In the face of the coronavirus pandemic, the German government embraced a major shift towards a grants-based EU recovery fund relying on common European debt. How can we explain this impetus, especially in view of the reticent German fiscal stance in previous years and in the early stages of the pandemic? To elucidate this question, this paper provides a qualitative inquiry into German preference formation during the spring of 2020. Theoretically, it reconciles liberal intergovernmentalist and discursive accounts of preference formation in the context of EU politics stressing the intertwined nature and simultaneousness of preference formation in the national and European arenas. We hypothesise that, along with material self-interests, the construction and framing of the pandemic as a certain type of crisis was key. Examining the stances taken by the federal government, commercial groups and key EU actors such as France and the European Commission, our findings point to a rapid preference realignment in German political and economic circles. Overall, the analysis suggests that especially in times of crisis, assumed national preferences are subject to reconfiguration thus allowing for contingent political responses.