Libet's Experiments Research Articles

Neurophenomenology in Action: Integrating the First-Person Perspective into the Libet Experiment

In this conceptual contribution, we argue that experimental investigations of phenomena in the cognitive sciences and consciousness research may benefit from a thorough integration of data acquired from the first-person perspective. We present a line of research from our lab applying this approach to the Libet task on voluntary action. In this well-known experimental paradigm, participants perform a movement at a moment of their own choice. Previous research has shown that this voluntary decision to perform the action is preceded by a specific pattern in the electroencephalogram, the so-called readiness potential. This finding that the decision is preceded (and presumably determined) by an action-related brain processes puts the neuroscientific account at odds with our subjective intuition and challenges the notion of free will. This discrepancy exemplifies the gap between neuro-cognitive models of the mind and the accounts of our conscious experience. The aim of our theoretical proposal is to enrich the study of volitional action by integrating reports from the first-person perspective with the Libet paradigm to develop a more coherent account. This provides an example of implementing the research program of neurophenomenology developed by Francisco Varela to overcome the gap between scientific accounts of the mind and subjective experience. Specifically, we show how this can be achieved by interweaving three methodological approaches: (i) adapting common neuro-cognitive paradigms (i.e., the Libet task); (ii) employing refined first-person methods such as the micro-phenomenological interview; and (iii) collaborating with experienced meditators as research participants. Our contribution demonstrates how the neurophenomenological framework can be used to shed new light on long-standing and fundamental debates in consciousness research. We show that this approach not only addresses questions of intellectual curiosity but also has concrete ethical implications for the practice of science itself, self-determination, and the accountability of the conscious subject. On the basis of our approach, meditation can be seen as a method for enhancing self-regulation and self-determination, which allows for more deliberate decisions and thus more ethical behavior.

Free Will in the World as a Computer Simulation

The article discusses the original many-worlds version based on the model of the world as a computer simulation, namely the space of a video game. Based on the interpretation of Benjamin Libet's experiment an assumption is made about how a person can function in a virtual game reality being and perceived as basic. This case shows that the question of the freedom of a person`s actions acquires a new meaning. In particular, in this situation, the acting person is proved to be actually deprived of the opportunity to act since decisions are made for him by someone else, for whom, in turn, decisions could be also someone else`s. The implementation of the described in the article scenario is theoretically possible — on obligatory condition of the successful creation of artificial intelligence and the availability of technical capacities which are necessary for the functioning of complex virtual systems. Obviously, at the moment neither one nor the other has been developed. But this is a highly topical issue and in modern scientific This work uses modeling and intellectual experiment methods: a simplified simulation model of a popular open-world video game is taken to demonstrate the main idea. Its example shows how the observable world can be realized — one of the possible versions of the multiverse.

Why Science and Faith Belong Together: Stories of Mutual Enrichment

Why Science and Faith Belong Together: Stories of Mutual Enrichment

Free will and (in)determinism in the brain: a case for naturalized philosophy

In this article we study the question of free will from an interdisciplinary angle, drawing on philosophy, neurobiology and physics. We start by reviewing relevant neurobiological findings on the functioning of the brain, notably as presented in (Koch 2009); we assess these against the physics of (in)determinism. These biophysics findings seem to indicate that neuronal processes are not quantum but classical in nature. We conclude from this that there is little support for the existence of an immaterial ‘mind’, capable of ruling over matter independently of the causal past. But what, then, can free will be ? We propose a compatibilist account that resonates well with neurobiology and physics, and that highlights that free will comes in degrees – degrees which vary with the conscious grasp the ‘free’ agent has over his actions. Finally, we analyze the well-known Libet experiment on free will through the lens of our model. We submit this interdisciplinary investigation as a typical case of naturalized philosophy: in our theorizing we privilege assumptions that find evidence in science, but our conceptual work also suggests new avenues for research in a few scientific disciplines.

Libet's intention reports are invalid: A replication of Dominik et al. (2017).

In the "Libet experiment" the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that conscious intention may not play a role in initiating voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that the intention reports employed in the Libet experiment, which Libet et al. (1983) found to precede movement reports, are invalid. In the study by Dominik et al., intention reports preceded movement reports only when participants had prior experience making movement reports. Individuals without such experience reported intention around the same time as movement. These findings suggest that Libet's intention reports do not reflect experiences of intention, but, rather, inferences based on prior experience with movement reports. Our study replicated the core findings of Dominik et al. We argue that Libet's intention reports are invalid and explore the phenomenology of intention in the Libet experiment.

La libertad incorporada como clave para la neuroeducación moral

Abstract Freedom is one of the main attributes with which the human being has traditionally been characterized. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether, in the light of neuroscientific research and experiments, it is possible to continue characterizing the human being as a being with freedom. To this end, the well-known Benjamin Libet experiment and the reductionist conclusions that influential authors such as Patricia S. Churchland or Michael Gazzaniga extract for philosophy are mentioned. From a hermeneutical methodology, it is denounced the neuroscientific reductionism that aims to deny freedom based on empirical evidence. Faced with this reductionism, it is proposed a hermeneutic approach that complements the neuroscientific discoveries about the functioning of the brain with the moral perspective of the agent. From this approach it is possible to speak of ‘embodied freedom’, which overcomes both an irreconcilable vision between nature and freedom and a reductionist vision of the nature of freedom. The application of this embodied freedom into the plane of moral neuroeducation is especially important since it allows us to understand moral learning as a synergistic action of the corporal substrates and the moral ideas. By taking into account both the phylogenetic explanation of morality (focusing on the neurobiology of the moral nature) and the cultural dimension of moral education (focusing on moral progress from education), it is possible to achieve a more comprehensively approach to the phenomenon of neuroeducation moral. Both the concept of coevolution and the neuroeducation of care and justice contribute to recognizing the embodied freedom as a fundamental key to moral neuroeducation.

Objections and Responses to the Existence of Free Choice

Objections and Responses to the Existence of Free Choice Ezra Sullivan O.P. Samuel Johnson once observed: "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it."1 He was only half right. As we will see, St. Thomas Aquinas offers a strong theory in favor of the freedom of choice. In this essay, I will weigh three objections to fully voluntary acts: those derived from neuroscience, physicalist determinism, and the problem of habituation. Although many other objections to free choice exist, these represent some of the most serious assaults on the idea of human freedom, and therefore human responsibility. In a final section, I will address Aquinas's claim that freedom is rooted in reason. With these considerations in place, we will be well on our way to establishing a solid theory of morality in all its subtlety and richness. First Objection: The Experiments of Benjamin Libet Scientists and thinkers who argue against the existence of free choice very frequently cite the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet.2 For many, Libet's experiments demonstrate that human action is not caused by an individual's will or intention to act, and therefore that voluntary action is an illusion. Let us see why they think so. Libet's goal in his experiments was to determine how or whether a [End Page 913] voluntary act arises in relation to brain functioning.3 In order to do this, he and his colleagues devised a way to ask test subjects about what he defined as a "voluntary action." For Libet, a voluntary action has three aspects: (1) it arises from within a person and is not determined by an external stimulus; (2) it is free from "externally imposed restrictions or compulsions that directly or immediately control subjects' initiation and performance of the act"; and (3) "most important, subjects feel introspectively that they are performing the act on their own initiative and that they are free to start or not to start the act as they wish."4 Accordingly, Libet asked the subjects "to perform a simple quick flexion of the wrist or fingers at any time they felt the 'urge' or desire to do so," ensuring that the movement was spontaneous and wholly unforced.5 They were then to look at a spot of light that revolved around a clock face in a little over two and a half seconds. They were to report for each wrist or finger movement precisely where the spot was on the clock when they were first aware of wanting to flex. The results of the experiment were striking. Measuring brain electrical activity, Libet found that a "readiness potential" (RP) to act arose almost 300 milliseconds before the subject was aware of wanting to act. That is, the brain was already active before the individual became conscious of a movement in his desire to flex. This is represented in the figure below.6 Click for larger view View full resolution It should be emphasized that, although the brain was active prior to their conscious awareness of a desire to act, the subjects all reported that their movements were self-initiated, that they believed they were in control of whether or not to act, and that they were aware of no external or psychological [End Page 914] pressures that affected the time when they decided to act.7 The importance of these results is indicated by the fact that they have generated a cottage industry of responses and analyses. Many interpreters were astonished by Libet's findings.8 Supposing that the subject's will is the cause of his movement, it seems to follow that the will would be the cause of the brain's activity that initiates the movement. Thus, one's brain activity should come after or at least be simultaneous with one's decision to move, but certainly not before it. Because the brain activity preceded the subject's desire to act, there seems to be no reason to hold that the subject's will initiated the series of movements that led to his flexion. Instead, as Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner put it, Libet's experiments suggest that, "voluntary action is a...

Libet's experiment: A complex replication.

Libet's experiment is an influential classical study, which does not stop provoking heated debates. However, a full-scale replication has not been carried out to this day. Libet-style studies have usually focused on isolated ideas and concepts and never on the whole experiment in all its complexity. This paper presents detailed methodological description and results of a complex replication study. The methodology follows Libet's directions closely in most cases; when it does not, the differences are described and elaborated. The results replicate Libet's key findings, but substantial differences were found in some of the results' categories, such as the introspective reports or the number of readiness-potentials found. The discussion also addresses some current problems pertaining the methodology of the Libet-style experiments and provides some recommendations based on a detailed process evaluation.

Time to lay the Libet experiment to rest: Commentary on Papanicolaou (2017).

Author(s): Kihlstrom, JF | Abstract: For more than 30 years, Libet has inspired and dominated philosophical and scientific discussions of free will and determinism. Unfortunately, this famous experiment has been compromised by a serious confounding variable (i.e., there has been no control for watching the clock), and the method of data collection ignored conscious mental activity that occurred prior to the decision to act. Because Libet's results appear to be wholly an artifact of his method, his experiment should be discounted in future discussions of the problem of free will.

First-person approaches in neuroscience of consciousness: Brain dynamics correlate with the intention to act

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet's experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N=1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.

Spontaneous EEG fluctuations determine the readiness potential: is preconscious brain activation a preparation process to move?

It has been repeatedly shown that specific brain activity related to planning movement develops before the conscious intention to act. This empirical finding strongly challenges the notion of free will. Here, we demonstrate that in the Libet experiment, spontaneous fluctuations of the slow electro-cortical potentials (SCPs) account for a significant fraction of the readiness potential (RP). The individual potential shifts preceding self-initiated movements were classified as showing a negative or positive shift. The negative and positive potential shifts were analyzed in a self-initiated movement condition and in a no-movement condition. Comparing the potential shifts between both conditions, we observed no differences in the early part of the potential. This reveals that the apparently negative RP emerges through an unequal ratio of negative and positive potential shifts. These results suggest that ongoing negative shifts of the SCPs facilitate self-initiated movement but are not related to processes underlying preparation or decision to act.

A MODEL OF PRIMITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS BASED ON SYSTEM-LEVEL LEARNING ACTIVITY IN AUTONOMOUS ADAPTATION

Although many models of consciousness have been proposed from various viewpoints, they have not been based on learning activities in a whole system with the capabilities of autonomous adaptation. We have been investigating a simplified system using artificial neural nodes to clarify the functions and configuration needed for learning in a system that autonomously adapts to the environment. We demonstrated that phenomenal consciousness is explained using a method of virtualization in the information system and that learning activities in a whole system adaptation are related to consciousness. However, we have not sufficiently clarified the learning activities of such a system. Consciousness is basically modeled as a system-level learning activity to modify both its own configuration and states in autonomous adaptation through investigating learning activities as a whole system. The model not only explains the time delay in Libet's experiment, but is also positioned as an improved model of Global Workspace Theory (GWT).

Mental states, processes, and conscious intent in Libet's experiments

The meaning and significance of Benjamin Libet's studies on the timing of conscious will have been widely discussed, especially by those wishing to draw sceptical conclusions about conscious agency and free will. However, certain important correctives for thinking about mental states and processes undermine the apparent simplicity and logic of Libet's data. The appropriateness, relevance and ecological validity of Libet's methods are further undermined by considerations of how we ought to characterise intentional actions, conscious intention, and what it means to act with conscious intent. Recent extensions of Libet's paradigm using fMRI and decision-based tasks suffer from similar limitations. The result is that these sorts of laboratory studies of isolated, trivial, decontextualized bodily movements, in a context of extended (conscious) intentional experimental participation and cooperation, are of dubious and potentially misleading relevance to the study of agency.

Benjamin Libet's experiment and its critique between 2000-2012

The article describes the results of Libet’s experiment and its resulting critique, as witnessed by the articles published between 2000 and 2012. As a result of his experiments, Libet concluded that conscious intentions of making a movement are preceded by brain activity registered as the readiness potentials (RP). In this interpretation, free will does not initiate the decision of making a move but is however capable of stopping this process. For this reason, Libet does not conclude that will is determined by biological processes. The resulting discussion in the literature concerns mainly methodology and conclusions drawn by Libet. The methodological points raised include an argument against the use of EEG as an accurate research tool and criticism of the method of timing the occurrence of the conscious intention of making a move. We note that subsequent modifications made to the original experiment, did however allow putting some of the methodological doubts to rest. On the other hand, the critique of Libet’s conclusions focuses on the problematic nature of correlation of physical movements with the readiness potentials. The most recent research also shows that the potentials might have a more complicated origin than previously thought. Libet’s interpretation is also criticised for its vagueness in defining intention and for not distinguishing it from wishes and desires. The last part of our article summarises the latest state of affairs as emerging from the analysis. We point out the difficulties in correlating potentials with movement, their interpretation and difficulties with the notion of veto, since it seems to require that contradictory intentions of making and refraining from a movement are present simultaneously. The article concludes that on the basis of the current research, the thesis about a biological determination of voluntary processes lacks a sound justification.

自由意志と神経科学—リベットによる実験とそのさまざまな解釈—

自由意志と神経科学—リベットによる実験とそのさまざまな解釈—

Analysis of a choice-reaction task yields a new interpretation of Libet's experiments

Benjamin Libet has demonstrated that the readiness potential precedes the time at which participants consciously decide to perform an intentional motor act, and suggested that free will is an illusion. We performed an experiment where participants observed a stimulus on a computer monitor and were instructed to press one of two buttons, depending on the presented stimulus. We found neural activity preceding the motor response, similar to Libet's experiments. However, this activity was already present prior to stimulus presentation, and thus before participants could decide which button to press. Therefore, we argue that this activity does not specifically determine behaviour. Instead, it may reflect a general expectation. This interpretation would not interfere with the notion of free will.

Free will: reconciling German civil law with Libet's neurophysiological studies on the readiness potential

The free will debate widely exceeds the neuroscientific and philosophical fields due to profound implications for legislation, case law and psychiatric expert opinion. Data from Benjamin Libet's experiments on the readiness potential have been used as an argument against personal responsibility and for changes in the law. Due to the explicit use of the term "free will" in German civil law, the psychiatrist as an expert witness is confronted with this debate. In this article we outline the role of this crucial term in German civil law and we describe the neurophysiologic challenge in the form of Libet's experiments, which is led on three levels: the correctness of the data, the impact on the question of whether free will exists and possible consequences for the law. We conclude that the problem of free will cannot be debated on the basis of the data provided by Libet's experiments and that doubts about the existence of a free will must not lead to changes in the law or in psychiatric expert testimony. Therefore, advice for the psychiatrist as an expert witness is offered on the basis of a psychopathological approach that takes into account cognitive and motivational preconditions and the structure of values and personality.

Zum Verhältnis von Willensfreiheit und Neurobiologie

Whether or not the neurobiological basis of mental processes is compatible with the philosophical postulate of free will is a matter of committed debating in our days. What is the meaning of those frequently-quoted experiments concerning voluntary action? Both convictions, being autonomous subjects and exercising a strong influence on the world by applying sciences, have become most important for modern human self-conception. Now these two views are growing apart and appear contradictory because neurobiology tries to reveal the illusionary character of free will. In order to cope with this ostensible dichotomy it is recommended to return to the core of scientific thinking, i. e. to the reflection about truth and methods. The neurobiological standpoint referring to Libet as well as the philosophical approaches to free will must be analysed, considering pre-conceptions and context-conditions. Hence Libet's experiments can be criticised on different levels: methods, methodology and epistemology. Free will is a highly complex system, not a simple fact. Taking these very complicated details into account it is possible to define conditions of compatibility and to use the term free will still in a meaningful way, negotiating the obstacles called pure chance and determinism.

Mind time: the temporal factor in consciousness

Our subjective inner life is what really matters to us as human beings - and yet we know relatively little about how it arises. Over a long and distinguished career Benjamin Libet has conducted experiments that have helped us see, in clear and concrete ways, how the brain produces conscious awareness. For the first time, Libet gives his own account of these experiments and their importance for our understanding of consciousness. Most notably, Libet's experiments reveal a substantial delay - the time of the title - before any awareness affects how we view our mental activities. If all conscious awarenesses are preceded by unconscious processes, as Libet observes, we are forced to conclude that unconscious processes initiate our conscious experiences. Freely voluntary acts are found to be initiated unconsciously before an awareness of wanting to act - a discovery with profound ramifications for our understanding of free will. How do the physical activities of billions of cerebral nerve cells give rise to an integrated conscious subjective awareness? How can the subjective mind affect or control voluntary actions? Libet considers these questions, as well as the implications of his discoveries for the nature of the soul, the identity of the person, and the relation of the non-physical subjective mind to the physical brain that produces it. Rendered in clear, accessible language, Libet's experiments and theories will allow interested amateurs and experts alike to share the experience of the extraordinary discoveries made in the practical study of consciousness.

Are mental events preceded by their physical causes?

Abstract Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one‐to‐one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events concerned given that Libet himself has found the reports of subjects to be unreliable in this regard. Third, there is a suspect assumption that there are such things as timable and locatable mental and brain events accompanying and causing human behaviour. For all these reasons we reject the claim that physical events are prior to and explain mental events.