Logical Inconsistencies Research Articles

Responses to Maher, and to Kelly, Schulte, and Juhl

1. Continuing Dutch Flow. My idea, in Section 2 of Bayes and Beyond, was not to give a new proof of a Dutch Book theorem but rather to present a new reading of an existing theorem-proved, e.g., as in Howson and Urbach-framed in such terms that challenges to the premises based on considerations of preference or utility could be bypassed as irrelevant. The aim was to forge a reading such that systematic substitution of flow terms for the usual betting terms would result in unproblematic premises and Dutch Book theorems more directly expressing Howson and Urbach's insight, namely that an incoherent belief system-one violating the probability axioms-can be revealed to be defective in the sense of containing a logical inconsistency. Thus, the defectiveness is clearly epistemic, and there is no need to bring in considerations of prudential or decision-theoretic rationality. (Of course, one may well bring in such considerations if one wants to answer such questions as When should we 'reject' an inconsistent belief system? But clearly that is a distinct question at a different level from the one explicitly addressed by Dutch Flow arguments, viz. For what epistemic reason should degrees of belief conform to the probability axioms?) The inconsistency involved in violating a probability axiom takes the canonical form of judgments that a set of belief-tests-say a finite set, in the simplest case-consists of only or fairtests when indeed they are provably not all neutral, where 'neutral' was defined to mean having zero expected flow, i.e., xPr(h) = yPr(-,h) as explained in Section 2. This notion of neutral belief-test is to be substituted for

In theory

In theory

“Strawpersons,” Selective Reporting, and Inconsistent Logic: A Response to Kimiecik and Harris’s Analysis of Enjoyment

“Strawpersons,” Selective Reporting, and Inconsistent Logic: A Response to Kimiecik and Harris’s Analysis of Enjoyment

Group utility in the micro motivation of collective action: The case of membership in the AARP

The fundamental assumption of human rationality in neo-classical economic analysis is the maximization of individual utility. As economic analyses are being widely used in political science under the broad rubric of public choice, one cannot escape the logical inconsistency between theory and reality arising from the free-rider problem in the preference for collective goods. Recent literature argues that a way out of this dilemma is to recognize the existence of motivations other than self-interest. This paper demonstrates the need to enlarge the assumption of economic rationality by explicitly taking into account the factors of group utility. With the help of survey data on the preference for membership in the American Association of Retired People (AARP), this study adds to the mounting empirical evidence for the fact that for a proper understanding of collective action, the existence of a collective identity should be recognized.

“You Were Interested in Him as a Person?”: Rhythms of Domination in the Kennedy Smith Rape Trial

In this study I explore the theoretical and linguistic implications of the Kennedy Smith rape trial, using transcriptions of real live testimony as data. I examine theoretically how the logic of inconsistency in trial testimony of the victim and other witnesses activates an interaction among language, law, and culture as an epistemological practice of domination. In microlinguistic detail, I examine the categorization of action, linguistic ideologies, and situated rhythms of legal language through which our sexual identities are constituted to create an apparent inconsistency in the victim's account. Looking at the law-in-action, I hope to show how social actors use language and culture to create meaning in their legal interaction.

All in the Family: Present and Past in Euripides' Andromache

Having been criticized at least since Aristotle's time for his failure to build unified plots1), Euripides has been particularly attacked for plays like the Hecuba and the Andromache which combine different, traditionally unrelated stories: wielding them into one piece, Euripides necessarily had to put up with some logical inconsistencies and to leave some loose ends that might not damage the overall effect of the play but are easily detectable by even a casual observer2). The Andromache gives a very hard time to anyone who looks for Aristotelian unity in the conventional sense3). Not only does the heroine leave the stage fairly early on (765), she does not play any visible role afterwards and is only briefly referred to by Thetis, the dea ex machina, at the end (1243-45)4). Thus the figure

Checking the coherence and redundancy of fuzzy knowledge bases

Checking the coherence of a set of rules is an important step in knowledge base validation. Coherence is also needed in the field of fuzzy systems. Indeed, rules are often used regardless of their semantics, and it sometimes leads to sets of rules that make no sense. Avoiding redundancy is also of interest in real-time systems for which the inference engine is time consuming. A knowledge base is potentially inconsistent or incoherent if there exists a piece of input data that respects integrity constraints and that leads to logical inconsistency when added to the knowledge base. We more particularly consider knowledge bases composed of parallel fuzzy rules. Then, coherence means that the projection on the input variables of the conjunctive combination of the possibility distributions representing the fuzzy rules leaves these variables completely unrestricted (i.e., any value for these variables is possible) or, at least, not more restrictive than integrity constraints. Fuzzy rule representations can be implication-based or conjunction-based; we show that only implication-based models may lead to coherence problems. However, unlike conjunction-based models, they allow to design coherence checking processes. Some conditions that a set of parallel rules has to satisfy in order to avoid inconsistency problems are given for certainty or gradual rules. The problem of redundancy, which is also of interest for fuzzy knowledge bases validation, is addressed for these two kinds of rules.

中性子ゆらぎ信号を用いた炉心流量計測技術の開発

The extensive work on the measurement technology of total and local flow rates in BWR core has been performed using in-core neutron fluctuating signals. Based on a large amount of actual data acquired from commercial BWR plants in operation, physical interpretation was discussed on the transit time of the neutron fluctuating signals. The new findings against the logical inconsistency of the transit time between the different LPRM detector positions lead to a promised core flow measurement algorithm using in-core neutron fluctuating signals. The advanced on-line core flow measurement system was developed and tested during the startup phase of the first ABWR. The measurement test results demonstrate the present core flow measurement system within the errors of 5 through 10% over the wide operating area besides the capability for the local void fraction and two-phase flow regime monitoring.

Sources of Influence in Moral Thought: the new Moral Authority Scale

Abstract Current interest in theorising about moral judgement has been dominated by Kohlberg's (1969, 1971) cognitive developmental view. This paper will argue that Kohlberg's and Rest's purely “formalistic” conceptualisations of moral judgement and associated measures may misrepresent the true nature of moral thought. Henry (1983a) and Trainer (1982) have identified certain logical inconsistencies in Kohlberg's reliance on the “form” of moral judgements, arguing for a reconceptualisation in terms of the “content” of moral judgement, a much neglected yet equally informative alternative. In light of this, the present study attempts to operationalise Henry's content distinction with respect to Kohlberg's stage approach. Psychometric properties of a new measure called the Moral Authority Scale (MAS) are reported. The MAS was administered twice to 93 late adolescents. Findings revealed that test‐retest and split‐half reliabilities of the MAS subscales were appropriately high. The convergent validity of the MA...

Phallic Facts, Fallacies, and Fantasies: Comments on Cohn's 1994 Paper on Melanoplus spretus (Walsh)

In the course of analyzing my work (Lockwood 1989) on the morphometric differentiation of the Rocky Mountain grasshopper, Melanoplus spretus (Walsh), from its relative, the migratory grasshopper, Melanoplus sanguinipes (F), T. Cohn undertook an intensive review and reinterpretation of the evidence (Cohn 1994). Although he raises a number of interesting points and clarifies several details, his review is fraught with misrepresentations of the literature, logical inconsistencies, and naive interpretations of science. In replying to Cohn's arguments, I shall address the four issues that appear to form the basis for his impassioned concern: 1) the context of my original work, 2) the uncertain taxonomic status of M. spreftus in acridology, 3) the inconsistent and selective use of genitalia as taxonomic characters, and 4) a novel and intriguing approach to the scientific method and the species concept.

Dynamic Fuzzy State-Feedback Controller and its Limitations

Fuzzy state-feedback controllers can be designed on the basis of linear Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy models when the premises of the IF- THEN rules do not involve the current value of the control variable u(k). The occurrence of the latter in some rule premises indeed would result in problems of logical inconsistency. This paper attempts to solve these problems through the introduction of dynamic state-feedback controllers. These can be obtained by solving linear matrix inequalities corresponding to a quadratic Lyapunov function used for stability analysis of the control loop, Eventually, limitations of such fuzzy controllers are discussed.

Facilitating successful prediction problem solving in biology through application of skill theory

The purpose of this study was to identify cognitive factors associated with differences in prediction problem-solving success among high school biology students, and to determine whether guided practice facilitated successful prediction. The Group Assessment of Logical Thinking was used to evaluate subjects' cognitive operational level, written prediction worksheets and think-aloud interviews were used to measure predictive success and identify problem-solving tendencies. Treatment group subjects received 8 hr of directed prediction practice using interactive computer simulations, whereas the control group practiced prediction without focusing on specific skills, after which all subjects were retested. Predictive reasoning success showed a significant correlation (p < .01) to both formal operational development and five specific cognitive skills: (a) identifying relevant knowledge in long-term memory, (b) using a systematic problem-solving strategy, (c) applying cause-effect reasoning, (d) reviewing solutions for logical inconsistency, and (e) evaluating alternative solutions. Analysis of covariance indicated significantly increased prediction success for treatment group subjects following practice in the five identified skills (p < .01). © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

A case study of electoral manipulation: The Mexican laws of 1989 and 1994

The Mexican electoral laws of 1989 and 1994 are used as a case study to illustrate a point: the logical and mathematical properties defined in law have significant practical consequences. The 1989 law is an extreme case of logical inconsistency and ignorance of the properties of rules of apportionment, and as such provides a rich menu of the properties rules for apportioning seats should satisfy. The 1994 law, at face value more reasonable, is an illustration of how innocuous looking rules can yield real political advantage. Both laws can engender anomalous and contradictory results; and both reveal an inattention to elementary concepts of equity which cannot go unnoticed in view of Mexico's current turmoils. An electoral law defines the transformation of numbers (populations and votes) into numbers (political representation to political power), and so defines a mathematical function. The political and legal men who devise such functions are perhaps wise to the wiles of men, and sometimes even to the subtleties of arithmetic rules, but the professional advice of those competent in the ways of functions would bring benefits in accuracy, rigor and clarity, if not equity, to the formulation of electoral law.

Inferring Acceptance and Rejection in Dialog by Default Rules of Inference

This paper discusses the processes by which conversants in a dialog can infer whether their assertions and proposals have been accepted or rejected by their conversational partners. It expands on previous work by showing that logical consistency is a necessary indicator of acceptance, but that it is not sufficient, and that logical inconsistency is sufficient as an indicator of rejection, but it is not necessary. I show how conversants can use information structure and prosody as well as logical reasoning in distinguishing between acceptances and logically consistent rejections, and relate this work to previous work on implicature and default reasoning by introducing three new classes of rejection: IMPLICATURE REJECTIONS, EPISTEMIC REJECTIONS, and DELIBERATION REJECTIONS. I show how these rejections are inferred as a result of default inferences, which, by other analyses, would have been blocked by the context. In order to account for these facts, I propose a model of the common ground that allows these default inferences to go through, and show how the model, originally proposed to account for the various forms of acceptance, can also model all types of rejection.

Theological misinterpretations of current physical cosmology

In earlier writings, I argued that neither of the two major physical cosmologies of the 20th century support divine creation, so that atheism has nothing to fear from the explanations required by these cosmologies. Yet theists ranging from Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz to Richard Swinburne and Philip Quinn have maintained that, at every instant anew, the existence of the world requires divine creation ex nihilo as its cause. Indeed, according to some such theists, for any given moment t. God's volition that the-world-should-exist-at-t supposedly brings about its actual existence at t. In an effort to reestablish the current viability of this doctrine of perpetual divine conservation. Philip Quinn argued (1993) that it is entirely compatible with physical energy conservation in the Big Bang cosmology, as well as with the physics of the steady-state theories. But I now contend that instead, there is a logical incompatibility on both counts. Besides, the stated tenet of divine conservation has an additional defect: It speciously purchases plausibility by trading on the multiply disanalogous volitional explanations of human actions.

On defoliating Meinong's jungle

entities), that Quine's rhetorical demand for unsatisfiable identity criteria for nonexistent possibilia can have any force. Otherwise, the answer is obvious, and is just the solution Meinong gives in offering his thesis of the ontic neutrality or indifference of pure objects in the Auflersein, and of the ontic independence of Sosein from Sein. 26 If nonexistent nonsubsistent Meinongian objects belong to the extraontology rather than ontology of the Meinongian semantic domain, then, in the strict principle expresses the nonpsychologistic sense of Meinong's thesis of the unrestricted freedom of assumption (unbeschrankten Annahmenfreiheit) in intending mindindependent objects of thought. The set theoretical paradoxes associated with latitudinarian comprehension can be managed in several ways; i.e., by type-theory or existence restrictions on abstraction well-formedness, equivalence, or detachment (in effect controlling authorized substitution instances for 'F'). 26 To avoid logical inconsistency in Meinongian semantics a distinction between internal and external negation or predicate complementation and propositional negation for constitutive property predications is usually drawn, whereby it does not follow from the fact that an object has the complement of a constitutive property that the object therefore does not have the property. This distinction depends on Meinong's further division between constitutive (nuclear) and extraconstitutive (extranuclear) properties. Formal characterizations of the distinction between predicate complementation and propositional negation can equally be used to sharply define the nuclear-extranuclear property distinction. An extranuclear or extraconstitutive (CEN) property is one that can be defined in terms of logical operators and quantification over uninterpreted predicate symbols alone, while a nuclear or constitutive (CN) property is any property that is not categorical, or one that requires for its definition the interpretation of at least some predicate symbols. Formal criteria for the distinction can thus be provided in these terms: (CN) -'n(VXl)...(VXn)(VFn)(~FnXl...Xn = ff'nxl...Xn) (CEN) (~/Xl)...(VXn)(VFnt)(~FntXl...Xn = ff-'n!x l...xn) Meinong introduced the distinction between konstitutorische and auflerkonstitutorische Bestimmungen (constitutive and extraconstitutive properties) in [Meinong 1915], 176177. [Findlay 1963], 176, proposed the English translations 'nuclear' and'extranuclear'. See [Jacquette 1985-1986], 423-438; [Jacquette 1994], 345-359. ON DEFOLIATING MEINONG'S JUNGLE 31 sense of the word, Meinong in allowing incomplete and impossible nonexistent and nonsubsistent objects cannot rightly be said to have planted a jungle by inflating ontology with explanatorily or otherwise theoretically unnecessary objects. The objects he postulates are in fact strictly needed to account for the intentionality or object-directedness of ordinary and scientific thought and discourse. Yet beingless objects do not inflate ontology, because they reside instead in the Meinongian semantic domain's extraontology. Meinong obviously does not claim that nonexistent nonsubsistent objects exist or subsist, By denying the being-predication thesis, on the contrary, Meinong allows his semantics to refer to and truly predicate constitutive properties of absolutely beingless objects. Nor can Meinong's object theory correctly be said to have planted a tangled jungle in the sense of admitting logically or metaphysically disorderly objects into the ontology or extraontology. Beingless Meinongian objects are identified and individuated on the basis of the constitutive properties truly predicated of them as constituting their being-indifferent beingindependent natures or so-beings. Meinong's object theory is neither an excessively lush or tangled semantic jungle. 27 6. Abstracta in a Meinongian Extraontology The distinction between Meinongian ontology and extraontology makes it possible for an object theory semantics to support an even more parsimonious ontology in its commitment to fewer or fewer kinds of existent objects than Russell's later extensionalist theory of entities or 'individuals', including universals, or Quine's extensionalist desert landscape ontology of spatiotemporal entities and (including some tumbleweeds) abstract classes. The idea is to have available a nonexistent nonsubsistent abstract referent that does all the work of traditional existent or subsistent absfract entities, but for which ontic commitment is unnecessary. The object theory developed by Meinong and his students provides precisely the concepts needed for an analysis of this kind. They make it possible to go beyond concerns about whether Meinong planted a jungle to present an ontically more streamlined desert-like ontology of existent entities than that provided by even the most austere extensionalist semantic domains. 28 Once we have admitted the division of a Meinongian semantics into ontology and extraontology, it is a relatively simple matter to propose a principled basis for consigning all abstract traditionally subsistent entities from 27 [Meinong 1969-1978], II, 490-93. See [Chisholm 1972] and [Grossmann 1974]. The independence of Sosein from Sein thesis was formulated by Meinong's student Ernst Mally, in his [1904], 127. See [Findlay 1963], 44, [Lambert 1982] and [1983], [Griffin1979]. 2s See also [Campbell 1972], 89-102.

The ‘New’ Deferred Tax: a Comment on AARF Discussion Paper No. 22 ‘Accounting for Income Tax’

Discussion Paper No. 22 Accounting for Income Tax (DP 22), issued by the Australian Accounting Research Foundation, represents significant change through its advocacy of a “balance sheet” rather than the currently prescribed “income statement” approach for the recognition of deferred tax assets and liabilities. This paper clarifies the differences between the two methods and illustrates their effects on financial statements. It evaluates DP 22's arguments in favour of the balance‐sheet approach and provides some guidance on the “usefulness” of deferred tax numbers. The paper concludes that the logical inconsistencies in DP 22, coupled with the available evidence on income‐tax allocation, suggest that we should be cautious in making changes to current reporting requirements.

Can survey data be used to estimate physician practice costs?

Health policy makers rely on survey estimates of physician practice costs to set reimbursement rates. The Health Care Financing Administration has just funded a multimillion dollar effort to collect survey data that will be used to revise payments under the Medicare Fee Schedule. However, the ability of large-scale physician surveys to obtain accurate information about practice costs is not apparent. This article examines several of the key obstacles encountered when trying to obtain accurate estimates. Rates of both unit and item nonresponse over time are described; in general, there is a trend toward lower unit response rates and higher item response rates. The article also examines logical inconsistencies in data. The results suggest that physician surveys may not be the most appropriate source of data about physician practice expenses. Health policy makers concerned about provider reimbursement issues should seriously scrutinize the accuracy of results from physician practice cost surveys. This article concludes by suggesting alternative methodologies for incorporating physician practice costs into reimbursement rates.

Psychological laws and non-monotonic logic

In this essay I enter into a recently published debate between Stephen Schiffer and Jerry Fodor concerning whether adequate sense can be made of the ceteris paribus conditions in special science laws, much of their focus being on the case of putative psychological laws. Schiffer argues that adequate sense cannot be made of ceteris paribus clauses, while Fodor attempts to overcome Schiffer's arguments, in defense of special science laws. More recently, Peter Mott has attempted to show that Fodor's response to Schiffer fails, and furthermore that further study shows that the logical framework in which Schiffer and Fodor address their issue is susceptible to inconsistency. In this essay I argue that adequate sense can be made of ceteris paribus conditions. Against Mott, I argue that recent work in the model theory of non-monotonic logic indicates how his problem involving logical inconsistencies can be overcome. Against Schiffer, I argue that the claims that he makes against ceteris paribus clauses would lead to a fatal skepticism concerning indefinitely many of the claims we make about the world (and indeed that his claims would be destructive of the view of the special sciences that Schiffer himself presents in his paper), and that the semantical considerations from non-monotonic logic that I present provide a suitable framework for dealing with his complaints. Thus I come out on the whole on Fodor's side of this debate, although for my own reasons, as I argue against much of Fodor's own argumentation.

Single-Case Evaluation on Trial: Broken Promise or New Scapegoat?

This article takes issue with Rubm and Knox on three main points: (1) misrepresentation of single-case experimental designs; (2) logical inconsistencies; and (3) skewed portrayal of weaknesses existing in single-case designs. Possible reasons why single-case experimental designs are often misinterpreted in the social work literature are also discussed.