Level Of Popular Support Research Articles

Why Strike Ballots are Undemocratic

AbstractSince 2016, new legislation governing strike ballots has made it more difficult for trade unions to achieve a mandate for industrial action. Such a mandate now requires that a majority of members vote in the ballot. This article argues that these balloting processes are undemocratic. The turnout requirement means that a mandate for industrial action does not simply depend on its level of popular support amongst union members. This has surprising consequences. Sometimes opponents of action would be better advised to abstain, rather than to vote against it. Thus, it is not always clear how they should vote. Whatever they do, their actions may be counterproductive. Further, even when they do know how best to promote their desired outcome, there may be a conflict between voting strategically and clearly expressing their true preferences. Consequently, there is no guarantee that the outcome of the ballot accurately reflects what people really want.

Leaving the Barracks: Military Coups in Developing Democracies

A large body of research has examined the factors that influence military coups in authoritarian and democratic states. While this research is informative, we contend that three factors are central in assessing the likelihood of military coups in developing democracies: the perception of corruption within regimes, levels of popular support, and the incentives segments of the military have to initiate coups. In utilizing a historical case‐study analysis with six states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (from 1970‐2010) we find that successful military coups are more likely to occur when the ruling administration is increasingly viewed by the public as being corrupt, is unpopular with large portions of society and key factions within the state, and when segments of the military perceive their position within the state as being threatened by the current regime. These findings have important implications for democratic governance in developing democracies. Related Articles:Hiroi, Taeko, and Sawa Omori. 2013. “Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis.” Politics & Policy 41 (1): 39‐64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12001Kim, Hae S. 2009. “The Complexities of Internal Conflict in the Third World: Beyond Ethnic and Religious Conflict.” Politics & Policy 37 (2): 395‐414. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00177.x/abstractMcCarthy‐Jones, Anthea, and Mark Turner. 2015. “Policy Transfer through Time and the Search for Legitimacy in Developing Nations.” Politics & Policy 43 (2): 215‐238. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12113

Who Governs in the Council? Determinants of Ministerial Participation in Council Meetings

The Council of the EU is the primary institution through which ministers of member states can express their positions on Commission proposals and vote upon legislation. This article first examines the extent to which ministers actually attend Council meetings before moving toward investigating the determinants of ministerial participation in over a period covering almost thirteen years between May 2004 and December 2016. It aims to identify determinants of why ministers from the Visegrad countries participate at some meetings and are absent from others. Using an original data set containing information about 940 Council meetings as well as several country-specific characteristics, we show that, on average, at about four out of every six meetings, ministers are absent. The results of our regressions indicate a pattern in which holding the office of the EU’s rotating presidency, the number of b-points on the agenda, and the size of the government increase the likelihood of ministerial participation in meetings. In contrast, high levels of popular support for Eurosceptic parties and holding of national legislative elections decrease the probability of ministerial attendance. Moreover, meetings of Council formations related to policy areas with a low level of EU competence are significantly less likely to be attended by ministers.

Between Populism and (Electric) Power: Reconciling a Green Shift and Popular Legitimacy in Kuwait

Kuwait faces the double challenge of potentially destabilising effects of climate change as well as a changing international energy market in favour of renewables that may threaten the foundation of the oil-based economies dominating the region. Both these challenges point to the need for a transition towards more renewable energy sources and not least more sustainable patterns of energy consumption –– a transition that will be demanding for state and society alike. A successful green shift depends on a certain level of popular support or acceptance, yet it has proven difficult for the Kuwaiti government to gain support for their proposed solutions, and to reconcile the necessary changes with the existing relationship between state and society. This paper explores these challenges by studying public discourse concerning two contentious issues that are at the heart of the government’s economic reforms and of Kuwait’s planned efforts to cut GHG-emissions, namely fuel subsidy reform, and water and electricity conservation.

Регіональні еліти в контексті символізації (1994 – 2004 рр.).

Understanding democracy as D. Sartori as electoral polyarchy, the status of political elites depends on the level of popular support. The democratic values which should declare elites, become values of the people. But in the conditions of influence of regional elites which created their own political matrix at the all-Ukrainian level, understanding of democratic values was provincial. Therefore, they not only did not become nationwide, but led to a crisis in the political regime. Absence of the intention to find consensus resulted in absence and convergence of regional elites. And in spite of shadow agreements and the mechanisms of influence open of artificial declaring and the technology of destruction of competitors, political Ukraine elite was forced to concede Majdana’s requirements.Political confrontation between regional elites during the reign of L. Kuchma has several stages. Initially, the victory in the election of a representative from Dnipropetrovsk led to the involvement of a resident of the city from the President’s team. The long-standing confrontation between Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk elites began, which ended with the appearance of Viktor Yanukovych. The Crimean regional elite, due to the secret intervention of Kiev, was focused on its own internal conflicts, which led to the destruction of the authoritative figure of Yu. Meshkov. The role of the Kharkiv regional elite, which became an influential lever of the President and its support in the parliament after 2002, has gradually increased. The constant struggle between Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk, Kharkiv and Donetsk has led to confrontation with the Kiev elites with DonetskAnalyzing the activities of the political elite of the times of L. Kuchma, we can distinguish three groups that had a certain influence on the nature of the political regime’s change: the ruling elite, the shadow elite and the counter-elite. Inside each group and between them there was no formation of uniform strategy, as each group had its own model of the idea of national state. Two main models which influence development of the democracy in transitional societies : the model of “pact” and the model “convergences” were not carried out in Ukraine.

Does voting end at the water’s edge? Canadian public opinion and voter intentions, 2006–2015

Public attitudes on Canadian foreign policy matters have received growing attention in recent years, both to understand the nature of public opinion and the effects of public preferences on decision makers. This article offers a contribution on both fronts, focusing on the study of specific events (policies and political messaging) rather than grand principles. By doing so, we offer a novel approach to assess the level of public support enjoyed by the Harper’s government international policy. Also, we compare public attitudes toward the events with voter intention data to evaluate whether the level of popular support for governmental decisions on international issues correlates with electoral gains or losses for the ruling party. This article concludes that public opinion was highly supportive of the Conservative government foreign policy, but that this did not translate into a systematic increase in voter intention. In this sense, foreign policy decisions did not produce electoral payoffs for the ruling party.

Is “fracking” a new dirty word? The influence of word choice on public views toward natural gas attitudes

The increased public attention to hydraulic fracturing as a technique for extracting natural gas has raised the stakes of the political and regulatory struggle that surround it. This increased attention has also raised questions about the levels of popular support or opposition to the technique. Before we can assess this support or opposition, we must have a firm understanding of the language and framing of language of these extractive technologies. This paper uses a survey experiment to compare two popular framing languages for hydraulic fracturing, with half of the respondents receiving questions that refer to the technique as “hydraulic fracturing” and the other half, as “fracking”. We analyzed the effects of framing for the two treatments by conducting t-tests to compare responses to questions concerning opinions and attitudes about the extraction technique. The results illustrate that the concerns that the term “fracking” is politicized and pejorative are overstated. The survey reveals that familiarity with the technique influences levels of support and reactions to specific wording, but there is no general framing effect for the use of one wording over the other.

THE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST AGRIPPINA THE ELDER IN a.d. 27 AND 29

Tacitus traces a series of conflicts between Agrippina the Elder and her father-in-law Tiberius. After the death of her husband Germanicus in Syria (a.d. 19), Agrippina returned to Rome with their children. Germanicus' lingering popularity with the armies and people meant that his widow Agrippina and their children enjoyed a level of popular support as well—one that eventually became a threat in Tiberius' mind. Agrippina, moreover, refused to embrace the modest, retiring role that her father-in-law (and Roman society in general) expected of her. Tiberius was, moreover, ‘never gentle toward the house of Germanicus’ and his concerns were augmented by the machinations of Sejanus, who reported that the people were dividing themselves into factions, some even calling themselves members of the partes Agrippinae. The combination of Agrippina's high birth—the only still-living grandchild of Augustus—and her status as widowed daughter-in-law of the emperor, therefore mother of the emperor's probable heir, along with her persistent independence and sometimes unfeminine strength of character made her seem an intolerable political threat. This paper examines the culmination of these conflicts, when Agrippina is subjected to criminal prosecution and penalty in a.d. 27 and 29 at the instigation of Sejanus, with the overt approval of Tiberius. Of primary concern is the timing and the order of the charges brought against Agrippina.

Working on the Revolution in Bahrain: From the Mass Strike to Everyday Forms of Medical Provision

The 2011 Arab Spring uprising with the highest levels of popular support took place in Bahrain. This level of mobilization was due in part to the organizational capacity of trade unions and professional associations, and yet their role in the ‘near-revolution’ has received very little scholarly attention. In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, where the official trade union federations played an ambiguous or even hostile role as workers began to organize strikes during the protests against Ben Ali and Mubarak, the official General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions not only supported the protests against the Al Khalifa regime, but called for two general strikes. As significant as the strikes were, the work of unpaid volunteers constituted another less recognized, but equally important form of labor activism. Understanding the mass mobilization in Bahrain, and elsewhere, requires an encompassing approach to labor: one that can conceptualize equally the ability of collectivities to stop working, but also the ability to collectively continue to work, even on an unpaid basis. I will illustrate the contradictory role of the labor movement with examples from the Bahrain Teachers’ Association and the Bahrain Nursing Society. The majority of members of both associations were women. Finally, the Bahraini regime punished both forms of labor activism – both the teachers who went on strike, and the nurses who declared they would not strike but continue to work and care for the injured protesters.

The Issue Agenda, Party Competence and Popularity: An Empirical Analysis of Austria 1989–2004

This article analyses the effects of the issue agenda and of party competence on party popularity. Based on the salience and the issue ownership literatures, shifts in party support may be attributable to two factors: changing voter perceptions of issue salience and shifts in perceived party competence. We thus hypothesize that (1) a party's popularity increases if the public issue agenda changes in its favour such that its “best” issues become more important to voters and (2) that voters' changing perceptions of party competence account for shifting party popularity. Using annual macro data on voter perceptions of the issue agenda, party competence and popularity in Austria, we find no support for the first hypothesis. Rather, voter perceptions of party issue competence vary considerably and this variation accounts for the parties' level of popular support. This suggests that party competition plays out more by what politicians actually do and what impression they give about their deeds and competence than by exercising influence on the issue agenda.

Welfare program organization and legitimacy. A comparison of eleven OECD countries

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the institutionalisation of the Welfare State (WS) and its legitimacy, that is, until what extent the way of organising welfare programs have an impact on citizen’s perceptions of these programs and, hence, on the size and composition of the legitimacy basis of the WS. In order to comply with this objective the paper is organised as follows: first we will present data showing the cross-country variation in support for three main welfare programs (health care, old-age pensions, unemployment benefits); then we will analyse until what extent high levels of legitimacy are achieved through cross-class coalitions or cross-ideology coalitions. Finally we evaluate the impact of different program characteristics on the aggregate level of popular support each program achieves.

Plan Colombia’s Place in the Democratic Security Program of Alvaro Uribe Vélez

PLAN COLOMBIA’S PLACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY PROGRAM OF ALVARO URIBE VÉLEZ James D. Henderson Coastal Carolina University “With the help of Plan Colombia the Nation has increased control of its territory and has improved public security. Hence it has helped bring about a sense of public tranquility.” Security analyst Alfredo Rangel 1 The world was charmed on July 2, 2008, when it received word that the Colombian military had neatly plucked fifteen hostages from hands of the FARC, and had done it by duping the guerrillas. Colombians were ecstatic when they heard the news. Operation Checkmate was very much made in Colombia. Never before had the old adage “In Colombia the civilians make war and the military brings peace” been proven truer. Even the military’s U.S. allies had been kept in the dark about the daring rescue. As one Colombian put it, “the gringos knew that something was cooking in the jungle, when their spy planes reported unusual movement of hostage groups a few days before the rescue. But it was not until the day before the hostage extraction that any high U.S. official learned what was afoot. Hours before the mission Juan Manuel Santos briefed U.S. presidential candidate John McCain on the matter. McCain, on an official visit to Bogotá at the time, could only respond “My God!” “Good luck!”2 For the FARC, Operation Checkmate was the humiliating climax of a disastrous six months. The year 2008 had begun with massive marches protesting its long-term holding of hostages. Then in quick succession the guerrilla group witnessed the deaths of three members of its directorate, chief among them its founder Manuel Marulanda Vélez. These events put Colombians into an extraordinarily happy frame of mind, and no one benefited more from this than Alvaro Uribe Vélez. Elected president six years earlier, at a time when academics were labeling Colombia a failed state, and when the FARC continued to believe that it would march triumphantly into the national capital, Uribe had won election on the promise that he would make the country a safe place for the average Colombian. That by 2008 the two-term president had indeed done so drove his popularity rating to heights never before seen in the country. Following the hostage Presented at the 57th Annual Meeting of the South Eastern Council on Latin American Studies, Mexico City, April 9, 2010 C 2011 Southeastern Council on Latin American Studies and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 3 The Latin Americanist, March 2011 rescue Uribe’s approval rating reached ninety-two percent, likely a record in modern democratic politics in any country, especially for a chief executive well into his second elective term. Uribe’s popularity and level of administrative success stands unparalleled in Colombian history. All other public figures of his stature suffered slings and arrows while they were in the public eye. Simón Bolı́var died a broken, embittered man. Francisco de Paula Santander suffered exile following a failed assassination plot against Bolı́var. Rafael Núñez gave the nation a new constitution and a national anthem, but not peace. Rafael Reyes set Colombia on the path to economic modernization but was driven from the presidency and into exile . And Alfonso López Pumarejo brought important reforms to Colombia but was driven from office prematurely owing to scandals surrounding his administration and members of his immediate family. Only the slight, bespectacled, youthful-appearing Uribe, among Colombia’s leading political figures, will leave office with his popularity intact and to the accolades of his fellow citizens. In fairness to the luminaries of Colombian political history mentioned above, it must be pointed out that Alvaro Uribe took up leadership of the country with a level of popular support, and with substantial attending benefits, that no previous chief executive had ever enjoyed. As the most hard-line candidate in the 2002 presidential contest it was clear a priori that he would vigorously address the massive violence and kidnapping that afflicted Colombia at the time. Uribe had campaigned on the concept of “Democratic Security,” vowing to attack these problems. Colombians put their faith in Uribe and were gratified to see sharp...

What Sort of Semi-presidentialism do Finns Want? An Intra-systemic Comparative Analysis

Against the backdrop of moves by the political establishment, endorsed by political scientists, to shift towards a purely ceremonial presidency, this paper uses recent survey data to assess levels of popular support – and the socio-demographic structure of support – for two different types of semi-presidentialism in Finland. It represents an exercise in intra-country comparison – comparing public support for a return to the significant powers the head of state possessed under the 1919 constitution (Duverger-style semi-presidentialism) with backing for the more limited presidential prerogatives enshrined in the 2000 constitution (status quo semi-presidentialism). Correlation and multiple regression analysis of complementary data-sets led to two main findings. The vast majority of Finns seem content with the current limited powers of the president – status quo presidentialism – whilst among the minority that would apparently prefer a return to Duverger-style semi-presidentialism, there is a disproportionate number of persons with relatively low levels of formal education, low social status and predominantly left-wing party political persuasion.

Juristocracy vs. Theocracy: Constitutional Courts and the Containment of Sacred Law

AbstractOne of the fascinating yet seldom explored phenomena in predominantly religious polities in the Middle East and elsewhere is the growing reliance on constitutional courts and their jurisprudential ingenuity to contain the spread of religiosity or advance a pragmatic version of it. In this article, I explore the scope and nature of this phenomenon. I proceed in several main steps. First, I define what may be termed "constitutional theocracy" with its often conflicting legal commitments, political interests, and social realities. Second, I examine the main epistemological, juridical and political reasons why constitutional law and courts are so appealing to secularist, modernist, cosmopolitan, and other non-religious social forces in polities facing deep divisions along secular/religious lines. Third, I look at various modes of interpretive ingenuity drawn upon by constitutional courts in Egypt, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey in order to contain, limit, and mitigate the resurgence of religiosity in their respective polities. All of these countries have experienced a growth in the influence of religious political movements, with a commensurate increase in the levels of popular support that they receive. Despite the considerable differences in these countries' formal recognition of, and commitment to, religious values, there are, however, some striking parallels in the way that the constitutional courts in these (and in other similarly situated countries) have positioned themselves as important secularizing forces within their respective societies. I conclude by drawing some general lessons concerning the political construction of judicial review and the secularizing role of constitutional courts in an increasingly religious world.

The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization

Many terrorist factions care about the level of popular support they enjoy within a population they claim to represent. Empirically, this level of support can either rise or fall in the aftermath of a campaign of terrorist violence. Under what circumstances is the use of terror an effective tactic for mobilizing political support for an extremist group? This article models a scenario in which an extremist faction considers attacking a government in the hopes of provoking a counterterror response that will radicalize the population, increasing the extremists' support at the expense of a more moderate faction. In our scenario, such radicalization can result either from the economic damage caused by counterterror operations or by the way in which such operations change the population's assessment of the government's motivations. We demonstrate that such attempts at mobilizing public support can be, but need not be, successful, discuss factors that make both the initiation of a terror campaign and successful mobilization more or less likely, and relate our results to several empirical cases.

BURUNDI'S DDR AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PEACE

Extracted from text ... WALDEMAR FREY AND HENRI BOSHOFF BURUNDI'S DDR AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PEACE A F R I C A WA T C H The formal stages of the political transition in Burundi are drawing to a close with the elections now completed. The newly elected president, Pierre Nkurunziza, was installed on 26 August 2005 and the final set of elections, for the collines, was held on 23 September. The whole process was carried out with far less intimidation and violence than many observers had predicted and turnout was generally high, indicating a considerable level of popular support for a peaceful ..

Polling and Public Policy

This commentary distinguishes five reasons why one might want to conduct a survey concerning people's beliefs about death and the permissibility of harvesting organs: (1) simply to learn what people know and want; (2) to determine if current law and practice conform to the wishes of the population; (3) to determine the level of popular support for or opposition to policy changes; (4) to ascertain the causes and effects of popular beliefs and attitudes; and (5) to provide guidance in determining which law and practices are ethical. The commentary expresses qualms about how well surveys in general can perform with respect to the fifth objective, and it provides specific reasons to doubt whether this survey is informative from the perspective of a moral philosopher concerned with the nature of death and the contours of a permissible system of organ procurement.

Popular Satisfaction with the Party System and Representative Democracy in the United States

There are a variety of explanations for diminished levels of popular support for American government, institutions, and leaders evident since the Watergate era. Prominent theories focus on the changing nature of US political culture or perceptions of economic conditions. A plausible alternative explanation is that citizens feel inadequately represented by agents of government, and that the linkages facilitating representation no longer function effectively. Although the role of political parties often is portrayed as declining, parties still have the potential to be meaningful conduits for citizen representation. The article examines explanations for public support or alienation from various dimensions of the political system, focusing on citizens' orientations toward political parties. In general, it finds a strong connection between citizens' partisanship and feelings about political parties and their support for the political regime and democratic processes.

Modified Rapture All Round: The First Elections to the Scottish Parliament

AS ELECTION DAY APPROACHED IT SEEMED CERTAIN THAT LABOUR would come out on top and the Scottish National Party (SNP) would come second. Thanks to the new German-style electoral system it also seemed certain that Labour could not win an overall majority in the new Scottish Parliament and that the Conservatives would get some parliamentary representation however low their vote. But each of the parties had hopes and ambitions as well as expectations. Labour hoped to get over 60 seats in the new parliament of 129, enough at least to have the option of forming a minority government. The SNP hoped to get well over 40 seats, enough to let it assume the undisputed role of the opposition, and to mark a further step along the road to independence. The Liberal Democrats hoped to be more than a small but useful coalition partner in the new parliament. Out in the country they hoped the new electoral system would end the traditional handicap of a Liberal Democrat vote being dismissed as a ‘wasted vote’ and so let their votes rise to equal their underlying level of popular support. ‘Other’ parties and candidates hoped that the new electoral system and the new inclusive politics would somehow include them.

Les États—Unis d'Italie: la solution fédérative du problème national chez les démocrates du Risorgimento

SUMMARY In this article Franco Bozzi discusses the case made by the supporters of Italian Risortgimento, who advocated a federal structure for the new Italian national state. Because in the course of events, Cavour's model of a unitary state under the House of Savoy was adopted, it is often overlooked that coherent arguments were advanced, to the effect that the whole historical-political tradition of political life in Italy had been federalist, built around the tradition of the autonomous City Commune. Thinkers such as Carlo Cattaneo, Enrico Cemuschi and outsiders, including Proudhon, suggested that a federal structure for the new state would be in line with the political tradition of Italy and would attract a much higher level of popular support and consent, whereas a unitary structure would have to be enforced from above on a reluctant people. In the light of their thinking, the unification after 1860 could be seen, and has been interpreted, as a potential popular revolution that failed or was stifled by Cavour and the centralizers.