Legislative Reorganization Research Articles

근로자대표 관련 근로기준법 일부개정법률(안)에 대한 소고

The worker representative system has been expanded as the subject of written agreement and hearing opinions in labor laws, including the Labor Standards Act. Workers' representatives are recognized as important in determining working conditions at workplaces in a situation where the limitations of the traditional working condition determination system are faced due to the low labor union organization rate and diversification of employment types. However, in fact, there are no legal protection regulations for the selection procedure, method, status and activity guarantee of worker representatives, so they are not functioning properly. On October 16, 2020, the Economic, Social & Labor Council announced the results of the Labor-Management Agreement on the Improvement of the Workers' Representation System, and on March 6, 2023, the government announced the legislation of a partial amendment to the Labor Standards Act related to the Workers' Representation System based on the Economic, Social & Labor Council. However, it cannot be said that the government's legislative amendment bill has sought legislative measures in line with the principle of equal working conditions, and legislative reorganization should be prepared to enable equal decisions by labor and management, including when there is no labor union in the workplace based on Article 32 (3) of the Constitution or in light of the basic ideology of equal working conditions in labor contracts. Considering the relationship with the labor union, it is not easy to achieve its legal intention properly without an agreement between labor and management and constant efforts by labor and management to realize the system as originally intended. It will be necessary to seek an institutional search to realize the principle of equal working conditions even under realistic constraints, and giving workers' representatives a role in writing and changing employment rules is also positive in that sense.

Study on the Application Direction of the Deemed Authorization or Permission under the General Act on Public Administrative

The deemed authorization or permission has been widely introduced and used, but its contents and methods are not uniform. Although regulations on the licensing agenda were introduced in General Act on Public Administration, it is difficult to see that the legal issues surrounding the deemed authorization or permission have been clearly clarified with those regulations. Looking at the flow of the Supreme Court ruling and the interpretation of the Ministry of Legislation, the divisible deemed authorization or permission is widely accepted instead of integrated deemed authorization. Even in light of the related regulations under the General Act on Public Administrative, the application of the deemed authorization or permission should be developed on the premise of the divisible deemed authorization or permission. Relevant authorization is established internally through consultation of the relevant authorizing administrative authority , and takes effect externally through notification of the primary authorization. Accordingly, the relevant authorizing administrative authority may revoke or withdraw relevant authorization, and even in the case of a dispute over relevant authorization, the relevant authorizing administrative authority may become the defendant. If consultations cannot be reached because the relevant authorization requirements are not met, a lawsuit regarding the refusal of relevant authorization is filed against relevant administrative agency. On the other hand, if it is impossible to proceed with the project according to the primary authorization without relevant authorization, the primary authorization itself may be rejected. In this case, a lawsuit is brought against the refusal of both primary and relevant authorization. The litigation becomes complicated according to the concept of divisible deemed authorization or permission but this can be resolved through the introduction of procedural rules. To this end, It is necessary to introduce regulations on the indication of the administrative agency, the presentation of reasons for the refusal of the consultation, the object of dispute and the defendant. Finally, it is necessary to reexamine whether the omission of relevant authorization procedures is justified. Under the divisible deemed authorization or permission, relevant authorization procedures are guaranteed in principle, and procedures can only be omitted in exceptional cases if necessary for rapid business progress. Legislative reorganization should be made through a comprehensive review of individual laws. In addition, the relevant authorizing administrative authority should be allowed to proceed with relevant authorization procedures if necessary.

Who Conducts Oversight? Bill-Writers, Lifers, and Nail-Biters

The landmark Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 charges Congress, through its standing committees, to “exercise continuous watchfulness” over the executive branch. Yet committees differ markedly in their performance of this responsibility; the modal House committee convenes no oversight hearings in the typical year, while other committees hold many dozens of hearings. This Article compares the characteristics of committee chairs that pursue oversight vigorously with those that do not. Surprisingly, I find that chairs’ previous prosecutorial or other legal experience has no discernable connection with oversight activity. Instead, committees that engage in frequent oversight tend to be chaired by productive lawmakers (“bill-writers”), members with long tenures in office (“lifers”), and members facing competitive elections (“nailbiters”). Should congressional leaders desire to increase their branch’s role in governance after the passage of laws, they ought to encourage members with these characteristics to chair committees.

The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the Culture of Transparency, 1945–1975 by Michael Schudson

Reviewed by: The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the Culture of Transparency, 1945–1975 by Michael Schudson Tim Lacy The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the Culture of Transparency, 1945–1975. By Michael Schudson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2015. Given the ubiquity of invocations of the “Information Age” and the widely-shared assumptions behind it, particularly about the full accessibility of information and the right of the public to obtain it, one would think that more scholarly historical studies on those assumptions would be on record. In The Rise of the Right to Know, Michael Schudson unearths and examines those assumptions. His book traces a series of “openings”—the episodic “emergence of a culture of disclosure” and openness—in American politics, government, law, journalism, and society (17, 24). Schudson effectively argues that this emergence began many years before the onset of our Information Age. Indeed, Schudson’s central contribution is to move the advent of the rise of the right to know to the 1950s and early 1960s. The push for bureaucratic and political openness, he narrates, then converged with the cultural opening of the late 1960s, as well as with the spectacular growth in information storage and delivery that occurred in the 1970s. [End Page 104] The notion of “the right to know” encompasses a constellation of larger ideas, terms, and philosophical concerns: visibility, transparency, access, openness, disclosure, the public-private divide, privacy, secrecy. Schudson addresses these concerns. Those bigger issues animate, and make interesting, a series of mostly obscure politicians, bureaucrats, and activists. Of course, Ralph Nader and the various postwar presidents that move in and out of Schudson’s story are not obscure. But figures like John Moss, Philip A. Hart, John Douglas, Esther Peterson, Richard Conlon, Henry “Scoop” Jackson, Lynton Caldwell, and Gaylord Nelson are likely not familiar to those who work outside of political history or the history of government. It is a credit to Schudson that this text fosters a desire to learn more about each. To support his argument, Schudson uses these figures to focus the reader on a series of acts, groups, and initiatives that catalyzed the “right to know” as a phenomenon. These included: the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 1966), the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (1966), the push for food unit pricing and nutritional labeling, the Democratic Study Group (1959–1995) and its research reports, the Legislative Reorganization Act (1970), the rise of contextual/investigative journalism (i.e. an adversary press), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 1969) and its environmental impact statements, and, finally, the Inspectors General Act (1978). Each of these emerged from efforts that began before the late 1960s. For instance, the FOIA grew out of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and the work of California’s Democratic Congressman John Moss and his “Moss Committee” (Subcommittee on Government Information), which existed from 1955–1966 (37–45). Moss and members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors worked to pull back the “paper curtain” of executive secrecy (45–50). The work of Philip Hart and Esther Peterson on food packaging, pricing, and labeling came out of John F. Kennedy’s “consumer ‘bill of rights’,” articulated first on the 1960 campaign trail (64–66). Schudson definitely proves his thesis. And his discussion of recent political theory on democracy, focusing on John Keane, Bernard Manin, Pierre Rosanvallon, and Morton Keller, elevates the book philosophically. The new openness of information has enabled the multiplicity of public representation and government accountability. Schudson is most sympathetic to Keane’s construct of a “monitory democracy” to explain the myriad “political observatories” that counter the power of the administrative state (233–234, 257). The author confesses to an overall “positive appraisal” of these developments (24). They helped America become “more fully democratic than…before” (5). As such, Schudson does not attempt to explain the forces of counter or anti-knowledge, so ably covered in recent works by Robert Proctor, Noami Oreskes, and Erik Conway. It is not as if those forces disappeared after being explored and explained in Richard Hoftstadter’s famous 1963 work, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. Before and alongside the rise of the...

The Establishment of Party Policy Committees in the U.S. Senate: Coordination, Not Coercion*

ObjectiveWe seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intraparty coordination influenced observed levels of party unity in the U.S. Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.MethodsFirst, we examine Congress at the vote level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be classified as “party unity votes” before and after the establishment of the policy committees. Second, we employ a micro‐level analysis by examining individual senators’ procedural party support scores.ResultsWe find that members of the majority party were more likely to have higher levels of procedural unity after the adoption of policy committees.ConclusionThe establishment of party policy committees in the Senate played a role in helping party leaders coordinate activities, advance a legislative agenda, and maintain high levels of party unity on the floor by better structuring procedural votes.

国会法の制定

Parliamentary reform between 1945 and 1947 was one of the key policies implemented in Japan during the Allied occupation. It brought a fundamental change to the institutional arrangement of the Japanese legislature. This article finds that it was truly a by-product of the U.S. congressional reform around that time. The newly established National Diet of Japan bore a significant resemblance to the U.S. Congress reorganized by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Some novel institutions proposed by congressional reformers were struck down at home but survived on the opposite side of the world. Although the main content of the reform was not optimal for Japan, it was the best choice from the subjective view of GHQ/SCAP in Tokyo. The author also contends that GHQ/SCAP expected the House of Councillors to be an obstacle to the democratization of Japan. Thus it was rational for GHQ/SCAP to provide the House of Representatives with veto power that would infringe the autonomy of the upper chamber.

Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946–1999. By David H. Rosenbloom. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2000. 199p. $34.95 cloth.

In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure and Legislative Reorganization Act. In this legislation, Congress purposefully provided for itself a prominent role in the administration of the federal government. David Rosenbloom writes that the “… purpose of this book is to explain how and why Congress adopted that role, its underlying coherence, [and] its durability … for seemingly ever-increasing congressional involvement in federal administration …” (p. ix). The author maintains that Congress was uneasy about this endeavor but was forced by the “federal administrative state” to reposition itself. Some even believed that Congress' place in the constitutional scheme-of-things had been altered. For example, it was asserted that Congress was abandoning constitutional principle if it allowed unelected governmental administrators to make rules (i.e., administrative law). The 1946 legislation has resulted in a merger between Congress and the federal bureaucracy. The author contends that federal agencies became “extensions” of Congress' authority to make law. In addition, this legislation resulted in the view that the administration of the bureaucracy was no longer to be seen as the private preserve of the executive branch of government. The concept of “legislative-centered public administration” is used to describe the results of this legislation.

Building a legislative-centered public administration: Congress and the administrative state, 1946-1999

Before 1946 the congressional role in public administration had been limited to authorization, funding, and review of federal administrative operations, which had grown rapidly as a result of the New Deal and the Second World War. But in passing the Administrative Procedure Act and the Legislative Reorganization Act that pivotal year, Congress self-consciously created for itself a comprehensive role in public administration. Reluctant to delegate legislative authority to federal agencies, Congress decided to treat the agencies as extensions of itself and established a framework for comprehensive regulation of the agencies' procedures. Additionally, Congress reorganized itself so it could provide continuous supervision of federal agencies. Rosenbloom shows how these 1946 changes in the congressional role in public administration laid the groundwork for future major legislative acts, including the Freedom of Information Act (1966), Privacy Act (1974), Government in the Sunshine Act (1976), Paperwork Reduction Acts (1980, 1995), Chief Financial Officers Act (1990), and Small Business Regulatory Fairness Enforcement Act (1996). Each of these acts, and many others, has contributed to the legislative-centered public administration that Congress has formed over the past 50 years. This first book-length study of the subject provides a comprehensive explanation of the institutional interests, values, and logic behind the contemporary role of Congress in federal administration and attempts to move the public administration field beyond condemning legislative micromanagement to understanding why Congress values it.

Congressional Research Service Enviromental Reports Online: A Service of the National Library for the Environment

The most recent news about the NIE. Copyright Information: All rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. Contact the author or original publisher for any necessary permissions. eScholarship is not the copyright owner for deposited works. Learn more at http://www.escholarship.org/help_copyright.html#reuse Congressional Research Service Environmental Reports Online: A Service of the National Library for the Environment Frederick W. Stoss SUNY University at Buffalo Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports provide a major link between the scientific and public policy aspects of critical environmental issues. The Committee for the National Institute for the Environment provides free, full-text, online access to the CRS reports dealing with environmental quality, natural resources, and general environmental issues. The Committee for National Institute for the Environment (CNIE) http://www.cnie.org/ began providing, for the first time ever, free online full-text access to technical reports produced by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 1996. The CRS reports were provided from the CNIE's National Library for the Environment (NLE) Web site http://www.cnie.org/nle/. It was the desire by CNIE to identify a unique, major environmental information resource that was not readily available to the environmental research and policy communities (nor the public atlarge), and provide free, direct access to that resource. Making these CRS environmental reports freely available was the first information component provided through the newly created NLE Web site, and serves as an example of the type of information resource that can be provided by this proposed library gateway. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is the public policy research program of the Library of Congress. CRS provides comprehensive and reliable analysis, research, and information services that are timely, objective, nonpartisan, and confidential. CRS was created by an Act of Congress in 1914 as the Legislative Reference Service. It was renamed by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which expanded CRS's mandate to serve the needs of both Houses of Congress, especially service to its committees. CRS works exclusively and directly for all Members and committees of the Congress. Today CRS provides a full range of analytical and evaluative research and information services to both Members and committees of Congress. CRS reports and documents undergo review for accuracy and objectivity Stoss: Congressional Research Service Enviromental Reports Online: A Service of the Nation...

A model for a new approach to federal government information access and dissemination

The potential of electronic technologies to reduce costs, increase access, and decentralize federal information dissemination activities has sparked several legislative reorganization proposals. Congress has also called on the U.S. Government Printing Office to plan for a more electronic Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP). Realizing that developments to data were only opening salvos, the American Library Association President convened a Forum on Government Information Policy in July 1995. Representatives of several library associations developed a “Model for New Universe of Federal Information Access and Dissemination.” This article discusses the New Universe model, which includes two preliminary proposals: to reconceptualize federal information access and dissemination responsibilities and to reinvent the FDLP as a federal/ state/local library partnership program.

Congressional Oversight and the Diversity of Members' Goals

The literature on congressional oversight of the executive branch often argues that Congress fails at its mandate to oversee the bureaucracy comprehensively in large part because members of Congress receive so few political payoffs from oversight. 1 Although scholars differ on how adequate is the amount of oversight done by Congress, it is rarely, if ever, asserted that it approximates the standard of systematic and comprehensive oversight set by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Members of Congress are thought to be motivated to engage in activity that serves the reelection goal more directly than oversight, specifically, in passing legislation with particularized benefits for constituents and organized interests and in doing casework.2 Some recent studies of oversight likewise assume that legislators are motivated primarily or exclusively by the desire for reelection and, therefore, do oversight only when it serves their constituents and clientele groups. However, unlike earlier research, this more recent litera-

France and the fight against terrorism

This essay briefly examines the kinds of terrorism that have occurred in France in the past 20 years and the recent domestic and international measures taken to combat them. Domestically, countermeasures include legislative and procedural changes and reorganization of police structures and operations. On the international level, increased co‐operation has taken place in the areas of legal conventions, diplomatic initiatives and policing.

An Update on the Senate Democratic Policy Committee

The United States Congress has long been known for its lack of partisan cohesiveness and the inability of its majority parties to formulate and enact programs of policy. In the modern era (since the 1930s), policy leadership in the national government has come largely from the executive branch during the few periods of reasonably unified party rule (Roosevelt's New Deal, Johnson's Great Society). Over the past 35 years, the prevalence of divided government of a particular sort (Republican presidents with Democratic congressional majorities) has highlighted the internal divisions and lack of centralized power among congressional Democrats. There is, therefore, a natural interest in instruments of party leadership that are designed to offset the tendencies toward fragmentation and parochialism in Congress. The focus of this paper is on the Senate Democratic Policy Committee.The Senate's version of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 included provisions for the establishment of party policy committees. This legislation stemmed largely from the work of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, known as the LaFollette-Monroney Committee. The Joint Committee's report called for the establishment of policy committees “to formulate overall legislative policy of the two parties” (Bone 1956, 342). The Committee's work was informed by, and part of, an active reform effort at that time (which included many political scientists) aimed at bringing about stronger parties that could be held accountable for certain policy outcomes (see for example Committee on Congress, American Political Science Association 1945; Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress 1946; Galloway 1946; Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association 1950).

An Update on the Senate Democratic Policy Committee

The United States Congress has long been known for its lack of partisan cohesiveness and the inability of its majority parties to formulate and enact programs of policy. In the modern era (since the 1930s), policy leadership in the national government has come largely from the executive branch during the few periods of reasonably unified party rule (Roosevelt's New Deal, Johnson's Great Society). Over the past 35 years, the prevalence of divided government of a particular sort (Republican presidents with Democratic congressional majorities) has highlighted the internal divisions and lack of centralized power among congressional Democrats. There is, therefore, a natural interest in instruments of party leadership that are designed to offset the tendencies toward fragmentation and parochialism in Congress. The focus of this paper is on the Senate Democratic Policy Committee.The Senate's version of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 included provisions for the establishment of party policy committees. This legislation stemmed largely from the work of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, known as the LaFollette-Monroney Committee. The Joint Committee's report called for the establishment of policy committees “to formulate overall legislative policy of the two parties” (Bone 1956, 342). The Committee's work was informed by, and part of, an active reform effort at that time (which included many political scientists) aimed at bringing about stronger parties that could be held accountable for certain policy outcomes (see for example Committee on Congress, American Political Science Association 1945; Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress 1946; Galloway 1946; Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association 1950).

The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970

The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970

The Performance of House Committee Staff Functions: a Comparative Exploration

THERE has been considerable growth in the size of the congressional bureaucracy in recent decades. This growth has signaled an increasingly important role for the nonelected participant in the legislative process. Legislators are becoming even more dependent upon their professional staffs to help them identify problems, develop legislation, and work with other actors in the political system. Clearly, one might question whether this staff expansion or explosion has only positive consequences. Senator Barry Goldwater, for example, complains that staff runs Congress. You get off the elevator to vote and you have to beat your way through 50 or 60 of them standing around (Farney 1979). Representative Morris Udall agrees. You can become a prisoner of your staff .... Congress ought to focus on the big issues, but I spend about half my time in fights that my staff or somebody else's staff gets me into (Farney 1979). Like it or not, the growing staff bureaucracy is part of recent congressional history. The number of committee, personal, and support staff has grown steadily since the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. In the decade between 1970 and 1980 the number of congressional staff almost doubled. Specifically, the House, in 1980, employed 8,667 personal staff members, while the Senate had 4,281. Additionally, House committee staffers numbered 1,818, while their Senate counterparts totaled 1,108 (Davidson and Oleszek 1981: 238). Finally, congressional aides working in support agencies such as the Library of Congress, General Accounting Office, and the Congressional Budget Office numbered several thousand (Fox and Hammond 1977: 3). The manner in which professional staff members operate influences not only the legislative environment but also the making of legislative policy. Committee staffers, even more than their member office staff counterparts, are highly trained specialists (Fox and Hammond 1977: 44-46). The orientation that they have toward their work affects the number and kinds of projects their committees undertake. While their influence is dependent on the legislators' receptivity to their efforts, in many instances staff exercise a great deal of discretion in the handling of issues. The way that staffers define and perform their jobs thus has an important impact on what committee members are able or inclined to do (Price 1981: 173).

LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM: EVALUATING REGIME POLICY

It is often said that it is in the realm of regime policy that political scientists have most extensively contributed to public policy analysis. The political system's constitutional rules and institutional structures have been major objects of political research, while the substance of public policy, or the consequences of substantive public policy, have been analyzed much less extensively. Promontories of the regimethe party system, the presidential election system, apportionment of legislatures, congressional and state legislative organization-have been traditional targets of inquiry, sometimes diagnosis, and occasionally agenda for institutional change. The general problem is, of course, to juxtapose goals, purposes, or functions on the one side, and capability, effectiveness, or performance on the other, and then to assess political institutions in terms of how well they meet their goals, fulfill their purposes, or perform their functions. In the case of American state legislatures, the professional and quasi-professional literature of political science fairly abounds in various attempts to evaluate legislative capability or effectiveness, and recommend institutional changes. Political scientists can claim only very modest success in connection with their involvement in movements to effect changes in regime policies. Particularly in the case of state legislative reform, the research contribution made by political scientists has been distinctively modest. To the greatest extent, this is probably due to the fact that other, more theoretical concerns have preoccupied political scientists, but to some extent it is the case because of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The implications for political science research relevant to state legislative reorganization which are widely

The Electronic Voting System for the United States House of Representatives

The most important voting procedure traditionally utilized in the United States House of Representatives to resolve legislative issues involves a time-consuming roll call of Representatives' names. It has been recognized for a number of years that this cumbersome feature of the legislative process could be automated so that a more efficient use of Members' time would be possible. The year 1970 saw the fruition of several years' effort to achieve a broad range of Congressional reforms. Not since 1946, when important structural changes in Committees and their staffs were made, had there been a generalized reform of Congressional, procedures. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (PL 91-510) in section 121 specifically provides that electronic equipment may be used to record votes in the. House of Representatives. The Senate, a body of only 100, has not chosen to employ automated voting procedures.

Statement before Executive and Legislative Reorganization Subcommittee of House Committee on Government Operations on Reorganizaton Plan No. 2 of 1965, the Environmental Science Services Administration, June 9, 1965

statement before Executive and Legislative Reorganization Subcommittee of House Committee on Government Operations on Reorganizaton Plan No. 2 of 1965, the Environmental Science Services Administration, June 9, 1965