Zum Verhältnis von Willensfreiheit und Neurobiologie

Abstract

Whether or not the neurobiological basis of mental processes is compatible with the philosophical postulate of free will is a matter of committed debating in our days. What is the meaning of those frequently-quoted experiments concerning voluntary action? Both convictions, being autonomous subjects and exercising a strong influence on the world by applying sciences, have become most important for modern human self-conception. Now these two views are growing apart and appear contradictory because neurobiology tries to reveal the illusionary character of free will. In order to cope with this ostensible dichotomy it is recommended to return to the core of scientific thinking, i. e. to the reflection about truth and methods. The neurobiological standpoint referring to Libet as well as the philosophical approaches to free will must be analysed, considering pre-conceptions and context-conditions. Hence Libet's experiments can be criticised on different levels: methods, methodology and epistemology. Free will is a highly complex system, not a simple fact. Taking these very complicated details into account it is possible to define conditions of compatibility and to use the term free will still in a meaningful way, negotiating the obstacles called pure chance and determinism.