Major Accident Prevention Research Articles

Major accident prevention decision-making: A large-scale survey-based analysis

Decision-making under risk and uncertainty is not straightforward. This paper investigates how people make decisions when they need to choose between prevention and production investments and the decision involves risks and uncertainties that could have major negative consequences. A questionnaire was conducted among 405 students at the University of Antwerp, in Belgium. With regard to decision-making under risk, the findings reveal that the respondents behaved in a more risk-averse manner than predicted by the theory of expected values. Concerning decision-making under uncertainty, the respondents also displayed more risk-averse decision-making behaviour than anticipated, especially under circumstances of complete uncertainty. The study also shows that men are more likely to behave in a more risk-seeking manner than women are, and that people with a high intuitive thinking style are less risk-averse than people with a low intuitive thinking style. Furthermore, people with a high rational thinking style are more risk-averse than people with a low rational thinking style, and respondents with a high sensation-seeking style make decisions in a more risk-seeking way than respondents with a low sensation-seeking style.

Preventing black swans: incident reporting systems as collective knowledge management

In hazardous industries, disasters are mercifully rare and yet the potential is ever present. For this reason, companies and industries as a whole put substantial effort into gathering information about past small failures and their causes in an attempt to learn how to prevent more serious events. Despite these efforts, recent research has captured how organizations can ‘fail’ to learn. Disastrous events can become ‘black swans’ and remain unpredicted despite the existence of information warning of them. This article engages with this challenge by analyzing incident-reporting systems as a tool for collective knowledge. Drawing together the literatures on organizational knowledge management and incident reporting, we examine incident-reporting systems as used and as structured. We explore the potential use of incident-reporting systems for mediation and synchronization of knowledge within and across groups of professionals and organizations. We also address the social practices that translate information in databases into collective knowledge. Building on the work of Hecker, we argue that research concerned with incident reporting and organizational learning would benefit from using ‘knowledge’ and specifically ‘collective knowledge’ as its reference point. We show that conceptualizing this problem in terms of ‘reporting’ and ‘learning’ distracts attention from the knowledge needs for people to learn. We argue that we must ask: What do people need to know to play their part in major accident prevention? And how is that knowledge effectively shared? We conclude with an empirical research agenda in light of this investigation.

Major accident prevention and management of information systems security in technology-based work processes

The oil and gas industry in Norway has taken into use and is developing ICT-based work processes to improve efficiency and safety. Protection of information resources and technology; ensuring safe and secure processing of information; and ensuring reliable and safe flow of information is essential for both production and protection in such ICT-intensive organizations. Information systems security (IS) thus matters for major accident prevention. In the ICT-based work processes in the oil and gas industry new challenges for IS security occur related to: increased need for availability and integrity of information; merge of process safety systems and ICT-systems; manual use of information resources; and flow of information between distributed actors. These challenges imply new requirements for IS management: More focus on availability and integrity as protection principles; resilience-based approaches as a supplement to formal management approaches; validation of information flows; and integration of loss prevention approaches.

Decisions and decision support for major accident prevention in the process industries

Decision making is a central component in the management of safety-critical operations. Some attempts have been made to employ Quantitative Risk Analysis as input to such decisions. Although adequate for long-term planning where the average risk is the relevant parameter, such systems tend to fall short in operational and instantaneous decisions where ‘average risk’ is of less relevance. In this paper we investigate how operational and instantaneous risk can be managed and supported.Our analysis is based on interviews and observation studies at a major plant processing hazardous fluids and gas. We suggest a typology for decisional situations at the plant, and relate these to well-known traditions in the literature of decision-making theory. Strategic decisions in the plant fit well into the characteristics of rational choice theory, operational decisions are well described in terms of bounded rationality, and, finally, instantaneous decisions are typically taken as described by naturalistic decision making theory.We suggest several principles for improving decision support. While many decisions today are based on a high degree of probabilistic information, we see a need to deploy more factual information to make the risk picture more relevant for both operational and instantaneous decisions. In addition, the available probabilistic information is often inaccurate; improving the probabilistic information base, through more nuanced criticality factors for example, will also be an improvement. Finally, a basic premise for improvements in the decision process, is the need to be conscious regarding what should be considered strategic, operational and instantaneous decisions.

Major Accident Prevention Risk Communication Effectiveness: A Survey in the Czech Republic

Abstract An effective communication among authorities, citizens and industry is crucial to ensure good awareness of risk and knowledge of adequate reactions in preparedness to major industrial accidents. The present risk communication system in Czech Republic was evaluated by a nationwide survey. The main research was focused on the level of knowledge about risks and appropriate reactions to an accident and on the attitudes towards existing risk communication system. The results of survey indicate that the current system is insufficient and has to be improved to fulfill the requirements of the new Seveso III directive (2012/18/EU) and to secure safety of the citizens.

Do incentives work? A qualitative study of managers’ motivations in hazardous industries

Incentive schemes are one way that companies seek to align the interests of their employees with corporate goals. Indicators of major accident risk management have been historically excluded from such incentives. However, analyses of the recent BP disasters found that the incentives worked against process safety, and it was recommended that companies move to include indicators to support the safe management of their complex technologies. The extent to which this recommendation has been applied, and its appropriateness in practice has not been the subject of systematic inquiry.Drawing on the literature on human motivation and incentives, this article addresses the present and potential role of incentives to manage major accident risk in hazardous industries. It focuses on the extent to which senior managers are motivated by incentives in their daily decisions. This analysis is based on qualitative interviews, observation, and document analysis in 11 case study companies across the oil and gas, petrochemical, pipeline, and mining sectors.We argue that despite discomfort with the concept that safety decisions might be influenced by money, incentives influence priorities and behaviours because they do not rely for their effect on economic self-interest alone. Instead they tap a number of human motives, among them the need for approval, and the need to be recognised as making a valuable contribution. We conclude that if incentives continue to be used as a motivation strategy for financial and business performance, safety – particularly as it relates to major accident prevention – must also be incentivised in this way.

The Assessment of Population Safety in the Vicinity of Unclassified Risk Sources

Act on the Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents defines the threshold quantities of hazardous substances in companies. Businesses that have exceeded their limits assess risks under this act. For smaller establishments where dangerous substances are present in quantities subliminal, risk assessment in terms of the occurrence and effects of the accident is not required. Nevertheless, these objects can represent a source of danger of a major accident, especially given its location, nature of the threat and synergy due to several adverse circumstances. Aim of this paper is to design a model for assessing the degree of threat or safety margin so unclassified sources of risks, for example refrigeration equipment, winter stadium, gas reservoirs and to apply the algorithm for the risk assessment of such objects. Unclassified sources of risk may also be a threat to critical transport infrastructure or its elements. The result is a consistent multi-step methodological approach to the assessment of risk sources and validation of selected operations involving dangerous substances, not reaching the threshold of this Act.

Coupling of advanced techniques for dynamic risk management

Identification and assessment of hazards and risks in the activities of the process industry are of paramount importance for the prevention of major accidents. Although several techniques of HAZard Identification (HAZID) and quantified risk analysis have often been proved effective in the industry, they generally lack the dynamic dimension of risk management. In other words, they lack the ability to learn from new risk notions, experience and early warnings. When carrying out HAZID and risk assessment, there is the need to know how to deal with atypical accident scenarios as soon as their emergence is demonstrated. The related risk needs to be addressed in an ever-changing environment. In fact, what is not identified or assessed cannot be prevented or mitigated and latent risk is more dangerous than recognized one due to the relative lack of preparedness. This study proposes a dynamic approach to risk by coupling an advanced technique for hazard identification to an innovative method for risk assessment: the Dynamic procedure for atypical scenarios identification (DyPASI) and the Dynamic risk assessment (DRA) method. DyPASI was developed within the EC project iNTeg-Risk. This technique aims to complete and update HAZID. Atypical accident scenarios, which by definition are deviating from normal expectations of unwanted events or worst case reference scenarios, are identified through a systematic screening of related emerging risk notions. The DRA method aims to estimate the updated expected frequency of accident scenarios by means of Bayesian inference. Real time abnormal situations or incident data are used as new information to update the failure probabilities of the system safety barriers, which necessarily affect the overall scenario frequencies and the related risk profile. The BP Texas City refinery accident, that occurred on 23 March 2005, was considered as a case study. The results obtained from the application of the dynamic risk approach show that the accident should have been expected and its occurrence probability could have been reduced through this approach. The results highlight the need of safety culture and decision-making processes capable of dealing dynamically with emerging and increasing risk issues.

Addressing dynamic risk in the petroleum industry by means of innovative analysis solutions

The importance of Integrated Operations (IO) is rapidly growing in today's petroleum industry. It is being developed to improve capture of real-time safety barrier data and to process, visualize and share this information for closer onshore-offshore collaboration and expert support. Increased capacity in the communication infrastructure (e.g. via fibre optics) and integration and processing of data from various sources enable more accurate methods of risk analysis that would have been previously considered time- costly. For this reason this study addresses the topic of dynamic approach to risk in an IO context by presenting and integrating advanced techniques of hazard identification and risk assessment, such as: DyPASI (Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification), DRA (Dynamic Risk Assessment) and the Risk Barometer methodology. DyPASI was developed in the EC project iNTeg-Risk. This technique aims to produce complete and updated HAZID process. Atypical accident scenarios, which by definition are deviating from normal expectations of unwanted events or worst case reference scenarios, are identified through a systematic screening of related emerging risk notions. The DRA method aims to estimate updated expected frequency of accident scenarios by means of Bayesian inference. Real time abnormal situations or incident data are used as new information to update the failure probabilities of the system safety barriers, which necessarily affect the overall scenario frequencies and the related risk picture. The Risk Barometer was developed within the Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry. It aims to continuously monitor specific indicators measuring the status of critical safety barriers and translate them into risk picture changes. Its result is an intuitive graphical representation of the overall risk level in order to support decision makers in daily operations. The description of these techniques will be accompanied by a preliminary application on a generic case-study, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of such dynamic approach in risk management and prevention of related major accidents.

Major accident management in the process industry: An expert tool called CESMA for intelligent allocation of prevention investments

A tool (called CESMA) was developed to carry out cost–benefit analyses and cost-effectiveness analyses of prevention investments for avoiding major accidents. A wide variety of parameters necessary to calculate both the costs of the considered preventive measures and the benefits related with the avoidance of accidents were identified in the research. The benefits are determined by estimating the difference in (hypothetical) major accident costs without and with the implementation of a preventive measure. As many relevant costs and benefits as possible were included into the tool, based on literature and expert opinion, in order to be able to deliver an all-embracing cost–benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis to assist in the investment decision process. Because major accidents are related to extremely low frequencies, the tool takes the uncertainty of the unwanted occurrence of a major accident into account through the usage of a so-called ‘disproportion factor’. Compared with existing software, the CESMA tool is innovative by striving for an as-accurate-as-possible picture of costs and benefits of major accident prevention, and taking the uncertainties accompanying disastrous events into consideration. Furthermore, an illustrative example of CESMA is presented in the paper.

How to consider engineered nanomaterials in major accident regulations?

Major accident regulations aim at protecting the population and the environment from possible accidental releases of chemicals. To achieve this goal, the regulations need to be reassessed in light of the development of new technologies. A currently rapidly growing new technology is nanotechnology, and engineered nanomaterials (ENM) are already produced and used in commercial products. The aim of this work was therefore to evaluate the current knowledge on human and ecotoxicology of ENM and their release and behavior in the environment in the context of major accident prevention. Nano-specific release paths are not to be expected. The established safety standards in the chemical industry are also applicable to ENM, especially the separate storage of flammable solvents and detention reservoirs. The potential of a release to the environment of ENM in powder form is larger than for suspensions; however, it can be minimized by safety measures established for conventional dusts. The considered human toxicology studies show that to date not conclusive enough answers regarding the toxicity of ENM can be made. The effects are dependent not only on the material itself but more on the functionalization, surface reactivity, size, and form. The acute ecotoxicity of ENM seems to be similar to the one of the corresponding microparticles (TiO2) or the respective dissolved ions (Ag, Zn) with the exception of photocatalytically active nano-TiO2, which has an increased toxicity. In order to guarantee that all ENM are included in the existing major accident regulations, different classification options are possible and the advantages and disadvantages are discussed. An important step will be the compulsory inclusion of nano-specific data in the Material Safety Data Sheets that serve as the basic medium to transfer information from the manufacturer to downstream users and authorities. We also call for a regular monitoring of the production and uses for ‘high production volume ENM’ that could have the largest implications for major accident regulations.

Dypasi Methodology: from Information Retrieval to Integration of Hazid Process

The availability of hazard identification methodologies based on early warnings is a crucial factor in the prevention of major accidents. Accidents like Seveso, Buncefield and Toulouse, where severe consequences occurred seemingly unexpected by the plant safety management, have made it clear that a comprehensive and complete identification and assessment of potential hazards in the process industry are of primary importance for the prevention and the mitigation of accident scenarios. The accident scenarios deviating from normal expectations of unwanted events or worst-case reference scenarios captured by common HAZard IDentification (HAZID) techniques are usually defined as “atypical”. The main issue posed by the prevention of atypical scenarios is the availability of techniques able to identify them within a routine HAZID process, capturing evidence of new hazards and learning from ‘early warnings’ as soon as they come to light. For this reason a specific method named Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification (DyPASI) was developed. The method was conceived as a development of conventional bow-tie identification techniques. DyPASI is a method for the continuous systematization of information from early signals of risk related to past events. It dynamically integrates in the bow-ties the results of information retrieval activities. DyPASI features as a tool to support emerging risk management process, having the potentiality to contribute to an integrated approach aimed at breaking “vicious circles”, helping to trigger a gradual process of identification and assimilation of previously unrecognized atypical scenarios. The current contribution presents the technique and demonstrates the application by a selected case-study of practical application (Toulouse AZF accident, Buncefield oil depot accident, LNG regasification terminal, CCS plant).

Comparison of Approaches to Major Accident Prevention between the European Union and Russia

Operation of equipment containing hazardous chemical substances and products is very dangerous area related to risk of major accidents and injuries. Currently, safety of employees and residents is considered as one of the most important factors to be taken into account in any activities. The development of legislation is important for industrial safety which regulates the minimum requirements for industrial processes. Legislative requirements vary from state to state; in advanced countries they are based on the fundamental principle - the employer is responsible for health of workers.The article compares legislation in the field of industrial safety in the European Union and Russia. The novelty of comparison is based on changes of Russian regulation on safety of major accident prevention. There is considered a system of major accidents prevention and basic requirements for industrial enterprises that deal with chemical substances; limit amounts of hazardous substances are compared too. A new approach to major accident prevention in Russia and a comparison to recent “Seveso Directive” have not been described in international conferences yet.

Prevention of Major Accidents of the Aboveground Parts of Natural Gas Storage Technologies and Shale Gas Production Facilities

This article is intended to describe the most significant hazards associated with the operation of the aboveground parts of shale gas production technology and to compare them with possible hazard of the aboveground parts of natural gas storage technologies in underground storage reservoirs (in natural or artificial spaces in underground geological formations). In both cases, in addition to hazards of treatment of methane (natural gas and shale gas), there are used hazardous chemical substances that may threaten employees and surrounding population. These chemical substances are used for extraction or storage of gas. The issue of prevention of serious accidents of aboveground part of technology for the extraction of shale gas has not yet been solved, but the information about safety and environmental aspects of extracting shale gas has already been described in the last two years, in the article (Pointet, 2011). Safety of chemical constituents used as propping agents is described in the study (Waxman at al., 2011). At present there is no specific legislation of European Union regarding the management of risks of shale gas production, but the update of the European directive 96/82/EC includes storage of natural gas in underground storage. The new Directive 2012/18/EU is generally applicable to all such forms of storage, including the storage in natural gas fields (onshore underground gas storage in natural strata, aquifers, salt cavities and disused mines, and chemical and thermal processing operations and storage related to those operations which involve dangerous substances, as well as operational tailings disposal facilities, including tailing ponds or dams containing dangerous substances shall be included within the scope of the Directive). Due to a larger volume of chemical substances stored in the aboveground part of the technology for extracting of shale gas (average amount about 230 m 3 in stage of hydraulic fracturing) compared with volumes of chemical substances used in the aboveground part of technology of underground storage of natural gas (about 50 m 3 ) the technology of shale gas extraction has significantly higher risk. However, in the case that the entire process of storage of chemical substances will be well managed and sufficient measures will be taken to minimize the risk, aboveground part of the technology for extracting of shale gas does not represent a significant difference from warehouses in chemical production plants. From the comparison of hazards of the aboveground parts of natural gas storage technologies in underground storage reservoirs with hazards associated with the operation of the aboveground parts of shale gas production technology is obvious, that future legislation of European Union in the field of major accident prevention should include also the shale gas production facilities. Although a research about hazards of the aboveground part of the shale gas extraction technology has been made to improve the knowledge on this risk source, more research would be required, especially with practical results of detailed risk analysis.

Plant Screening for Ageing Impact in the Process Industry

The degradation of onshore process plants due to ageing-related mechanisms such as corrosion, erosion and fatigue is becoming a key issue at a worldwide scale. Despite its increasing importance, ageing issues are seldom incorporated or anchored in a company’s Management System. This limited engagement of the onshore process industry towards ageing issues is to a large extent due to the absence of a governing legal framework, which otherwise is in place for offshore facilities, power plants and nuclear plants. The latter are under more scrutiny as the accompanying external, economic and environmental risks are more pronounced as compared to onshore process plants. A recent HSE study however demonstrated that risks related to ageing onshore plants are far from negligible: roughly 60% of all loss of containment incidents are related to technical integrity issues, 50% of which have ageing as a contributory factor. This triggers the need to establish a Plant Lifetime Management methodology, accounting for ageing issues in this industry sector. The overall approach for Plant Lifetime Management as described here contributes not only to the prevention and control of major accident hazards but, allows also for prioritization of investment efforts and, hence, sound decision-making with respect to managing critical assets. This paper presents a new screening tool to assess the adverse impact of ageing on global plant performance and the collateral impact on major accident prevention programs. The newly developed BIP Scorecard (Business Impact Potential) provides a Predictive Ageing Score, composed of a set of 50 performance indicators (leading & lagging) which altogether leads to a risk profile which values the adverse effects of ageing. This paper also highlights a new approach for Plant Criticality Analysis, designed to enable asset risk managers to prioritize their financial investments. This criticality assessment is consequence based only and allows for a first criticality ranking at 2 levels: 1) a high level screening at plant level (full scope) identifying the most critical units in the entire plant, and 2) a focused screening at unit or equipment level (reduced scope) allowing to identify the most critical equipment in a specified unit or critical components in a specified equipment. A subsequent risk assessment for the highest ranked assets considering the probability of failure of these target assets leads to a list of critical assets (risk based). These critical assets are the ones to be further considered in investment decisions and for establishing asset life plans.

Analysis of underlying causes of investigated loss of containment incidents in Dutch Seveso plants using the Storybuilder method

In the Netherlands there are around 400 “Seveso” sites that fall under the Dutch Major Hazards Decree (BRZO) 1999. Between 2006 and 2010 the Dutch Labour Inspectorate's Directorate for Major Hazard Control completed investigations of 118 loss of containment incidents involving hazardous substances from this group. On the basis of investigation reports the incidents were entered in a tailor-made tool called Storybuilder developed for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for identifying the dominant patterns of technical safety barrier failures, barrier task failures and underlying management causes associated with the resulting loss of control events. The model is a bow-tie structure with six lines of defence, three on either side of the central loss of containment event. In the first line of defence, failures in the safety barriers leading to loss of control events were primarily equipment condition failures, pre start-up and safeguarding failures and process deviations such as pressure and flow failures. These deviations, which should have been recovered while still within the safe envelope of operation, were missed primarily because of inadequate indication signals that the deviations have occurred. Through failures of subsequent lines of defence they are developing into serious incidents. Overall, task failures are principally failures to provide adequate technical safety barriers and failures to operate provided barriers appropriately. Underlying management delivery failures were mainly found in equipment specifications and provisions, procedures and competence. The competence delivery system is especially important for identifying equipment condition, equipment isolation for maintenance, pre-start-up status and process deviations. Human errors associated with operating barriers were identified in fifty per cent of cases, were mostly mistakes and feature primarily in failure to prevent deviations and subsequently recover them. Loss of control associated with loss of containment was primarily due to the containment being bypassed (72% of incidents) and less to material strength failures (28%). Transfer pipework, connections in process plant and relief valves are the most frequent release points and the dominant release material is extremely flammable. It is concluded that the analysis of a large number of incidents in Storybuilder can support the quantification of underlying causes and provide evidence of where the weak points exist in major hazard control in the prevention of major accidents.

The effective control of major industrial accidents by the Major Industrial Accident Prevention Centers (MAPC) through the Process Safety Management (PSM) grading system in Korea

This paper examines effectiveness of a regulatory enforcement organization (Major industrial Accident Prevention Center, MAPC), and a grading system for implementation of the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation in Korea. A lot of chemical installations have been built in Korea since the 1960s. The frequent occurrence of major industrial accidents had made people's concerns grow. The Korean government enacted PSM regulations in 1996 in order to curb these accidents.However, a key question is how to make sure companies comply with the PSM regulations. In order to improve company’ compliance with PSM regulations the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) responsible for the regulation introduced a grading management system in 2001 and then established special supervisory centers for enforcement of PSM regulations in 2005. This paper reviews the role and effectiveness of the system in term of PSM enforcement. The author found that the grade-based approach has encouraged employers to implement the requirements of the PSM regulations. MAPCs play an effective role in enhancing enforcement performance. Although the more chemical plants have been established in Korea, the fewer major industrial accidents have occurred since the introduction of the system. The results may be useful for the policy maker to build an effective and efficient enforcement system.

Hazardous Workplace Review Program in Taiwan

In Taiwan, relevant mid-term plans and projects of mitigating occupational hazards have been launched in recent years in the hopes of lowering the incidence of occupational hazards. In light of the lack of objective methodologies for researches on issues pertaining occupational safety and health, this research aims to explore the priorities of safety and health issues through focal groups, expert questionnaires and interviews on relevant issues such as hazard installations identified in R181 Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Recommendation, 1993 proposed during the 18th World Congress on Safety and Health at work in Seoul 2008. Results revealed that distribute reports of major domestic/foreign occupational disasters to relevant sectors for the prevention of major accidents is needed, both from the importance and feasibility analysis. It is the only topic that scored over 4 points in average for expert and focal group consensus. Furthermore, the experts and focal groups came to consensus in the ranking of priority for 4 items, namely: 1) Installations containing/using large quantities of hazardous materials should be prioritized for inspection, 2) Incorporation of hazard installation review/inspection into OSH management system accreditation, 3) Impose operation shutdown as a means of penalty) and 4) Prioritize the promotion of preliminary PHA.

Bringing to life line-of-sight for major accident prevention

The process safety of exploration and production has evolved since Piper Alpha with safety cases, hazard identification studies (HAZIDs) in design and, more recently, Bow-Ties becoming industry norm; however, recent incidents such as Texas City, Macondo, Varanus Island and Montara have shown industry and regulators from the UK, Australia and beyond that complacency cannot be allowed. The industry has been acting on process safety, but it has struggled to bring it to life in daily operations. Missed warning signals, poor change management, failure to follow procedures, capability issues and lack of communication have been preventable factors in these incidents. Recent efforts in Australia, using the line-of-sight methodology, are advancing process safety by bringing to life major accident prevention. The methodology focuses organisations on systematic management of preventative barriers to accidents and can be applied to all elements of the value chain. The methodology involves: conducting analysis of safety cases; assessing performance standards and safety to identify critical preventative barriers; developing measures and assigning accountabilities to monitor barrier effectiveness; and, developing tracking and reporting systems to provide visibility across operations management. A case study about an Australian operator has shown benefits in improved safety and operational performance. This is done by focusing the operators on critical barriers (as well as their normal daily jobs), better visibility on the state of operations and hence allowing a proactive approach to managing process safety. The system is in its infancy, but it is being improved to support line-of-sight becoming a standard tool across the industry.

Major accident analysis and prevention of coal mines in China from the year of 1949 to 2009

From the year of 1949 to the present, the China national coal output has been increasing quickly and became first in the world in 2009. But at the same time, major coal mining accidents still exist nowadays. In order to review the overall situation and provide information on major accidents of coal mines in China, we investigated 26 major coal mining accidents in China between the years of 1949 and 2009 through statistical methods, each of which led to more than 100 fatalities. Statistical characteristics about accident-related factors such as time, death toll, accident reasons, characters and nature of enterprise were analyzed. And some special conclusions have been achieved. For example, although we have made great progress, the safety situation in China coal mining industry is still serious, and the reasons for the mining accidents are all human errors which are not inevitable. Such results may be helpful to prevent major accidents in coal mines. Moreso, based on both the knowledge of other countries which have good safety situation nowadays and the safety management situation of China, we made suggestion on safety management of China coal mining. In conclusion, countermeasures were proposed in accordance with the results of statistical studies and the analyses of problems existed in coal mines, including the perfection of safety supervision organization, the establishment of cooperating agency among government, coal mines and workers, the perfection of safety rules and regulations, the improvement of safety investment, the enhancement of safety training, the development of safety technique, and the development of emergency rescue technique and equipment.