Moore and Russell on Existence as a Predicate

Abstract

MOORE'S PAPER, IS Existence a predicate?! consists of an introduction and two parts. The first part, much the longer of the two, is well-known and relatively clear. In the second part the argument is sketched briefly rather than being developed with Moore's usual lengthy and exhaustive attention to detail. Consequently this part is rather obscure. But this much is immediately apparent: he is presenting arguments that tell against the thesis that existence cannot be a logical predicate. The first part appears to support this thesis. Since this part is clearer and better known, the opinion is widespread among philosophers that Moore simply denies that existence can be a predicate. For instance Jonathan Barnes writes, It is plain, I think, that Frege and Moore are wrong in denying sense to sentences of the form, 'a exists' .2 But careful reading of Moore's Is Existence a Predicate?, especially the second part, shows that this is far from being Moore's position. In this paper I foeu.s chiefly upon the second part, Moore's final word on the subject, in an effort to discover just what is his position. I arrive at the conclusion that he has no consistent position on this issue; for his common-sense intuitions are at odds with certain logical doctrines of Russell, which Moore accepts. Moore's paper is part of a symposium, following a paper on the same topic by William Kneale. Kneale, in a standard Russellian analysis, argues that existence is not a logical predicate or attribute. Sentences such as Tame tigers exist do have a meaningful use; but