Level Of Ownership Concentration Research Articles

Corporate governance and firm performance within the Russian agri-food sector: does ownership structure matter?

This article provides pioneering empirical evidence on the ownership structure and firm performance relationship for the case of corporate agri-food companies in Russia. While Russia plays a vital role in the global agri-food system, its domestic agri-food production is evidently dominated by a small number of corporate enterprises, which are in turn characterized by high ownership concentration. We employ unique panel data obtained from 203 companies for the years between 2012 and 2017. A random effects model was used to analyze the impacts of ownership concentration and ownership identity on the firms’ financial performance, measured by return on assets and return on sales. Our results indicate an inverse U-shaped association between ownership concentration and firm performance, with average level of ownership concentration found to be on the descending range of the inverse U-shaped curve. Moreover, we observe a similar quadratic relationship between ownership concentration by government and directors and firm performance. On average, ownership by directors was found to be on the ascending range and below the peak point, suggesting a potential for further performance improvement, while the impact of agroholding ownership was found to be linear and positive.

Family firms, banks and firm value: Evidence from Malaysia

PurposeThis paper examines the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value and how this relationship is moderated by ownership concentration at low and very high level on a sample of Malaysian family and non-family firms.Design/methodology/approachFor hypotheses testing, panel data analysis using the fixed effects model (FEM) is used because the FEM can address any endogeneity problems effectively (Chi, 2005). The panel data regression is conducted on both family firms and non-family firms.FindingsWe find that there is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks engaged by family firms, operating in industries where these firms do not have absolute monopoly, and firm value. However, there is no evidence that this significant negative firm value effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Furthermore, the significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on this relationship within family firms in such industries is evident only at low level of ownership concentration. Interestingly, at very high level of ownership concentration, this significant positive moderating effect becomes negative. There is no evidence that these significant moderating effects are stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms.Research limitations/implicationsThis research has focused only on family and non-family firms.Practical implicationsAn implication of this research is that there is a need for the capital market regulators to introduce appropriate policies to deter family firms from having a close relationship with domestic banks as well as monitor the number of domestic banks engaged by such firms. There may be policy implications for consideration by the Central Bank of Malaysia as well.Originality/valueThis research provides some insights to both academia and industry regarding the consequences of domestic banking relationship and different levels of concentrated ownership in family firms in an emerging market. These insights can help improve the corporate governance as well as ownership structure of Malaysian public-listed family firms which dominate the capital market. Our findings refute the argument by Peng and Jiang (2010) by demonstrating that corporate reputational effects may be a substitute for institutional deficiencies.

The trajectories of companies’ financial architecture in the real economy

The formation of an effective company’s financial architecture, which includes such basic elements as the capital structure, ownership structure, and the state of corporate governance, has a significant impact on maintaining a certain market position and ensuring stable profitability of activity. This research aims at determining the state of financial architecture, changing its trajectory, and its impact on company’s market position. Twenty-two (22) Ukrainian companies were selected for the study from the list of top 200 in terms of the largest volume of sales revenue received, and those that provided full financial statements for the period from 2007 till 2017. To determine the state of company’s financial architecture and the relevant market position, the authors used a cluster analysis using the method of the most remote neighbors. Algorithms of Kohonen’s self-organizing maps were applied. Harrington’s desirability function was used to determine the integral index. The selected sample demonstrated a high level of ownership concentration in almost all companies and showed that only a few individuals controlled a significant amount of assets, thereby confirming the oligarchic structure of the Ukrainian economy. As a result, seven cluster groups were obtained, reflecting the companies in terms of the quality of their financial architecture. Only five companies in the total sample were found to have high-quality financial architecture, i.e., capital structure and ownership structure are consistent and optimal and ensure that the company maintains a leading market position.

Family Firms, Banks And Firm Value: Evidence From Malaysia

This paper examines the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value and how this relationship is moderated by ownership concentration at low and very high level on a sample of Malaysian family and non-family firms. We find that there is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks engaged by family firms, operating in industries where these firms do not have absolute monopoly, and firm value. However, there is no evidence that this significant negative firm value effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Furthermore, the significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on this relationship within family firms in such industries is evident only at low level of ownership concentration. Interestingly, at very high level of ownership concentration, this significant positive moderating effect becomes negative. There is no evidence that these significant moderating effects are stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. An implication of this research is that there is a need for the capital market regulators to introduce appropriate policies to deter family firms from having a close relationship with domestic banks as well as monitor the number of domestic banks engaged by such firms. There may be policy implications for consideration by the Central Bank of Malaysia as well.

The Influence of a Company’s Ownership Structure on Upward Real Earnings Management

Financial transparency, including transparency of transactions, is one of the pillars of sustainability. This study investigates whether a company’s ownership structure, including ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and the presence of institutional investors, affects upward real earnings management practices. The research is based on companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland adapting panel data regression models. The significance and contribution to literature of the paper lies in the fact that we provide evidence that the association between the magnitude of total upward real earnings management and shareholder concentration is U-shaped, thereby indicating that there is an optimal level of ownership concentration, minimizing the magnitude of upward real earnings management and thus increasing financial transparency. Our results show the negative relationship between total upward real earnings management and managerial ownership, thereby we confirm the alignment of interest hypothesis, in terms of real earnings management. We also confirm that individual instruments of real earnings management are linked to ownership concentration and managerial ownership in specific ways. The presence of institutional investors reduces the magnitude of total upward real earnings management.

Effects of ownership structure on the mergers and acquisitions decisions in Brazilian firms

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of ownership structure on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions of Brazilian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach This paper is an applied and explanatory research based on secondary data. The sample is comprises non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa between 1998 and 2007. Considering that the dependent variable is binary, the authors estimate panel data logistic regression models. Considering the existence of conflicts of interest among those who have the decision-making power and the supplier of capital for M&A transactions, they draw upon the Agency Theory to develop the theoretical hypotheses. Findings The results show that, for a sample of Brazilian non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa (B3), from 1998 to 2007, Brazilian firms present, on average, a highly concentrated ownership structure and the major controlling shareholders are families or the State. These characteristics are negatively related to the likelihood of M&A transactions, as most of these controlling shareholders are reluctant to adopt mechanisms that reduce their control. Research limitations/implications With regard to the limitations, this study considered only the M&A definitions as stated by the Bureau van Dijk database. In this sense, future studies may analyze the effects of ownership structure based on other M&A definitions and typologies. In addition, the study is limited to the period from 1998 to 2007, which is prior to the international financial crisis. Future studies may extend the analysis period to include the post-crisis period (2008) to check if there are differences in M&A strategies before and after the crisis. Practical implications From a managerial perspective, the results show that minority shareholders have little or no influence over an M&A decision, so they cannot decide on the use of resources for fast growth and access to new markets through M&A. Thus, the investment decision must take into account the nature and the quality of the controlling shareholder. Social implications This study shows a significant and negative effect of ownership concentration on the likelihood of M&A transactions. In part, this result demonstrates the importance of understanding the behavior of controlling shareholders before inferring on other key aspects that the M&A literature tends to make fundamental in explaining M&A decisions in publicly traded companies, particularly, in an environment of low minority shareholder protection. Originality/value Previous studies have partly found that the M&A decision is motivated by individual advantages obtained from increasing the size of the firm, or from managerial hubris. The results show that these hypotheses do not hold in the Brazilian context. Moreover, the results indicate that M&A decisions are associated with the characteristics of the controlling shareholder, their level of ownership concentration and their typology, contributing to the agency debate on whether the incentive or the entrenchment effect prevails in the context of the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders, particularly, in an institutional environment of low shareholder protection.

Mutual funds, tunneling and firm performance: evidence from China

In contrast to US companies, Chinese firms have concentrated ownership with the effect that the central agency problem emanates from controlling shareholders expropriating minority shareholders, a phenomenon referred to as ‘tunneling’. This study examines the monitoring effect of mutual funds on the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders. Due to the distinctive institutional settings in China, including a high level of ownership concentration, underdeveloped legal system in the stock markets and weak governance mechanisms in the mutual fund industry, we find that an increase in mutual fund ownership effectively mitigates the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders thus improving firm performance. Nonetheless, after the mutual fund ownership reaches a certain threshold, an increase in concentrated mutual fund ownership is associated with heavier tunneling and lower firm performance. This may suggest that concentrated mutual funds collude with controlling shareholders in order to preserve their private interests. Moreover, the above effects are found to be more pronounced for firms with heavier tunneling activities. Our finding of the non-monotonic monitoring role of mutual funds brings attention to the private interest theory for mutual funds, an aspect that has been largely ignored in previous studies on mutual funds.

Effects of ownership structure on the relationship between multinationality and downside risk

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore how multinationality affects multinational companies’ (MNCs) downside risk and the moderate effects of ownership structure in the setting of emerging markets based on Chinese publicly traded manufacturing MNCs.Design/methodology/approachThe author derives hypotheses based on real options theory and agency theory, and tests hypotheses by using Tobit model and a unique data set of Chinese A-shared publicly traded manufacturing MNCs in the period of 2010–2016.FindingsThe empirical results suggest that multinationality is positively related to downside risk and this effect is subjected to ownership structure for firms in emerging markets. In particular, multinationality of MNCs with a high level of ownership concentration, managerial ownership and institutional ownership is more likely to reduce downside risk.Practical implicationsThe main conclusion of this paper highlights the importance of ownership structure of MNCs in explaining the real options value of multinationality, and conveys to owners of MNCs in China and other emerging markets the need to strengthen firms’ governance if they want to maximize the benefits of multinational operations.Originality/valueThis study extends existing studies by taking ownership structure into consideration and highlighting the importance of agency problem in the examination of multinationality and downside risk, which provides a potential explanation for previous mixed evidence. This study also provides new evidence for the relationship between multinationality and downside risk by using a unique sample from China, an emerging market country.

The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: An Application in Vietnam Stock Exchange

Abstract This research examines the possible association between ownership structure and Vietnam listed companies’ dividend payout policy over the period of 2009 – 2015. We have investigated 642 listed firms in Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock exchange, using pannel data analysis. Ownership structure is described with two main sub-variables: ownership concentration and ownership composition. Specifically, the Herfindahl index (or H-index) was applied to measure the level of ownership concentration /dispersion for all major shareholders in the company, including the five biggest investors, corporate institutional investors, the ownership concentration level, and foreign investors. It has been observed that the H-index of all major shareholders has an average of less than 0.5 but the value of the H-index of institutional investors at 0.594 indicates that institutional investors are more likely to be concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors. The result showed linear relationship between institutional ownership and the dividend rate, but not statistically significant for the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payout ratio.

The Rise of Hostile Takeovers and Defensive Measures in China: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives

As the ongoing shareholding structure reform continues to reduce the level of ownership concentration of Chinese listed companies, hostile takeovers have been on the rise in China, so has the use of takeover defences. The recent high-profile case of Vanke vs Baoneng has generated an intensive social debate on the use of takeover defences and their regulation in China. This paper undertakes an in-depth study of the Chinese regime for takeover defences both in the books and in practice. From a comparative perspective, it reveals that Chinese law is a mixture of experiences transplanted from overseas jurisdictions, but functions differently due to the unique local conditions in China. It then empirically examines how takeover defences are used in practice, finding that takeover defences, particularly ex ante defences, are widely adopted by Chinese listed companies. This is a matter of concern given that takeovers have important economic functions particularly at the present stage of China’s economic development. In spite of this, the paper refutes the idea of a blanket ban on the use of takeover defences, because takeover defences have both beneficial and detrimental effects. In regulating takeover defences, there needs to be a delicate balance between allowing the use of takeover defences and protecting shareholders’ rights. It is submitted that the primary power to decide on the use of takeover defences should be vested in the hands of shareholders. Considering the local situation in China where the main agency problem of corporate governance is between majority and minority shareholders, it is further argued that the issue of takeover defences should not be left entirely to shareholders in the name of corporate autonomy, but rather need to have some legal intervention to protect the rights of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, in relation to the use of takeover defences.

Ownership concentration, investor protection and economic performance in public agroindustrial companies with the listing on warsaw stock exchange

The study aimed to identify the presence / absence of ownership concentration in agro-industrial companies in Ukraine and to investigate the possible impact of these processes on the economic performance of companies. We have proven that there is a significant level of ownership concentration among analysed companies in both groups UX and UA. Although there are exceptions, there is a general tendency to hold a large share of equity instruments by the founders or major owners. We describe this phenomenon through a twin agency problem, arguing that such a large share of power concentration serves as a substitute for a weak environment for protecting investor rights. Concentration of property is the bulwark from unwanted interventions from both third parties and from state rulers. The study has found no significant relationship between ownership concentration and several indicators used as proxy for economic performance, namely Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss before tax, Tobin’s Q. Our findings indicate that concentration of ownership does not affect the economic performance of analysed companies, regardless of whether we take for the analysis the accounting indicators (Profit) or market-based indicators (Tobin’s Q).

Board characteristics, state ownership and firm performance: evidence from Vietnam

This paper investigates the association between board characteristics and firm performance and examine whether such relationship is moderated by different levels of ownership concentration among Vietnamese listed firms from 2008 to 2014. A series of fixed effect panel regressions was employed to test the impact of ownership concentration on corporate governance-firm performance relationship. The results indicate that the impact of an effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism on firm performance is influenced by the different levels state ownership. The evidence of this study suggests that corporate governance system that is beneficial for other developed markets may not be a good fit for emerging markets. Corporate governance policies in Vietnam are in the process of being reformed, and the results, thus, will provide insights for regulatory bodies by helping them better understand corporate governance practices.

Оцінка концентрації власності в корпоративному секторі України.

The article deals with the structure of share capital based on the reporting of all banking institutions and a hundred companies in different sectors of the Ukrainian economy real sector. The advantages of joint-stock ownership compared to other forms are distinguished. The average size of one and two shareholders' shares is calculated. The dynamics of the ownership concentration of joint-stock companies over the past five years is analyzed and the tendency towards a high level of ownership concentration in the Ukrainian corporate sector is noted. It is noted that the corporate sector is one of the system components of the country's economy. The estimation of the ownership concentration level in the corporate sector of Ukraine in comparison with other countries is given. It is determined that the level of ownership concentration in banks is higher than in enterprises. It is concluded that in the absence of external constraints when making management decisions, a concentrated ownership structure in the corporate sector of Ukraine creates a high risk of agency conflict between minority and majority entities.

Productivity effects of the ownership concentration in Polish employee-owned companies

Research background: The conducted empirical research on the influence of the degree of ownership concentration in the employee?owned companies on their sales revenues thematically fits into the issue of efficiency of the direct privatisation method, in particular giving a state?owned enterprise for use against payment.
 Purpose of the article: The main goal of this article is to verify the research hypothesis stating that in employee?owned companies an increase in the degree of ownership concentration leads to an increase in sales revenues.
 Methods: The empirical studies were carried out on a sample of 15 employee-owned companies from Mazowieckie Province, which concluded the agreement of giving a state?owned enterprise for use against payment from 2000 to 2004 and using the data from financial statements handed in by these entities to the National Court Register for a ten?year period after the privatisation year. The verification of research hypothesis was based on the estimation of a Cobb?Douglas production function by Ordinary Least Squares method for two variants, differing in the way of measuring the degree of ownership concentration in investigated employee?owned companies.
 Findings & Value added: The research hypothesis formulated in this paper was verified negatively as the increase in the degree of ownership concentration in employee?owned companies caused the decrease in their sales revenues. The conducted empirical research also suggests that sales revenues in examined employee?owned companies peak at some intermediate/optimal level of ownership concentration.

How Do Ownership Concentration and Family Control Affect R&D Investments? New Evidence from Taiwan

AbstractThis study finds a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments. Specifically, ownership concentration is positively related to R&D investments at a low level of ownership concentration; the relationship becomes negative when ownership concentration is at a high level. However, the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investments is lessened in family‐controlled firms; that is, family control moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments. Overall, this study suggests that the ownership concentration's nonlinear impact on R&D investments differs between family‐controlled firms and nonfamily‐controlled firms.

Television market, ownership concentration and management strategies in Portugal

Abstract The main objective of this article is to measure media concentration of the Portuguese television industry, and to evaluate the extension to which concentration in television companies relates to management strategies. A review of literature about media economics and management and strategic decisions is presented. Following this theoretical background, the empirical analysis of the ownership concentration of Portuguese television companies is based on qualitative and quantitative methods. The main information sources were corporate reports, television market reports, specialized books, articles and scientific papers, among other documental sources of information related to this area. In terms of main conclusions, high television ownership concentration levels, which have always been a feature of the Portuguese television industry market, although still high, have been decreasing for the past ten years. However, high concentration levels are observed in media groups, resulting from the convergence of television and other types of media. This is mainly due to bundling strategies of telecom operators (which added pay television services to the traditional telecommunications portfolio) and to diversification strategies from television network players (taking advantage of audience segmentation and easier access to broadcasting space).

Ownership concentration and firm performance: the moderating effect of the monitoring and provision of resources board roles

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the effect that the monitoring and the provision of resources board roles have on the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. The sample of this study is made up of 579 European firms registered on the STOXX Europe 600 index during the period 2002–2011. The results of this study show that the monitoring provided by the board positively influences the effect that ownership concentration has on performance. The results also highlight that the moderating effect of the provision of resources role has a positive influence on firm performance concerning almost all levels of ownership concentration, diminishing and having slightly negative effects when the concentration levels are extremely high.

The myth of the “good governance code”: an analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and the comply-or-explain disclosure

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to assess the degree of disclosure about compliance with corporate governance code and the explanations provided by Italian firms and second, to analyze the relationships between this disclosure and different variables of ownership structure.Design/methodology/approachThe sample was composed of 75 non-financial companies listed in Italy in 2016. Content analysis of the corporate governance statement and ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression models were used to test the hypotheses.FindingsCompanies tended to comply with the corporate governance code and to disclose this information, but when they decided to not comply, they did not provide adequate explanations. Findings revealed a negative relation between ownership concentration and the disclosure analyzed. Results also highlight that a more equal distribution of shares among larger shareholders is beneficial for disclosure. Moreover, the presence of a dominant financial shareholder at a high level of ownership concentration creates inefficiency of the degree of adherence to the comply-or-explain principle.Originality/valueThis study examines in depth the underexplored issue of “explanation” and exceeds the issue of ownership concentration, which has already been examined extensively, raising the issues of counterweight power and shareholders’ identities, which remain underexplored. In this way, results presented contribute to explaining some causes of the diverse findings that research has found about the relationship between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure, demonstrating the importance of counterweight power and largest shareholder’s identity. Consequently, when self-regulating initiatives are designed and implemented, legislators, regulators and managers should not ignore the characteristics of the firms’ ownership structure.

Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effect of the Monitoring and Provision Of Resources Board Roles

This paper explores the effect that the monitoring and the provision of resources board roles have on the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. The sample of this study is made up of 579 European firms registered on the STOXX Europe 600 index during the period 2002-2011. The results of this study show that the monitoring provided by the board positively influences the effect that ownership concentration has on performance. The results also highlight that the moderating effect of the provision of resources role has a positive influence on firm performance concerning almost all levels of ownership concentration, diminishing and having slightly negative effects when the concentration levels are extremely high.

Ownership Concentration, Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Equity in Chinese Listed Private Firms

This study tests a proposed nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and the cost of equity in Chinese private listed firms. It also aims at testing the potential role of disclosure quality in mitigating the adverse consequences of concentrated ownership. It finds that the initial concentration of ownership reduces the cost of equity but once the ownership concentration surpasses an optimal threshold further concentration results in higher cost of equity. Moreover, the optimal level of ownership concentration for value maximization (i.e., 45%) is much higher than that for minimizing the cost of equity (i.e., 28%). More importantly, empirical evidence provides strong support for a moderating role of disclosure quality, where better disclosure quality reduces the strength of positive relationship between ownership concentration and the cost of equity. These findings underscore the potential role of disclosure quality in alleviating the adverse consequences of ownership concentration in an economy characterized by high ownership concentration.