I wish to suggest that the Doctrine of Reminiscence may have some hitherto unnoticed consequences for the psychology of Republic 43Sc-44IC. In this passage Plato, on the evidence of that common experience we call a conflict of motives, argues that the is made up of three constituents: the rational element (?oyLaTLX6v), the spirited element (Ou,uoeLae for which 'self-assertiveness' may be the best translation), and the appetitive element (LtWLlY.Lv). This is familiar ground. I would merely note that the classification is not meant to be exhaustive. The is being considered only in so far as analogous to the community i.e., as an organism in action; and the tripartite division is thus an example of Plato's habit of using extemporised logical machinery for a given purpose. 2Yet clearly for Plato it was a working hypothesis of some importance, for apart from its use in more than one passage of the Republic, it reappears in the myth of the Phaedrus, and finds almost physical expression in the Timaeus (69c-7oa), where the of the soul are apportioned to parts of the body. It is natural to ask what Plato means by his term of the soul, for in spite of the Timaeus passage, surely no spatial division is intended. Archer-Hind long ago proposed that they should be regarded as nmodes of the soul's activity, 3 and this view has been generally accepted4 though with some modification. Cornford, for example, writing with the Symposium in mind, regards the 'parts' as manifestations of a single force, called Eros, directed through divergent channels towards various ends; 5 and Murphy has recently suggested that they may be defined as to act with the qualification Perhaps all that can be said is that according to Plato the has in it different organs or capacities and that from their difference, different tendencies of arise. Associated with