Major Uprisings Research Articles

The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: The Central Role of Identity Recognition (or Lack Thereof)

Academics and state officials over the years have put forth a host of factors to explain armed insurrections in Turkey since the 1920s. From ‘religious reactionaries’ and ‘underdevelopment’ to ‘foreign intervention,’ ‘economic inequality’ and ‘identity-based grievances.’ What sort of explanation one subscribes to generally seems to depend on either one’s politics or simply which analysis sounds most plausible and convincing. This study looks for evidence from the insurrections in Turkey to help shed more light on the issue. We examine the stated demands and grievances of the rebels fighting the Turkish state in the major uprisings of the twentieth century (1925, 1927–1930, 1937 and 1978 onwards). Judging from their own statements, the recognition of Kurdish identity was central to all these episodes. No other issue appears so prominently in all the uprisings. The study then turns to theoretical work on protracted conflicts and ethnic conflicts to explain why identity recognition is of such importance. Following this analysis, parameters to resolve the Kurdish conflict in Turkey are examined in light of these observations. Solutions to end the conflict need to begin first and foremost with official identity recognition and acceptance of the Kurds, as Kurds. The rest consists of issues to be negotiated.

Obraz historii Polski (1818-1918) w komiksie Henryka Jerzego Chmielewskiego

Henryk Chmielewski is the author of a historical comic book devoted to the 100th anniversary of Poland regaining its independence. The comic book of Chmielewski is a subjective vision of Polish history, because every act of creation is first of all an act of destruction. Artist says about very difficoult moment of Polish history (the 19th century, the early 20th century). He creates original story, argues, that the idea of Poland as an independent state was never not lost. Polish people were formed armyduring the Napoleonic Wars, and Polish organisations started major uprisings (the Polish–Russian War of 1830–1831 and the January Uprising of 1863-64). Chmielewski creates an interesting picture of the world with the use of many varying forms, different codes (e.g. picture, word, photography). He use various means of expression: semantic, linguistic, compositional (see values, compotents: metannaration, digression, opposition "we" - "they", stereotype, appropriate words - freedom, Poland, Poles, relationship: fiction - real world, illusion, colloquial language).

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN CENTRAL UKRAINE ON THE THRESHOLD OF AND DURING THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION (1881–1922): THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

The subject of the study is the analysis of economic development (agrarian relations) in Central Ukraine in the 80s of the XIX century – the first quarter of 1922. The problematic nature of the article is stipulated by the insufficient attention of specialists to the economic history of this region. The publication deals with the socio-economic sphere of regional history. Methodology. The study is based on the use of interdisciplinary methodological optics: economics, history, geography, and law. The purpose of the article is to analyse the approaches to solving the agrarian issue in Central Ukraine in the post-reform period and during the liberation struggle of 1917-1922. The article focuses on various aspects of socio-economic development in the late XIX century – the first quarter of the XX century. Conclusions. In the 80s and 90s of the XIX century, significant economic experiments took place in Central Ukraine aimed at solving the agrarian issue and meeting the economic needs of the peasantry. They were initiated by both representatives of the authorities – zemstvo officials – and public figures, such as M. Levytskyi. These attempts were partially successful economically: the peasantry of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Kyiv, and Poltava provinces had larger land holdings than in other areas, and were more entrepreneurial, as evidenced by their support for the cooperative movement. The second part of the article deals with the analysis of socio-economic relations during the liberation struggle of 1917-1922. The analysis of this struggle suggests that the peasantry of Central Ukraine was the driving force behind various insurgent movements. There were several major uprisings on socio-economic grounds in these areas, which were caused by the Ukrainian peasantry's rejection of the economic experiments of the Russian occupiers: the Bolsheviks and their opponents, the White Guards. The interests of the Ukrainian peasantry were partially satisfied by the introduction of a new economic policy in 1921, which contributed to the gradual decline of the insurgency.

Rogue Revolutionaries: The Fight for Legitimacy in the Greater Caribbean by Vanessa Mongey

Reviewed by: Rogue Revolutionaries: The Fight for Legitimacy in the Greater Caribbean by Vanessa Mongey Michael Lawrence Dickinson Rogue Revolutionaries: The Fight for Legitimacy in the Greater Caribbean. By Vanessa Mongey. Early American Studies. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020. 212 pages. Cloth, ebook. In her Rogue Revolutionaries, Vanessa Mongey pushes readers to reconsider political projects during the Age of Revolutions that historians have often dismissed as marginal failures worthy only of cursory mention rather than in-depth study. She challenges readers to relinquish traditional concepts of “failure” and “success” and emphasizes instead the range of goals and actions of her subjects, whose obscurity she attributes to their failure to conform to historians’ presuppositions concerning revolution. She argues that these “rogue revolutionaries”—whom she finds mostly in the decades after the Haitian Revolution—were motivated by “cosmopolitan patriotism” (6), which she defines as an allegiance to the best interest of humanity, as opposed to implicit loyalty to a nation-state or community. For Mongey, what sets these figures apart from traditionally celebrated revolutionaries is that their ideals led them to participate directly in multiple revolutionary conflicts and projects across geographic borders. As Mongey argues, to appreciate the significance of these rogue revolutionaries properly, historians “need a more expansive definition of revolution that includes various attempts to forcibly overthrow regimes and generate alternative social, economic, and political orders” (4). Though theoretically this is the widely held definition, Mongey maintains that scholars often disregard unsuccessful revolutionary activity as unworthy of examination. By contrast, she wants readers to see beyond imperial boundaries and the formation of nation-states to the horizons of possibility imagined by her subjects. In doing so, she argues against idealized, normative patterns of state formation and oversimplistic terms such as “failed state” and underscores the complexities and messiness of radical enterprises. According to Mongey, a broader conception would reveal the ways revolutionary ideology and fervor permeated the Atlantic beyond the major uprisings and formations of national governments that have been the frequent subjects of historical study. Rogue Revolutionaries therefore advances an important vein in recent scholarship: prioritizing those traditionally marginalized in narratives of the Age of Revolutions in order to better understand the period and its implications. Like many authors of recent works, Mongey uses the “Greater Caribbean” as her geographic frame of analysis, arguing that the region served as “a fertile ground for the cross-pollination of goods, ideas, and peoples; it [End Page 159] was a revolutionary rendezvous” (12).1 Though she never defines how she envisions the term, she persuasively demonstrates that the region functioned as a liminal space defying imperial boundaries, which fostered revolutionary zeal and facilitated radical ideation. Mongey’s historical actors include mostly men from Europe and the Caribbean, and only one individual featured was born in colonial North America—likely a deliberate decision made to decenter the United States. These were stateless actors, either by choice or as the result of exile, who participated in unsuccessful revolutionary projects. Most of the figures fought in major conflicts of the era, whether in the Latin American revolutions, the French Revolution, or smaller engagements such as the War of 1812 or warfare in and around Texas. Most shifted allegiances throughout their lifetimes and were involved in revolutionary activities across borders. For example, Saint Domingue–born Joseph Savary fought for Spanish American troops and later led fellow free men of color in the War of 1812 at the Battle of New Orleans. Likewise, Prussian native Henri Louis La Fayette Villaume Ducoudray-Holstein enlisted in the French army and later fought for the Texas Republic before serving Latin American revolutionary leader Simón Bolívar. For Mongey, they were no less emblematic of the revolutionary age than more well-known figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Simón Bolívar, or Toussaint Louverture. Mongey’s approach builds upon the work of scholars such as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, who have uncovered the significant roles that ordinary and unheralded individuals played during the tumults and turbulence of late eighteenth-century uprisings.2 As she emphasizes, given the massive changes through which they lived, such figures had significant reason to imagine potential success. But those rebellions that...

Determinants of the Arab Spring Protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya: What Have We Learned?

This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of protest participation in Arab Spring countries that witnessed major uprisings and in which social unrest was most pronounced. Namely, this paper investigates the latter in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya using a micro-level data survey, the Arab Transformation Survey (2015). The findings of our probit regression analysis reveal that gender, trust in government, corruption concern, and social media usage have influenced the individual’s perception of protest activism. We find evidence that the role of economic factors was inconsistent, whereas political grievances were more clearly related to the motive to participate in the uprisings. We then control for country-specific effects whereby results show that citizens in each country showed different characteristics of participation. The findings of this research would set the ground for governments to better assess the health of their societies and be a model of governance in the Middle East.

Caucasus War by the Eyes of Artist F. Roubaud

The topicality of the study is due to the fact that today, both the territory and citizens of the North Caucasus are a historical phenomenon. One of the less studied historical phenomena is the integration of the Caucasus into the Russian Empire. The conquest of the Caucasus began in the early 18th century and is closely related to the Persian campaign of Peter I (1722-1723). However, historians sometimes forget the major uprisings in Chechnya and Dagestan (1877-188). It was at the same time that the Russo-Turkish War took place. At the same time, the 200,000-strong group of tsarist troops maintained calm in the region. The Caucasian War is a poorly studied phenomenon in the history of the Russian state. The annexation of the territory of the Caucasus to the Russian Empire has had both positive and negative consequences.

Civil Resistance Mechanisms and Disrupted Democratization: The Ambiguous Outcomes of Unarmed Insurrections in Egypt, 2011–2015

Egyptian pro‐democracy activists mobilized two major uprisings in recent years: one ending Hosni Mubarak's decades‐long rule in February 2011 and the other precipitating a coup against newly elected president Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. Prior research indicates that nonviolent campaigns succeed more often and are more likely to result in democracy than armed insurgencies. The theorized explanation, in short, is that nonviolent campaigns better facilitate democratic participation, but it is inadequate when civil resistance has mixed outcomes. Analysis of the Egyptian case demonstrates how ambiguous results can be understood by disentangling the specific ways civil resistance prefigures democracy. The article traces the varying efficacy of civil resistance in Egypt between 2011 and 2015 through five distinct mechanisms: fostering inclusive political participation; organizing civil society; establishing civilian checks on authority; implementing procedures for nonviolent conflict management; and instituting practices of egalitarian self‐governance. The case study serves to refine our understanding of the link between nonviolent action and democratization.

“Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”: Economic imperialism and ecclesiastical imperialism

British military aggression during the Opium War forced China to open up her coastal ports to Westerners for trade and to Christian missionaries for evangelization. Commerce and Christianity, opium and Christ were somehow connected in this relationship between Western powers and China. It was a relationship shaped by the unequal treaties imposed upon China by the West and thus it was marked by hostilities, resentment and hatred. The effects of the Opium War led to various local uprisings against the foreigners as well as against the Qing government for its failure to prevent the Westerners from humiliating China. These upheavals in China were also caused by political corruption, military degradation and natural disasters. This article focuses on two major uprisings – the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer War – which were sparked off by anti-foreign and anti-Christian sentiments. It also attempts to highlight the impact of Christianity on Chinese soil, which on the whole was disastrous and tragic, as we shall see in the Taiping Revolt as well as the Boxer Movement.

From Palestine to Syria: Three Intifadas and Lessons for Popular Struggles

What lessons can the Palestinian national movement offer contemporary revolts in the Middle East in general, and Syria, specifically? Though the Syrian revolt to overthrow dictatorship is distinct from Palestinians’ mobilization against occupation, many issues and patterns link them as popular struggles. Looking for such patterns, this essay examines three major uprisings in Palestinian history: the Great Revolt of 1936–39, the first Intifada beginning in 1987, and the second Intifada beginning in the year 2000. Comparing these cases to the ongoing Syrian rebellion, it draws conclusions about the factors shaping the course and success of grassroots struggles. Specifically it points to the yearning for dignity as the fundamental engine of popular mobilization against oppressive rule, the effect of state repression in escalating protest, and the relationship between movements’ internal political unity and the effectiveness of their campaigns for change.

Jordan and the ‘Arab Spring’: No Challenge, No Change?

Many of the factors that in 2011 caused major uprisings in several Arab countries and led to deep political changes were and continue to be present in Jordan. Access to social media, widespread frustration with corruption, high unemployment among the well-educated youth, and growing inequality are but a few of the elements common to Jordan and those Arab states that experienced governmental upheavals. Nevertheless, the Jordanian political reality in the years 2010/11 experienced rather limited demonstrations and modest demands from society that the ruling regime met with traditional practices that the Jordanian monarchy has used to deal with previous, non-revolutionary crisis situations since the 1970s. Although demonstrations in late 2012 were more radical than in 2010/11, they also fell short of creating a revolutionary situation as in Egypt and Tunisia one year earlier. In order to contribute to an explanation of structural particularities in Jordan during the ‘Arab Spring’ we contend that the flow of rent revenues contributes to regime stability. In the case of Jordan, its political rents were significantly higher than those of Egypt and Tunisia, and this situation may help to explain the different outcomes. Political rents contribute both to an explanation of why protests in 2010/11 were less significant and why they could be met by the regime. Yet, rent income as such does not explain political stability fully, and for that reason this article also critically discusses the institutional frame in which the rent streams are embedded.

Revoltas, Motins, Revoluções: Homens Livres Pobres E Libertos No Brasil Do Século XIX

Revoltas, Motins, Revoluções: Homens Livres Pobres E Libertos No Brasil Do Século XIX

Spatial Dynamics of the Arab Uprisings

Analyses of the spread of the Arab uprisings have been dominated by three comparative angles. Single-country studies have emerged as the most common framework, often put to use in a second comparative approach of examining variation across cases. For example, studies explore which states have had major uprisings and which have not, which uprisings were peaceful and which were violent, and so on (Amar and Prashad 2013; Haddad, Bsheer, and Abu-Rish 2012; McMurray and Ufheil-Somers 2013; Sowers and Toensing 2013). A third approach explores comparisons with other waves of popular mobilization against authoritarian regimes, for example, in Europe during the mid-nineteenth century, Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and so on (Patel, Bunce, and Wolchik 2013 Weyland 2012). These literatures investigate the complex processes of mobilization, revolution, and transition unfolding in parts of the Middle East since the outbreak of the uprisings in late 2010. From the literature on revolutions, for example, we know that a popularly based movement that brings about some change in political leadership does not necessarily lead to a regime change resulting in a fundamental overturning of an economic, political, or social system. From past cases we have learned that at least some old institutions and alliances almost always reemerge, and what form the new institution will take eventually is often unknown for several years—for example, think of the Iranian revolution, let alone the French revolution. As events in postrevolutionary Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen continue to unfold—and it is questionable whether those revolutions are even over—and as the bloody civil war in Syria continues, these insights provide us with useful tools for examining how institutions, processes, and power relations are changing—and how they are not.

The complete Roman legions

This is the first book for a general audience to cover all 45 imperial legions in compelling and accurate detail, telling the tales of their triumphs and defeats as they policed the empire and enlarged its borders. Focusing on the legions as the core of the Roman army, and chronicling their individual histories in detail, this volume builds on the thematic account of the Roman military force given by its companion The Complete Roman Army, and is vital reading for anyone who has enjoyed that book. It describes the legions in their various postings and major campaigns, as well as their activities as builders and peacekeepers on the empires frontiers. Data files on each legion list their titles, standards, main bases and major campaigns; box features throughout range from accounts of major uprisings to surveys of the main bases and fortresses. Over 200 illustrations portray weapons, armour, inscriptions, fortresses and the regions where the legions served. Beautifully designed and comprehensively illustrated, the books authoritative and informative text dramatically brings to life the ancient world's most successful military machine. (Professor Lawrence Keppie).

Bare-sticks and rebellion: The drivers and implications of China’s reemerging sex imbalance

At several points throughout the history of Chinese civilization there has been a sizable sex ratio imbalance in which males vastly outnumber females. This surplus of males has been constituted primarily by poor, unmarried men known as “bare-sticks” ( guanggun). Driven by a socio-cultural preference for sons and facilitated by sex-specific infanticide and infant neglect, the growth of the bare-sticks population in imperial China had serious implications for rural rebellion. The bare-stick population served as a major constituency for violent revolt in a number of major uprisings, many of which were directly related to securing fundamental natural resources and the survival of subsistence communities. After a hiatus during the Maoist period, China’s bare-sticks are making a forceful comeback due to a variety of factors including the endurance of the traditional son preference, restrictive fertility policies, a dearth of retirement options for the country’s increasingly large elderly population, and the introduction of prenatal sex-determining technologies like the ultrasound. Most importantly, as modern China continues down the path of rapid economic growth that has blighted natural resource quality for the last 30 years, the social implications of the re-emergence of the bare-sticks are magnified.

Iraq’s Militias: The True Threat to Coalition Success in Iraq

In the last five years, the United States invaded two countries and overthrew two ruling parties. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the so-called end of major combat operations came swiftly and decisively. In their wakes emerged resistances far more resolute than predicted, forcing coalition military commanders to shift from a conventional warfare doctrine to one better suited for fighting long wars against asymmetric enemies with extremist ideologies. But while religious extremism may typify the average insurgent, the biggest threat to American policy is not posed by the jihadist, who in most cases, lacks the ability to organize, effectively train and recruit forces (other than suicide bombers), and has no long-term strategy for generating resources, garnering public support, or achieving realistic strategic goals. The real hazard to American objectives in Southwest Asia comes from armed and active militias who, unlike most insurgents, have served as career soldiers, seized the support of their populace, and, in many cases, infiltrated national government institutions. Though a form of resistance, militiamen are far different in nature than insurgents or terrorists. In the long-term, militias are most damaging because they weaken government influence by providing unofficial (and effective) security in localized areas using illegal methods. (2) Due to the support they receive from their constituents and the resultant political power they wield, militias can only be neutralized through state-sponsored Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives. By understanding the similarities and differences between militias and insurgents, noting the potential positives and negatives associated with militias, and applying lessons-learned from DDR-type programs recently employed in Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition forces can develop an effective counterstrategy for Iraq's militias. Such a strategy should be based on political will and international financing as part of a comprehensive approach inculcating political, economic, and military components. Militias and Politics in Afghanistan and Iraq The most prominent militia commander in Afghanistan, and a real threat to national stability and growth, is Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, former mujahedin party leader and head of a militia founded in Wahhabism, an extremely conservative brand of Sunni Islam. Now the leader of the Upper House of Afghan Parliament, Sayyaf has openly refused to dismantle his militia. His Islamic orthodoxy coupled with his political participation has slowed the modernization of the Afghan judiciary and hindered the expansion of Western style freedoms in Afghanistan. (3) Iraq's primary militias consist of the Badr Corps (a paramilitary wing of the politically powerful Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), the Kurdish Peshmerga (essentially an authorized armed force supported by a legitimate Kurdish Regional Government), and Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (commonly referred to as the Mahdi Army or Militia). Of these, the Mahdi Militia is widely viewed as most dangerous. As of May 2006, it is the only militia known to have attacked both coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, and it was responsible for two major uprisings against coalition and Iraqi forces in 2004. (4) Like Sayyaf's group, Sadr's Mahdi Militia claims to be religious based, possesses an extremely conservative and anti-Western ideology, openly enforces an extreme brand of Sharia law, and is now very politically active--not so much as government leaders, but more as political spoilers, undermining democratic initiatives whenever possible. Like Sayyaf, Sadr has openly refused to dismantle his militia. In recent months Sadr claimed to lose control over rogue elements of his organization, making it even more dangerous than it was two years ago. Militias and politics are often inextricably linked. During the last five years, in both Afghanistan and lraq, violence heightened during the run-up to every election. …

Curas and Social Conflict in the Doctrinas of Cuzco, 1780–1814

Historians concerned to evaluate the turbulent political history of southern Peru in the late colonial period have, in the main, sought their answers in the voluminous correspondence generated in the wake of the several rebellions, seditions and sundry protests and riots which so scarred the epoch. Several historians have recently explored the wider structural context of such unrest, and we even have a socio-racial analysis of the leading cadres of the Túpac Amaru rebellion of 1780. Beyond the political and economic or commercial context within which such political conflict took place, however, we still lack an analysis of social stratification in southern Peru which embraces both the divisive and cohesive facets of inter-class relations, with all that the imply fo the potential formation of political alliances in the region. Moreover, apart from the immediate conflicts which precipitated the two major uprisings of 1780 and 1814, little is known of the nature of social relations at local level during the interregnum of some three decades which separated those two revolts, or indeed before 1780.

The Riot as Politics

Two independent tests with a total of 36 large and medium-sized non-southern cities have demonstrated support for a political explanation of the major riots of the 1960s. It is argued that politically interested and motivated segments of the black community were disaffected because of the failure of government to respond to their demands. Their participation turned minor disorders into major uprisings. An alternative hypothesis, that public policy response generates increased expectations and ultimately greater violence, has been rejected. However, the findings rest upon the riot experience of a small number of cities in the 1960s. It seems very unlikely that the public policies of these cities would have much impact on the expectations of their black citizens and thus the rationale of the alternative hypothesis is undermined. The public policies of other governments, at other times, might have more influence on the expectations of their citizens. Additional research would be required to identify circumstances under which public policy response might lead to increased expectations, disaffection, and ultimately greater violence.