Cognitive Capacity Limitations Research Articles

Reminders eliminate age-related declines in prospective memory.

Prospective memory (PM)-the process of establishing intentions for future action and remembering to fulfill these intentions at the appropriate time-is necessary for many instrumental activities of daily living and for maintaining functional independence with increased age. Offloading PM demands onto the environment, such as setting a reminder alarm to take medication, offers an easy and effective way to mitigate age-related PM declines. However, a lack of basic knowledge about the cognitive and metacognitive processes that drive offloading decisions presents barriers to successful implementation. The present study addresses these issues by examining age differences in PM for offloaded (i.e., with reminders) and nonoffloaded (i.e., without reminders) intentions under low and high memory demands. With highly specific intentions that can be retrieved via bottom-up processes (Experiment 1), there were no age differences in PM without reminders, and younger and older adults equally benefitted from reminders under high memory load. With nonspecific intentions that require top-down attention for retrieval (Experiment 2), older adults had worse PM under high load without reminders. Critically, this age difference was eliminated with the use of reminders, likely due to increased reminder checking for older adults under high load. These findings suggest that offloading can circumvent cognitive capacity limitations and minimize computational effort to improve intention fulfillment in older adults. The theoretical and applied ramifications of these findings are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Examining Limits of Small Multiples: Frame Quantity Impacts Judgments with Line Graphs.

Small multiples are a popular visualization method, displaying different views of a dataset using multiple frames, often with the same scale and axes. However, there is a need to address their potential constraints, especially in the context of human cognitive capacity limits. These limits dictate the maximum information our mind can process at once. We explore the issue of capacity limitation by testing competing theories that describe how the number of frames shown in a display, the scale of the frames, and time constraints impact user performance with small multiples of line charts in an energy grid scenario. In two online studies (Experiment 1 n = 141 and Experiment 2 n = 360) and a follow-up eye-tracking analysis (n = 5), we found a linear decline in accuracy with increasing frames across seven tasks, which was not fully explained by differences in frame size, suggesting visual search challenges. Moreover, the studies demonstrate that highlighting specific frames can mitigate some visual search difficulties but, surprisingly, not eliminate them. This research offers insights into optimizing the utility of small multiples by aligning them with human limitations.

Peacocks, Penknives and Power

ABSTRACT This article conceptualizes evolutionary theory as a bridge between existing theorizing in strategic communication on the one hand, the mind sciences on the other. It discusses six core concepts of evolutionary psychology that have a bearing on strategic communication theory: a) the human as a highly flexible social species; b) the regulation of individually-minded vs. collectively-minded behavior; c) advanced, symbolic communication as a mode of regulation and its second-order problems; d) a consilient conceptualization of communication; e) evolutionary psychology’s role as a heuristic; and f) the limits of cognitive capacity and the role of heuristic shortcuts. The article concludes with a note on the theory of science in strategic communication research and cautions against the common misunderstanding of evolutionary psychology’s agenda.

Menzerath-Altmann Law in Consecutive and Simultaneous Interpreting: Insights into Varied Cognitive Processes and Load

ABSTRACT Notwithstanding theoretical simulations of distinctive cognitive processes and load of consecutive (CI) and simultaneous interpreting (SI), quantitative linguistic inquiry into their outputs is needed for solid empirical evidence. As a fundamental law of quantitative linguistics, Menzerath–Altmann Law (MAL) mirrors the economic processing of linguistic information and complex dynamic language system. Given its extensive validation at various linguistic levels and predictive power of its parameters in register, language and authorship differentiation, MAL is worthy of being applied to interpreting studies. We endeavour to investigate whether interpreted languages follow the MAL and reveal varied cognitive load of CI versus SI, as manifested by different MAL fitting models. Results show that (1) both CI and SI outputs follow the MAL; (2) SI processing involves more diversified structural information and shows a greater tendency of shortening the clauses of a sentence with increased sentence length, than CI processing, expressed by significantly higher a and lower b in SI models than that in CI models. Our findings suggest the disparate language representations are shaped by cognitive capacity limitations and interpreting modalities, and reveal how language system dynamically re-regulates and reorganizes the linguistic information to accommodate environmental settings from the perspective of synergetic linguistics.

Mechanisms underlying training-induced cognitive change

The prospect of enhancing cognition through behavioural training interventions, for example, the repetitive practice of cognitive tasks or metacognitive strategy instruction, has seen a surge in popularity over the past 20 years. Although overwhelming evidence demonstrates that such training interventions increase performance in the trained tasks, controversy remains over whether these benefits transfer to other tasks and abilities beyond the trained context. In this Review, we provide an overview of the effectiveness of cognitive training to induce transfer to untrained tasks, with a particular focus on the theoretical mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie training and transfer effects. We highlight that there is relatively little evidence that training enhances cognitive capacity, that is, the overall cognitive resources available to an individual. By contrast, substantial evidence supports training-induced improvements in cognitive efficiency, that is, optimized performance within existing cognitive capacity limits. We conclude that shifting research towards identifying the cognitive mechanisms underlying gains in cognitive efficiency offers a fruitful avenue for developing effective cognitive training interventions. However, to advance our understanding of human cognition and cognitive plasticity we must strive to develop and refine theories that generate testable hypotheses.

When is Psychology Research Useful in Artificial Intelligence? A Case for Reducing Computational Complexity in Problem Solving.

A problem is a situation in which an agent seeks to attain a given goal without knowing how to achieve it. Human problem solving is typically studied as a search in a problem space composed of states (information about the environment) and operators (to move between states). A problem such as playing a game of chess has possible states, and a traveling salesperson problem with as little as 82 cities already has more than different tours (similar to chess). Biological neurons are slower than the digital switches in computers. An exhaustive search of the problem space exceeds the capacity of current computers for most interesting problems, and it is fairly clear that humans cannot in their lifetime exhaustively search even small fractions of these problem spaces. Yet, humans play chess and solve logistical problems of similar complexity on a daily basis. Even for simple problems humans do not typically engage in exploring even a small fraction of the problem space. This begs the question: How do humans solve problems on a daily basis in a fast and efficient way? Recent work suggests that humans build a problem representation and solve the represented problem-not the problem that is out there. The problem representation that is built and the process used to solve it are constrained by limits of cognitive capacity and a cost-benefit analysis discounting effort and reward. In this article, we argue that better understanding the way humans represent and solve problems using heuristics can help inform how simpler algorithms and representations can be used in artificial intelligence to lower computational complexity, reduce computation time, and facilitate real-time computation in complex problemsolving.

Cognitive Capacity Limits Are Remediated by Practice-Induced Plasticity between the Putamen and Pre-Supplementary Motor Area.

Humans show striking limitations in information processing when multitasking yet can modify these limits with practice. Such limitations have been linked to a frontal-parietal network, but recent models of decision-making implicate a striatal-cortical network. We adjudicated these accounts by investigating the circuitry underpinning multitasking in 100 human individuals and the plasticity caused by practice. We observed that multitasking costs, and their practice-induced remediation, are best explained by modulations in information transfer between the striatum and the cortical areas that represent stimulus-response mappings. Specifically, our results support the view that multitasking stems at least in part from taxation in information sharing between the putamen and pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). Moreover, we propose that modulations to information transfer between these two regions leads to practice-induced improvements in multitasking.

Neuroimaging and Reading Comprehension

In this position paper, we advocate that advancements made in other disciplinary areas such as neurolinguistics should be included into contemporary reading comprehension courses and programs. We present findings from neurobiology of reading that suggest explanation of certain reading behaviors: (1) the differences between reading disability and typically developing readers; (2) an inverted U-shaped function that reflects the fact that learning to read is associated with increased activation (the rising part of the inverted U) and activation decreases are associated with familiarity, experience, and expertise (the falling part of the inverted U); (3) and, the identification of reading networks. As potential pedagogical implications of neuroimaging studies to reading, a list of sentence structures is proposed as an example to further relate reading comprehension to cognitive capacity limits.

Cognitive capacity limitations and Need for Cognition differentially predict reward-induced cognitive effort expenditure

While psychological, economic, and neuroscientific accounts of behavior broadly maintain that people minimize expenditure of cognitive effort, empirical work reveals how reward incentives can mobilize increased cognitive effort expenditure. Recent theories posit that the decision to expend effort is governed, in part, by a cost-benefit tradeoff whereby the potential benefits of mental effort can offset the perceived costs of effort exertion. Taking an individual differences approach, the present study examined whether one’s executive function capacity, as measured by Stroop interference, predicts the extent to which reward incentives reduce switch costs in a task-switching paradigm, which indexes additional expenditure of cognitive effort. In accordance with the predictions of a cost-benefit account of effort, we found that a low executive function capacity—and, relatedly, a low intrinsic motivation to expend effort (measured by Need for Cognition)—predicted larger increase in cognitive effort expenditure in response to monetary reward incentives, while individuals with greater executive function capacity—and greater intrinsic motivation to expend effort—were less responsive to reward incentives. These findings suggest that an individual’s cost-benefit tradeoff is constrained by the perceived costs of exerting cognitive effort.

Multitasking as a choice: a perspective

Performance decrements in multitasking have been explained by limitations in cognitive capacity, either modelled as static structural bottlenecks or as the scarcity of overall cognitive resources that prevent humans, or at least restrict them, from processing two tasks at the same time. However, recent research has shown that individual differences, flexible resource allocation, and prioritization of tasks cannot be fully explained by these accounts. We argue that understanding human multitasking as a choice and examining multitasking performance from the perspective of judgment and decision-making (JDM), may complement current dual-task theories. We outline two prominent theories from the area of JDM, namely Simple Heuristics and the Decision Field Theory, and adapt these theories to multitasking research. Here, we explain how computational modelling techniques and decision-making parameters used in JDM may provide a benefit to understanding multitasking costs and argue that these techniques and parameters have the potential to predict multitasking behavior in general, and also individual differences in behavior. Finally, we present the one-reason choice metaphor to explain a flexible use of limited capacity as well as changes in serial and parallel task processing. Based on this newly combined approach, we outline a concrete interdisciplinary future research program that we think will help to further develop multitasking research.

Interference and memory capacity limitations.

Working memory (WM) is thought to have a fixed and limited capacity. However, the origins of these capacity limitations are debated, and generally attributed to active, attentional processes. Here, we show that the existence of interference among items in memory mathematically guarantees fixed and limited capacity limits under very general conditions, irrespective of any processing assumptions. Assuming that interference (a) increases with the number of interfering items and (b) brings memory performance to chance levels for large numbers of interfering items, capacity limits are a simple function of the relative influence of memorization and interference. In contrast, we show that time-based memory limitations do not lead to fixed memory capacity limitations that are independent of the timing properties of an experiment. We show that interference can mimic both slot-like and continuous resource-like memory limitations, suggesting that these types of memory performance might not be as different as commonly believed. We speculate that slot-like WM limitations might arise from crowding-like phenomena in memory when participants have to retrieve items. Further, based on earlier research on parallel attention and enumeration, we suggest that crowding-like phenomena might be a common reason for the 3 major cognitive capacity limitations. As suggested by Miller (1956) and Cowan (2001), these capacity limitations might arise because of a common reason, even though they likely rely on distinct processes. (PsycINFO Database Record

Category-based grouping in working memory and multiple object tracking

ABSTRACTTwo prominent cognitive capacity limitations are the maximal number of objects we can place in working memory (WM) and the maximal number of objects we can track in a display. Both are believed to have a numeric value of 3 or 4, which has led to the proposal that we have a general cognitive capacity, and that this capacity is most likely linked to limitations of how many objects we can attend simultaneously. Based on previous results showing that we can memorize more objects if they come from different categories than if they come from the same category (e.g., Feigenson & Halberda, 2008; Wong, Peterson, & Thompson, 2008; Wood, 2008), we compare how category-based grouping affects performance for WM and multiple object tracking (MOT). We present participants with either “pure” displays of either cars or faces, or with “mixed” displays of cars and faces. Overall, the effects of category are weak. In some analyses but not others, we replicate the mixed advantage for WM, albeit with a small effect size. In contrast, we observe a weak pure advantage for MOT tasks, at least in a meta-analysis of five experiments, but not in all experiments. Accordingly, WM and MOT tasks differed significantly in their sensitivity to category membership. We also find that WM is slightly better for faces than for cars, but that no such difference exists for MOT. We tentatively suggest that cognitive capacity limitations in different domains are at least partially due to the limitations of distinct mechanisms.

Effect of visual support on the processing of multiclausal sentences

Processing morphemic elements is one of the most difficult parts of second language acquisition (DeKeyser, 2005; Larsen-Freeman, 2010). This difficulty gains prominence when second language (L2) learners must perform under time pressure, and difficulties arise in using grammatical knowledge. To solve the problem, the current study used the tenets of multimedia learning theory (Mayer, 2005) to help L2 learners’ reconstruct multiclausal sentences. This theory assumes that limitations in cognitive capacity are reduced when information is given to learners both visually and aurally. Given this assumption, the current study examined whether pictorial information helps L2 learners process morphemic elements in multiclausal sentences presented aurally. Thirty-two learners of Japanese engaged in elicited imitation both with and without pictorial support. The results revealed that the learners performed significantly better with pictorial support, lending support to multimedia learning theory for L2 learners’ processing of morphemic elements. However, a limited effect of pictorial support was found for the processing of an element that the L2 learners had learned recently, and that was in sentence-final position, suggesting that these types of items are difficult to automatize regardless of cognitive support.

Sound mind, irrational behavior?

Sound mind, irrational behavior?

Lack of mirror use by pigs to locate food

Many mammalian species, as well as birds, are able to use a mirror either in the context of self-recognition, or instrumentally for discovering and manipulating objects that cannot be perceived directly. A noteworthy study by Broom et al. (2009) investigated the ability of pigs (Sus scrofa) to use a mirror to locate a hidden food source. The mirror-experienced pigs appeared to be able to bypass a solid barrier that blocked direct view of a food bowl when the food bowl could be seen via a mirror. We tried to replicate these findings using 2 groups of 11 piglets each. The procedure used for testing the first group of 11 pigs followed Broom's description as closely as possible. Only two of the pigs of the first group were able to locate the hidden food bowl during the mirror test. Therefore, measures were taken to increase the number of pigs noticing the mirror in the second group of 11 pigs. Now, although pigs notice the mirror significantly earlier, only 1 of the mirror-experienced pigs and none of the mirror-naive pigs used the detour around the partition wall to reach the hidden food. We take this observation as evidence that the pigs did not understand what the mirror image represents, and did not use the mirror to locate food. This indicates that not all pigs are capable of using mirrors under all circumstances, and thus that mirror use may be at the upper limits of cognitive capacity of these animals at this age.

Cognitieve beperkingen bij patiënten met COPD: een overzicht

COPD (Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease) is a respiratory disease characterized by progressive and largely irreversible airway limitation and extrapulmonary problems. The prevalence of COPD increases with age. Mental health problems, including cognitive capacity limitations, occur frequently. Patients with COPD may have problems with cognitive functioning, either globally or in single cognitive domains, such as information processing, attention and concentration, memory, executive functioning and self-regulation. Possible causes are hypoxemia, hypercapnia, exacerbations and decreased physical activity. Cognitive problems in these patients may be related to structural brain abnormalities, such as gray matter pathologic changes and the loss of white matter integrity. Because of the negative impact on health and daily life, it is important to assess cognitive functioning in patients with COPD in order to optimize patient-oriented treatment and to reduce personal discomfort, hospital admissions and mortality.

Neural substrates of cognitive capacity limitations

Cognition has a severely limited capacity: Adult humans can retain only about four items "in mind". This limitation is fundamental to human brain function: Individual capacity is highly correlated with intelligence measures and capacity is reduced in neuropsychiatric diseases. Although human capacity limitations are well studied, their mechanisms have not been investigated at the single-neuron level. Simultaneous recordings from monkey parietal and frontal cortex revealed that visual capacity limitations occurred immediately upon stimulus encoding and in a bottom-up manner. Capacity limitations were found to reflect a dual model of working memory. The left and right halves of visual space had independent capacities and thus are discrete resources. However, within each hemifield, neural information about successfully remembered objects was reduced by adding further objects, indicating that resources are shared. Together, these results suggest visual capacity limitation is due to discrete, slot-like, resources, each containing limited pools of neural information that can be divided among objects.

Adaptation to increased work autonomy: The role of task reflection

This experiment investigated how individuals adapt to increased work autonomy and examined the moderating role of task reflection. Work autonomy was manipulated in an experimental setting in which participants (n = 56) completed a scheduling task. Multilevel analyses demonstrated that participants who began work with low autonomy showed poorer performance when autonomy was increased compared to participants who began with a high level of autonomy. Analysis of thinking-aloud protocols revealed that reflection about task accomplishment had a negative impact on performance among those individuals who worked previously with low autonomy. The data suggest that cognitive capacity limitations and prior task-related knowledge led to the detrimental effects of task reflection on performance when experiencing low autonomy.

Ironic processes in the eating behaviour of restrained eaters.

Theory. The present study examines the processes underlying the disinhibition of the eating behaviour of restrained eaters following negative emotions. Based on Herman and Polivy's (1984) Boundary Model and Wegner's Ironic Process Theory (1994), the limited capacity hypothesis is formulated, suggesting that overeating in restrained eaters results from cognitive capacity limitations. Predictions were that (1) impairment of cognitive capacity during eating will lead to overeating in restrained but not in unrestrained eaters and that (2) this difference should only emerge with food perceived to be high in calories.METHOD: The hypotheses were tested in an experiment with a 2 (restrained/unrestrained) x 2 (distraction yes/no) x 2 (perceived calories high/low) design, in which subjects consumed ice-cream in a taste test situation. Ice-cream consumption was the dependent variable.RESULTS: A second-order interaction was found: as predicted, in the high calorie condition restrained eaters ate the same amount as unrestrained eaters when not distracted, but considerably more when distracted. There was also an unexpected main effect of distraction, which indicated that restrained as well as unrestrained eaters ate more if distracted than if not distracted.DISCUSSION: The restraintxdistractionxperceived calories interaction can be explained by both the Ironic Process Theory and the Boundary Model; and the limited capacity hypothesis appears to be confirmed. The overall main effect of distraction remains puzzling. Two speculative views for the latter effect are offered.

Learning face-name associations and the effect of age and performance: a PET activation study

Learning face-name associations is a complex task to be mastered in every day life that approaches the limits of cognitive capacity in most normal humans. We studied brain activation during face-name learning using positron emission tomography (PET) in 11 normal volunteers. The most intense activation was seen in occipital association cortex (BA 18) bilaterally, also involving lingual and fusiform gyrus (BA 37). In the left hemisphere additional activation were located in inferior temporal gyrus, the inferior part of pre- and postcentral gyrus, and orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11), whereas in the right hemisphere only a region in the precuneus (BA 19) was activated additionally. There was considerable interindividual variation of encoding success, which was significantly related to activation of BA 18 bilaterally. Subject ages covered a range of 26–72 years, but — in contrast to the effect of encoding success — there was no significant age effect on activations. Task-independent habituation effects were seen in cerebellum and left middle temporal gyrus. These results indicate that the intensity of information processing in ventral occipital association cortex is most important for success of face-name encoding. Learning is further mediated by a predominantly left-hemispheric network including inferior temporal and orbitofrontal cortex.