In the World of International Affairs Punditry, it is both fashionable and profitable to take extreme positions about the future of international relations. What is happening and what will happen in the world, however, is more complex and almost always less extreme than the predictions that catch the attention of the popular press and even the front-line scholarly journals. Such is the case for discussions of American decline and the prospects for stability in the international system: pessimists predict increasing system-wide conflict while optimists foresee a world of growing interdependence and transnational co-operation. But when the empirical record is examined in three policy areas that are important to the maintenance of international system stability -- foreign aid, debt relief, and international peacekeeping such extreme judgments are more eye-catching than valid.Put simply, the relative decline of American power has not led to a prolonged, across-the-board decrease in international efforts to maintain the stability of the international system. If anything, such efforts increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, only to turn downward after the 1994 American elections swept the Republicans into control of both houses of Congress for the first time since the 1950s. Thereafter, the level and intensity of efforts did not return to the modest pre-1980 policy approaches. The growth of international commitments to maintaining stability and the partial retrenchment that followed make a case for muted optimism about the future of a stable world system and demonstrate the contributions of non-Americans to that goal. The developments in the Canadian-led landmines negotiations in 1997 provide one example in which non-Americans led the way toward resolving an issue that is important to international stability and peace. Given the obvious reluctance of the United States, Russia, and China to move decisively on that issue, one can argue that progress would not have occurred without Canadian leadership. When taken in tandem with the aid, debt, and peacekeeping data presented below, events such as these demonstrate the crucial role of non-hegemons to the success of international initiatives and point toward an evolving, more specialized, and narrowly focussed United States activism in the world.PerspectivesOne fashionable extreme argues pessimistically that the stability of the international system has and will further become a casualty of the apparent withdrawal of the United States from a dominant, activist role in world affairs. In this view, contributions which focus on maintaining and enhancing the stability of the global system will decline without an American hegemon to serve as underwriter and disproportionately large contributor to the goals and policy tools of stability. The assumption is that a United States faced with domestic preoccupations, superpower fatigue, diminishing relative resources, and no overarching adversary will do less for global welfare. Moreover, others have not, will not, and possibly cannot do more. This selfish, neo-isolationist behaviour will harm the general welfare of the nations and populations of the world. The result: apres les Etats Unis, le deluge.(f.1)The other fashionable extreme is optimism. Socio-economic globalists see a world unified not by any political entity, but by the new information and communications technology, economic and cultural globalization, and the prevalence of widely shared beliefs about a common human fate, about moral obligations, and about international status. In this view, distant foreign developments acquire immediate relevance within domestic society. Failure to address foreign concerns clashes with notions of proper and rewarding behaviour and may be dangerous to interests back home. As new political and social communities rise, national governments and the international organizations they control are pushed to counter threats to system stability. …