Rhetorical action in a liberal international order in crisis: theorising EU and NATO enlargements post-2022

1. Explaining the constitutionalization of the European Union. Berthold Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2. Conditions for EU constitutionalization: a qualitative comparative analysis. Frank Schimmelfennig, Berthold Rittberger, Alexander Burgin and Guido Schwellnus. 3. Constitutionalization through enlargement: the contested origins of the EU's democratic identity. Daniel C. Thomas. 4. 'No integration without representation!' European integration, parliamentary democracy, and two forgotten Communities. Berthold Rittberger. 5. Guarding the guards. The European Convention and the communitization of police co-operation. Wolfgang Wagner. 6. Competition and community: constitutional courts, rhetorical action, and the institutionalization of human rights in the European Union. Frank Schimmelfennig. 7. Reasons for constitutionalization: non-discrimination, minority rights and social rights in the Convention on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Guido Schwellnus. 8. Towards the constitutionalization of aliens' rights in the European Union? Sandra Lavenex. 9. Comment: Shaming the shameless? The constitutionalization of the European Union. R. Daniel Kelemen. 10. Comment: Fact or artefact? Analysing core constitutional norms in beyond-the-state contexts. Antje Wiener.

The transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world order following the Cold War has profoundly affected international security. This article examines the implications from the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), focusing on NATO's enlargement and nuclear proliferation. Such developments have strained post-Cold War relations and increased global security concerns. The hypothesis suggests that the end of the USSR has significantly impacted international stability. It asserts that NATO's expansion in the Liberal International Order (LIO) has contributed to tensions with the Russian Federation, leading to an adversarial relationship. Nuclear proliferation, exploiting the dissolved bipolar structure, has complicated arms control negotiations and intensified the risk of nuclear conflict. This research paper highlights the West’s failure to recognize Russia's security interests and hegemonic pursuits. Using the framework of the LIO, it examines the principles of cooperation, democracy, and multilateralism, offering a lens to address the complex challenges and work toward a future characterized by security and collaboration. By shedding light on the interplay between nuclear proliferation, NATO's enlargement, and the LIO, it underscores the importance of addressing the security concerns of all nations and fostering a cooperative and reliable future.

This paper explores the causes of Russian revanchism alongside phases of NATO expansion, and concludes that evidence of Moscow’s reflexive revanchism is sparse. Russian foreign policy is tested and correlated with Russian rhetoric, military strategy and Russian balancing actions, in light of each phase of actual and potential NATO expansion. The paper concludes that, first, Russia balances against perceived threats, only in areas where it has entrenched material and military interests. Otherwise, Russia is aware of relative military inferiority, and is agnostic about NATO and EU enlargement. These findings have enormous policy relevance, as both NATO and EU plans further enlargement, American and British isolationism grows, and European security scenario alters rapidly.

The Law of Peoples

: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative was unveiled at the January 1994 NATO summit at Brussels, Belgium. PFP contained, in part, the Alliance's response to the challenge since the end of the Cold War whether, when, and how to expand eastwards. Twenty-seven countries, including Russia, have finally taken up NATO's open-ended offer of closer political and military cooperation. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been the loudest in expressing their desire for full NATO membership. This paper proposes that NATO expansion into East Central Europe is ill advised at this pivotal period in Russian history, and should be delayed until the Russian economy and democratic government become more stable. It also argues that the prospects for long-term political and economic stability in East Central Europe rests not with NATO, but in the European Union (EU). Following an in-depth analysis of Russian and East Central European history in conjunction with a comprehensive review of the current literature on NATO expansion, this study concludes that admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is fraught with danger. It is likely to foster insecurity, and not the intended enhanced European security framework NATO seeks. NATO expansion in the region also might precipitate Russian's estrangement and the redivision of Europe into two competitive spheres, the same divisions it spent four decades trying to erase. Finally, the paper concludes with recommendations how the West should address the complex challenge of fostering democracy in Russia and aiding its emerging market economy without antagonizing its insecurities by a premature push towards NATO expansion.

Conclusions * Relations between Russia and NATO--not the enlargement of NATO--is the main issue in European security. * To preserve hopes for a partnership between Russia and NATO, the gap between declarations and reality must be closed. A new cooperative relationship between Russia and the West is possible if it is developed within a year or two. * Russia would have no reason to consider NATO expansion a threat if Russia and NATO establish an actual, equal partnership. * A Treaty on Cooperation or a Mutual Security Treaty are the most realistic options for legally binding arrangements between NATO and Russia. Either treaty would require Russia and NATO to agree, inter alia, to neither station forces in border territories nor use military threats against any neighboring states, to continue the de-nuclearization process, and update arms control treaties. * The institutionalization of security cooperation between NATO and Russia requires the creation of an architecture for permanent coordination of foreign and military policies. Russian political participation at the annual NATO summits, involvement in NATO ministerial committees, and the establishment of liaison missions at the military headquarters of both sides would facilitate cooperation. * The establishment of permanent commissions to cooperate on issues such as the development of defense doctrines, force structure, nuclear policies, and others matters would further enhance security cooperation. The Need for a New Relationship Russia should not seek the right of veto in NATO. However, European and other international security issues affecting Russia's vital interests should not be handled without Russia's direct participation. The main issue as far as European security is concerned is not an enlargement of NATO but relations between Russia and the North Atlantic alliance. If they establish a real rather than a declaratory partnership, an enlarged NATO would hardly pose a threat to vital Russian interests. Admitting the Visegrad Group to NATO would be dangerous only if Russia and the alliance resumed their military-political rivalry. Moscow has been unable to specify what it expects from NATO and what forms of cooperation (or alliance) Russia would accept. It is not too late for speeding the formation of a Russian-NATO military-political partnership, complete with reciprocal obligations and the creation of interactive mechanisms. If we delay, as we did in the case of the Russian-U.S. strategic partnership, current opportunities will be irrevocably lost. Relations with NATO are a key question for Russia. It determines the nature of our relations with the West. If NATO's expansion occurs without due account of legitimate interests of Russia's security, estrangement between Russia and the West will become inevitable. This will not mean, of course, that a new Cold War will automatically follow. But the mechanism of positive interaction in the military and political sphere between Russia and the West will not be established. This will inevitably lead to long-term internal consequences for Russia because an estrangement with the West, and confrontation with the West, cannot but affect Russian economic, democratic and political reforms. Coinciding Spheres of Interests There are other coinciding spheres of interest for Russia and NATO: * maintaining peace and stability in Europe; * carrying out peacekeeping operations and joint training of peacekeeping forces; * establishing and strengthening measures for effective civilian political control over the armed forces; * blocking the spread of nuclear weapons; * preventing conflicts; * eliminating mutual mistrust. Russia still has a serious interest in a cooperative relationship with the West because it is in Russia's national interests. …

386 SEER, 8i, 2, 2003 toaMarket Economy (Basingstokeand New York,I997) in itsaccountof the early post-Soviet years, it also includes handy information on the more recent difficultiesoccasioned by the Russian crisis of I998. Generally speaking, the situation in Russia during the period in question was indeed 'unbelievably worse' than the Latvian experience. For Pabriksand Purs, this 'comparative misery and hardship factor' (p. 96) has been instrumental in the popular acceptance of economic reform.Whilstthereisundoubtedlysome truthin this, one should not discountthe more positive consensussurroundingthe goal of a 'return to Europe', something that the authors discuss in their concluding chapter on foreign policy. The latter offers an insightful and interesting discussion which is in many ways the highlight of the work. Experiences between the wars and during the I990S have shown the Latvians that the realization of their foreign policy goals depends upon gaining support from 'some of the world powers' (p. 124). As the authorssuggest, 'only integration and interdependence [will] provide "empty-handed"Latviandiplomatswith bargaining power' (pp. I44-45). The processes of EU and NATO enlargement , however, have been to a large extent contingent upon the interplayof 'greatpower' interests.According to Pabriksand Purs, the Baltic States have not understoodthatpullingtogetherwillhelpthemintotheEU. This overlooks thefactthatEU policy, whilstpreachingco-operation,hasalltoo oftendictated competition. As the middle of the three states,Latviahas had a greaterinterest in Baltic co-operation than its neighbours: whereas Estonia has gravitated towardsFinland and LithuaniatowardsPoland in theirpursuitof integration with theWest,LatvianidentityliesmoresquarelywithintheBalticSea Region. This notion standsat the core of the recent 'AmberGateway' initiative,which formsthefocusof an interestingdiscussionhere.Purelyregionalarrangements, of course,mustbe seen asa complement to, ratherthana substitutefor,fullEU and NATO membership. The year since 9/ II may well have changed the goalposts as far as NATO enlargement is concerned; in the same period, however, it has begun to dawn on Moscow that EU enlargement will not necessarily give Russia 'a rich neighbour [...1 without a lock on its door' (P. 136). Department ofCentral andEastern European Studies D. J. SMITH University ofGlasgow Nordenstreng, K.; Vartanova, E., and Zassoursky,Y. (eds). RussianMedia Challenge. Aleksanteri Institute. Kikimora Publications, Helsinki, 2001. 292 pp. Notes. Appendices. ?29.00 (paperback). THIS is a very usefulvolume, full of facts and analysisabout the development of the Russian media over the last decade. The book has a Finnish co-editor and publisher,but it is effectivelya Russian production. All of the substantive chapters,bar a brief epilogue and a statisticalanalysisof regional newspapers in the appendix, are by Russians, most of whom are members of Moscow State University'sFacultyofJournalism. The book startspoorlywith a prologue fromMikhailGorbachev. Gorbachev 's moralclaim to introducea book about the development of Russianmedia cannot be disputed. He, and all the other contributors, rightly note the REVIEWS 387 importance ofglasnost'to the expansion of pressfreedom in Russia. However, the chapterisbadlywrittenand is almostimpenetrablein places. No clearline of argument except personalvindication -emerges. Afterthe prologue, thingsimprovedramatically.The firstchapter,by Elena Vartanova, gives an overview of changes in media production and consumption . Vartanova's chapter is a mine of information. She notes the general change from print to electronic media under conditions of economic crisis and transition, the fragmentation of hierarchically organized Soviet media into new 'horizontal configurations'based on regional markets(pp. 26-29), the emergence of new forms of media, such as the internet, and of new forms of old media, such as free newspapers,and lifestyle/niche marketmagazines. Russiansnow watch 30 per cent more TV thanWesternEuropeans,and more now listen to the radio than read newspapers (pp. 40, 52). Vartanova's assessment of regional media is usefullybacked up in the appendices, which contain a guide to regional media and an analysisof regional newspapersby JukkaPietilainen.Vartanovapoints out thatthesechangesmean thatRussians consume more entertainmentand lessinformationthan they did previously,a point that is alsomade by Ivan Zassourskyin his chapteron media and power. Vartanova's chapter ends with a review of the various pressuresthat are at work on Russian media structures: historical traditions of censorship, economic pressures and new patterns of social stratification that change demand, regionalism, and technological developments best typified by the internet. Her conclusions arejudicious: the diversityof media is an improvement on the past, but the servicethat the media providesto its audience is not necessarilyimproved. The remaining chaptersin the book flesh out the political...

The rise of China and other great powers raises important questions about the persistence and stability of the 'liberal international order'. This book provides a new perspective on these questions by offering a novel theory of revisionist challenges to international order. It argues that rising powers sometimes seem to face the condition of 'status immobility', which activates social psychological and domestic political forces that push them toward lashing out in protest against status quo rules, norms, and institutions. Ward shows that status immobility theory illuminates important but often-overlooked dynamics that contributed to the most significant revisionist challenges in modern history. The book highlights the importance of status in world politics, and further advances a new understanding of this important concept's role in foreign policy. This book will be of interest to researchers in international politics and security, especially those interested in great power politics, status, power transitions, revisionism, and order.

The Turkish Straits (composed of İstanbul and Çanakkale Straits) are strategic geographic regions between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Their legal status and the sovereignty-navigation regimes are determined by a multilateral treaty, namely the Montreux Straits Convention of 1936. Today, International Relations (IR) environment has changed greatly when compared with the period of the signing of the Convention. The Cold War is now over and the balance between the East and the West has been disrupted. Furthermore, there are some conflicts in the Black Sea basin, such as the war between Russia/Ukraine and Russia/Georgia. The complex nature of the Black Sea requires a securitization framework from both Russia and the EU/NATO perspectives. In this context, the recent developments in international politics about the region may also have an impact on the Montreux regime in the Turkish Straits in future. Considering these current developments, this paper analyzes the impact of the NATO and EU enlargements on the Montreux regime and evaluates future scenarios about the security of the Turkish Straits. In doing so, it will use the securitization theory as an explanatory approach for the developments in the region. Thus, the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits contains the securitization dynamics within itself.

Constructivism as a theory of International Relations (IR) asserts the primacy of norms over material considerations in domestic and international politics. This article criticises the constructivist approach to the field of human rights with a focus on the Arab Middle East. It points to the deficiencies of this approach in not taking state sovereignty into account as a possible limitation to international efforts in protecting human rights. Furthermore, it contends that the constructivist approach does not properly consider regime type and other more complex nuances, such as ‘mixed’ human rights records. The article concludes by proposing an alternative explanation for the successful implementation of international human rights norms in domestic practice of authoritarian regimes which concentrates on a state's economic and financial vulnerability. Central to this competing explanation are the theoretical concepts of ‘rentier states’ and of ‘rhetorical action’

Ask a Political Scientist: A Conversation with Cynthia Enloe about Gender and Global Politics

1999. In The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Frank Schimmelfennig poses some stark questions regarding the expansion of these two institutions. Most important, given that the economic benefits to the European Union as a whole and the security benefits to NATO as an alliance have been at best ambiguous and perhaps even negative, why did the members of these two institutions pursue policies of postCold War expansion? Schimmelfennig's answer is quite clever and of particular value to academic theorists. In essence, Schimmelfennig finds that, even though identity explanations are superior to rationalist arguments in helping us understand the decisions to expand these institutions, the specific positions taken by individual states during the processes of enlargement are much better understood by relying on rationalist approaches. Thus, Schimmelfennig is able to make excellent use of two major alternative perspectives in international relations theory. Moreover, due to his careful tracing of the political processes involved, Schimmelfennig's argument is persuasive. And his decision to explore both NATO and EU enlargement is quite ambitious, given that most other authors have chosen to focus on only one or the other institution (see, for example, Goldgeier 1999; Poole 2003). Although the casual observer might be tempted to see the inclusion of much of the former Soviet bloc into the European Union and NATO as inevitable, it did not seem so in the early 1990s. Schimmelfennig correctly highlights the very rational reluctance to pursue the enlargements felt by leaders in many Western capitals. Even though it was obvious why the Central and Eastern Europeans wanted to join, EU members understood the economic costs that would be involved in helping their poorer neighbors. Similarly, NATO countries feared that a larger alliance would be less effective and might even spur a renewed Russian threat, so recently diminished by the collapse of the Soviet Union. So why did they do it? Schimmelfennig argues that because these institutions (and their member states) represented a community of liberal democracies, shutting the door to countries aspiring to leave behind a communist-imposed past and rejoin Europe was not consistent with their identity. In short, their liberal identity necessitated an open door policy. How could old Europe say no, especially if the countries of new Europe adopted the norms of democracy, a market economy, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of border disputes that were being demanded of them? Indeed, joining the European Union required that countries fulfill the body

Geopolitics studies the geographical basis of power in international relations, therefore it occupies a central place in our research, because the work considers the role of space or territory in international relations, i.e. international politics. The paper starts from the concept and importance of the study of geopolitics and its place and role in international relations, and in this sense the permanent significance of space in international politics is highlighted. Namely, in one period there was a decline in the role of the state in international relations and thus a "crisis of the importance of space". Space was neglected in social science theories, even in political theory. However, in geopolitical practice the situation was quite different. To some extent, the paper shows the understanding of space from the point of view of geoeconomics. Geopolitics has come a long way from being a disputed scientific discipline to the place it occupied in the system of sciences or scientific construction as a complex synthetic science. With globalization, there has been a shift in its center of gravity, which is certainly space, i.e. there was a neglect of its importance and the emphasis on the old and the birth of other scientific disciplines and sciences. Thus there was a shift and focus from classical geopolitical considerations to postmodernism. But it seems that these trends were premature and hasty and that there was no end of geopolitics, or rather no end. It is quite clear that space and territory are "in the game" again, or rather they were never "out of the game". This fact is becoming more and more present every day, and therefore more and more clear considering the wars raging in the world and the spaces and territories that are occupied again and again. The area of Heartland is still today the axis of the entire Eurasian geopolitical dynamics. The world is preoccupied with wars in Eurasia and the Middle East. The constant conflict and confrontations do not stop either on the Korean peninsula, or between China and Taiwan. It seems that the entire area of Rimland represents one huge front, in some parts of which wars are raging with a large number of human casualties. Even the long-disputed geopolitical concept of land-sea has been resurrected like a phoenix bird. Actually, from the point of view of classical geopolitical conception, it is an example of thalassocratic expansion of the Rimland to the detriment of the Heartland, while on the other hand we had a tellurocratic restoration of the Heartland. Furthermore, the expansion of NATO itself was a real example of the struggle for space. Confrontations and conflicts do not stop in the North, Baltic, Mediterranean, Aegean Sea, Black Sea, Red Sea, South China Sea, but also in other peripheral seas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The current migrant crisis, wars, terrorism, climate change and other security challenges and threats to the modern world are just another confirmation of the "return" of classical geopolitical argumentation. All of this puts the classical geopolitical conception in the foreground when considering these conflicts and instability. Therefore, the paper, by applying a comparative analysis, aimed to show how disastrous is the neglect of the legality of classical geopolitics in scientific and professional circles. Considering examples of processes and events in international politics, the author concludes with a analysis that the approach of classical geopolitics is the most suitable for their scientific explanation. In the paper, the author argues that events in international relations have re-actualized the issues of geopolitics and highlighted the importance of space in international politics. Territory and space have not lost their importance for man, and it is shown again and again how geopolitical reasons are present in the struggles for possession or holding them.

With the diffusion of power in global affairs, a convergence of multiple threats began to intersect and challenge ‘the liberal international order’. On the one hand, the US, the sole hegemon, has been frequently abusing the rules and institutions of ‘the liberal international order’. Besides, ‘the post-Cold War US grand strategy of liberal internationalism’ has been under pressure from ‘the revisionist states such as Russia and China’ and the right-wing populist leaders in advanced Western democracies. On the other hand, the global society is witnessing the return of great power politics, imperial ambitions, and Moscow’s desire to gather Russians and re-establish a Russian sphere of influence in its neighbourhood by unleashing war against Ukraine. These geopolitical challenges aggravate the great powers’ competition, undermining the American dream of the universal liberal order. With the return of ‘the tragedy of great power politics’, the United States needs to maintain a strategy of coexistence rather than confrontation. Washington ought to prefer stability over democracy promotion, shore up its democratic alliance, and shred its imperial character such as NATO enlargement to preserve the rules of the liberal international order.

The concept of “Liberal International Order” (LIO) is one of the most popular in contemporary international relations. LIO received global recognition and became a key factor of international politics after the Second World War. Studies of the LIO have gone through periods of peaks and valleys since the Second World War. Nowadays, the studies are once again at the epicenter of political discussions. Academic studies of the LIO face difficult challenges since the concept has found itself in a ‘grey zone’ between two well-established disciplines — political science and economics. Two factors, which signaled a deep crisis of the LIO are: 1) disaffection of people living in Western democracies in multiple negative effects of globalization; 2) the progressive rising of powers such as China and Russia, whose political regimes are currently defined as illiberal. For many states in different parts of the world, the LIO did not generate prosperity for a majority of their population. Rather it led to an economically painful transformation from previous socio-economic systems as well as rising inequality. Member states of BRICS and of SCO have been and still are more respectful of the principles of the traditional Liberal International Order than the USA and western European countries. China currently is promoting a non-Western version of globalization, but it is still globalization with low customs barriers and the free movement of people, services and capital.