Logical Doctrine Research Articles

How Original a Work is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus?

Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe accurate. The Tractatus, despite making significant advances on the logical doctrines of Frege and Russell, is essentially a derivative work—Wittgenstein, as he elsewhere acknowledges, provided a fertile soil in which the original seeds of other peoples' thought grew in a unique way. In a play of mine, published in Philosophy (1999), Wittgenstein fails a tough viva on the Tractatus because he fails to properly support some of the weak arguments in the work and because of his inadequate acknowledgment of sources. The present paper further explores some of the antecedents of Wittgenstein's early views and answers some criticisms of the play.

“The Eminent Later Scholar” in Avicenna's Book of the Syllogism

Avicenna refers on a number of occasions in his Book of the Syllogism to “the eminent later scholar” (al-fā[ddotu]il min al-muta'a[hbrevu][hbrevu]irī). At least three recent studies have argued or assumed that this eminent later scholar is Alexander of Aphrodisias. It is argued in this article that Avicenna is in fact referring to Alfarabi. This has consequences for reconstructing the lost first part of Alfarabi's Great Commentary on the Prior Analytics, for highlighting certain aspects of Alfarabi's logical doctrines, and for understanding more about the relation between Avicenna and Alfarabi in matters logical.

Odo of Tournai, the Phoenix, and the Problem of Universals

Odo of Tournai, the Phoenix, and the Problem of Universals IRVEN M. RESNICK OVER THE PAST SEVERALYEARSa good deal of attention has been focused on the philosophical literature of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries in an attempt to locate the origins of nominalism? As part of this effort, several scholars have attempted to come to a new and better appreciation of one of the most vilified figures of the late eleventh century, namely Roscelin of Compi ~gne, whose logical doctrine, sometimes described as "proto-nominalism" or "vocalism, ''2 represents an early stage in the development of twelfth-century logical thought. Some have attempted simply to reconstruct, on the basis of the little material available to us that describes Roscelin's views, a less polemical and more coherent account of his theory of universals.3 Others have attempted to identify additional writings--both published and unpublished--that may properly shed light on Roscelin's philosophy.4 All, however, would agree on Roscelin's significance for the history of philosophy at the beginning of the twelfth-century renaissance. Roscelin's importance does not necessarily presuppose his originality. Evi- ' This effort has resulted in the dedication of an entire number of Vivarium to the origin and meaning of twelfth-century nominalism. Cf. Vivarium 3o/1 (1992). For a discussion of various doctrines on universals that emerged before Abelard, see Augustine Thompson, "The Debate on Universals before Peter Abelard,"Journal of the History of Philosophy33/3 (1995): 4o9-29 . 'See Iwakuma Yukio, " 'Vocales' or Early Nominalists," Traditio 48 (1992): 4o-41. sCf. Eike-Henner W. Kluge, "Roscelin and the Medieval Problem of Universals," Journal of the History of Philosophy a4/4 (1976): 4o5- 14; and John Jolivet, "Trois variations m6di~vales sur I'universal et l'individu: Roscelin, Ab~lard, Gilbert de la Porr~e," Revue de radtaphysiqueet de morale 97/1 0992): 111-55. 4Cf. Constance Mews, "St. Anselm and Roscelin: Some New Texts and Their Implications," Archives de histoiredoctrinale et littg, raire du Moyen Age 58 (1991): 55-97; and his "Nominalism and Theology before Abaelard: New Light on Roscelin of Compib.gne," Vivarium 3~ (1992): 4-33. This reevaluation of Roscelin'swork has also resulted in attempts to deny his authorship of other texts sometimes ascribed to him, e.g., the Sententia de universalibussecundum magistrum R. Cf. Judith Dijs, "Two Anonymous Twelfth-Century Tracts on Universals," Vivarium 28/2 (a99o): 85-117. [355] 356 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:3 JULY 1997 dently, the first person to teach 'vocalism' or a proto-nominalism toward the end of the eleventh century--perhaps c. lo8o--was a certain John ("the Sophist "), active at the time of Lanfranc of Canterbury. Among his students are counted Roscelin, Rotbert of Paris, and Arnulf of Laon. Further, Herman of Tournai provides evidence for the career of yet another of these moclerni, Raimbert of Lille, who taught c. lo9o.5 Nevertheless, Roscelin, in part because of the powerful enemies he acquired--e.g., Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard--and in part because of the apparently ill-considered application of his logical principles to one of the most difficult issues in theology, viz., the mystery of the Trinity, stands out as the most visible of those who proposed a nonrealist or nominalist doctrine of universals, i.e., genus and species.6 His treatment of the Trinity brought about the condemnation of his writings at the Council of Soissons in lo92. Although at the council Roscelin abjured the opinions contained in them, it is noteworthy that Ivo of Chartres remarks that after the council Roscelin was said to have returned to his previous views and even to have sought to convince others of them, insuring that his ideas would survive.7 While Roscelin found new disciples, the application of his proto-nominalism to the mystery of the Trinity elicited a violent attack from his own former student, Peter Abelard. Abelard describes Roscelin's views as "insane" and attempted to respond in his Theologia'SummiBoni' (composed probably between 1117 and 112 l) to Roscelin's trinitarianism. Ironically,because Abelard himself was unable to overcome his teacher's influence (although he sought to deny it), his own...

Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom

The issue of freedom and contingency as it appears in the works of Leibniz is one that has frustrated and fascinated students of Leibniz beyond measure. Since the publication of Bertrand Russell's A Critical Exposition of Leibniz's Philosophy in 1900, English-language discussions on this issue have focused on how Leibniz can have freedom and contingency as part of his given the logical, metaphysical, and modal doctrines he wants to defend. These discussions usually begin with an exposition of some set of logical, metaphysical, or modal doctrines that Leibniz endorsed and proceed through a protracted attempt to reconcile the set with some notion of freedom or contingency. In addition, these discussions have often taken for granted, and in fact modelled, the popular notion, endorsed and promoted by Russell, that Leibniz begins his philosophizing with a certain set of logical or metaphysical doctrines he wishes to defend, and then proceeds to build a system around them. However, as more of Leibniz's work becomes available to us this model of Leibniz's work seems less and less accurate. It is now becoming clear that for Leibniz, as for most figures in the history of philosophy, numerous factors were responsible for leading him to the claims he endorsed. One of these factors which has received surprisingly little attention in the English-language literature on Leibniz is the role that his theological commitments played in the development of his views. In this essay I would like to look at one facet of Leibniz's theological agenda in order to show that his thoughts on this matter profoundly impacted his views on freedom. The air in the seventeenth century was surely filled with as many theological disputes of central importance as any other prior to it or since. The Reformation had taken full hold and the theological factionalism that arose in its wake left the Catholic Church with more than just Luther and his progeny to worry about. One of the central disputes which raged, not only between Catholics and Protestants, but within Catholicism and Protestantism them-

Rational Inconsistency and Reasoning

Nicholas Rescher has argued we must tolerate inconsistency because of our cognitive limitations. He has also produced, together with R. Brandom, a serious attempt at exploring the logic of inconsistency. Inconsistency tolerance calls for a systematic rewriting of our logical doctrines: it requires a paraconsistent logic. However, having given up all aggregation of premises, Rescher's proposal for a paraconsistenl logic fails to account for the reductive reasoning Rescher appeals to in his account of inconsistency tolerance. A non-adjunctive logic developed by P.K. Schotch and RE. Jennings provides just what Rescher's logic is lacking: It allows a tolerant attitude toward inconsistency while giving an account of reductive reasoning.

The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull

This book is a comprehensive, critical survey of all the logical doctrines of the well-known, but little-understood Catalan philosopher and theologian Ramon Lull. The highly idiosyncratic character of his writings has long frustrated the efforts of general medieval historians to define his contribution to later Scholastic culture, and resisted attempts by specialists to explain exactly how his methods and procedures worked. This new study, the first book-length treatment in English of Lull's philosophy for over 50 years attempts to resolve both of these difficulties. The author argues that Lull's peculiar logical doctrines, like his entire project for a so-called General and Universal Art of Knowledge, result from his reinterpretation of the use of commonplace scholastic teachings according to his own preferred ethical and ideals. The product is a spiritual logic that effectively serves Lull's great goal of tracing all knowledge back to its source in the one truth, God.

The doctrine of logic as form

The doctrine of logic as form

Moore and Russell on Existence as a Predicate

MOORE'S PAPER, IS Existence a predicate?! consists of an introduction and two parts. The first part, much the longer of the two, is well-known and relatively clear. In the second part the argument is sketched briefly rather than being developed with Moore's usual lengthy and exhaustive attention to detail. Consequently this part is rather obscure. But this much is immediately apparent: he is presenting arguments that tell against the thesis that existence cannot be a logical predicate. The first part appears to support this thesis. Since this part is clearer and better known, the opinion is widespread among philosophers that Moore simply denies that existence can be a predicate. For instance Jonathan Barnes writes, It is plain, I think, that Frege and Moore are wrong in denying sense to sentences of the form, 'a exists' .2 But careful reading of Moore's Is Existence a Predicate?, especially the second part, shows that this is far from being Moore's position. In this paper I foeu.s chiefly upon the second part, Moore's final word on the subject, in an effort to discover just what is his position. I arrive at the conclusion that he has no consistent position on this issue; for his common-sense intuitions are at odds with certain logical doctrines of Russell, which Moore accepts. Moore's paper is part of a symposium, following a paper on the same topic by William Kneale. Kneale, in a standard Russellian analysis, argues that existence is not a logical predicate or attribute. Sentences such as Tame tigers exist do have a meaningful use; but

New Sanskrit fragments of the Pramanasamuccaya

For the study of the logical doctrine of Dignâga it is essential to collect the Sanskrit fragments of his works, for to our regret most of his works on logic have been lost in the Sanskrit original and preserved only in Tibetan or Chinese translations which are by no means easy to comprehend. After the pioneering attempt of Randle1 a number of fragments of Dignâga have been discovered by many scholars in the logical texts of the Buddhists, Naiyâyikas and other schools.2 In this article I shall present some new fragments of the Pramânasamuccaya and its Vrtti (Chapters II and III), one of the most important logical texts of Dignâga.3

From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto. Isaac Cardoso, A Study in Seventeenth Century Marranism and Jewish Apologetics (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 403 William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words trans, with intro, and notes by Norman Kretzmann. (Minneapolis. University Press, 1968. Pp. xm+ 173) Already known by his William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic (Minneapolis: University Press, 1966), the translator offers us an advanced treatise on Medieval logic, the Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood, published in Medieval Studies, III (1941). Once more we are acquainted with scholastic logic of which we knew already the Tractatus Syncategorematum of Peter of Spain translated by Joseph Mullally and Roland Houde and published by the Marquette University Press in 1964. Thanks to the diligent work of ,the translator, the notes and the index, the reading of this difficult treatise becomes relatively easy. The translator did well by keeoing the latin equivalent of the expressions, prepositions, adverbs, conjunctions analysed by the treatise. What is the object of this logical work? William of Sherwood, in a short introduction, answers this question: the objects are these secondary parts of a statement (enuntiatio) which "are determinations of principal parts (the substantival name and the verb) insofar as they are subjects or predicates." In other words, the syncategorematic words (syncategoremeta ) with which W. of Sherwood is dealing do not mean something which belongs to things but results from the "mind of the speaker" (p. 118). For a contemporary logician, the syncategorematic words signify the structure of language, the syntactical elements of it; for a medieval thinker, they express all the entia ration&, the logical entities of thought. As a matter of fact, both speak of the same thing in a different mentality: on the one hand nominalism, on the other hand conceptualism. Anyway, the specifically logical doctrines are almost the same. Consequently, it is still very fruitful to go back to these treatises of the Middle Ages. The following topics are dealts with: words which determine the distributivity of the predicate, "Every" or "All" (omnis), "Whole" (totum), "Both" (uterque), "of Every sort" (quaelibet), "No" (nullus), "Nothing" (nihil), "Neither" (neutrum)---these sync~tegorematic words correspond to quantifiers; "But" (praeter), "Alone" (solus), "Only" (tantum)---these syneategorematie words introduce the implicitly compound propositions of the Scholastic logicians; "Is" (est)---it is syncategorematie insofar as it signifies a composition; otherwise, it is not; "Necessarily" (necessario), "Contingently" (contingenter)----these words introduce modal propositions; "Not" (non), "If" (si), "unless" (nisi), "and" (et)---these words correspond to the connectives of the propositional logic. One word "but that" (quin) is rather a grammatical expression than a logical one. The same has to be said of "he.... an", which correspond to "Whether" or "Or." Many subtile analyses distinguish the several uses of the syncategorematic words. Many sophisms are proposed and solved thanks to the distinctions. It is evident that these analyses are made in an epistemological context which implies Metaphysics. E. WINANCE Claremont Graduate School Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto. Isaac Cardoso, ,4 Study in Seventeenth Century Marranism and Jewish ,4pologetics. (Columbia University Press, New York. xx+524 pp.) This excellent scholarly study of the amazing career of Isaac Cardoso, 1603/4-1683, brings to life a much neglected current in 17th century intellectual history, that of 404 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the philosophical and theological odysseys of Iberia's thinkers of Jewish origins who had been forced to live and develop in the Inquisitional Catholic world. The powerful and often innovative contributions of these tormented intellectuals vlayed a very significant role that is just beginning to be recognized in the "making of the modern mind." Cardoso was raised in Portugal and Spain, and at age twenty-one was professor of philosophy at Valladolid, and two years later was professor of medicine. He was apparently a great success as a eeacher and doctor and became a royal physician. He was in the circle of Lope de Vega (who died after fainting while a~tending one of Cardoso's lectures). He published some important scientific works in Spain, as well as a funeral oration for Lope de Vega. In spite of his Jewish background, Cardoso rose to great heights in Spain, and was protected by some of the strongest figures in the Inquisitional world. Then, for unknown reasons, Cardoso left Spain in 1648, and turned...

William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 403 William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words trans, with intro, and notes by Norman Kretzmann. (Minneapolis. University Press, 1968. Pp. xm+ 173) Already known by his William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic (Minneapolis: University Press, 1966), the translator offers us an advanced treatise on Medieval logic, the Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood, published in Medieval Studies, III (1941). Once more we are acquainted with scholastic logic of which we knew already the Tractatus Syncategorematum of Peter of Spain translated by Joseph Mullally and Roland Houde and published by the Marquette University Press in 1964. Thanks to the diligent work of ,the translator, the notes and the index, the reading of this difficult treatise becomes relatively easy. The translator did well by keeoing the latin equivalent of the expressions, prepositions, adverbs, conjunctions analysed by the treatise. What is the object of this logical work? William of Sherwood, in a short introduction, answers this question: the objects are these secondary parts of a statement (enuntiatio) which "are determinations of principal parts (the substantival name and the verb) insofar as they are subjects or predicates." In other words, the syncategorematic words (syncategoremeta ) with which W. of Sherwood is dealing do not mean something which belongs to things but results from the "mind of the speaker" (p. 118). For a contemporary logician, the syncategorematic words signify the structure of language, the syntactical elements of it; for a medieval thinker, they express all the entia ration&, the logical entities of thought. As a matter of fact, both speak of the same thing in a different mentality: on the one hand nominalism, on the other hand conceptualism. Anyway, the specifically logical doctrines are almost the same. Consequently, it is still very fruitful to go back to these treatises of the Middle Ages. The following topics are dealts with: words which determine the distributivity of the predicate, "Every" or "All" (omnis), "Whole" (totum), "Both" (uterque), "of Every sort" (quaelibet), "No" (nullus), "Nothing" (nihil), "Neither" (neutrum)---these sync~tegorematic words correspond to quantifiers; "But" (praeter), "Alone" (solus), "Only" (tantum)---these syneategorematie words introduce the implicitly compound propositions of the Scholastic logicians; "Is" (est)---it is syncategorematie insofar as it signifies a composition; otherwise, it is not; "Necessarily" (necessario), "Contingently" (contingenter)----these words introduce modal propositions; "Not" (non), "If" (si), "unless" (nisi), "and" (et)---these words correspond to the connectives of the propositional logic. One word "but that" (quin) is rather a grammatical expression than a logical one. The same has to be said of "he.... an", which correspond to "Whether" or "Or." Many subtile analyses distinguish the several uses of the syncategorematic words. Many sophisms are proposed and solved thanks to the distinctions. It is evident that these analyses are made in an epistemological context which implies Metaphysics. E. WINANCE Claremont Graduate School Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto. Isaac Cardoso, ,4 Study in Seventeenth Century Marranism and Jewish ,4pologetics. (Columbia University Press, New York. xx+524 pp.) This excellent scholarly study of the amazing career of Isaac Cardoso, 1603/4-1683, brings to life a much neglected current in 17th century intellectual history, that of ...

Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic-I

IT is well known that Ennead VI contains an onslaught by Plotinus on Aristotle's Categories, but that his pupil, Porphyry, established both the Categories and Predicables as part of the Neoplatonic and eventually the Scholastic philosophical curriculum. So far as this situation has been studied, it has been for the most part from the standpoint of its extemal history. Philology has traced many of Plotinus's criticisms to the commentaries of the Middle Academy, and many of Porphyry's expressions to Stoic logicians; historical enquiry has found motives in the social position of the Schools for the Neoplatonic acceptance of Aristotle's logic. This valuable work, however, tends at best to ignore the philosophical understanding of both the criticism and the reinstatement of Aristotle, and at worst to give an erroneous account of the place of Neoplatonism in the history of logic. First, the criticism is of intrinsic philosophical interest, because it aims to shew that 'inseparable' universals, and the whole theory of genus and species, are unable to do the task required of Secondly, the logic which Porphyry and his successors reinstate resembles that of the Stoics in being stripped of certain metaphysical implications. The reason for this is not corruption of Platonism by the Stoa, but the inevitable effect of wanting Aristotle the elementary logician without Aristotle the metaphysician. And the result is that a good deal of credit has gone to the Stoics which was due to the Neoplatonists. Useful as it is, Prantl's work needs rewriting. This must not be misunderstood. In dealing with Neoplatonists we cannot be concerned, as we can in the case of Stoics, withformal logic. I doubt whether there is a single theorem whose discovery can be attributed to them. We are concerned with logic in a wide sense, which can for the present purposes be quite accurately defined as the sense in which the Categories and Predicables are logical doctrines. What Porphyry achieved what he was driven to achieve was a logic of this kind, which, merely because of its restricted metaphysical implications, was valuable to Boetius and the Schoolmen and important in the history of philosophy. It allowed Aristotelian logic to become an autonomous

The Historical Pattern of Psycho-Analysis

r NHE NEWCOMER to Western Europe can 11ardly fail to be struck by the interest accorded to psycho-analysis in this part of the svorld. f . In big centres such as London or Paris this interest far exceeds any scientific curiosity; psycho-analysis has become not only a fashionable topic of conversation, but an atmosphere. It is only fair to state that this atmosphere prevails in a particular social stratum that could appropnately be described as the middle classes of Western culture. To these classes belong people for whom intellectual preoccupations or any dealings with ideas are a spare-time activity. The cultural importance of these people, much more numerous in the West than anywhere else, is not yet fully assessed. At the moment they show a growing interest in cultural productions, and a weakening of the critical sense at the same time. W. H. Auden had perhaps these people in mind when trying to sketch the popular conception of Freudianism as following: (I) Sex pleasure is the only real pleasure; (2) All reasoning is false and consists merely of rationalization; (3) It is my parent's fault that I am not Shakespeare or Napoleon, and (4) Virtue means do as you like. And yet the present popularity of psycho-analysis does not result primarily from its attitude towards sexual life. The widespread belief that psycho analysis is the right cure for all sorts of individual and even collective troubles confers upon it a prestige seldom found in the evolution of any other psych logical doctrine. Not less important is the conviction that psycho-analysis has opened new vistas for research not only in psychology but in all the social sciences, ethics, sociology, economics, politics, art criticism, anthropology, etc. If psycho-analysis is not an epoch-making discovery, a new srision of life, a Copernican idea, then it is nothing. This kind of praise is accorded even by people who are professionals in the field of culture. Copernicus destroyed the belief in the central position of the earth, Darwin destroyed the pride in human uniqueness, and Freud revealed the extent to which consciousness is the plaything of the Unconscious, says one of them.l The concept of the strusfgre of mind was an inevitable consequence of Freud's discovery of un-

Charles Sanders Peirce's Metaphysics of Evolution

ades of the Twentieth. In the field of logic, certainly, this prophetic quality of Peirce's work will scarcely be disputed. The chief doctrines of contemporary mathematical logic, as enshrined in the famous Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell and in other recent works, are for the most part outlined in advance in Peirce's writings. Also, that seemingly very different type of logical doctrine, the pragmatic theory of meaning, is no less definitely to be found in Peirce, along with many important features of the current theory of scientific method. Were this all, it would be enough to justify a considerable degree of fame. But it is by no means all. The most representative metaphysical systems of our time, including those of Bergson and Whitehead, are strikingly akin to the metaphysics of Peirce. We can see now that the second half of the last century was one of the great turning-points in the history of metaphysical thought-thought, that is, regarding the strictly universal or all-pervasive features of existence, those found throughout all space and time. The revolution effected by metaphysicians during this period, and by none other so incisively as Peirce, was in part a return to the great tradition, to modes of thought dominant before the modern era, prior to Bruno and Spinoza. The new type of thought arrived at involved, further, a deliberate and well-considered retention of certain modern*

Are There Ultimate Simples?

In the course of modern philosophy, there have been several attempts to demonstrate the existence of ultimately simple objects by purely logical methods. One of the most recent of such attempts forms part of the foundation of Wittgenstein's logical doctrine. As Wittgenstein has, until quite recently, been considered the authoritative source of Logical Positivism, an examination of his supposed demonstration of logical simples is propaedeutic to an evaluation of the method of the school.

Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic.

Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic.

IV.--The Place of the Concept in Logical Doctrine

Journal Article IV.—The Place of the Concept in Logical Doctrine Get access J. H. Muirhead J. H. Muirhead Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume V, Issue 20, October 1896, Pages 508–522, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/V.20.508 Published: 01 October 1896

Societies and Academies

LONDONRoyal Society, January 20.—The following papers were read:— “On the mechanical performance of logical inference,” by W. Stanley jevonS, M.A. Lond., Professor of Logic, & a, in Owens College; communicated by Professor E. Roscoe, F.R.S. The author first referred to the general use of mechanical contrivances for the purpose of mathematical computation, and then contrasted this fact with the utter absence of machines for aiding logical operations. This absence he attributed to.the incompleteness of the old logical doctrines. The problem of logical science in its complete generality was first solved by Boole. His logical views, when simplified and corrected, give us a method of indirect deduction of extreme generality and power, founded directly upon the fundamental laws of thought. A proof of the truthfulness and power of this system is to be found in the fact that it can be embodied in a machine just as the calculus of differences is embodied in Mr. Babbage's calculating machine. To explain the nature of the logical machine alluded to, it may be pointed out that the third of the fundamental laws of thought allow us to affirm of any object one or the other of two contradictory attributes, and that we are thus enabled to develope a series of alternatives which must contain the description of a given class or object. Thus, if we are considering the propositions,