This article examines the closely fought March 2004 Taiwan presidential election, in which the difference between the winner and the runner-up was a mere 0.22 percent, and which was characterized by a high level of partisan passions and distrust. This election was also notable because the rules governing disputes during presidential elections had never been used, since the 2004 presidential election was only the third instance of a popular election of a president. The article examines the context and structure of electoral contest and the various dimensions of the controversy, identifies the avenues for ”electoral dispute settlement,” the role played by different political and social actors, as well as that of various institutions in this heated electoral drama. The authors show that three sets of agents played a role in increasing the legitimacy of a legal solution to the problem, and thus to remove the possibility of greater political conflict, namely the United States, the mass media and the general public, and third and most critically, leaders from both camps, who made compromises and concessions at crucial moments. In contrast with the latter actors, the military, the judiciary, and the Central Election Committee (CEC) managed to remain neutral. The authors conclude that the newly installed Taiwanese democracy is probably less fragile than it appears to be, as it passed the litmus test of acceptance by electoral losers of a dispute settlement mechanism and of a ”verdict.” Thus, despite sustained mass mobilization, unauthorized mass rallies, acute political polarization, and vitriolic exchanges between the leading contenders, the electoral dispute was resolved by the judiciary.