Leadership In China Research Articles

China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth?

China is the fastest growing country in the world. Yet its adherence to the Rule of Law is frequently criticized. Does the coexistence of these two facts mean that institutions in general, and the Rule of Law in particular, are not necessary for sustained economic growth? The experience of the Asian Tigers, who had an overall growth record in their early years at least equal to China's, suggests that China may face a slowdown in growth. China is still a poor country, poorer than the Asian Tigers when their growth slowdown began. The Asian Tigers faced many of the same problems of crony capitalism, connected lending and poor corporate governance that China now faces. China's institutional and governance weaknesses involve a weak judiciary, including a lack of judicial independence; a weak financial sector with inadequate banking and corporate bond markets; and an outmoded bankruptcy system. Yet China's leadership, starting with Deng Xiaoping, has avoided some of the missteps of the transition countries of the former Soviet Union and has recognized the need for an evolutionary approach toward a more efficient economic system. But there is nothing in China's experience to date that would lead to the conclusion that institutional and Rule of Law issues are not important in economic development.

Quantifying regional economic impacts of CO2 intensity targets in China

To address rising energy use and CO2 emissions, China's leadership has enacted energy and CO2 intensity targets under the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), which are defined at both the national and provincial levels. We develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with global coverage that disaggregates China's 30 provinces and includes energy system detail, and apply it to assess the impact of the current binding provincial CO2 emissions intensity targets. We compare the impact of the provincial targets approach to a single target for China that achieves the same reduction in CO2 emissions intensity at the national level. The national target assumes trading of emissions allowances across provinces, resulting in the least-cost reductions nationwide. We find that the national target results in about 20% lower welfare loss in China relative to the provincial targets approach. Given that the regional distribution of impacts has been an important consideration in the target-setting process, we focus on the changes in provincial-level CO2 emissions intensity, CO2 emissions, energy consumption, and economic welfare. We observe significant heterogeneity across provinces in terms of the energy system response as well as the magnitude of welfare impacts. We further model the current policy of fixed end-use electricity prices in China and find that national welfare losses increase. Assumptions about capital mobility have a substantial impact on national welfare loss, while changing assumptions about the future availability of domestic natural gas resources does not have a large effect.

Changing of the Guard

When Jiang Zemin was elevated to be general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, the Party's topmost official position, in the wake of the suppression of the Tiananmen protests in June 1989, few thought he would wield much power. At that time, the Party general secretary was not the real leader but was more of a clerk who had to please several elderly bosses; nor did he have secure tenure, as Jiang's two predecessors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, found out to their sorrow. To the surprise of most "China watchers", however, Jiang has not only survived politically, but has also consolidated his authority. Ever since the deaths of Chen Yun in 1995 and Deng Xiaoping in 1997, Jiang has emerged as China's unrivaled leader and has wielded impressive power. Under Jiang's stewardship, China's leadership structure, factional alignments and policymaking processes have undergone remarkable changes that are in stark contrast with elite politics under Deng Xiaoping.

Inside the leader relationship: constructive controversy for team effectiveness inChina

AbstractResearch is needed to understand the dynamics by which high‐quality leader relationships have their productive effects on followers. This study proposes that these leader relationships do not simply induce compliance but encourage employees and managers to discuss their diverse views open‐mindedly and constructively. Team leaders indicated leader–member relationship with employees who rated their constructive controversy and their team's effectiveness and feelings of respect, support, and reduced stress. Structural equation analysis suggested that leader–member relationship affects employee team productivity and emotions through constructive controversy. The study's findings and previous research were interpreted as suggesting that high‐quality leader relationships coupled with constructive controversy provide a foundation for effective team leadership inChina.

Do Land Revenue Windfalls Reduce the Career Incentives of County Leaders? Evidence from China

We analyze a dataset constructed on the political turnovers of 3,623 county leaders in China during 1999-2008, and nd that their career incentives|the institutional foundations of China’s three decades of sustained economic growth|remain powerful. This is in spite of a policy shock that assigns to them the residual claiming rights over land revenues and their having substantially more discretionary revenue to spend as a result. Specically, the county leaders spend signicantly more to signal their

Chinese Agriculture Development Cooperation in Africa: Narratives and Politics

Chinese agriculture engagements are redefining the ‘aid’ landscape, moving from a paradigm of development assistance to one of development cooperation mixed with investment. China's leadership asserts that this approach ‘infuses new life’ into South–South cooperation and ‘promote[s] the establishment of a fair and rational new international political and economic order’ (GOV 2010: 2). Based on a review of documents and interviews with 30 informants, this article explores Chinese discourses, justifications and critiques underpinning China–Africa cooperation in agriculture. While mainstream Chinese discourse on China–Africa agriculture cooperation focuses on the mutual advantages and the opportunities these create, some are developing alternative frameworks for China–Africa agriculture cooperation. China's approach in African agriculture reflects both current debates and historical experiences of modernising and liberalising China's own rural economy. The article concludes that a more nuanced understanding of Chinese motivations can support constructive and active engagement by African partners with China.

Building Asia-Pacific Regional Institution: The Role of APEC

East Asia, influenced by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997-97 and the current financial tsunami starting from 2008, is undergoing fundamental changes in its regional governance and economic cooperation. The region's inter- state cooperation and institutional building was long perceived as underdeveloped. But now a wide range of economic cooperation and community building initiatives have emerged, and they are profoundly transforming the dynamics of regional economic cooperation and institution-building in East Asia. These regional cooperation programs include, but not limited to: the ASEAN+3 process, the Chiang Mai Initiative, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asian Bond Market, and a series of bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Area (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). Unlike prior attempts to construct a trans-Pacific regional architecture centered on APEC, these projects were driven by the shared sense of purpose among East Asian countries to construct a more Asian-oriented community and to serve the need of better East Asian regional governance. Also, unlike the regional production networks largely shaped by the Japanese economic power and corporate strategies from the 1970s to 1990s, the rapidly rise of the Chinese economic power has become a leading force to reshape regional governance and regional institutional building. To what extent does China influence other East Asian countries’ economic development, and how others have benefited from China's growth? As the countries in East Asia have become increasingly interdependent, leaders in the region have become more determined to build a framework for greater regional cooperation and integration. What regional political-economic organizations would emerge in East Asia? How leaders in China think about future regional cooperation and regional governance in East Asia? This paper attempts to address these questions and shed light on the policy and academic debates about these issues.APEC celebrates its twentieth birthday in 2009. Yet, to many people, APEC's “good old days” have passed and is facing an uncertain future in years to come. APEC has lost its momentum and even relevance to the on-going regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. For the last two decades, the regional organization has been unsuccessful in attaining some of its ambitious goals such as regional trade liberalization and building a Pacific community. It is now facing a challenge of how to remain relevant in the future Asia-Pacific regional architecture. It relevance could be jeopardized by its hollow dialogue agendas as well as a growing number of regional community building projects in the Asia-Pacific region.There is no doubt that APEC is a useful platform for bilateral and multilateral meetings among regional leaders, and, as the only forum for trans-Pacific dialogues, it is important for stability and prosperity in the Asia Pacific. But besides that, how can APEC contribute to regional institutional building in future? How will it be related to the emerging regional architecture in the Asia Pacific? This article addresses this issue through analyzing its role and weakness in regional community building, the shaping forces for future regional architecture, challenges APEC is facing in the competitive environment of region building, and what possible roles APEC could play in the construction of the regional architecture in the Asia Pacific.

We’re ‘all in’ on this one, but we’ll need your help!

We’re ‘all in’ on this one, but we’ll need your help!

The economic causes and consequences of social instability in China

This paper provides a survey of the economic literature relevant to social instability in China and moulds it into an argument. The objective is to offer a fresh view of economic policy and performance through the lens of the threat posed by social instability. This is a concept that economists rarely analyse, and yet it can lurk behind much economic policy-making. China's leadership has often publicly expressed its concern to avoid ‘social instability’. It is viewed as a threat both to the political order and to the continued rapid growth of the economy. This threat to growth in turn endangers the maintenance of social stability. The paper examines the likely economic determinants of social instability, using both surveys and other evidence. After discussing the determinants of China's rapid growth, the paper goes on to examine the likely mechanisms by which social instability can affect the growth rate. There is a case for more research on the role of social instability in the economic development process.

Introduction

Introduction Travis Tanner (bio) All major Northeast Asian countries, as well as the United States, held elections or underwent leadership transitions in 2012 that will not only have an impact on their respective domestic political landscapes but also shape their foreign policy priorities in 2013 and beyond. For the Asia-Pacific as a whole, the leadership transitions of 2012 will have profound geopolitical consequences for years to come. In the United States, the re-election of President Barack Obama in November indicates that the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific will be largely sustained, despite budgetary pressures and domestic political challenges. In China, the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party convened in November and made a once-a-decade announcement of a new cohort of national leaders, with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang being named to the highest positions on the Politburo Standing Committee. Likewise, both Japan and South Korea held major elections in December. Japan returned Shinzo Abe and the previously dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to power following a few short years of rule by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), while in South Korea, Park Guen-hye of the Saenuri Party was elected president, becoming the first woman democratically chosen to lead a Northeast Asian state. Earlier in 2012, Taiwan and Russia both held national elections. In Taiwan, incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) was re-elected in January, likely indicating his rapprochement with mainland China will continue. In Russia, a controversial election in March returned the presidency to Vladimir Putin, despite large protests in Moscow similar to those following the December 2011 legislative elections. Finally, in the wake of Kim Jong-un's formal assumption of power in late 2011, North Korean politics continued to unfold during 2012 in ways little understood by the outside world. Recognizing that all these leadership changes were occurring within a relatively short window, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), in partnership with the Henry M. Jackson Foundation and the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, hosted an international conference on "Northeast Asia in Transition: [End Page 46] New Leadership, New Dynamics." The conference, which was held on November 13, 2012, at the University of Washington, featured a select group of experts who examined the political, economic, and social issues affecting Northeast Asia amid these leadership transitions. The conference was organized by NBR's Kenneth B. and Anne H.H. Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies. Named in honor of NBR's founding president and his wife, the Pyle Center conducts research and organizes events on Northeast Asia to advance the study of the complex dynamics and deep forces reshaping the region. The conference was also part of a series of events organized to celebrate the Henry M. Jackson centennial, the hundredth anniversary of Senator Jackson's birth. This roundtable features essays by three of the presenters, who were asked to examine the leadership transitions in Japan, China, and the Korean Peninsula and the associated implications for Northeast Asia. Yoichiro Sato (Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University) examines the shifting domestic political landscape that led to the LDP's return to power and how the new Abe government will likely address the challenges currently facing Japan. He notes that the new government is likely to adopt a more nationalistic stance, which could lead to escalating regional tensions and difficulties in managing the alliance with the United States. Ren Xiao (Fudan University) provides a lucid rundown of the outcomes of the 18th Party Congress and describes the implications of the new leadership configuration for China's relations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States. He warns leaders in China and the United States not to exaggerate each other's "unfriendly intentions" and recommends that both new governments explore areas for collaboration that will promote peace and benefit both nations. Sung-yoon Lee (Tufts University) gives an authoritative and insightful assessment of the "uniquely unique" North Korean leadership structure, pointing out its many flaws and weaknesses. He argues that Kim Jong-un's youth and inexperience make the regime vulnerable and that President Obama and President Park Geun...

Interview: Lee Cheuk-Yan

A different approach Yet the 40-day strike at Hong Kong International Terminals (HIT) that ended in early May brought about a 9.8 percent pay increase, the first for the hundreds of strikers in more than a decade, and a promise to improve conditions that had workers doing 12-hour-plus shifts without breaks. Lee says shifts sometimes extended to 24, 48 and even 72 hours. It was historical in the sense that we were able to hang on for 40 days. Since 1949, this was the longest strike. It is a miracle. We don’t have a strike fund. We are not like the AFL-CIO ([n the United States]. Originally I didn’t think we could last, then I made a move to raise funds from the public. We were able to raise HK$8.9 million (€870,000) for 400-plus workers. I was shocked about the public support. No one believed that such appalling working conditions existed in the docks, in the terminals . So shameful. I think it really did get a lot of sympathy from the public. Secondly, I think it was because of Mr. Li Ka-shing (the Hong Kong billionaire who controls more than 70 percent of the city’s port traffic), the richest man in Asia. People feel it is a classic David and Goliath case. Isn’t the outcome of the dockworkers’ strike an indication that workers can assert their rights in modern-day Hong Kong? I would say we were only partially successful because we could not even get union recognition , a collective bargaining agreement. We got partial recognition because HIT cannot escape meeting with us. On the final day, they said they won’t go back to the bargaining table. They just gave us a unilateral wage increase of 9.8 percent and promised improvements that had already been offered at the bargaining table regarding lunch breaks, working hours. Two confederations played very different hands on behalf of dockworkers in a recent wages dispute INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 20 Volume 20 Issue 3 2013 You were very active in both the dockworkers’ strike and the June 4 pro-democracy vigil. Were they, in any way, related events? I’ve always been with the labour movement, and with an independent labour movement in Hong Kong, you deal with worker issues and the issue of democracy. If you don’t vote, workers’ rights cannot be protected. My starting point is both workers’ rights and the democratic rights of workers. Are such rights threatened in a Hong Kong that may enjoy relative autonomy but which has been part of the People’s Republic of China since the handover from Great Britain in 1997? You have to deal with the Communist Party regime. After the handover, they had a coalition with big business. They want big business to be on their side. Their concern is overwhelmingly stability . They want to cooperate with the capitalists, and that the capitalists should cooperate with them. That is the political deal: the capitalists support the Communist regime, and the Communist regime supports the capitalists. Workers, of course, are always the ones that sacrifice. Could you say the colonial model established for Hong Kong under British rule, which enshrined capitalism, works quite well for Communist leaders in China, where state-run capitalism has become the order? They find the colonial government [model] really works well for them. They themselves have the same mentality as a colonial government. As a oneparty -rule, authoritarian regime, they have no problem taking over that, no problem continuing to suppress workers’ rights. They believe Hong Kong needs stability. That means you don’t have workers going on strike to make problems for the capitalists. JOSEPH B. ATKINS is a veteran journalist and professor of journalism at the University of Mississippi. He is the author of Covering for the Bosses: Labor and the Southern Press. His blog is http://www.laborsouth .blogspot.com. INTERVIEW ❐ LEE CHEUK-YAN, HKCTU Lee Cheuk-yan, is Chair of the Hong Kong Labour Party, and Chair of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China. He is also General Secretary of the Hong Kong...

China's Leadership Change and Its Implications for Foreign Relations

China's Leadership Change and Its Implications for Foreign Relations

Chinese-style decentralization and health system reform.

China’s health system reform (HSR) recently entered a second phase, the State Council and a multi-agency steering committee announced many important new initiatives. However, China’s social sectors are heavily decentralized, the Ministry of Health has limited influence on the detailed design and implementation of the HSR at sub-national level. Sub-national leaders in China are mostly driven by economic progress and revenue generation; health is generally regarded as consuming, not generating revenue. A new health management information system and performance-based management of health staff may enhance oversight. However, parallel reforms in governance, financing, and accountability are also needed in China, to ensure achievement of the equity objective of its HSR.

China Futurisms: Research Universities as Leaders or Followers?

Are research universities simple reflections of the society that gives them life, subject to local cultural and political norms? Or are they leaders of their society, a place for cutting-edge thought and debate? This is a question that is not discussed by ministerial or academic leaders in China. Rather, it is an underlying question that is a source of tension and will likely emerge slowly and more openly as the central government continues its uneven progress toward greater economic liberty. It is also a vital question if China wishes to develop a set of comprehensive research universities that are truly among the top in the world - and not simply good producers of scientific research and patents. The national Outline for Medium and Long Term Education Reform and Development (otherwise known as the 2020 Blueprint) appears to make one more step toward supporting a select group of universities to adopt features of some of the world's best and influential universities, including offers of greater autonomy and funds for improving academic management. At the same time, the 2020 Blueprint retains the ethos of central ministerial planning and control and has been presented in an environment in which criticism of society's problems remain constrained. Globalization, including increased interaction with the university faculty and leader in the US, EU and elsewhere, is creating a consensus among China's academic leaders that increased institutional independence, including new levels of academic freedom and improved internally generated quality control, will be necessary for their universities to fully mature. Yet this will be a slow process, shaped by Chinese societal norms and the still dominant hand of the national government.

China's Leadership Transition

China faces a major leadership transition over the coming months. Jane Duckett explains how political succession works in China and considers the policy shifts the forthcoming transition might bring.

Ethical ideologies among senior managers in China

The ethical judgment of Chinese business leaders has become increasingly important particularly due to the important role that China plays in the global economy. Previous studies tend to categorize Chinese managers as more relativist and thus more lenient in their ethical judgments. In this study we survey 256 senior managers from mainland China and find that they are in fact less relativist and more idealist than the global average. A significant portion of them are absolutists which imply that these managers believe that positive consequences should result from ethical decisions based on universal moral rules. Our findings question the implications made by previous researchers that among Chinese managers there is a less than clear demarcation between right and wrong. We conclude that business leaders in China would be more supportive of codes of conduct and other ethical behaviour because of the ethical position they hold.

China's 12th Five-Year Plan: a potential game changer for economic restructuring and socio-economic development

The 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP), 2010–2015, comes in at the critical juncture of China's political, economic and social development. It coincides with China's leadership transition when the younger generation of leadership under Xi Jinping will take power, and the new leaders are likely to pay more attention to the increasing demand across China for new direction in socio-economic development. China's economy having achieved spectacular growth at an annual average of 10% for over three decades is under a lot of structural stress and strains that are crying out for structural adjustment. Hence, one of the major economic objectives of the 12th FYP is to rebalance China's economic growth pattern by reducing its dependence on exports and increasing domestic demand as its major source of growth. Structural change is a natural part of the economic growth process, but it is not easy to speed up the economic restructuring process. This requires good policies as well as strong political commitment from the top leadership. The successful implementation of this important FYP will render China's economic growth more sustainable as well as better able to meet various social objectives. The 12th FYP could well be a significant ‘game changer’ if it would succeed in making the required breakthrough on many fronts. It has the spirit, but the real game change would need many more FYPs.

Domestic Institutional Challenges Facing China's Leadership on the Eve of the 18th Party Congress

Domestic Institutional Challenges Facing China's Leadership on the Eve of the 18th Party Congress

China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the “Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy”

AbstractThe contradiction between the astonishing dynamic of China's domestic climate policy agenda and its seemingly tenacious position in international climate negotiations presents a puzzle that, on closer inspection, reveals much about a nation at the crossroads, undecided which way to turn. The alterations in China's political interests connected to the issue of climate change are clearly evident in the domestic policy changes China introduced during previous years. However, China's leadership thus far has remained hesitant to translate this new set of interests fully into a coherent position in the international arena. China's mounting difficulties in reconciling its rapidly changing role on the international stage with its altered domestic situation, as well as its traditional foreign policy interests and principles, undermine its ability to pursue a consistent and effective strategy in international climate negotiations. China's reluctance to redefine its role in the international arena has led to a number of inconsistencies that particularly plagued its position during the Copenhagen conference, adding to the overall non-constructive dynamic of the proceedings that ultimately left China, as everyone else, with empty hands. The Copenhagen negotiations demonstrated that China's leadership will have to address these inconsistencies resolutely if it wants to realize the benefits that international climate cooperation offers.

Rebalancing China's growth: some unsettled questions

China's leadership has spoken for much of the past decade about the need to ‘rebalance’ the economy and put it onto a different growth path, with domestic consumption as a leading driver of growth. This paper analyses two questions in this regard. The first is how to best to characterise China's existing growth path. China is typically considered to be an export-led economy par excellence. However, the results of the growth accounting approach are reviewed which question this characterization. Second, if China wishes to shift growth paths then, on the basis of insights generated by post-Keynesian growth models, I conclude that a shift to a consumption-driven (wage-led) growth path may be much more problematic than is generally assumed. Résumé Durant la dernière décennie, les autorités chinoises n'ont cessé de communiquer sur la nécessité de rééquilibrer l'économie chinoise et de la mettre sur une différente trajectoire de développement, en faisant de la consommation domestique une des sources majeures de la croissance. Cet article en explore deux problématiques. D'abord, on s'interroge sur la meilleure façon de caractériser l'économie chinoise. En effet, alors que la Chine est communément perçue comme un pays exportateur, des études récentes démontrent le contraire. Ensuite, on explore les autres trajectoires de développement susceptibles d'être empruntées par la Chine. Il semble, sur la base des conclusions des modèles de croissance post-keynésiens, qu'un changement de trajectoire de croissance en Chine serait plus problématique que ce qui est généralement admis.