The myth of the “good governance code”: an analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and the comply-or-explain disclosure

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to assess the degree of disclosure about compliance with corporate governance code and the explanations provided by Italian firms and second, to analyze the relationships between this disclosure and different variables of ownership structure.Design/methodology/approachThe sample was composed of 75 non-financial companies listed in Italy in 2016. Content analysis of the corporate governance statement and ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression models were used to test the hypotheses.FindingsCompanies tended to comply with the corporate governance code and to disclose this information, but when they decided to not comply, they did not provide adequate explanations. Findings revealed a negative relation between ownership concentration and the disclosure analyzed. Results also highlight that a more equal distribution of shares among larger shareholders is beneficial for disclosure. Moreover, the presence of a dominant financial shareholder at a high level of ownership concentration creates inefficiency of the degree of adherence to the comply-or-explain principle.Originality/valueThis study examines in depth the underexplored issue of “explanation” and exceeds the issue of ownership concentration, which has already been examined extensively, raising the issues of counterweight power and shareholders’ identities, which remain underexplored. In this way, results presented contribute to explaining some causes of the diverse findings that research has found about the relationship between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure, demonstrating the importance of counterweight power and largest shareholder’s identity. Consequently, when self-regulating initiatives are designed and implemented, legislators, regulators and managers should not ignore the characteristics of the firms’ ownership structure.