Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Research Articles

Restoring Indonesia’s (Un)Constitutional Constitution: Soepomo’s Authoritarian Constitution

AbstractThe recent years saw the rise in discourse to undo the liberal-democratic amendments introduced between 1999 and 2002 and restore the Indonesian 1945 Constitution to its original 1945 version. Some Indonesian public figures believe that these amendments are not legitimate, because they are deemed to have eliminated the basic values of the original 1945 Constitution which was built on the “integralist” concept as propounded by its main architect Soepomo. According to the integralist conception, the state should be seen as a family in which the government played a role as a wise father who can bring its people to the right choice. This article seeks to prove that these amendments are legitimate although they constitute a “dismemberment” of the original 1945 Constitution. This is because the original 1945 Constitution was formed only by a handful of elites in an institution established by the Japanese occupying power in early 1945. By contrast, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) who was in charge of the four amendments to the 1945 Constitution had a greater democratic legitimacy compared to the drafters of the original Constitution given that they were elected through the 1999 elections. Furthermore, the original 1945 Constitution was never intended to operate beyond the Indonesian revolutionary period, which ended in 1949. It was expected that the document be significantly changed or even replaced by the People’s Consultative Assembly through the amendment process.

COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE BROAD GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY AND THE MEDIUM‐TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN

<div><p class="Els-history-head">The Broad Guidelines of State Policy (BGSP) or Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN) and the National Medium-Term Development Plan (NMDP) or Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) are important state policies in the execution of Indonesia's national development in various aspects of the life of the nation and state. The BGSP is no longer exists, and the MDP is still in effect today. The purpose of this study is to compare the two policies to obtain the superiorities and weaknesses of each when faced with several parameters obtained from various theories related to politics and law. This study is qualitative research using comparative studies in its analysis. From this study, it was found that in general, the BGSP made by the People's Consultative Assembly (PCA) or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) had a greater relative superiority when compared to the MDP made by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.</p></div>

STUDI KEBIJAKAN PENANAMAN MODAL INDONESIA

Investment is one form of economic politics carried out in the context of economic democracy. As stated in the Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor XVI/MPR/1998 concerning Economic Politics in the framework of Economic Democracy, investment policies always underlie people's economy which involves the development of micro, small, medium and cooperative businesses. Investors who aim to exploit the resources and means of production at low prices are interesting to put forward if viewed from what issues and how investment policies in Indonesia maintain national economic activity? This policy study uses the library research method.

TINJAUAN YURIDIS TERHADAP PENGEMBALIAN KEWENANGAN ISTIMEWA MAJELIS PERMUSYAWARATAN RAKYAT MELALUI PERUBAHAN UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN 1945

The amendment of the Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 positioned the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat no longer as the highest state institution and the highest sovereign of the people. This has implications for the authority of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat to have a strategic position, namely to UUD 1945, to stipulate GBHN, to elect the president and vice president through amendment of its authority to be very limited and weak. This paper examines jurisdictionally how to restore the privileges possessed by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat through the amendment of the UUD 1945. A normative legal research method with statute approach and conceptual approach is used to analyze this problem.The results of the study indicate that the MPR's repatriation in the main and vital position in the Indonesian state administration system is very important, namely through amendments to the material content of the UUD 1945 which must be implemented on an ongoing basis.

The Constitutional Court and Consolidation of Democracy in Indonesia

The amendment of 1945 Constitution was stipulated and conducted gradually and became one of the agendas of the Meetings of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) from 1999 until 2002. It happened after the resignation of President Soeharto on May 21, 1998, that already in power for almost 32 years. In the reform era, Indonesia has taken comprehensive reform measures by bringing the sovereignty back to the hand of the people. To safeguard the supremacy of the 1945 Constitution, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia is formed as one of the judiciary authority organizing court proceedings to enforce the law and justice. This article analyzes the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia, the role of Constitutional Court of Indonesia based on its authority and describe how its decision has significant support for consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. The result of the research then shows that the Constitutional Court has made a positive influence in Indonesian consolidation of democracy. The Constitutional Court is also handy for upholding the constitutional norm, especially about state institutions and human rights. The Constitutional Court has taken an essential role in the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia through its decisions in judicial review of acts and resolving election disputes.

Political linkages between CSOs and parliament in Indonesia: a case study of political linkages in drafting the Aceh Governance Law

ABSTRACTThis research explores how political linkages between civil society organizations (CSOs) and Parliament are established, formed, and operated, using the drafting of the Aceh Governance Law as a case study. It finds that the initiative of establishing political linkages between CSOs and Parliament was taken by the CSOs joined in the Aceh Democracy Network (JDA, Jaringan Demokrasi Aceh). It confirms Lawson’s finding that parties are not the only linkage providers; however, the establishment of non-party linkages are not indicators of parties’ failure to provide linkage. This article shows how what Lawson terms ‘typology’—participatory linkage, policy-responsive linkage, linkage by reward, directive or coercive linkage—is manifested more as different ‘dimensions’ of linkages. Participatory linkage involves a bottom-up model, unlike directive or coercive linkage, which are top-down. Likewise, the motives behind responsive linkages—for aspirations, demands, and views to be heard—tend to be from the bottom, while the motives of linkage by reward is more frequently from the top.Abbreviations: ACSTF: Aceh Civil Society Task Force; ADF: Aceh Development Fund. Independent non-profit organization that works to mobilize funds and other resources to be channelled to CSOs are characterized by changes in the framework of poverty alleviation and strengthening of democracy, with the scope of the working area of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; AJMI: Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institute. Aceh-based nongovernmental organization which advocates for victims of state violence; Cetro: Centre for Electoral Reform. Non-profit organization that aim to strengthen and promote fair elections through electoral system reformation; Demos: Lembaga Kajian Demokrasi dan Hak Asasi (democracy and human rights think tank); ELSAM: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (Institute for Societal Study and Advocacy); Flower: Aceh-based civil society organization concerned with gender, empowerment and strengthening grassroots women in urban and rural areas; FORBES: Forum bersama politisi asal Aceh (Joint Forum of Politicians from Aceh); Forum: LSM Aceh Forum Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Aceh Nongovernment Organization Forum); GAM: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement); Golkar: Golongan Karya (Functional Groups). Party formed under the New Order and represented as a governmental party at that time; ICW: Indonesia Corruption Watch. Nongovernmental organization founded in 1998 whose primary mission is to monitor and report to the public incidents of corruption in Indonesia; Imparsial: Indonesian Human Rights Monitor. Founded in 2002 to monitor and investigate human right violations; JDA: Jaringan Demokrasi Aceh (Aceh Democracy Network); JPUK: Jaringan Perempuan untuk Kebijakan (Women’s Policy Network); Kalyanamitra: Women’s advocacy organization, especially for women who work as labourers, farmers, fishers, informal sector workers. Kalyanamitra derives from Sanskrit ‘Good Friend’; Koalisi NGO HAM: Coalition of Human Right Nongovernment Organizations. Founded in 1998 by nongovernmental organizations whose concern is promoting human rights in Aceh; KontraS: Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence; KPMD: Komite Monitoring Perdamaian dan Demokrasi (Committee for Peace and Democracy). Founded in Aceh in 2002 to bring peace and justice for Acehnese people; MISPI: Mitra Sejati Perempuan Indonesia (True Partner of Indonesian Women). Aceh-based women’s organization that promotes women’s participation and encourages women to speak with their own voices; MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly); PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party). Moderate Islamist political party that was founded by reformists, including Amien Rais, former chairman of the Muhammadiyah organization; PBR: Partai Bintang Reformasi (Star of Reform Party). Islamist political party founded in 2002 as a result of PPP conflict; PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democrat Party-Struggle). Founded by Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of Soekarno, in 1999; PDRM: Pergerakan Demokratik Rakyat Miskin (Democratic Movement for the Poor); PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party). Established in 1998, representing Nahdlatul Ulama organization (associations of ulamas formed in 1926 in East Java); PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party). New name of Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), which emerged from the Tarbiyah party movement; PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party). Founded by the New Order in 1973 as part of the ‘rationalization of political life’; PSHK: Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan (Centre for Legal and Policy Studies). Established in 2008 by several scholars, advocates, and law students to drive efforts for legal reform after the 1998 reformation; WALHI: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Environmental Forum). Founded in 1980, its scope is broader than just environmental concerns, but also works for social transformation, people’s sovereignty, and sustainability of life and livelihoods; YAPPIKA: Yayasan Penguatan Partisipasi Inisiatif dan Kemitraan Masyarakat (Foundation to Reinforce Public Participation, Initiative, and Partnership). Founded in 1991 to promote peacebuilding, development of democratic local governance, active citizenship, and claiming state responsibility to meet people’s basic needs

Paradigmatic Reverse in the Legal Policy of the Notion of Deliberative Democracy from People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) to Village (A Preliminary Study)

Abstract This article aims to assert that some regulatory mechanisms, such as the appointment of members of and the voting for decision in both Indonesia Peoples Deliberative Assembly (MPR) and village flows in a formalizing pattern from the top governmental body of the central, to the regional, and to the ends at the boom level, the village. This also applies the procedural aspects of the democratic system where the organizational body is made as formal, uniform, and permanent in structure (despite the periods). This somehow seems contradictory with the noon of deliberative democracy (demorasi permusyawaratan) once upheld by the founding fathers of Indonesia. However, the vague understanding surrounding the noon of deliberative democracy necessitates a closer study for a more comprehensive overview, which should also be conducted for beer comprehension on the concept of democracy adopted by the MPR. This article serves only as a preliminary study to prelude a more in-depth study. The derivation of legal policy in this article has the purpose of identifying the political direction towards which the village democracy was taken. This article highlights a paradigmatic shift in the legal policy change of the democratic pattern from the village to the MPR, then later from the MPR to the village. Arus Balik Polik Hukum Gagasan Demokrasi Permusyawaratan dari Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat ke Pemerintahan Desa (Suatu Kajian Awal) Abstrak Pada tulisan ini hendak dikemukakan pengaturan, misalnya mengenai pengambilan keanggotaan dan putusan, serta kelembagaan desa, menamakan pola imitasi dari kelembagaan di pusat, daerah, maupun desa begitu pula mengenai tata cara kehiduan berdemokrasi dari kelembagaan demokrasi, badan representasinya dibuat secara formal, seragam, dan permanen walaupun terdapat periodisasi. Hal ini tampak kontradif dengan konsep demorasi permusyawaratan yang diusung oleh para founding fathers ketika Indonesia berdiri. Namun demikian, pemahaman mengenai demokrasi permusyawaratan itu sendiri masih harus digali agar lebih tergambar secara komrehensif begitu pula mengenai konsep berdemokrasi dalam kelembagaan. Tulisan ini merupakan kajian awal sebagai pengantar untuk kajian yang lebih mendalam. Alasan hal ini ditarik sebagai sebuah politik hukum adalah untuk melihat apabila terdapat desain arah kebijakan terhadap entitas desa untuk dapat melaksanakan kehiduan demokrasi. Tulisan ini menunjukkan perubahan politik hukum pola berdemokrasi dari pemerintahan desa ke MPR menjadi dari MPR ke pemerintahan desa. DOI: https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v2n3.a10

Tapal Kuda Bergolak: Suatu Kajian tentang Resistensi terhadap Pelengseran Presiden Gus Dur 2001

This article describes social resistance in Tapal Kuda community against The People Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) who deposed President Wahid (Gus Dur) in 2001. Their resistance resulted in loss of human life as well as the destruction of religious buildings, educational institutions, and other public facilities, which are believed to have historical connections to their opponents, i.e. Muhammadiyah or its leader, Amien Rais. The Tapal Kuda community shares typical cultural characteristics such as Maduranese, Muslim, “remain traditional”, based on Ulama, and made their kiai (religious leader) as the highest role-model. Additionally, they have developed network of religious boarding schools of Tarekat Naqsyabandiah wal Qadiriah and classifying them into hierarchy of “core schools” (pesantren induk) and their sub-levels.The resistance shows symbolic manipulations made up by local elite leaders for fabricating profane symbols into a sacred ones in a way that unmistakebly drawing political dimension into intra-religious conflicts. The tension appeared in how they define themselves as minna (saya, as self) and minkum (kamu, the others). This definition had became a moral basis that justified their act in destroying the opponents as the others. It is important to see how value of Islamic solidarity within traditional muslim community in Madura tends to get firmer while paradoxically the wholeness of Muslim brotherhood is under threat. Key words: Tapal Kuda, Madura, kiai, pesantren, resistance, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah

Tinjauan Yuridis Terhadap Kewenangan MPR Dalam Melakukan Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar

In a lawful country, the existence of constituent is one of the most important requirements to control a country. Hence, it is also required for Indonesia; which had put its society life rules fully in a constituent (UUD 1945). By far, Indonesia has faith that the importance of a constituent‟s existence will take effect for a greater life in nation society‟s needs. The change in a constituent or UUD in a country, for instance, will be done by a competent national bureau. In Indonesia, such competency is obtained by Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR). Meanwhile, the reformation era takes its role in year 1998, and then MPR held the court to discuss about the change in UUD 1945 for some times ahead; at 19th of October 1999, the first change had done, at 18th of August 2000, the second change had done, and also, at 10th of November, the third change had done, and finally at 10th of August 2002, the fourth change had done too. Keywords : Juridic observation, MPR Rights, The Change in UUD

Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945

Abstract: The article discuss the changes of indonesian political system in indonesia after the amendment of Indonesian Constitution of 1945 with the focus of the amendments of legislative, eecutive and judicative bodies. Legislative amendments is located in the emergence of a new body called DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah of Regional Representative Assembly) as a part of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consulatation Assembly) alongside DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of Representative). Such amendment is basically a modifictaion of bicameral system as that of the United States’ political system. Executive body amendments lies on direct election of president, limitation of presidential tenure up to two tenures of five years, and likeliness of presidential impeachment in case of breaking law and constitution. Amendment on judicative body is obviously apparent in the creation of Constitutional Court alongside the Supreme Court and Judicial comission which is in charge of safeguarding the judgeship profession.Kata Kunci: Amandemen, UUD, dan System Ketatanegaraan

The Making of the 1999 Indonesian Press Law

The Making of the 1999 Indonesian Press Law Janet Steele (bio) Perhaps the single greatest achievement of Indonesian President B. J. Habibie's seventeen months in office was the freeing of the Indonesian press. Nearly all scholarly works on Reformasi or the post-Suharto years note how Habibie's minister of information, Lieutenant General Muhammad Yunus Yosfiah, "stunned the nation" by revoking the ministerial regulations that had choked the press during Suharto's time.1 To Indonesian journalists, it has always been clear that many of the other notable achievements of the Habibie presidency would not have been possible without vigorous reporting by a newly revitalized press. Unprecedented scrutiny from the press uncovered scandals—including the Bank Bali and Habibie-Ghalib tape scandals—that easily would have been swept under the carpet during the Suharto years.2 Public opposition to legislation supported by the administration, such as the State Security bill, was fanned into high flames by a newly unshackled press.3 Habibie's historic decision to offer the people of East Timor a referendum on their status received widespread coverage in the Indonesian press, much of it negative. And [End Page 1] such tragedies as what later became known as "Semanggi I," in which fifteen protesters were killed and five hundred wounded in violent clashes with security forces during the first post-Suharto MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly) session, were also covered by the press in direct ways that would have been unimaginable only a few months earlier.4 Yet despite the obvious importance of the 1999 Press Law, there has been a surprising lack of scholarly interest in the complex negotiations and set of events that led to its passage. The law, which was arguably the crown jewel of Reformasi, was the result of a remarkable collaboration between journalists, the minister of information, the public, and the legislative assembly (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Assembly). Beginning with the resignation of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesian journalists wasted no time in seizing the moment to institutionalize press freedom. As Warief Djajanto wrote, "During the brief seventeen-month Habibie presidency, media leaders worked fast and furiously with a forward-looking information minister and concerned legislators to make press freedom legally binding."5 Signed into law by President Habibie on September 23, 1999, as one of his last legislative acts, UU Pers no. 40/1999 received widespread acclaim as a model press law. Leo Batubara, the head of the Indonesian Newspaper Publishers' Association, called it a "masterpiece."6 By effectively eliminating state control of print media, the 1999 Press Law redefined Indonesian press-government relations. Yet Indonesian courts have not been consistent in using the Press Law as lex specialis in cases involving the press. After tracing the events and negotiations leading up to the historic passage of the Press Law and noting the contradictions between it and the criminal defamation provisions of the Penal Code, this study concludes with a brief discussion of what might have motivated some of the players to become unlikely "heroes" of press freedom. It ends with a comment on the importance of the passage of the 1999 Press Law in securing lasting reform. Under President Suharto, Indonesia's press was tightly controlled through a series of regulations enacted and enforced by the Ministry of Information. Although the Basic Press Act of 1966 explicitly guaranteed freedom of the press in accordance with the fundamental rights of citizens, would-be press entrepreneurs were required to obtain two permits before they could publish a newspaper or magazine: the Permit to Publish (SIT, Surat Izin Terbit) from the Department of Information and the Permit to Print (SIC, Surat Izin Cetak) from the military security authority.7 As David Hill has written, to obtain a press publication enterprise permit, or SIUPP (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers), during the Suharto years, a news organization had to produce "a raft of more than a dozen letters and preliminary permits, including letters of support from all relevant professional organizations (the Indonesian Journalists Association and the [Newspaper] [End Page 2] Publishers' Association) at both the regional and national level, several permits from civilian and military authorities, [and] supporting letters...

Indonesia: The Year of Continuing Turbulence

Indonesia since it embarked on reforms and democratization in 1998. By and large, the adverse conditions in 2001 were the continuation of the unstable conditions of the previous year.1 But in contrast to 2000, which was marked by a high expectation for stabilization at the beginning of the year, only to be quashed by political infighting at the end, 2001 started out on a gloomy note and was coloured by a heightened sense of optimism in the middle, and then ended showing signs of strain, and the seeds for possible future tension. The impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur), his replacement by Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and all the accompanying drama and tension both before, during, and after the process, were th? main events of the year. Additionally, there were signs of a possible resurgence of Islamic extremism, which gained much publicity after the 11 September terrorist attack on the United States and subsequent retaliation against the alleged perpetrator, Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda organization, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan accused of harbouring these terrorists. These developments in Indonesia brought anxiety to its neighbours as well as the international community in general. In the political arena, the democratization process in Indonesia underwent a severe test as the nature of relationships among the high state bodies was put into question. Indeed, the controversies surrounding Gus Dur's impeachment have put forth the idea that a totally amended Constitution is needed. Understandably, this issue became one of the main subjects of contention during the annual assembly of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative Assembly ? Indonesia's highest state body). The country's economy remained in a precarious position. If anything, the situation has gone from bad to worse. In the preceding year, foreign investment had already been difficult to come by because of the lack of confidence in the

INDONESIA IN 2000 A Shaky Start for Democracy

Research Article| February 01 2001 INDONESIA IN 2000 A Shaky Start for Democracy R. William Liddle R. William Liddle Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (2001) 41 (1): 208–220. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.1.208 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation R. William Liddle; INDONESIA IN 2000 A Shaky Start for Democracy. Asian Survey 1 February 2001; 41 (1): 208–220. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.1.208 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. © Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Indonesia: An Uncertain Outlook

?lite politics in Indonesia during 1993 continued to revolve around the linked questions of presidential succession and the President's relationship with the military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [ABRI] ). There was hardly any doubt that the President would be re-elected at the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat [MPR]) session in March, so atten tion was focused on the vice-presidency. Initially it seemed that ABRI may have forced the President to accept its nominee for the vice-presidency but Soeharto soon made it clear that he remained in charge by appointing a new cabinet and reshuffling the military leadership. Nevertheless, there was much debate and speculation about the President's long-term intentions and the plans of the military. While Soeharto seemed to be promoting a process of civilianization, it appeared that military officers were positioning themselves to play a domi nant role in the post-Soeharto era. The open political atmosphere of the last few years continued, especially in Jakarta, where the press routinely carried items that would not have been tolerated a decade ago. An approach was made to the opposition Petition of 50 group and travel restrictions on them were lifted, Muslim dissidents were released from jail, Muslim student demonstrations forced the closure of a government-sponsored lottery, and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia [PDI]) was eventually permitted to elect a leader of its choice. But at the same time various political controls remained in force, dissi dent students were detained and put on trial, the establishment of a new trade union federation was obstructed, and on two occasions the government, backed by ABRI, foiled attempts by the PDI to elect a leader. In the three provinces where resistance movements were active, political controls were especially severe.

The 1987 Election In Indonesia

The 1987 general election was the fifth election since Indonesia's independence in 1945, and it was only since the second election in 1971 that general elections have become a tradition in political life. Therefore, general elections are a relatively new thing for the people and in Indonesia's political culture. In the light of this, general election in Indonesia today should be seen primarily as a vehicle for political education. It has not as yet become a major instrument for political change. None the less, its practice over the past years is important for the development of democratic life in Indonesia. Although a general election in Indonesia today does not provide for the opportunity to change or to topple the government as is the case in Western societies, its importance to the government derives from its use to maintain the government's legitimacy. The general election in Indonesia is a parliamentary election; it is aimed at electing representatives who will also become members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), which in turn will determine state policies and elect the president and vice-president for a five-year period. Contestants compete for seats in Parliament or the House of Representatives at the national level (DPR-RI), the province level (DPRD I), and the district level (DPRD II). The contestants in the 1987 election, as in the preceding two elections, were the two political parties, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunanr or United Development Party) and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratic Party), and the so-called GOLKAR, an acronym for Golongan Karya, meaning Functional Group. In the DPR-RI, 400 of the 500 seats are contested, the remaining 100 seats are given to ABRI, the Indo nesian Armed Forces, whose members are not allowed to vote. Voters do not choose their representatives directly, but they give their vote to one of the three contestants, each with a list of candidates.

Indonesia: Internal Developments and External Outlook

Political developments On 14 August, 1975, the Indonesian Parliament, the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) passed the law on political parties and Golkar, thus providing a legal stamp to the party system created by the government in 1973. The simplified party system was designed to eradicate or at least mitigate intense politicization and ideological confrontation, which was common in the 1950s and even under Sukarno's guided democracy. The present party system, composed of the Golkar as the func tional group, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan?United Development Party), the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia?Democratic Party of Indonesia), has been justified by the Suharto Government in terms of the need for political stability and economic development. Yet, its acceptance either by the masses or the political ?lite outside the government and its effectiveness in diverting politics away from religious or ideological confrontation to an orientation towards development issues remains to be seen. The government had to apply considerable pressure on the Muslim parties, particularly, Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) to get them to agree to their incorporation into the PPP. In the face of opposition to the merger from the President, H. M. Ch. Ibrahim, and the Secretary General, Wartomo Dwijoyuwono, of the PSII, a party-coup was staged on 22 December, 1972, no doubt with the government's blessings, that resulted in the creation of an Emergency Leadership Board led by H. Anwar Tjokroaminoto. Under Tjokroaminoto, the Emergency Board speeded up measures to incorporate the PSII into the PPP, which was finally formed on 5 January, 1973. In March that year, three members of the former executive board of the PSII, Oesman Helmi, Wartomo Dwidjoyuwono and Mrs. Djubaedah Mochtar, who had opposed the formation of the PPP were deprived of their seats in the DPR and MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). Similarly, leaders of the NU such as H. Imron Rosjadi and the late Subchan who opposed the formation of the PPP soon found themselves politically ostracized. The opposition of some of the leaders of the PSII and the NU to the formation of the PPP may have stemmed partly from fears concerning their positions in the new organization and partly from real differences among the Muslim parties in their 'theological orientation and political styles. Though politically weak the PPP was still better off than the PDI which was formed on 10 January, 1973, and consisted of five non-Muslim parties (PNI, IPKI, Partai Katolik, Parkindo and Murba). While the PPP could effectively claim to represent millions of Muslims in Indonesia, the PDI, a more heterogeneous entity was regarded as an alliance of minorities. Its major constituent, the PNI, suffered a severe setback in the 1971 elections when it lost part of its support base, namely the pamong praja (civil service) and more broadly