What is intergovernmental about the EU’s ‘(new) intergovernmentalist’ turn? Evidence from the Eurozone and asylum crises

Sandrino Smeets,Natascha Zaun

doi:10.1080/01402382.2020.1792203

Sandrino Smeets, Natascha Zaun

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2020.1792203

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Abstract

Engaging with recent claims of increased intergovernmental dynamics, this article asks what exactly is intergovernmental about the EU’s major crisis-induced reforms. Drawing on central claims of both New Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, it is demonstrated that the Eurozone reform and the asylum reform differ significantly regarding the role played by the European Council (NI) and the role of institutional expertise provided by supranational actors (LI). While the European Council played a central facilitating role in the Eurozone crisis and worked effectively with the Commission, which provided important technical expertise, expertise in the area of asylum still largely lies with the member states. The Commission therefore acted as a political stakeholder, thus estranging the European Council that subsequently acted as a reform blocker. This article is a first attempt to assess empirically the micro-level foundations of different types of intergovernmentalism and to nuance claims on the weakened role of supranational institutions.

Highlights

The successive, existential crises of the EU, the Eurozone and asylum crisis, and the related rise of intergovernmental bodies, the European Council, have given rise to a vibrant debate about the applicability of grand theories, new and old, to crisis and post-crisis EU decision making (Hooghe and Marks 2019; Ioannou et al 2015; Kleine and Pollack 2018; Puetter and Fabbrini 2016)
While not denying that EU decision making had become ‘more intergovernmental’, these studies point to a need to analyse on a more micro level, what this increased intergovernmentalism entails for the process and outcomes of major EU reform negotiations
We contribute to research suggesting that EU policy making has become more ‘intergovernmental’ in recent years, by nuancing two central claims of intergovernmentalist theorising: the perceived dominance of intergovernmental actors, especially the European Council, in these reform processes and the supposedly limited role of supranational actors and expertise

Summary

Introduction

The successive, existential crises of the EU, the Eurozone and asylum crisis, and the related rise of intergovernmental bodies, the European Council, have given rise to a vibrant debate about the applicability of grand theories, new and old, to crisis and post-crisis EU decision making (Hooghe and Marks 2019; Ioannou et al 2015; Kleine and Pollack 2018; Puetter and Fabbrini 2016). 2. The different role of supranational expertise, or institutional ideas and information, as a power differential in these reform processes.

Results

Conclusion