Left-wing Governments Research Articles

Policy space and regional predilections: Partisanship and trade agreements in Latin America

ABSTRACTSeveral prominent political economy models of trade policy, at first glance, seem to suggest that leftist governments in Latin America have strong incentives to sign preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The Heckscher–Ohlin model, for instance, predicts that the ideological left in the developing world will favour trade liberalization. Other research, specifically on trade agreements, suggests that leftist governments sign such treaties to credibly signal a commitment to sound economic policies. In light of these predictions, it is perhaps surprising that many left-wing Latin American governments have been especially averse to signing PTAs. In this article, I provide an explanation for the partisan left's disposition toward trade agreements. First, I identify the ways in which PTAs can be difficult to reconcile with hardline or populist left-wing governance. Second, I explore the conditions under which left governments are most inclined to sign trade agreements. I anticipate that regional commonalities and shared partisanship increase the prospects for cooperation. A statistical analysis of PTA signing in 18 Latin American countries, as well as a more in-depth treatment of several cases, yields results consistent with my expectations. These findings have implications for the literature on the political economy of trade agreements as well as the scholarship on globalization in the Latin American context.

Government Ideology and Tuition Fee Policy: Evidence from the German States

In January 2005, the German Supreme Court permitted the state governments to charge tuition fees. By exploiting the natural experiment, we examine how government ideology influenced tuition fee policy. The results show that right-wing governments were active in introducing tuition fees. By contrast, left-wing governments strictly denied tuition fees. This pattern shows clear political alternatives in education policy across the German states: the political left classifies tuition fees as socially unjust; the political right believes that tuition fees are incentive compatible. By the end of 2014, however, there will be no tuition fees anymore: the political left won four state elections and abolished tuition fees. In Bavaria, the right-wing government also decided to abolish tuition fees because it feared to become elected out of office by adhering to tuition fees. Electoral motives thus explain convergence in tuition fee policy. (JEL codes: D72, I22, I28, H75)

Ecce Homo Novus: snapshots, the ‘new man’, and iconic montage in the work of Santiago Alvarez

This essay explores Santiago Alvarez's iconic, montage-style filmmaking as it prefigured Modernity's accelerated crisis as produced by transnational capitalism and theorized years later by poststructuralists and postmodernists. Alvarez, one of the fathers of New Latin American Cinema, stands as an ever more relevant mentor for many contemporary young filmmakers in terms of his lessons about audience cultivation and politicized, immediate, innovative image-making in a context of what he termed ‘accelerated underdevelopment’. His aesthetic of limited resources and limited time and his early emphasis on the tactless camera eye has become a veritable weapon for change for many filmmakers in Latin America's latest decade, which saw successive economic crises, the failure of neoliberal policies, and a rise in left wing governments.

Political cycle and fiscal policy in the countries of the European Union

The efforts of politicians in power to affect the decisions of voters through expansive fiscal policies in pre-election periods are still topical. This article determines whether governments in European Union countries initiate the political-budget cycle. We analyse 23 EU member states in the period 1995–2008. We pay attention to four institutional factors that can contribute to the creation of the political-budget cycle: length of democracy, type of parliamentary election, term of election and ideology. We find that the political-budget cycle was present throughout European Union countries in this period. The factor of the length of democracy had a small impact on the statistical significance of the results. However, ideology turned out to be the most important factor in our analysis. Current revenues were used as a tool of fiscal policy in the years of elections predominantly by ideologically mixed governments. Left-wing governments used rather the expenditure side of the budget to win the favour of the electorate. The type of election (regular or early) became relevant only in specific cases and in combination with other institutional factors. Finally, the new EU member governments consider the spring or autumn term of the election as a criterion co-determining their pre-election fiscal policies.

Conditional Election and Partisan Cycles in Government Support to the Agricultural Sector: An Empirical Analysis

We examine the effect of elections and government ideology on public funding to the agricultural sector using a panel model for more than 70 democratic countries from 1975‐2009. We find that support for agriculture increases prior to elections, and that right‐wing governments redistribute more income to the agricultural sector than left‐wing governments. Political cycles are conditional on certain factors; for example, elections have a stronger effect on support under right‐wing cabinets. Further, in industrialized countries, the election (partisan) effect is strongest under majoritarian (proportional) electoral systems. In developing countries, the election (partisan) effect is strongest under proportional (majoritarian) electoral systems.

Globalization, Factor Mobility, Partisanship, and Compensation Policies

This paper examines the relationship between economic globalization, factor mobility, government partisanship, and the relative budgetary salience of two different instruments of compensation policies: social welfare spending and industrial subsidy provision. While welfare spending directly benefits labor, industrial subsidies benefit both capital owners and labor along the sectoral line. Based on both factoral and sectoral models of trade, we theoretically argue and empirically show that governments are more likely to use welfare politics as compensation policies if free trade generates class-based interests in the society, and subsidy politics if trade openness promotes industry-based interests. We also argue that the interactions of the three variables are contingent on government partisanship. When non-class-based interests are salient as a consequence of trade openness, left-wing governments are likely to focus on welfare politics while right-wing governments favor provision of subsidies. However, when class-based interests are salient, even right-wing governments behave similarly to left-wing governments, favoring welfare spending over subsidies as the key compensation policy. In the analysis of compensation policies in the OECD countries between 1980 and 2001, the test results confirm our expectations.

The state of poverty: Elite perceptions of the poor in Brazil and Uruguay

This article approaches elites’ perceptions of poverty, inequality, and social policy in Brazil and Uruguay from democratization to the recent shift toward left-wing governments. It explores elites’ perceptions of the roles of the state, the market, and their own role in relation to poverty. The analysis relies on a series of elite surveys targeting leaders from the state and government, the corporate world, and the third sector in Brazil and Uruguay. The main argument is that poverty and inequality can be perceived by elites as a source of political and social threats, potentially motivating elites to embrace collective action and policy support. Although Brazil and Uruguay are often treated as opposite cases in Latin America, they share similarities in the way in which their national elites have dealt with poverty and inequality since democratization. From authoritarian regimes to cash transfer programs, the historical inheritance of a business-state and the threats posed by the poor pushed elites toward similar measures, although often based on different understandings of poverty and inequality.

The Drug Policy Reform Agenda in the Americas

Latin America has emerged at the vanguard of efforts to promote debate on drug policy reform. For decades, Latin American governments largely followed the drug control policies and programs of Washington’s so-called war on drugs.Yet two parallel trends have resulted in a dramatic change in course: the emergence of left-wing governments that have challenged Washington’s historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism and growing frustration with the failure of the prohibitionist drug control model put forward by the US government. In recent years, the regional debate on drug policy issues -- long dormant -- has surged as evident in media coverage, renewed interest on the part of academia, the emergence of grassroots initiatives such as the cannabis reform movement, and perhaps most importantly, calls for reconsideration of prevailing drug policies by a range of local and national officials.For the first time, sitting presidents are questioning the underlining premises of the international drug control paradigm and calling for debate on alternative approaches. Their actions have had repercussions internationally, as those presidents have successfully pushed for debate within the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN).

Partisan Convergence in Emerging Economies: What Can We Learn from Stock Markets?

Globalization theorists have long argued that the convergence of left-wing and right-wing governments' agendas has made alternation of power irrelevant from the economic perspective, particularly in emerging economies heavily dependent on foreign savings. So far, however, the difficulties involved in quantifying integration and the lack of reliable data has made empirical work on these regions mostly inconclusive. In this article, I argue that stock market responses to national elections provide a simple and rather effective measure of partisan convergence on economic outcomes, suitable to testing this claim. Results challenge convergence theories, pointing to a scenario of partial divergence, whereby markets respond to elections along partisan lines but their capacity to anticipate a government’s agenda during the campaign is limited, even when electoral results are predictable. Compared to developed democracies, I find that the magnitude of market responses to elections is still significantly larger in the emerging markets.

HEALTH CARE AND IDEOLOGY: A RECONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC HEALTHCARE FUNDING IN THE OECD

In this article, we examined if partisan ideology and electoral motives influence public healthcare expenditure (HCE) in countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We distinguished between the effects on the growth of the expenditures and its adjustment to violations of a long-run equilibrium linking HCE with macroeconomic and demographic trends. Regarding the influence of partisan ideology, we found that if governments are sufficiently long in power, right-wing governments spend less on public health than their left-wing counterparts. Furthermore, if a right-wing party governs without coalition partners, it responds more strongly to deviations from the long-run HCE equilibrium than left-wing governments. With regard to electoral motives, we found that health expenditure increases in years of elections. Independent of their partisan ideology, single-party (minority) governments induce higher (lower) growth of public HCE. Each of these political factors by its own may increase (decrease) HCE growth by approximately one percentage point. Given an average annual growth of HCE of approximately 4.1%, political factors turn out to be important determinants of trends in public HCE.

Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs

This study investigates how government ideology matters for the success of World Bank economic policy loans, which typically support market-liberalizing reforms. A simple model predicts that World Bank staff will invest more effort in designing an economic policy loan when faced with a left-wing government. Empirically, estimates from a Heckman selection model show that the quality at entry of an economic policy loan is significantly higher for governments with a left-wing party orientation. This result is robust to changes in the sample, alternative measures of ideology, different estimation techniques and the inclusion of additional control variables. Next, robust findings from estimating a recursive triangular system of equations indicate that leftist governments comply more fully with loan agreements. Results also suggest that World Bank resources are more productive -- in terms of reform success -- in the design of policy operations than in their supervision. Anecdotal evidence from several country cases is consistent with the finding that left-wing governments receive higher quality loans.

Italy and the F-35

Italy's participation in the F-35 procurement program was initially decided in 1998 by the left-wing government under Massimo D'Alema, the leader of the former Italian Communist Party, which invested US$10 million in the Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP) of the program. In 2002 the right-wing government led by Silvio Berlusconi confirmed this strategic choice by committing $1,028 billion to the System Design and Development (SDD) phase and by signing the US-Italy memorandum of understanding (MOU). In 2007 the left-wing government guided by Romano Prodi signed the bilateral MOU for the Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD) phase with an investment of $904 million. Finally, in 2009, again under a Berlusconi government, the Italian parliament approved the acquisition of 131 F-35, including 69 F-35 A (Conventional Take Off and Landing, or CTOL) variants and 62 B (Short Take Off Vertical Landing, or STOVL) variants. At that time, the Italian government also agreed to build a Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) and Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul, and Upgrade (MROU second is the industrial rationale, based on the strategic interests of Italy's defence industry in participating in the procurement program; third is the multinational rationale-the strong inclination of Italian policymakers to pursue defence procurement and, generally speaking, defence policy in multinational frameworks; and fourth is the transatlantic rationale, based on the importance Italy attaches to bilateral relations with the US and NATO. Beginning in 2012, the budgetary constraints caused by the Eurozone crisis in almost all European countries, including Italy, fuelled a political debate over the costs and benefits of Italian participation in the F-35 program that revolved largely around these four rationales. …

Economic Freedom and Government Ideology across the German States

Potrafke N. Economic freedom and government ideology across the German states, Regional Studies. This paper examines whether government ideology influenced economic freedom across the German states. The results show that in former West Germany rightwing governments promoted economic freedom, whereas leftwing governments confined it. In the former East Germany, however, rightwing governments were not associated with propagating economic freedom. This finding appears to conflict with the common notion of policy convergence at the federal level. In fact, the observed variation in political preferences across states may indicate that politicians gratify the local electorate and, in return, offer moderate policies at the federal level. Potrafke N. 德国各州的经济自由与政府理念，区域研究。本文考察了政府理念如何影响德国各州的经济自由。结果表明，前西德右翼政府主推经济自由，而左翼政府则对此进行了否定。然而，前东德右翼政府并未对经济自由进行积极宣传干预。这一发现似乎有悖于联邦政府层面政策趋同这一普遍性认识。事实上，各州间政治倾向上的显著差异可能意味着政治家取悦地方选民举动，反过来也会为联邦政府层面提供相对缓和的政策。 经济自由 政府与政治理念 机构 德国政府 面板数据 Potrafke N. La liberté économique et l'idéologie du gouvernement à travers les états allemands, Regional Studies. Cet article cherche à examiner si, oui ou non, l'idéologie du gouvernement influe sur la liberté économique à travers les états allemands. Les résultats montrent que dans l'ex-Allemagne de l'Ouest, les gouvernements de droite ont favorisé la liberté économique, tandis que les gouvernements de gauche l'ont limitée. Cependant, dans l'ex-Allemagne de l'Est, les gouvernements de droite ne se sont pas associés à la promotion de la liberté économique. Il semble que ce résultat va à l'encontre des idées reçues sur la convergence de la politique au niveau fédéral. En effet, il se peut que la variation observée des préférences politiques à travers les états puissent indiquer que les hommes politiques gratifient l'électorat local et, en contrepartie, proposent des politiques modérées au niveau fédéral. Liberté économique Idéologie politique du gouvernement Institutions États allemands Enquête à échantillon constant Potrafke N. Wirtschaftliche Freiheit und Regierungsideologie in den verschiedenen deutschen Bundesstaaten, Regional Studies. In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, ob sich die Regierungsideologie auf die wirtschaftliche Freiheit in den verschiedenen deutschen Bundesstaaten ausgewirkt hat. Aus den Ergebnissen geht hervor, dass rechtsgerichtete Regierungen in der alten Bundesrepublik Deutschland die wirtschaftliche Freiheit förderten, während linksgerichtete Regierungen sie einschränkten. In der ehemaligen DDR zeichneten sich rechtsgerichtete Regierungen hingegen nicht durch eine Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Freiheit aus. Dieses Ergebnis scheint der generellen Vorstellung einer politischen Konvergenz auf Bundesebene zu widersprechen. Tatsächlich könnten die beobachteten Unterschiede bei den politischen Präferenzen in den einzelnen Bundesstaaten darauf hinweisen, dass die Politiker die Wählerschaft auf lokaler Ebene zufrieden zu stimmen versuchen und deshalb wiederum auf Bundesebene gemäßigte Politiken anbieten. Wirtschaftliche Freiheit Regierung und politische Ideologie Institutionen Deutsche Bundesstaaten Paneldaten Potrafke N. Libertad económica e ideología gubernamental en los Estados alemanes, Regional Studies. En este artículo analizamos si la ideología gubernamental ha influido en la libertad económica en los Estados alemanes. Los resultados indican que en la antigua Alemania Occidental los Gobiernos de derecha fomentaron la libertad económica, mientras que los Gobiernos de izquierda la limitaron. Sin embargo, en la antigua Alemania Oriental los Gobiernos de derecha no estaban vinculados al fomento de la libertad económica. Estos resultados parecen entrar en conflicto con la noción común de convergencia política a nivel federal. De hecho, la variación observada en las preferencias políticas en los diferentes Estados podría indicar que los políticos gratifican al electorado local y, a su vez, ofrecen políticas moderadas a nivel federal. Libertad económica Ideología política y gubernamental Instituciones Estados alemanes Datos de panel

The opposition's policy influence through issue politicisation

AbstractIn a quantitative study using unique quarterly data across two decades, this article addresses the opposition's opportunities to influence policy; a topic that has been neglected in existing party-policy research. The idea that is developed is applied to a remarkable policy development on crime during the Danish leftwing government in the 1990s. Contrary to its policy position when it took office in 1993, the leftwing government repeatedly adopted severe restrictions to penal policy. The policy position of the rightwing opposition and its vehement and persistent criticism of the government provide an explanation, the article argues. Taking media coverage, public opinion, violence statistics, and the government's performance into account, the analysis shows that opposition criticism spurred the penal policy restrictions. Hence, by incorporating a policy agenda perspective, this article encourages a broadening of the perspective on parties’ policy influence. In particularly the opposition's opportunities to politicise issues and hereby influence policy.

A right-to-left policy switch? An analysis of the Honduran case under Manuel Zelaya

A member of the Honduran elite and elected president with a right-of-center platform in 2005, Manuel Zelaya soon came to be allied with Latin America’s bloc of radical left-wing governments – this being the first case of a post-democratization right-to-left policy switch in the region. The aim of this article is to assess the reasons that could have motivated Zelaya’s ideological turn. After a brief discussion of the Honduran political process, we review the literature about the issue of policy switching and proceed to an empirical analysis of the Honduran case. We find that the fragility of the country’s energy sector and the alliance with Venezuela in a context of international economic crisis and high oil prices could have triggered a causal mechanism in Honduras similar to the one caused by currency scarcity and international pressure pointed to by the literature as the leading cause for traditional left-to-right switches, which suggests that this case study could serve as a pattern-matching exercise to the general findings of currently accepted switch theory.

Greek Drama on a Global Stage

Greek Drama on a Global Stage

Empirical determinants of in-kind redistribution: Partisan biases and the role of inflation

There is a dearth of research on the determinants of in-kind redistribution. Using dynamic panel data estimations for 32 OECD countries, we show that the in-kind share of social benefits is lower under left-wing governments. This effect is weakened when left-wing governments respond to inflation by increasing the share of in-kind transfers.

Determination of Local Tax mix: Evidence from Spain

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the local tax mix in Spain. As the main local own revenues, we analyze the five local taxes -with the property tax as the main source- and fees and charges. The study relies on a sample of 130 municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants for the years 2005 and 2009. The results show the relevance of scale variables such as the population or total assets, but per capita income and grants are not significant. In political terms, we observe that ideology is important and fragmentation plays a limited role: the property tax share tends to be lower with left-wing governments, who favor revenues using the benefit principle.

Ideology and Fiscal Policy: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the German States

Is government ideology important for fiscal policy? I study this question with data from all German States over the period 1975-2005. To identify the effect of ideology, I rely on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. I find that left-wing state governments spend more than state governments with right-wing and mixed ideology. Deficits of left-wing governments are larger than those of right-wing governments but smaller than those of governments with mixed ideology. These results are robust to sensitivity tests.

The Political Consequences of Terrorism: Terror Events, Casualties, and Government Duration

How does transnational terrorism affect the stability of parliamentary governments? Does terrorism cause some governments to fail prematurely and/or does it enhance the probability that some governments will stay in office longer than they otherwise would? Using a duration model on a sample of 18 advanced parliamentary democracies between the late-1960s and 2003, we find that terrorism exacerbates the likelihood of government failure for some governments but not others. Our principal finding is that right-oriented governments are able to keep their hold on power more than left-wing governments when confronted with transnational terrorism.