The article is devoted to the issues of criminal law protection of objects created by artificial intelligence. Currently, there is a legislative vacuum both in regulating the activities of artificial intelligence in general, and in matters of criminal liability for the use of these objects. The author highlights two aspects of the designated problem. First, a decision is needed regarding the possibility of recognising the algorithm as the author of the work it creates and, accordingly, fixing the copyright on this object. Secondly, it is required to study the features of objective and subjective signs of criminal acts in relation to such works. Considering the problem in the context of the theory of intellectual property and the social conditionality of the criminal law protection of intellectual property objects, the author comes to the conclusion that at present there are no grounds for recognising artificial intelligence systems as authors of works. However, the exclusive rights to such objects should belong to the owners of the algorithms. Accordingly, such results of the work of artificial intelligence can be recognised as the subject of crimes against intellectual property. Based on this position, the author describes the features of the criminal law characteristics of crimes against objects created by artificial intelligence, and defines these crimes as committed with direct intent on a large scale, illegal use of an intellectual property object or disclosure of the essence of an industrial property object created using information technologies and artificial intelligence technologies.