AbstractThis paper examines three levels of regulation and compliance imposed by the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and stock exchanges, on risk profile of banking institutions in the United States. SEC‐registered and exchanged‐listed bank holding companies have more concentrated and lower quality loan portfolios; they grow faster through acquisitions and are more likely to execute M&A exit strategy themselves. Also, bank holding companies that commit to higher levels of compliance are better capitalized but have lower return on equity capital. Lower profitability is partially compensated with higher payout ratio, suggesting that regulatory frameworks to some extent ameliorate agency issues.Multi‐tiered regulation of banking institutions yields a separating equilibrium, in which banks choose level of compliance to match their business strategies. Three‐tiered regulatory framework enables market segmentation and matching of capital providers with desired risk profile. Switch to higher levels of compliance is accompanied by risk profile increase without a better risk‐return tradeoff, suggesting managerial agency cost explanation. SEC‐compliant banks are likely to migrate to exchanges or downshift to FDIC disclosure only. Both SEC and exchange‐listed banks are likely to execute growth‐by‐acquisitions but listed bank holding companies are only marginally more likely to default, suggesting more efficient risk‐taking or reliance on government support when market conditions decline. SEC compliance is the most volatile of three disclosure regimes.My study does not conclude that excessive regulation yields negative effects. It does not address assessment of changes in systematic risk and externalities focusing instead on firm‐level effects. Finally, it suggests the need to regulate the market for corporate control, which appears to be one major risk‐taking transmission mechanism in the US private banking market.