Managerial Overconfidence Research Articles

Who shall succeed? An examination of manager overconfidence and CEO selection

AbstractBy categorizing managerial confidence attributes into overconfidence, rationality and diffidence with the methodology used in the finance literature, we investigate how company boards strategically select chief executive officer (CEO) replacements from the senior management pool with different confidence attributes. In normal retirements, company boards tend to select succeeding managers with the same confidence attribute as retiring CEOs. If boards fire company CEOs, they tend to select rational successors irrespective of the confidence attributes of the ousted CEOs. Such board inclination of picking rational successors also occurs when corporate operation is at the recession stage or corporate strategy is changed surrounding succession. The evidence indicates that the managerial confidence attribute is an important consideration of the board in the CEO selection process and that the board deliberately selects the CEO with a certain attribute to move the firm in a planned direction.

The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence on the Credit Rating

[연구목적]본 연구는 경영자의 과신성향이 신용평가에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 신용평가사가 과신성향의 경영자가 보고하는 낙관적 예측에 단순히 반응하여 신용평가를 수행한다면 상대적으로 높은 신용등급을 산정하게 될 것이다. 반면 신용평가사가 경영자의 과신성향을 파악하고 부정적 성과를 나타낼 위험을 반영한다면 신용평가등급이 낮게 산정될 수 있다. [연구방법]2001년부터 2020년까지의 유가증권 시장과 코스닥 시장에 상장된 3,422 기업-연도 표본을 대상으로 다변량 회귀분석을 수행하였다. [연구결과] 실증결과 경영자 과신성향은 신용평가등급과 양(+)의 관계를 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 신용평가사는 경영자의 과신성향을 간파하지 못하고 경영자가 제공하는 낙관적 정보에 단순히 반응하여 신용등급을 높게 산정하고 있음을 의미한다. 그리고 추가분석을 통해 경영자의 과신성향과 신용등급 간의 양(+)의 관계가 성장기회가 높은 경우에 주로 나타나는 것으로 확인되었다. 신용평가사가 모든 과신성향의 경영자에 대해 등급을 높게 산정하는 것이 아니라 성장기회가 높은 경우에 한하여 등급을 높게 산정하는 것으로 해석된다. 또한 소속시장과 분석기간을 달리하는 추가분석을 통해 본 연구의 실증결과가 강건함을 확인하였다. [연구의 시사점]본 연구는 신용평가 과정에서 경영자의 과신성향이 충분히 고려되는지에 대한 분석을 통해 신용평가사의 분석 과정에 대한 통찰을 제공한다. 그리고 신용평가등급에 영향을 미치는 새로운 요인으로 경영자 과신성향을 추가하는 누적적 연구 결과를 제시한다. 마지막으로 본 연구 결과는 신용평가등급에 대한 제도 정비를 위한 정책적 시사점을 제공하면서도 신용등급 정보이용자에게도 정보 해석 과정에 유용하게 활용될 수 있다.

Taxing mobile and overconfident top earners

We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high state and hence of receiving the bonus, whereas firms and governments are not. When governments maximize tax revenues, we show that overconfidence unambiguously reduces the bonus tax rate that governments set in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium, while increasing tax revenues. When the government objective incorporates the welfare of resident managers, however, bonus taxes also serve a corrective role and may rise in equilibrium when overconfidence is increased.

E EARNING MANAGEMENT: THE EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT OVERCONFIDENCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Many studies have discussed the determinants of earning management. However, most of these studies discuss external factors of management such as audit quality and quality of disclosure and as a determinant of earning management. Study that tries to examine the intrinsic factors such as managerial overconfidence effect on earning management has not been widely conducted, especially in companies listed on IDX, Indonesia. This study aims to examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on earning management in companies listed on IDX. Furthermore, this study also aims to determine the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between managerial overconfidence. By using data analysis with the SEMPLS technique, the present study has succeeded to prove that managerial overconfidence affect earning management. Furthermore, this study also successfully provide evidence that corporate governance mechanisms such as independent audit committees and audit committee activities moderate the relationship between managerial overconfidence and earning management.

The Association among CEO Overconfidence, Ownership Structure and Financial Performance

This paper explores the relationship among ownership type, managerial overconfidence, and corporate performance. In addition, the purposes of this research are to examine the structure of ownership and CEO overconfidence of family businesses and investigates whether it influences the performance. This study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time–series nature of the data; our sample includes firms listed on Taiwan’s stock market during the period of 2009 to 2018, totally 6,612. These results show that (1) financial performance of family business is worse than that of non-family business. It means that family interests of family business are higher than those of company which lead to exploited; (2) CEO overconfidence of family business is lower than that of non-family business. Family supervision and control can lead to family business managers who depress his (her) own overconfident tendency; (3) the overconfident CEO has poor impact on corporate performance. This means that manager’s overconfident expectations will damage company’s benefits; and (4) after the overconfident CEO joins family business, corporate performance will be increased. It means overconfident manager can compensate for family’s conservativeness and lead to increased corporate performance.

Is managerial ability a moderator? The effect of credit risk and liquidity risk on the likelihood of bank default

This study investigates the effect of credit and liquidity risks as well as the moderating role of managerial ability on the likelihood of European commercial bank default during the period 2006 to 2017. We employ data envelopment analysis and a tobit model to measure banks' efficiency, the z-score to measure the likelihood of their default, and perform endogeneity and model specification robustness tests. Our results reveal that both risks significantly affect the likelihood of bank default and that the high skill of managers does not attenuate this effect. Rather, in the case of credit risk, managerial ability extenuates this effect. Managerial overconfidence and narcissism may explain the latter result. Another plausible explanation is that highly skilled managers who are likely to be rewarded with performance-based compensation schemes may be incentivized to hide bad news for an extended period of time. Such a scenario would increase the likelihood of bank default.

Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay

Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay

CEO Experience, Managerial Overconfidence and Investment Efficiency: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China

CEO Experience, Managerial Overconfidence and Investment Efficiency: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China

The effect of unconditional conservatism on the effectiveness of investment policies through overconfidence in the French context

In this paper, we first present a practical analysis of the reciprocal relationship between unconditional accounting conservatism and managerial overconfidence. Second, we examine the accounting conservatism effect on the investment policy effectiveness in the French context. The analysis sample includes non-financial companies listed on SBF 250 market with the period 2009-2017. We determine, through this analysis, whether accounting conservatism mitigates the optimism of over-confident managers, knowing that they generally tend to overestimate future returns on investments, exercise less prudent accounting practices and over-invest in capital projects. Basically, this research aims to verify the type of moderating effect that accounting conservatism provides for investment policy effectiveness, and the reduction of related behavioural bias generated by overconfidence. Empirical results allow elucidating this relationship and removing the ambiguity of the accounting conservatism role on over-investment processes. The conclusions partly opposed to those established in the literature on other analytical samples.

Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay

Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay

Material accounting misstatements: Do managerial overconfidence, financial distress, and corporate governance practices matter?

This study examined factors related to the occurrence of material accounting misstatements in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs). Two factors, motivation and opportunity, were assessed in this study. According to Jensen (1993), as the consequences of material accounting misstatement can be extremely detrimental to the firms and their employees, the occurrence of such affairs must be driven by strong motivation and a great opportunity. The motivation factors consist of managerial overconfidence and financial distress, while the opportunity factors include internal and external corporate governance practices. A total of 103 misstatement and 103 non-misstatement firms, gathered from 2010 to 2018, were examined. Univariate and binary logistic regression analyses were deployed to test the hypotheses. Evidently, highly financial distress, a higher proportion of board independence, the practice of CEO duality, and a larger size of borrowings exerted a significantly positive relationship with material accounting misstatements. Interestingly, a higher proportion of independent board members encouraged the likelihood of material accounting misstatements instead of mitigating such mishaps. This study provides insights to regulators on the efficacy of corporate governance practices in curbing material accounting misstatements. The study addresses the element of managerial overconfidence, which was previously limited to studies on capital structure and leverage decisions.

Impact of CEO Overconfidence on Corporate Financing Decision with Mediating Role of Risk Perception

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of managerial (Chief Executive Officer) overconfidence on corporate financing decision with the mediating role of risk perception. This study indicates that psychological factors and biases affect the decision making of human beings including top management. The research design of this research work is causal and primary data has been used to test the results of this study. Among all the companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange, researchers have selected top executives of 200 companies as a sample. E-Questionnaire has been used to collect the required data through LinkedIn and other mailing sources. Simple linear regression and correlation have been employed to test the model and Baron and Kenny (1986) four-step mediation has been used to test the mediation effect of risk perception. Results of this study conclude that there is a significant positive relationship between overconfidence of CEO and leverage suggested that there is a significant negative relationship between CEO overconfidence and risk perception. However, there is an insignificant result for the mediating role of risk perception between CEO overconfidence and leverage. The results are in line with previous studies on emerging economies.

Evaluation of Managerial Overconfidence, Cash Holding, and Investment Efficiency in Companies

Managers’ overconfidence leads to overestimating their ability to manage cash sources. Holding more cash may result in overinvestment in projects and investment inefficiency consequently. The present study aims to investigate the effect of cash holding on investment efficiency with the moderating role of managerial overconfidence in Iranian companies. All listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange, excluding banks, insurance, pension funds, and financial intermediaries, are included in the research. We have used data from financial statements of 91 companies over the period from 2010 to 2018 and conducted multiple regression models to test the hypotheses based on pooled and panel data set with fixed effects. The results indicate a positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and cash holding. The effect of cash holding on investment efficiency turns out to be significantly negative. Furthermore, managerial overconfidence has a significant moderating effect on the relation of the variables. This study is almost the first one, which has been done in emerging markets, so the study’s findings not only contribute to the existing literature on managerial overconfidence and investment efficiency but also assist policymakers, managers, and investors in making effective decisions.

Interdependence of Influence between Risk Management Behavior, MSME Characteristics, and Overconfidence on Business Sustainability (A case study in Indonesia)

More than 50% of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in Indonesia run their business for reasons of livelihood, while 30% do this since MSMEs are profitable, and may support their living costs. This study aims to determine and analyze the influence of risk management behavior, characteristics of MSMEs through overconfidence on MSME business sustainability, and consequently MSMEs as a source of livelihood. The result of this study indicates that risk management behavior has a significant positive effect on overconfidence, while the characteristics of MSMEs have a significant negative effect on that. In turn, it’s shown that overconfidence had a positive and significant effect on the sustainability of MSMEs. However, the characteristics of MSMEs and risk management behavior had no significant positive effect on the sustainability of MSMEs. These results indicate also that MSME entrepreneurs’ overconfidence plays a major role in managing their business, which could be considered by the local government and/or the central government in determining MSME policies, such as placements to sell which are given and regulated by each local government considering the accessibility of sellers and buyers as well as their safety.

Internal-Control Willingness and Managerial Overconfidence.

Internal control is a branch of accounting subject, and accounting control and risk management are the core of enterprise internal control. Previous studies have shown that high-quality internal control inhibits or regulates managerial overconfidence (MOC). However, it is believed that the influential factors of internal-control quality (ICQ) are normally objective factors, such as corporate characteristics, financial status, and governance structure. Corresponding to another type of constituent element, that is, the subjective factor, which we called internal-control willingness, has not been explored. In this study, we defined internal-control willingness as the degrees of the subjective initiative of the internal-control construction and execution activities of enterprises. In addition, we proposed a method to measure internal-control willingness based on text analysis and principal component analysis using Python, and then, we tested its impact on ICQ and MOC. Our findings are as follows: (A) internal-control willingness has a positive impact on ICQ, and (B) internal-control willingness lowers MOC. Our study introduces subjective initiative factors into the field of internal control and also extends the understanding of internal-control theory. Based on empirical conclusions, we suggested that regulatory authorities and corporate boards improve incentive mechanisms to jointly strengthen the internal-control willingness of all employees, so as to help enterprise managers operate rationally.

A new method for measuring CEO overconfidence: Evidence from acquisitions

This study proposes a new direct method of measuring managerial overconfidence using an acquisition setting. CEOs with significantly higher synergies forecast error (SFE), measured as the deviation between acquisition forecasted operating synergies and actual realized operating synergies, are more likely to exhibit traits of overconfidence. In support of this view, we find that synergies forecast error is positively related to takeover premium and negatively related to acquirer returns. Additionally, validation tests confirm that high SFE firms conduct more diversifying acquisitions. Reflecting, as well, the ex-ante power of the overconfidence measure in other settings, high SFE firms have a positive relation with capital expenditures, leverage, and innovation, and negative relation with equity issues.

Industrial policy and corporate investment efficiency

Drawing on the quasi-experiment formed by the revitalization plan of ten industries in China, this study empirically examines the impact of selective industrial policy on corporate investment efficiency within a difference-in-differences framework. The results show that the revitalization plan has a significant and negative effect on corporate investment efficiency by boosting over-investment while having little influence on under-investment. Further, we explore two potential channels underlying these findings, and find that the mediating effects of capital allocation efficiency and managerial overconfidence are significant. This study, therefore, demonstrates that the revitalization plan cannot effectively improve corporate investment efficiency, and has important implications for the use of selective industrial policy inside and outside China.

The impact of corporate governance measures on firm performance: the influences of managerial overconfidence

The paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) measures on firm performance and the role of managerial behavior on the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance using a Chinese listed firm. This study used CG mechanisms measures internal and external corporate governance, which is represented by independent board, dual board leadership, ownership concentration as measure of internal CG and debt financing and product market competition as an external CG measures. Managerial overconfidence was measured by the corporate earnings forecasts. Firm performance is measured by ROA and TQ. To address the study objective, the researcher used panel data of 11,634 samples of Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2018. To analyze the proposed hypotheses, the study employed system Generalized Method of Moments estimation model. The study findings showed that ownership concentration and product market competition have a positive significant relationship with firm performance measured by ROA and TQ. Dual leadership has negative relationship with TQ, and debt financing also has a negative significant association’s with both measures of firm performance ROA and TQ. Moreover, the empirical results also showed managerial overconfidence negatively influences the relationship of board independence, dual leadership, and ownership concentration with firm performance. However, managerial overconfidence positively moderates the impact of debt financing on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and negative influence on debt financing and operational firm performance relationship. These findings have several contributions: first, the study extends the literature on the relationship between CG and a firm’s performance by using the Chinese CG structure. Second, this study provides evidence that how managerial behavioral bias interacts with CG mechanisms to affect firm performance, which has not been studied in previous literature. Therefore, the results of this study contribute to the theoretical perspective by providing an insight into the influencing role of managerial behavior in the relationship between CG practices and firm performance in an emerging markets economy. Hence, the empirical result of the study provides important managerial implications for the practice and is important for policy-makers seeking to improve corporate governance in the emerging market economy.

CEO Compensation, Managerial Overconfidence and Performance of Sharia Compliant Firms and Non-Sharia Compliant Firms: Evidence from Listed GCC Firms

Background: The positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and performance implies that overconfident managers overestimate their ability to create value and improve their firm’s performance, which also lead to overestimate their own firms returns by taking over other firms. Purpose: The study examines relationship between managerial overconfidence, CEO compensation, and performance of sharia compliant firms and non-sharia compliant firms for 207 GCC listed firms from 2010 to 2014. Methodology: The study sample comprised of 207 firms for the main empirical analysis. The data used in this study were collected from GCC stock exchange data-base and firms financial report provided by website argaam.com between 2010 and 2018. Findings: The study found that managerial overconfidence is positively and significantly related to firm performance. CEO compensation and managerial overconfidence is also associated positively with sharia–compliant firms’ performance. The findings supported first hypothesis that managerial overconfidence leads to better firms’ performance. Originality: The study has revealed a positive impact of sharia compliant firms’ managerial overconfidence on firm performance. Furthermore, the effect of CEO compensation is favorable in sharia compliant firms.

Managerial Overconfidence and Firm Value

Managerial Overconfidence and Firm Value