean, followed by a summary of India's perspectives and responses. It concludes with some broad recommendations regarding the right mix of capabilities, posture, and partnerships for India to manage the impact of an inevitable Chinese role in its maritime neighborhood.China's Growing Presence in the Indian OceanSince early 2009, China has maintained a naval force to counter piracy in and near the Gulf of Aden. Chinese forces have also been deployed for noncombatant evacuations, notably in Yemen. Warships and submarines are becoming increasingly frequent visitors to Indian Ocean waters, making use of dual-use port infrastructure in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and elsewhere. In addition, China is openly establishing a permanent military facility in Djibouti, and talk of a future network of access points or even overseas bases-a taboo idea just a decade ago-is becoming uncontroversial and commonplace in Chinese strategic circles. Unilateral combat exercises and, as recently as May 2016, counterpiracy exercises have occurred in the eastern Indian Ocean near Australia's island territories,1 while Chinese naval transits of Indonesia's Sunda Strait are becoming unexceptional.Given all these maritime activities, Xi Jinping's signature international initiative of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, while initially a geoeconomic project, will almost certainly have a security dimension that justifies an Indo-Pacific security footprint for China. The flag will follow infrastructure as well as trade.Much of this should not be a surprise. China has legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean. It is a great power and a trading economy enormously dependent on Indian Ocean sea lanes for its energy imports and container cargo. The predictability and security of this seaborne traffic are correspondingly critical to domestic economic, social, and thus political stability-indeed, to the survival of the Communist Party as the legitimate holder of state power. Accordingly, it would have been astounding if China had indefinitely outsourced the security of these critical sea lines of communication to the navies of strategic competitor the United States and U.S. allies and partners.Credible Chinese analysts such as You Ji (in this roundtable) are notably beginning to identify the contours of a Chinese Indo-Pacific maritime strategy, even if specific Indo-Pacific terminology is still treated with some wariness in China. The Maritime Silk Road, it could be argued, is proving to be the Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics.For other states, China's now-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean is cause neither for rejoicing nor despair. It is a fact. The question then becomes how other powers manage this historic shift in ways that protect and advance their own interests, as well as wider regional stability. A reasonable response would seem to be one that respects China's legitimate interests as an Indian Ocean power without harming the interests of others.A related consideration is the logic of engaging China as a provider of security public goods in the Indian Ocean. …

Maritime in transit care

Operation GRITROCK saw the first operational deployment of the Maritime In Transit Care team from the Role 2 (Enhanced) (R2(E)) Medical Treatment Facility, which is able to provide Damage Control Surgery and the limited holding of patients, situated on board RFA ARGUS. Whilst the Medical Emergency Response Team demonstrated the capability of advanced military Pre-Hospital Emergency Care (PHEC) on Op HERRICK, the need to provide a similar high level of care on contingency operations was recognised. Op GRITROCK allowed for the continued exploration of a maritime capability from an established R2(E) platform whilst providing medical evacuation capability for a significant population at risk distributed over a large Joint Operation Area. Although the patient load during the operation was low, key lessons were learnt and opportunities identified to further develop the newly recognised sub-speciality of PHEC, both medically and logistically, and these will be discussed in this article.

Towards Enhancing Maritime Capability in the Indian Ocean Rim

The Indian Ocean Rim is a vast geographical entity and consists of a number of regional and subregional identities. The paper highlights the common maritime concerns of littoral nations and the need for greater engagement and collaboration to address common threats and challenges. It then traces prominent maritime cooperation initiatives in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), highlighting cooperative trends at regional, subregional and bilateral levels. Ranging from security cooperation among nations and regional cooperation for fisheries management, to multidimensional capacity building, the trends also bring forth the opportunities for furthering the cooperation. The paper explores avenues for cooperation under existing pan-IOR constructs, underscoring the need for a multi-pronged approach to capacity building, and harnessing the potential of such cooperation across various maritime disciplines.

Poros Maritim dan Politik Luar Negeri Jokowi

This article discusses the President Joko Widodo’s poros maritim dunia or global maritime axis and the Indonesian foreign policy. This policy optimistically to strengthen Indonesia’s maritime capability and also to reviving the country as maritime super power as in the early history. Once Joko Widodo seizes the mandate after his dramatic victory in the last presidential election 2014, political polarization becomes a serious challenge to his administration. Yet, at the same time he obtained a huge international attention. Thus, this article attempt to understand Joko Widodo’s maritime policy from foreign policy perspective. Basically, foreign policy is determined by two factors namely international and domestic. To be more systematic, this article divided into five sections i.e.; introduction, maritime axis and Jokowi’s foreign policy, maritime axis and domestic politics, maritime axis and neighboring countries, and conclusion

Beyond the Gunboats

In East Asia, the coercive use of maritime capabilities has led some to argue that the return of gunboat diplomacy has become inevitable. The use of coercion and deterrence there are indeed undeniable. However, Alessio Patalano argues that there is more than gunboats to diplomacy in a self-aware maritime East Asia. Capable navies can offer a significant contribution when dealing with major natural disasters, and these deployments should be regarded as diplomatic missions aimed at building relations and enhancing regional security. Japan's experience in this regard provides a relevant case in support of this argument.

China's Military Capability and Anti-access Area-denial Operations

China's military developments and growing naval capabilities are the focus of much discussion among strategists and policy makers. China's moves in this direction are of particular concern because of the implications to maritime security in the region, particularly to countries that have territorial disputes. Its burgeoning military power and growing naval and maritime capability are linked to the country's overall maritime strategy and rising profile in the international arena, raising questions outside the region as to her long-term intentions in the Asia-Pacific region. Of particular interest is China's Anti-access Area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. This paper undertakes an analysis of China's military with specific reference to the A2/AD strategy, and is premised on the belief that the A2/AD strategy is a component of overall Chinese maritime strategy. This paper suggests that People's Liberation Army Navy military capabilities and force developments are inter-related to the evolution of China's maritime strategy, and that China's building onto A2/AD would pose a significant threat to regional security.

China's strategic Arctic interests

While China's intensifying activity in the Arctic is often viewed with suspicion, it is part of a strategy of general expansion of its maritime interests and capabilities, seeking a level of influence to match its global economic status.

The antiquity of sustained offshore fishing

The first settlement of Australia over 40 000 years ago provides evidence of the maritime capabilities of early modern humans. Did they also take to the sea to fish? Recent analysis of fish remains from sites in Timor-Leste and on islands off the coast of Papua New Guinea have been held to include deep sea species that must have been obtained through pelagic fishing. Here Atholl Anderson takes issue with the evidence, arguing that inshore fishing is a more likely scenario, and that deep sea fishing was beyond the scope of Pleistocene communities. Despite the early settlement of Australia, advanced boat technology was developed only during the Holocene. His reassessment is followed by responses from Sue O'Connor and Rintaro Ono, Geoff Bailey and Jon Erlandson, and finally by Atholl Anderson's reply to those comments.

Inshore or offshore? Boating and fishing in the Pleistocene

The first settlement of Australia over 40 000 years ago provides evidence of the maritime capabilities of early modern humans. Did they also take to the sea to fish? Recent analysis of fish remains from sites in Timor-Leste and on islands off the coast of Papua New Guinea have been held to include deep sea species that must have been obtained through pelagic fishing. Here Atholl Anderson takes issue with the evidence, arguing that inshore fishing is a more likely scenario, and that deep sea fishing was beyond the scope of Pleistocene communities. Despite the early settlement of Australia, advanced boat technology was developed only during the Holocene. His reassessment is followed by responses from Sue O'Connor and Rintaro Ono, Geoff Bailey and Jon Erlandson, and finally by Atholl Anderson's reply to those comments.

China and Maritime Transformation: History, Strategy and Policy Implications

This paper seeks to place China’s ongoing maritime transformation in a larger context, and thereby clarify the strategic implications of its pursuit of maritime capabilities. It argues that, given their amphibious nature, rimland powers are bound to encounter more challenges in the pursuit of maritime transformation, and more importantly, such pursuits easily backfire and cause undesirable ramifications. This paper examines the underlying mechanism which led to the failed maritime transformation of rimland powers in modern history. Then, based on the strategic lessons from modern history, it examines the strategic challenges concomitant with China’s pursuit of maritime capabilities, and contends that, if China hopes to escape similar fate, it has to pay serious attention to three strategic issues.

India–Australia Maritime Cooperation: Challenges and the Way Ahead

India and Australia have assumed a greater role in international affairs, emerging as regional powers with great power potential. Changes in the international environment, particularly the rise of China as a common source of concern and growing economic relations between the two countries in an era of increasingly complex interdependence, have provided an impulse for the two countries to enhance their bilateral ties. Part of that includes developing a robust maritime capability that can project force across blue water as well as on land, and which works in concert with allied maritime forces in assuring the defence of common interests. The paper provides an overview of the Indian–Australian relationship, focusing the analysis on India's changing maritime outlook, Australia's strategic priorities and a forecast of the possibilities for their developing a strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Shi Lang, a vehicle for regional change?

In a succession of disclosures over the summer of 2011, the People's Republic of China acknowledged the near completion of its first aircraft carrier and the initiation of a carrier building program. These revelations have come at a time of increased tension in the South China Sea on top of the wider worries in the region concerning China's overly assertive stance and the pace of its military modernization. This perspective will examine why the status of the vessel and the program have now been made public, in addition to surveying the wider implications this upgrade to Chinese maritime capabilities will have on the stability of the region over the coming years. However, this paper concludes that there is, at present, no reason for the sensationalism nor the threat‐mongering seen in many media outlets, of late. Hastily drawn conclusions based primarily on realpolitik fail to understand the nuances of this issue.