Lone-actor Terrorism Research Articles

Picturing Law and Order: A Visual Framing Analysis of ISIS’s Dabiq Magazine

The rise of ideologically-driven lone actor terrorist attacks, coupled with the use of Internet-circulated media products as sources of inspiration, raises the need to understand the message strategies embedded in media campaigns of groups like ISIS. To better understand “enforcers” of ISIS’ interpretation of Shari’a law on the global stage, this study examines how ISIS has visualized law enforcement in its claimed territories in Iraq, Syria, and other Arab countries in the online publication, Dabiq, since the declaration of the so-called caliphate. Using a quantitative content analysis and a qualitative visual framing analysis of all law enforcement-related images in the fifteen issues of Dabiq, the study identifies four law enforcement frames and examines Entman’s framing associations—the problem definition, causes, moral stance, and treatment recommendations—displayed in each frame.

Radicalization patterns and modes of attack planning and preparation among lone-actor terrorists: an exploratory analysis

ABSTRACTThis article explores the link between radicalization patterns and modes of attack planning and preparation among lone-actor terrorists. Building on theorized patterns of lone-actor radicalization, we discuss and compare their modes of pre-attack behavior, including target and weapon choice, observance of operational security measures, likeliness of engaging in leakage behavior, and the overall amount of time devoted to these activities. This exploratory study builds upon a dataset of thirty-three lone-actor terrorist cases in North-America and Europe between 1986 and 2015. The analysis suggests that specific patterns of radicalization are linked to systematic differences in modes of attack planning and preparation. The results provide insights into the heterogeneity of terrorist involvement and tentatively suggest the potential importance for law-enforcement agencies in using case-specific knowledge on radicalization patterns to inform forecasts of likely pre-attack behaviors.

Lone Actor Terrorist Attack Planning and Preparation: A Data-Driven Analysis.

This article provides an in-depth assessment of lone actor terrorists' attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre-attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open-source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the "loneness" thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re-evaluation of the "lone actor" concept.

Terrorism and mental disorder, and the role of psychiatrists in counter-terrorism in the UK

In this paper, we review the extant research on the links between terrorism and mental disorder in the light of evolving theoretical frameworks and new empirical evidence, examine the role of the psychiatrist in terrorist prevention as detailed in recently published guidance from the Royal College of Psychiatrists in response to government policy and legislation, and explore the contribution of contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives on existing empirical findings characterising the lone-actor terrorist.

Why is terrorism a man's business?

Terrorism, whether it is group-related or performed as lone actor terrorism, is a predominantly male phenomenon. Generally and throughout history, young males have been the main protagonists of criminal and political violence.This article aims to contribute, from different perspecives, to the question of what makes young men violent. These include neurobiological aspects, such as sex differences in the brain that predispose males to physical aggression and violence; gender role aspects, with regard to aggression and violence being basic components for demonstrating and reconstructing masculinity; demographic aspects of male youth bulges as potential breeding grounds for terrorism; aspects of group dynamics and identity fusion in the process of radicalization; and psychosocial characteristics of lone actor terrorists, which differ from group-related terrorists.It is concluded that in addition to ideological, political, economic, regional, demographic, or psychosocial causes, experiences of threatened masculinity may be an underlying factor and driving force for terrorism.

Utilizing mental health professionals to help prevent the next attacks

Recent high-profile cases and scientific research on lone actor terrorist attackers have indicated that there may be an association with mental illness. Simultaneously, countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives have recently been placing more emphasis on building intervention (aka secondary prevention) programmes to address this matter, with mental health professionals possibly playing important roles in preventing lone actor terrorist attacks. Mental health professionals can contribute to intervention programmes, as practitioners and as leaders, but more so by drawing upon the threat assessment model, than because of a possible association with mental illness. A public–private partnership in Los Angeles, based on a well-regarded, community-based service for addressing targeted school violence, is attempting to further develop such services. A tabletop exercise was used as a strategy for jumpstarting interventions, so as to engage mental health and other community partners, build trust between stakeholders, and identify capacities and gaps that need to be addressed to ensure successful implementation. Further progress and future success will depend upon equitable, ethical, evidence-based, and community collaborative practices.

Lone‐Actor Terrorist Target Choice

Lone-actor terrorist attacks have risen to the forefront of the public's consciousness in the past few years. Some of these attacks were conducted against public officials. The rise of hard-to-detect, low-tech attacks may lead to more public officials being targeted. This paper explores whether different behavioral traits are apparent within a sample of lone-actor terrorists who plotted against high-value targets (including public officials) than within a sample of lone actors who plotted against members of the public. Utilizing a unique dataset of 111 lone-actor terrorists, we test a series of hypotheses related to attack capability and operational security. The results indicate that very little differentiates those who attack high-value targets from those who attack members of the public. We conclude with a series of illustrations to theorize why this may be the case. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Indicators of lone actor violent events: The problems of low base rates and long observational periods.

A burgeoning literature exists on indicators associated with lone-actor terrorism, spree shooters, mass murders and other forms of targeted violence. Such studies of low- likelihood, high-impact crimes largely suffer from 2 interrelated problems: low base rates and long observational periods. These studies largely fail to consider whether risk factors are driven by temporal-cohorts within the wider observation pool or are uniform across the expanses of time under consideration. This paper compares a cohort of violent lone actors (composed of lone-actor terrorists, and solo mass murderer attackers) from 1990 to 2005 with a cohort from 2006 to 2013. We found no significant differences in terms of sociodemographic variables across the 2 temporal periods. The 2006 to 2013 cohort was significantly more likely to use the Internet in their attack planning, have a history of previous imprisonment, engage in multiple attack methods (e.g., a bombing and a shooting), and target ordinary citizens rather than a political or military target for example. The results also indicate that the 2006 through 2013 period contains fewer offenders who (a) had previous military experience, (b) made verbal statements to family/friends/wider audiences about their intent and beliefs, (c) socialized face to face with members of a wider network, (d) experienced being degraded or the target of an act of prejudice or unfairness, (e) experienced a recent stressor, and (f) interacted face-to-face with others holding a similar grievance. The conclusion discusses the research and operational implications of these findings.

The lone-actor terrorist and the TRAP-18.

An open source sample of 111 lone actor terrorists from the United States and Europe were studied through the lens of the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18). This investigative template consists of 8 proximal warning behaviors and 10 distal characteristics for active risk management or active monitoring, respectively, by national security threat assessors. Several aspects of criterion validity were tested in this known outcome sample. Seventy per cent of the terrorists were positive for at least half or more of the indicators. When the sample was divided into Islamic extremists, right wing extremists, and single issue terrorists, there were no significant differences across all eighteen indicators except for four. When the sample was divided according to successful vs. thwarted attackers, the successful attackers were significantly more fixated, creative and innovative, and failed to have a prior sexually intimate pair bond. They were significantly less likely to have displayed pathway warning behavior and be dependent on a virtual community of likeminded true believers. Effect sizes were small to medium (phi = 0.190-0.317). The TRAP-18 appears to have promise as an eventual structured professional judgment risk assessment instrument according to some of the individual terrorist content domains outlined by Monahan (2012, 2016).

Mental Health Disorders and the Terrorist: A Research Note Probing Selection Effects and Disorder Prevalence

ABSTRACTRecent research on lone-actor terrorism has found a high prevalence of mental health disorders among these offenders. This research note addresses two shortcomings in these existing studies. First, it investigates whether selection effects are present in the selection process of terrorist recruits. Second, it builds on the argument that mental health problems and terrorist behavior should not be treated as a yes/no dichotomy. Descriptive results of mental health disorders are outlined utilizing a number of unique datasets.

The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism: Recent Developments

This chapter synthesizes the existing evidence base on the individual risk assessment of terrorism, focusing critical attention on recent developments in the identification of valid risk factors. The most promising candidates for such risk factors identified here include ideologies, affiliations, grievances, moral emotions, and identities. Risk factors for lone-actor terrorism may diverge significantly from those for group-based terrorism. The chapter also reflects on what must happen if research on the risk assessment of terrorism is to yield knowledge that is actionable in the context of national security, i.e., the use of case-control, known-groups research designs.

A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor terrorism.

We test whether significant differences in mental illness exist in a matched sample of lone- and group-based terrorists. We then test whether there are distinct behavioral differences between lone-actor terrorists with and without mental illness. We then stratify our sample across a range of diagnoses and again test whether significant differences exist. We conduct a series of bivariate, multivariate, and multinomial statistical tests using a unique dataset of 119 lone-actor terrorists and a matched sample of group-based terrorists. The odds of a lone-actor terrorist having a mental illness is 13.49 times higher than the odds of a group actor having a mental illness. Lone actors who were mentally ill were 18.07 times more likely to have a spouse or partner who was involved in a wider movement than those without a history of mental illness. Those with a mental illness were more likely to have a proximate upcoming life change, more likely to have been a recent victim of prejudice, and experienced proximate and chronic stress. The results identify behaviors and traits that security agencies can utilize to monitor and prevent lone-actor terrorism events. The correlated behaviors provide an image of how risk can crystalize within the individual offender and that our understanding of lone-actor terrorism should be multivariate in nature.

The Frankfurt airport attack: A case study on the radicalization of a lone-actor terrorist.

The Frankfurt airport attack: A case study on the radicalization of a lone-actor terrorist.

The assassination of Empress Elisabeth of Austria: An investigative psychological analysis of a lone-actor terrorist.

The assassination of Empress Elisabeth of Austria: An investigative psychological analysis of a lone-actor terrorist.

A Death in Woolwich

Recent events in Syria and Iraq have shown in horrifying starkness the increased participation of British jihadists in terrorist fighting in the Middle East. In response, many have called for increased measures against home-grown radicals, to prevent them from travelling abroad to fight for the Islamist cause and, crucially, to stop them from carrying out attacks upon their return. Raffaello Pantucci analyses the difficulties of identifying potential terrorists among the many individuals who move within radical Islamist circles, and the even more challenging task of pinpointing those susceptible to self-radicalisation who could, without direct guidance, carry out dangerous acts of lone-actor terrorism.

Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone‐Actor Terrorists,,

This article analyzes the sociodemographic network characteristics and antecedent behaviors of 119 lone-actor terrorists. This marks a departure from existing analyses by largely focusing upon behavioral aspects of each offender. This article also examines whether lone-actor terrorists differ based on their ideologies or network connectivity. The analysis leads to seven conclusions. There was no uniform profile identified. In the time leading up to most lone-actor terrorist events, other people generally knew about the offender’s grievance, extremist ideology, views, and/or intent to engage in violence. A wide range of activities and experiences preceded lone actors’ plots or events. Many but not all lone-actor terrorists were socially isolated. Lone-actor terrorists regularly engaged in a detectable and observable range of activities with a wider pressure group, social movement, or terrorist organization. Lone-actor terrorist events were rarely sudden and impulsive. There were distinguishable behavioral differences between subgroups. The implications for policy conclude this article.