Liberal International Order Research Articles

Many hurdles to take: Explaining peacekeepers’ ability to engage in human rights activities

Human rights are a fundamental principle and purpose of the United Nations (UN). Yet, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) exhibit substantial variation in their ability to engage in human rights activities. While existing research has investigated deployment and mandates, we explain what peacekeepers can actually do on the ground. We argue that the UN Security Council’s permanent member states (the P5) limit human rights mandates if they have private interests in PKO host countries, thereby diminishing peacekeepers’ ability to promote and protect human rights. Moreover, armed conflict shifts priorities away from human rights activities. We use novel data on 21 human rights activities in African countries (1991–2016) and item response models to capture PKOs’ latent ability to engage in these activities. Random and fixed effects regression and mediation analyses with sensitivity tests support our expectations. We find that the P5’s economic interests in the PKO host country negatively correlate with the strength of human rights mandate provisions, which in turn negatively correlates with PKOs’ ability to engage in human rights activities. We find similar, although less consistent, correlations for P5’s security interests. Yet, while mandates partly define the scope of PKOs’ activities, field-level conditions also have an influence. Specifically, ongoing armed conflict negatively correlates with PKOs’ ability to engage in human rights activities. Our results suggest that rising challenges to the liberal international order by powerful states, coupled with the more frequent deployment of PKOs in conflict zones, will likely increase the hurdles that UN PKOs need to overcome to meet expectations regarding their human rights engagement.

Rhetorical action in a liberal international order in crisis: theorising EU and NATO enlargements post-2022

ABSTRACT The Russian invasion of Ukraine has thrust the issue of European Union and NATO enlargement back into the political spotlight. However, it remains uncertain whether established theoretical frameworks are still applicable in today’s rapidly changing world. In response to this uncertainty, this debate section brings together five short reflection pieces, with a response from Frank Schimmelfennig, to assess the relevance of the theory of ‘rhetorical action’ in light of recent developments in European and international politics. How effectively does rhetorical action explain current EU and NATO enlargement processes, as well as broader forms of international cooperation? The authors find strong overall support for the theory’s continued validity. However, they caution that the increasing politicisation of issues, the rising competition from populist, non-liberal forces, and the broader crisis of the Liberal International Order require more careful reflection and specification of the scope conditions that define the theory’s limits.

Forum on Canada and the United Nations: Why Canada should marginalize the UN

The history and current workings of the United Nations suggest it is not an effective vehicle for the promotion of Canadian interests and values. As it has generally been, the Security Council is paralyzed by great power vetoes, while the General Assembly has an overwhelming majority that reliably votes against the West, and against Canada. The creation of the postwar liberal international order owed more to other multilateral organizations and groupings with which Canada is associated than the UN. In its core function of underwriting global security and stability, the UN has generally failed and often been irrelevant, with the crucial understandings reached between the great powers directly. In an age of increased international polarization, the UN will remain of only modest utility and Canada would be better advised to forward its values and interests primarily through other multilateral vehicles, working with like-minded states.

Populism and the liberal international order: An analysis of UN voting patterns

AbstractPopulism is often assumed to undermine the liberal world order, but this claim has never been tested systematically. In this study, we do so for the first time. Based on an understanding of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” entailing anti-elitism and people-centrism, we expect populist governments to have foreign policy preferences opposed to the core features of the US-led liberal international order. Our empirical analysis assesses government preferences on the liberal international order as expressed through UN General Assembly votes. Our findings support the expectation that populism has a strong and statistically significant negative impact on foreign policy preferences related to the core norms of the liberal international order. Moreover, we find that populists with a left-wing ideology and those in less democratic countries tend to be more opposed to the US-led liberal international order. However, populist governments do not reject the UNGA as such, as they are not more likely to be absent from UNGA votes than other states. Thereby, this study makes a contribution both to the burgeoning literature on the international implications of populism and to debates on the crisis of the liberal order.

Illiberal Populism as a Polarizing Factor of Regional Cooperation in Central Europe

Central European identity and regionality are very traditional and deeply rooted discourses. Over the past 35 years, a number of regional cooperation formats have emerged, among which the Visegrad Group has acquired a special position. This weakly institutionalised and thematically selective regional organisation has nevertheless established itself in the last 15 years as one of the visible actors of so-called populist regionalism. The (partial) transformation of the V4 towards populist foreign policy, national conservatism and Euroscepticism is the subject of our analysis. Using the concepts of populist regionalism and illiberal populism, it focuses on the formation of a monolithic discourse of the V4 as a group opposed to the international liberal order and the "Brussels agenda" in terms of values and public policies. We also examine the negative implications of this populist appropriation of the V4 for the region's position within the EU.

Media debates about China’s role as a global public goods supplier: frame contestation in reporting on the Chinese COVID-19 vaccine

This study examines different and even conflicting media frames for the Chinese COVID-19 vaccine as a global public good. Through a standardised content analysis approach examining media frames for the Chinese COVID-19 vaccine across three media outlets, the study reveals that Chinese media emphasise the safety and efficacy of their vaccines, highlighting their benefits for the international community. Conversely, the US and German media express apprehensions about China’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ and perceive it as a political threat. Notably, Germany exhibits a relatively softer stance in this context, implying the existence of various attitudes and behaviours within the US and Europe in terms of coping with China’s rising influence. This case reflects the ongoing competition between superpowers, with the ‘China Threat Theory’ and the ‘China Responsibility Theory’ representing two major ideas dominating international discourse about China. China’s identity as a global public goods supplier in the context of the global pandemic may not make it more acceptable as a responsible great power, but rather, create more Western anxieties over China’s threat to the liberal international order.

Minilateralism and global governance: effectiveness of hybrid models

ABSTRACT The liberal world order is showing signs of disarray: two recent catastrophes in adjoining parts of the world (the Middle East and South Caucasus) have opened the fissures of the international governance gap; and the continuing ramifications of COVID-19 have already paralysed the world. On top of this post-pandemic disquietude, multiple conflicts this year are either in danger of precipitating or wars have already re-ignited over long-standing continuing conflicts, highlighting the failure of international governance institutions, including the UN system. In recent years, one of the central responses to the multilateral failures at multiple levels has been for states to form ‘narrower’ and ‘more flexible’ frameworks called ‘minilaterals’. Thus minilateralism has been contrasted through the lens of receding multilateralism, which has been a long-standing hallmark of the American-led liberal international order. This paper examines how far global governance would be dependent on minilateralism by exploring this growing trend in the Indo-Pacific and explores how minilateralism models can enhance international governance structures. This paper also attempts to analyse whether minilateralism is a product of regional fragmentation, or whether it can reinvigorate the comatose multilateralism. Then this paper posits that minilateralism helps rejig the chaotic multipolar order and thus re-invent global governance.

Geopolitical Shifts Amid War in Europe, and the Cooperation Between Portugal and the US | Mudanças Geopolíticas no Contexto da Guerra na Europa e a Cooperação entre Portugal e os EUA

The articles analyses the international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War and some of the challenges that it presently faces. In light of that, it also discusses several of the possibilities that lay ahead for a future order and engages in the ongoing debates. Indeed, the so-called international liberal order has been under challenge for some time. In all probability, that condition will not change in the near future and may even exacerbate. In fact, one of its more recent threats includes war in Europe, more specifically the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which further endangers its existence. Many, if not most, appear to believe that after the Russian invasion the world will never be the same again. Under these conditions, and independently of the type of ordering that we will see in the future, the article argues that given the historical and long-standing relationship between the US and Portugal the latter can play a significant role, as occurred during the Cold War, albeit this time with respect to energy.

Technocracy, populism, and the (de)legitimation of international organizations

Our understanding of the contestation of liberal international order relies on an intuitive dualism. Technocratic norms underpin the legitimation of international organizations (IOs) because IOs embody a functional and depoliticized mode of problem-solving based on expertise and non-majoritarianism. Populist norms challenge IO authority as IOs create constraints on the popular will of the “true people.” We empirically examine whether this duality extends to the actors engaging in IO (de)legitimation by leveraging a novel and unprecedentedly fine-grained database on IO (de)legitimation by national governments. We find that (de)legitimation patterns of governments with technocratic or populist tendencies are far more dynamic and diverse than a dualistic account suggests. In particular, we find complex patterns of (de)legitimation that suggest challenges to and defenses of IO authority are driven more by a strategic, as opposed to an ideological, logic. We outline implications for the literatures on the international liberal order, technocracy, and populism.

The fall and rise of sovereignty

The aftermath of the Cold War signalled a decline of the international norm of sovereignty. The ‘triumph’ of the Liberal International Order during a brief unipolar moment challenged traditional principles of sovereignty, notably non-intervention. However, recent years have seen a resurgence of affirmations of sovereignty in political discourse, coinciding with a broader narrative on the Liberal International Order’s erosion. This article attempts to make sense of this fall and rise of sovereignty. Motivated by genealogical concerns, it historicises political and scholarly conversations on the concept. First, it examines the perceived decline of sovereignty following the Cold War. Second, it traces the proliferation of sovereignty discourses in the European 2000s and 2010s back to debates surrounding the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Third, it explores the concept of sovereigntism, charting its move from political discourse into academic debates. Finally, the article concludes with a reflection on the trajectory of sovereignty in a post-Liberal International Order world.

A hierarchical vision of order: understanding Chinese foreign policy in Asia; China's asymmetric statecraft: alignments, competitors, and regional diplomacy; The authoritarian century: China's rise and the demise of the liberal international order

A hierarchical vision of order: understanding Chinese foreign policy in Asia; China's asymmetric statecraft: alignments, competitors, and regional diplomacy; The authoritarian century: China's rise and the demise of the liberal international order

China’s Promoting of Authoritarian–Westphalian Democracy and Its Implications for the Liberal International Order

China is seen as undemocratic, illiberal, and autocratic by many who live outside it, and the terms “democracy” and “China” are often difficult to reconcile. Nonetheless, Beijing has been actively employing the concept of democracy both domestically and on the international stage in recent years. This paper aims to critically examine how Beijing conceptualizes and advocates for democracy at home and abroad. It also endeavors to explore the implications for the country’s domestic and global governance, particularly in relation to the US-centered liberal international order in the context of critical international relations studies. In so doing, this paper will focus methodologically on Beijing’s official documents and state media outlets, presenting an argument that is twofold. First, by promoting its unique form of democracy known as “whole-process people’s democracy,” Beijing domestically intertwines democracy with authoritarianism, hierarchy, and dictatorship. This whole-process people’s democracy appears to function at home as a tool of regime security that is characterized by a rule that is of and for the people but not by the people. Second, China on the international stage has adopted Western-style liberal values to advocate for enhanced democracy in international relations. Through its strategic adoption of these liberal values, Beijing accuses the United States of a hegemonic liberal hypocrisy in international relations while appearing to aspire to a world that is fragmented into essentially different entities.

Forum: At the crossroads – Critical perspectives on the study of climate security

This discussion forum brings together some of the leading voices in the debate on climate change and security to reflect on the possibilities and limits of critical research in the face of global ecological crises. If we – as critical geography, IR, and security scholars – take the ongoing ecological crisis seriously, how must our questions, concepts, and methodologies change? How, if at all, can security be provided in a climate-changed world, for and by whom? How to come to terms with the unequal landscape of climate insecurity? What is left of security, and what comes instead: mere survival, resilience, or navigating through disasters?Seeking answers to these questions, the authors of these short forum pieces discuss and rethink core concepts and themes of human geography and neighboring disciplines. The reflection pieces trouble the racist imaginaries that often underpin existing policy debates on climate change, scarcity, and insecurity. They discuss the implications of climate security for the liberal international order, North-South relations as well as the relationship between humans and the non-human world. They reflect on the complicity of our research – both critical and problem-solving – in the violent transformation of the planet and the repression of the racialized “others” of colonial modernity. And they explore the emancipatory potential of alternative security discourses that center on the complex web of beings, practices, and relations endangered by the unfolding climate crisis.

A new multipolar order: combined development, state forms and new business classes

Abstract What are the key social forces and interests that underpin an emerging multipolar world? Existing research oscillates between the retreat of the liberal international order and the rise of the rest, which remains trapped in a form of geopolitical fetishism. These explanations tell us little about the kinds of forces that are driving a more fragmented and disordered global order. In this article, we suggest going beyond this by fleshing out the underlying social class relations that this new emerging order is based on. At the core of it is the emergence of a new business class—fraction of capital—that in turn sustains what we call competing regulatory geographies. The latter are internalized within state institutions and policies and have reconsolidated a combination of state and market-led industrial policy. Empirically, we also show how these dynamics unfold in key non-core states. In highlighting this particularly potent dynamic of the contemporary global order, this article calls for policy-makers to better recognize the internal contestation within states that shapes and is shaped by combined capitalist development.

Governmentality in the liberal international order: the responsibilization of small states

Governmentality in the liberal international order: the responsibilization of small states

A Global Phenomenology of Whiteness: Turkey, Europe and Institutional Global Racism

AbstractContemporary international institutions are often discussed as part of a new liberal international order and a departure from colonial logics of the nineteenth century. While some have discussed the ongoing dynamics of race within international institutions, few have explored whiteness as the positionality embedded in such institutions. This article argues that the racial logics embedded in most international institutions, throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty‐first centuries, are developed in relation to the structures of experience and consciousness of whiteness that circumscribe notions of 'universality' and 'normalcy'. This renders whiteness as an invisible characteristic, or background knowledge and practice, to which racialisation occurs. Using the case of the Ottoman Empire's attempt to accede to the European group of 'civilised nations' and subsequent Turkish attempts to gain membership to the European Union, this article explores how a phenomenology of whiteness is historically produced and embedded as an orientating mechanism in international institutions.

What is race? Epistemic ambiguity and liberal international order

Abstract There is increasing interest in how anticolonial actors advanced a norm of racial equality in mid-century formations of liberal international order (LIO). Less attention, however, is afforded to simultaneous epistemic conflicts over the scientific object of ‘race’ and their political effects. During postwar order-building and alongside political struggles for racial equality, there was wide and deep scientific debate on the analytical utility of race as a means to categorize human diversity. Race, I demonstrate, was rendered as epistemically ambiguous, caught between social scientists and philosophers who understood it as a social construct akin to ethnicity and natural scientists who maintained a biological basis. This split was not confined to academic debate but shaped political and normative struggles over the institutionalization of racial equality in LIO. Adopting an object-oriented approach, I argue that the epistemic ambiguity of race generated political effects, at once permitting the reproduction of colonial logics in LIO as well as providing latitude for strategies of resistance. Rather than a linear causal effect, I empirically map the work that epistemic ambiguity performed in the creation of mid-century international order.

(Post)Colonial Complexities and World (Re)Ordering: Contestations from/within the “Margin(alized)”

Abstract The changing constellation of international politics and the rise of emerging powers and new actors especially in the Global South (considered to be at the margins of international politics) are a characteristic feature of today’s world order. These actors challenged the cosmology of dominant Northern/Western liberal discourses on agenda-setting in international politics by creating alternatives like the Non-Aligned Movement, BRICS, and G77 focusing on South–South Cooperation, Pan-Asianism, and Pan-Africanism. However, racial capitalism and neo-imperial forces and conditions continue to define the global capitalist order manifesting in the rise of populism and nationalist sentiments across the Global North and the Global South. These developments have significant implications for world order(ing) and necessitate a deeper engagement with world ordering practices, especially within the Global South, which previously developed contestations of the dominant liberal international world order. Foregrounding postcolonial complexities existing within the “margins” of international politics, I examine the strategic appropriation of marginality by the Bharatiya Janta Party led Indian government externally (highlighting North–South Divide and portraying itself as the leader of the Global South) and internally (through language and elite/non-elite discourses) to gain legitimacy at the domestic level. I further explore how it promotes a particular ethnocentric vision of the world by bringing about changes in the education policy and curriculum. The world (re)ordering that is happening inside the states in the Global South can fertilize global discourses on addressing new and often conflicting ideas on the world order and practices of world (re)ordering.

A World of Many Walks? Zapatista World Ordering between Center and Margins

Abstract At the current moment of multiple global crises, including of the International Liberal Order, a search for new practices of world ordering seems to coexist with a deep skepticism regarding the possibilities of global solidarity and common struggles between centers and margins. Against this background, this paper focuses on the world ordering practices of the Mexican Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, a group that occupies a position between center(s) and margin(s). While they clearly self-identify as being on the political and economic margins—geographically remote, economically weak and under constant threat of military repression—their ideas occupied center stage in the search for alternative visions of world order at least for a certain moment. The paper will explore the potential pathologies that a recourse to Zapatism may entail, namely romanticization, hollowing-out and epistemic extractivism/opportunism. It then asks if and how these pathologies can be overcome in a search for common ground for both social movements and International Political Theory when trying to think differently about world ordering from the margins. In this exploration, special emphasis will be given to the pathways toward a desirable order that the Zapatistas conceptualize and practice, namely creating, narrating and walking.

The Triple Nexus and the Future of Multilateral Governance: Rethinking Coordination between Humanitarian, Development and Peacebuilding Efforts

ABSTRACT The UN-orchestrated Triple Nexus – a multilateral endeavour to provide humanitarian-development-peace responses in fragile and conflict-affected contexts – embodies several features of the emerging trend towards governance through regime complexity. Praised for its multi-actorness inclusivity and cross-policy experimentalism, the Nexus approach has been criticised as an attempt to replicate top-down, neo-liberal templates to govern crises in the peripheries. We analyse the new evidence provided in this Special Issue, connecting it to the debate on the future of multilateral governance, against the decline of the Liberal International Order (LIO). Guarding against naïve expectations of the Nexus as a panacea to bridge cross-policy gaps and bring about inter-agency cooperation amidst increased geopolitical tensions, we discuss its potential to become a venue for an enlarged conversation among traditional and new players. While also compatible with pluralist scenarios, a progressive variety of the Nexus may well emerge in the UN context, between Western and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) players. Their shared understandings of civil and political rights offer a promising avenue to advance some forward-looking Nexus components, supportive of individual and nature-based rights, to govern the increased complexity of the current multiplex order.