In an article published in November/December 1996 issue of Public Administration Review, LaPorte and Keller argued that management of large organizations that deal with hazardous materials (materials that pose significant risks over long periods) presented extraordinary challenges for public institutions. They postulated that, in our society, such organizations are Pressed to operate at nearly fault-free levels in order to remain viable. LaPorte and Keller went on to describe a concept they called They argued that such constancy is a necessary (but not sufficient) attribute of organizations, if they wish to achieve public acceptance in their operations with hazardous materials (see also LaPorte and Metlay, 1996). LaPorte and Keller describe institutional constancy from a number of perspectives: perceived need for it, barriers to achieving it, and an outline of matters that must be attended to if institutional constancy is to be achieved. In suggesting further paths for research, LaPorte and Keller urge that case studies be developed that examine the characteristics and experiences of institutions that have achieved a degree of institutional constancy. They mention a number of organizations that, based on externally available information, appear to meet their criteria for institutional constancy. One of these organizations is Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. The authors concur that much can be learned regarding institutional constancy by reviewing history, organization, and management of such organizations as Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (or Naval Reactors, as it is more commonly known). This program is responsible for design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of nuclear power plants that propel approximately 40 percent of major combatant ships of U.S. Navy. As such, Naval Reactors has managed building and operation of approximately 240 nuclear reactors and, importantly in today's environment, safely and responsibly decommissioned more than 50 of these reactors and their associated equipment. Since organization has safely and effectively dealt with hazards associated with nuclear power for almost 50 years, it seems appropriate to evaluate some of reasons for that success. In following discussion, Naval Reactors will first be described from an insider's perspective, that is, discussed in term that program (and its chroniclers) have employed. This description is intended to provide a feel for program The attributes that emerge during this discussion will then be compared to basic structure of institutional constancy described by LaPorte and Keller. Inside Naval Reactors Naval Reactors is a joint program of Navy and Department of Energy. The need for a joint effort stems from fact that Department of Energy is only government agency empowered by law to conduct research and development on power reactors (Rockwell, 1992, 44-46, 54-64; Duncan and Hewlett, 1974, 60-67, 88-94). In basic terms, Navy defines required features of nuclear power plants; Department of Energy develops and tests plants to ensure that they meet requirements. The Navy builds, operates, and decommissions shipboard plants, and then turns decommissioned reactor plants over to other organizations within Department of Energy for burial.(1) Very early in development of naval nuclear power, H. G. Rickover, then a Navy captain, saw that this statutory division of responsibilities posed grave difficulties. He recognized that development and utilization of this revolutionary new source of power should be treated as a series of closely related technical functions including research and development, detailed design, procurement of apparatus, maintenance and repair of equipment, and selection and training of personnel. …
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