Liberal International Order Research Articles

The Normalization of Contestation: The Sociology of Knowledge and the Challenges to the Liberal International Order

Abstract Many of the in-built contradictions in the liberal international order were pointed out by critics early on. Why were these voices not heard? How was contestation ignored or made acceptable by the people governing within liberal sub-orders, articulating progress, rationality, and equality? Drawing on insights from the sociology of knowledge and theories of organizational culture, I address this puzzle through the lens of the “normalization of deviance.” Beyond understanding the challenges as a crisis of and within the liberal international order, I argue that they unveil the limitations of hegemonic expertise governing this order. Part of the current predicament of the liberal international order has to do with the entrenched positioning and organizational cultures of political leaders and experts, making them blind to their own blindness. As they justify deviations and defend “their” order, they normalize contestation. The implications extend beyond the immediate challenges to the liberal international order, offering insights into reimagining its future and prompting a reconsideration of the discipline dedicated to understanding it.

Hierarchy and Endogenous Contestation in the Liberal International Order

Abstract A previous generation of influential scholarship treated international institutions as instruments of cooperation built by self-interested states to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Recent scholarship, including this special forum, suggests that the rational design of institutions does not guarantee their durability and that liberal institutions are intrinsically prone to contestation. This essay takes a step back and posits that the hierarchical nature of international order itself creates conditions for contestation, but not for the reasons typically identified in the literature. Institutionalized disagreement over distributional outcomes, values, and hypocrisy is ultimately about the politics of status between differently ranked states. While these differences are due to the hierarchical nature of order, it is the same hierarchy that can contribute to their resolution when leading states engage in institutional reforms—for example, by making institutional membership and leadership more inclusive. The essay closes with some reflections on a prominent source of hierarchy in the liberal international order (LIO): the legacy of Eurocentrism and colonialism in world politics. While countries in the Global South have typically engaged in order-consistent contestation, it is the LIO’s leading states that have engaged in order-challenging contestation. The present sense of crisis in the LIO might therefore have more to do with Western anxieties about security competition with China, Russian aggression, and domestic crises of liberalism than the “rise of the rest.”

Contestation in a World of Liberal Orders

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the core institutions of the Liberal International Order (LIO) have in recent years been subject to increasingly intense contestation. There is less agreement on the sources of this contestation. This introductory paper to the special forum on “contestation in a world of liberal orders” makes two main contributions. First, the paper develops a theory of endogenous order contestation. It conceptualizes the LIO as a system of different types of suborders, which vary in the extent to which they reflect and promote liberal values and in the extent to which they are legally institutionalized. The paper explains how these different suborders generate their own types of order contestation. More liberally embedded and institutionalized suborders endogenously generate more intense and order-challenging contestation, while less liberal and less institutionalized orders are amenable to more modest and order-consistent contestation. Second, this paper identifies the specific endogenous mechanisms through which contestation shifts from order-consistent to order-challenging in especially these more liberally embedded and institutionalized suborders. It argues that not only liberal resistance to reform gives rise to order-challenging contestation, but even liberal accommodation and responsiveness can ultimately paralyze and ossify LIO institutions, which in turn lose legitimacy, frustrate would-be reformers, and drive them to order-challenging contestation. The different contributions to this special issue examine our core propositions across a range of economic, security, and social–political LIO suborders.

Contestation and Resilience in the Liberal International Order: The Case of Climate Change

Abstract This article examines contestation and change in the global climate change regime, considered as a suborder of the broader Liberal International Order (LIO). The extensive literature on the LIO has overlooked the important case of climate institutions. The article begins by establishing that the climate regime is indeed part of the LIO, considering both its institutional and ideational features. I then outline the most important episodes of contestation against the regime, led at different times by the United States and emerging powers in the developing world, and note that the sources of contestation were partly endogenous to the regime itself. Despite persistent political challenges and the slow progress of global climate cooperation, the climate regime has remained largely intact and resilient. I explain this outcome by pointing to institutional design features and strategies that allowed the suborder to absorb and accommodate contestation before it escalated, including the nonbinding approach to commitments reflected in the Paris Agreement. The article concludes with a discussion of broader lessons for the LIO and for the design and effectiveness of climate institutions.

The Cooptation Dilemma: Explaining US Contestation of the Liberal Trade Order

Abstract While the United States (US) acted as a liberal hegemon in setting up the Liberal International Order (LIO), it is increasingly contesting the inclusive legacy institutions underpinning the LIO and is instead moving towards alternative, more exclusive institutions. Why is the US contesting the institutions it once set up to stabilize the LIO? We argue that hegemonic contestation is the result of a reactive sequence that is endogenous to cooptation-based orders where hegemons face a trade-off between inclusion and control. This Cooptation Dilemma is particularly pronounced in strongly institutionalized liberal (sub-)orders, such as the international trade regime. It unfolds in three stages: Privileging control, the liberal hegemon first creates exclusive institutions, which are likely to breed contestation by excluded states. To tame their contestation, the hegemon secondly includes previously excluded states into the order, making the previously exclusive institutions more and more inclusive. To compensate for the related control loss, the hegemon finally promotes alternative, more exclusive institutions, successively turning away from the inclusive legacy institutions. We demonstrate this reactive sequence by tracing the process that led to the US contestation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our findings suggest that cooptation-based orders in general and strongly institutionalized liberal orders in particular are prone to dynamic instability.

The International Refugee Regime and the Liberal International Order: Dialectics of Contestation

Abstract The international refugee regime finds itself in a delicate balance between two conflicting principles of the liberal order: the particularism of sovereign states and the universalism of human rights. This article proposes a theory of endogenous contestation, rooted in the dialectic of law, propelling liberal aspirations, and politics, vindicating sovereign control. In doing so, we identify three shifts in the international refugee regime. Following 1945, legal consolidation in a propitious geopolitical context engendered a phase of regime expansion. The provisional “triumph” of liberalism in the early 1990s bolstered the regime’s geographical and normative clout but fueled political backlash. This set the stage for a new phase of regime contestation, where liberal democracies adapted political practices to ostensibly uphold the asylum norm while precluding access to it. The article concludes by exploring whether this subversion signals a gradual evolution or a fundamental shift in the nature of the liberal refugee regime.

An Inflection Point or Business as Usual? Secessionism as State Contestation in Ukraine

Abstract Does the Russian war in Ukraine presage a change in the rules of the game for secessionisms around the globe? In this article, we explore how the Russian war in Ukraine and the contested international order from which it emerges can affect state contestation and secessionist movements through changing opportunities in the international order. International recognition plays a crucial role in state creation. The Great Powers of a given historical moment have the capacity to raise sovereignty expectations since having “friends in high places” has been essential to obtaining statehood, alongside de facto control of the territory. However, the liberal international order in place since 1945 has given way to a more contested landscape that opens new opportunities for different recognition patterns, which change how secessionists evaluate their optimal strategy for state contestation. The effects have already been notable in conflicts such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Kosovo, and many other territorial disputes, even “frozen conflicts” over the globe, from Western Sahara to Taiwan. We explore how Russia has created and exploited secessionist claims in eastern Ukraine to justify military aims in the Russian war in Ukraine. Based on a detailed review of the evolution of these claims, we draw different scenarios on the potential effects of a changing world order on state contestation. Our research suggests that the theoretical understanding of secession and secessionists’ optimal strategies need to be reviewed, taking into account the changing contested international order.

Dialectical Order-Making through Ambiguity: Contestation Is the Norm in International Peace and Security Maintenance

Abstract What kind of order and contestation dynamics emerge if the initial institutional bargain includes liberal, partially liberal, and nonliberal visions of order? This contribution to the special issue locates the liberal ideational and institutional properties within the crisis management domain and analyzes contestation dynamics and their impact. My argument is twofold. First, liberal visions of order (e.g., based on human rights and self-determination) have coexisted alongside other aspirations focusing on the right of nonintervention and privileged political communities because post–World War II conflict management is rooted in the legal ambiguity of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). This ambiguity (low legalized institutionalization) gives space to different interpretations of what counts as peace, enforcement, threat, and the relationship between the UN and regional organizations (low liberal embeddedness). Second, ambiguity and competing visions of order sustain persistent contestation, which produces dialectical ordering within and outside the UN. Within dialectical ordering, order-challenging contestation occurs when actors disengage from the global level or when their vision of order becomes globally hegemonic. While order-challenging attempts in the realm of crisis management exist, they have remained unsuccessful so far. Seen from this perspective, there has never been a liberal international order in conflict management—only liberal attempts to impose a liberal order on an ongoing dialectical order-making process. So far, other order-challenging attempts, such as Russia’s sphere of influence or China’s developmental peace approaches, have also remained unsuccessful. Contestation remains the norm.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime as a “Failed Promise”: Contestation and Self-Undermining Dynamics in a Liberal Order

Abstract The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) forms the core of the most prominent multilateral security governance regime of the liberal international order (LIO). Despite being a widely supported and remarkably successful security regime to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons, NPT politics have become increasingly polarized. In this article, I analyze contestation and self-undermining dynamics in the nuclear regime. The NPT is a strongly institutionalized but weakly liberal regime. However, it is unevenly institutionalized. Patterns of contestation in the regime derive from these characteristics. The basic source of contestation is the fundamental inequality between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Specifically, dissatisfied states seek to strengthen the rules and obligations in the less institutionalized domain. I argue that when efforts at order-consistent reform fail, states shift to a more radical strategy of liberal counter-institutionalization to pursue their goal of equality. Nonnuclear states have long been dissatisfied with the uneven distribution of the burdens and benefits of the regime, and especially the nuclear-armed states’ failure to pursue their obligation of disarmament. Most of the contestation in the NPT over the decades has been order-consistent and pursued “liberal reform.” However, when proponents of nuclear disarmament failed to achieve meaningful progress through the NPT, they shifted to a liberal counter-institutionalization strategy and adopted an entirely new legal instrument, the 2017 Nuclear Prohibition Treaty, to pursue disarmament. This was a direct—but liberal—challenge to the existing suborder. This treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons for all, legalizes the NPT obligation to pursue disarmament.

The Strategic Use of Legitimizing Norms in Unilateral Declarations of Independence

Abstract Issuing a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) is one of the strategies secessionists use to attract attention and further their goal for statehood. This article sheds light on how secessionists instrumentalize universal norms in their UDIs to legitimize their independence and increase their chances of attracting international support. It examines UDIs issued from 1970 to 2022, investigating whether secessionists invoked universal norms and, if so, which ones. By mapping UDIs over time, the analysis shows that there are changes in which legitimizing norms are invoked in UDIs proclaimed during the Cold War, during the prevalence of the liberal international order, and during its following purported decline. The article argues that secessionists strategically manipulate the use of norms and formulate their UDIs accordingly to appeal to the endorsed legitimizing norms of the international order at the time of their secession. UDIs therefore reflect the normative trends of any given international order signaling also transitions from one order to another.

Contestation from Within: Norm Dynamics and the Crisis of the Liberal International Order

Abstract To what extent is the current “crisis of the liberal international order” a result of features of the order itself? In this article, we focus on the role of formal and informal hierarchies by comparing two cases of contestation of core norms of the liberal international order: The African states and the African Union contesting the duty to prosecute institutionalized in the International Criminal Court and the United States contesting the international prohibition of torture. The African contestation of the duty to prosecute became radicalized and diffused, leading to challenges to the broader international criminal accountability regime. The US contestation of the prohibition of torture did not spread, leaving the broader human rights regime untouched. We argue that the formal and informal hierarchies in both orders shaped their contestation dynamics more than their formal institutionalization. While the duty to prosecute is situated in a highly hierarchical setting that fueled frustration and contestation, the contestation of the prohibition of torture evolved in the less hierarchical setting of the human rights treaty bodies, which helped prevent contestation from spreading.

Reshaping Power Relations Within the International Aid Regime: The Role of the People’s Republic of China and Africa

ABSTRACT International aid is one of the main issues within the Liberal International Order (LIO) in Africa, where traditional donors have held significant influence since the Second World War (WWII). The power dynamics within the aid regime, which have been characterised by asymmetry in both guiding standards and administering organisations, have started to undergo disruption in recent decades. The relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the potential to reshape the institutional arrangements of the international aid regime in the current global system. Beijing's increased financial presence in SSA, particularly its involvement in debt and financial dependency, challenges the hegemony of traditional donors who have historically employed Africa's debt and aid dependency as tools of asymmetric power. Both African governments and the PRC advocate for deep reforms of the current regime by defending favoured institutional arrangements, rejecting those deemed unfavourable and establishing new ones to substantially shift power dynamics within the international aid regime.

Change in international order? An institutional analysis

AbstractMany are now discussing the possible demise of the so called ‘liberal international order’, but how can we know whether any international order is changing? This article argues for understanding order as maintained by institutions of international society and further theorises the role those institutions play in the stability or transformation of international order. To usefully put institutional analysis to work, this article, first, models the stylised evolution of a primary institution. Second, it illustrates this evolution with a discussion of the historical institution of trusteeship in order to historicise adaptation and transformation in international order. Finally, this leads to a generalised idea of how institutional analysis can be employed to study stability and transformation in international order. Beyond making a contribution to the wider debates about the possible demise of the current international order, this piece also fills a gap in English School theory, which is quite silent on the question of when international society furthers transformation, and when it furthers stability. Accepting the view of history that the future is contingent on today’s events, this study suggests possible points where push comes to shove for change and continuity in international order more generally.

Intelligence in international society: An English school perspective on the ‘five eyes’

AbstractDespite the recent prominence of intelligence in post‐Ukraine global policy, it is a Cinderella in international relations studies. Using English School (ES) theorisation, we locate intelligence within the constellation of primary and secondary institutions in international society. Through looking at the Five Eyes, we explore where intelligence sits within widespread claims of a crisis of the post‐1945 liberal international order (LIO) and what role intelligence plays in diplomacy, war and great power management in the context of shifting global power dynamics. Following major twenty‐first century Western intelligence controversies, we argue against raison d'état approaches and for raison de système thinking. In the face of claims of a new Cold War between Russia, China and the West, we see an urgency for policymakers in open societies to re‐think intelligence from an international society perspective that is realistic and normative, and that pays attention to Global South dynamics. Insulating intelligence from politicisation is more important than ever but does not mean that intelligence is a value‐neutral government function.

NATO in the multi-order world

Abstract NATO has for 75 years been a remarkably resilient organization because it has been able to change when the world changed. NATO's longevity is in large part due to a dual structure, which has enabled the alliance to oscillate between a role as a military alliance and as a community of value. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and global geopolitical shifts such as the rise of China prompted NATO to prioritize its role as a military alliance and to add a new political focus on China. However, this article demonstrates that NATO's reading of the geopolitical transformation is incomplete. NATO should recognize the new global ordering architecture as a multi-order one, which requires NATO to distinguish clearly between the ‘unbounded’ global rules-based order in which several international orders now exist and the ‘bounded’ liberal international order of which NATO is a key institution. NATO needs to develop its policies accordingly—policies governing relations within the liberal international order must be clearly anchored in liberal values and designed to defend liberal international order, while policies governing relations between international orders cannot be anchored in liberal values, but must seek rules-based cooperation in areas of shared interests.

‘BrOthers in Arms’: France, the Anglosphere and AUKUS

Abstract Important French foreign policy dyads, such as relations between France and the United Kingdom and France and the United States, have consistently been subject to empirical, historical and policy analysis. However, France's relationship with the broader Anglosphere is rarely considered or conceptualized. This article theorizes France's relationship with the Anglosphere at a pivotal historical juncture. The 2021 announcement of AUKUS, a security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US, spectacularly excluded France despite a shared proclivity to use military force in defence of liberal international order. To analyse this vital contemporary case, we undertake a comparative, computer-aided discourse analysis of 540 political and media texts, triangulated with thematic analysis of 37 elite interviews. First, contributing to constructivist and ontological security theory, we develop a novel theorization of alliance politics, generally, through the concept of ‘brOthers in arms’, whereby a double identity inscription binds allies antagonistically together. Second, contributing to critical studies of foreign policy and research on national identity, we locate France–Anglosphere relations, specifically, towards the thick end of an alliance identity spectrum, held together in mutual alterity by complementary, competing and co-constitutive exceptionalisms. Third, contributing to studies of foreign policy and alliance politics, our analysis situates AUKUS within the fractious longue durée of France–Anglosphere relations.

Navigating the Post-Cold War Disorder: Examining NATO Enlargement and Nuclear Proliferation

The transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world order following the Cold War has profoundly affected international security. This article examines the implications from the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), focusing on NATO's enlargement and nuclear proliferation. Such developments have strained post-Cold War relations and increased global security concerns. The hypothesis suggests that the end of the USSR has significantly impacted international stability. It asserts that NATO's expansion in the Liberal International Order (LIO) has contributed to tensions with the Russian Federation, leading to an adversarial relationship. Nuclear proliferation, exploiting the dissolved bipolar structure, has complicated arms control negotiations and intensified the risk of nuclear conflict. This research paper highlights the West’s failure to recognize Russia's security interests and hegemonic pursuits. Using the framework of the LIO, it examines the principles of cooperation, democracy, and multilateralism, offering a lens to address the complex challenges and work toward a future characterized by security and collaboration. By shedding light on the interplay between nuclear proliferation, NATO's enlargement, and the LIO, it underscores the importance of addressing the security concerns of all nations and fostering a cooperative and reliable future.

When Foreign Policy Becomes Trade Policy: The EU's Anti‐Coercion Instrument

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has taken a geoeconomic turn since 2017 by creating a series of new unilateral instruments designed to preserve European autonomy and adjust to the progressive unravelling of the liberal international economic order. The most controversial of these instruments is the 2023 Anti‐Coercion Instrument (ACI), designed to deter third countries from targeting the EU and its member states with economic coercion through measures affecting trade or investment. This article analyses why this new policy instrument was created, traces its institutional genesis and explores its implications by asking whether the ACI represents an intentional attempt to transform the foreign policy issue of coercion into a commercial one. Using process tracing based on interviews and primary and secondary materials, we argue that ‘foreign policy becoming trade policy’ through the ACI was an unintended consequence both of external pressures to institutionalise the trade–security nexus and of the EU's uneven internal competence base.

Red Capitalism and Neoliberal Authoritarianism

Abstract The rise of the brics block has contributed to the emergence of a “multiplex world”. This shift in power dynamics has revealed the crisis of the existing liberal international order, a relative decline in the U.S. power, and a gradual transition towards a post-American order. This article examines the dynamics of Sino-mena relations in a “multiplex world” where both the U.S. and the mena states have chosen “The Look East” policy. The U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry explains a shift in the U.S. foreign policy from the Middle East toward the Far East. The Middle East’s “Look East Policy”, however, is largely due to the needs for an alternative global partner. This article examines three pillars of the Sino-mena relations: the first pillar pertains to a broad category of energy, trade, investment, arms deal, security and geostrategic significance. The second pillar is centred around the Chinese policy of no military intervention and respecting the state sovereignty. The third pillar is pertinent to the “Chinese Model of Development” and what it means for the mena. It examines whether such relations might consolidate autocratic capitalism and neoliberalism without democracy and, or benefit mena civil societies’ quest for a grassroots and egalitarian development and democracy.

The Russian War Against Ukraine and Its Implications for the Future of Liberal Interventionism

The Russian war against Ukraine has already had crucial implications for the future of liberal interventionism. Drawing on current debates in IR about the transformation of the global world order, the article outlines how processes of global reordering affect (liberal) interventionism at different scales. The article argues that what has become known as the liberal international order is in retreat, at the expense of liberal peace-oriented international interventions. At the same time, current geopolitical realignments appear to be dividing the world into new spheres of influence, pitting democracies against autocracies at the global level and within regional conflicts. However, when it comes to security interventions and peacekeeping, the emerging realities on the ground, where a growing number of actors with different agendas interact, are more complex than simplistic world-order narratives suggest. Using the cases of international peacekeeping and security assistance as examples, the article shows that in some current international intervention sites, the emerging “multi-order world” is characterised by complicated constellations of parallel external assistance offers and rapid shifts in allegiances that do not necessarily follow clear divisions between “authoritarian” and “liberal” forms of assistance. The article therefore does not confirm expectations of the emergence of a “new Cold War” and a new round of ideological competition between international systems.