Launch Decision Research Articles

Industrial New Product Launch Strategies and Product Development Performance

Just as reporters must answer a few fundamental questions in every story they write, decision‐makers in the new product development (NPD) process must address five key issues: what to launch, where to launch, when to launch, why to launch, and how to launch. These decisions involve significant commitments of time, money, and resources. They also go a long way toward determining the success or failure of any new product. Deeper insight into the tradeoffs these decisions involve may help to increase the likelihood of success for product launch efforts.Erik Jan Hultink, Abbie Griffin, Susan Hart, and Henry Robben present the results of a study that examines the interplay between these product launch decisions and NPD performance. Noting that previous launch studies focus primarily on the tactical decisions (that is, how to launch) rather than on the strategic decisions (what, where, when, and why to launch), they explore not only which decisions are important to success, but also the associations between the two sets of decisions. Because the strategic launch decisions made early in the NPD process affect the tactical decisions made later in the process, their study emphasizes the importance of launch consistency—that is, the alignment of the strategic and tactical decisions made throughout the process. The survey respondents—managers from marketing, product development, or general management in U.K. firms—provided information about 221 industrial new products launched during the previous five years.The responses identify associations between various sets of strategic and tactical decisions. That is, the responses suggest that the strategic decisions managers make regarding product innovativeness, market targeting, the number of competitors, and whether the product is marketing‐ or technology‐driven are associated with subsequent tactical decisions regarding branding, distribution expenditure and intensity, and pricing.The study also suggests that different sets of launch decisions have differing effects on performance of industrial new products. In this study, the greatest success was enjoyed by a small group of respondents categorized as Niche Innovators. Their launch strategy involves a niche focus, targeting innovative products into markets with few competitors. Tactical decisions made by this group include exclusive distribution, a skimming pricing strategy, and a broad product assortment.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

he Eve of the Launch Learning Culture, Revising History Risk, Work Group Culture, and the Norma lization of Deviance The Normalization of Deviance, 1981-1984 The Normalization of Deviance, 19856: The Culture of Production St ructural Secrecy The Eve of the Launch Revisited Conformity and Tragedy Lessons Learned Appendix A Cost/Safety Trade-Offs? Scra pping the Escape Rockets and the SRB Contract Award Decision. Appendix B Supporting Charts and Documents Appendix C On Theory Elaboration, Organizations, and Historical Ethnography.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. By Diane Vaughan. University of Chicago Press, 1996. 575 pp. $24.95

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. By Diane Vaughan. University of Chicago Press, 1996. 575 pp. $24.95

A Review of “The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA”

(1997). A Review of “The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA”. American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal: Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 308-309.

The challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA

The computer codes FRESCO-I, FRESCO-II, PANAMA and SPATRA developed at Forschungszentrum Jülich in Germany in the early 1980s are essential tools to predict the fission product release from spherical fuel elements and the TRISO fuel performance, respectively, under given normal or accidental conditions. These codes are able to calculate a conservative estimation of the source term, i.e. quantity and duration of radionuclide release. Recently, these codes have been reversed engineered, modernized (FORTRAN 95/2003) and combined to form a consistent code named STACY (Source Term Analysis Code System). STACY will later become a module of the V/HTR Code Package (HCP). In addition, further improvements have been implemented to enable more detailed calculations. For example the distinct temperature profile along the pebble radius is now taken into account and coated particle failure rates can be calculated under normal operating conditions. In addition, the absolute fission product release of an V/HTR pebble bed core can be calculated by using the newly developed burnup code Topological Nuclide Transformation (TNT) replacing the former rudimentary approach. As a new functionality, spatially resolved fission product release calculations for normal operating conditions as well as accident conditions can be performed. In case of a full-core calculation, a large number of individual pebbles which follow a random path through the reactor core can be simulated. The history of the individual pebble is recorded, too. Main input data such as spatially resolved neutron fluxes and fluid dynamics data are provided by the VSOP code. Capabilities of the FRESCO-I and SPATRA code which allow for the simulation of the redistribution of fission products within the primary circuit and the deposition of fission products on graphitic and metallic surfaces are also available in STACY. In this paper, details of the STACY model and first results for its application to the 200 MW(th) HTR-Module are presented.

The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work

The Challenger disaster cannot be accounted for by reductionist explanations that direct attention only toward individual actors, nor by theories that focus solely on communication failure or the social psychological dynamics of the infamous eve-of-launch teleconference. The cause of the tragedy was rooted in historic organizational and environmental contingencies that preceded the launch decision. By tracing the connection between top policy decisions and decisions by engineers and managers assigned to do risky work, this analysis contradicts conventional understandings about what happened at NASA. As a consequence, this case contains new lessons for both managers and students of organizations.

US government policy — the major factor shaping the international commercial space launch marketplace

In this Viewpoint — an edited version of a statement made to the US House Committee on Science's Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics' hearing on ‘US launch strategy’ — the President of Arianespace, Inc analyses the overriding importance of US government policies and executive decisions on the shaping and behavior of the international market in commercial space launch services. Chief among these is the overruling of commercial imperatives by foreign policy and national security interests and the consequent regular intervention of the US government in launch decisions. The ability of Arianespace successfully to compete in a market severely distorted as a result of these interventions, including the encouragement of joint ventures between US and Russian or Ukrainian companies, is explained.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

SCIFER‐Dayside auroral signatures of magnetospheric energetic electrons

The SCIFER sounding rocket was launched over the dayside aurora, at 10 hr Magnetic Local Time (MLT) on January 25, 1995. Meridian‐scanning photometers (MSP) and all‐sky television (ASTV) systems were operated at Longyearbyen (LYR) and Ny‐Ålesund (NYA) on Svalbard under the flight apogee to facilitate the launch decision and identify the ionospheric signatures of the various energetic particle populations observed at the rocket. The characteristics of the 0.3 eV–15.5 KeV electron populations producing the observed aurora were identified from the time, energy and pitch angle electron spectrometer data throughout the SCIFER flight. The optical data clearly showed the location of the trapping boundary seen by the SCIFER energetic electron spectra. Equatorward of the boundary, pulsating patches of auroral luminosity corresponded in pulsation period and location to the >4 keV energy‐dispersed electrons observed at SCIFER. The 10 eV electron flux rather uniformly distributed equatorward from the trapping boundary is accounted for by photoelectrons from the conjugate region, producing most of the 6300 Å [OI] emission observed south of the zenith in the MSP data. Poleward of the trapping boundary, relatively bright, discrete arcs and bands typical of the dayside auroral oval were observed. These corresponded to the inverted V and field‐aligned electron populations which were observed at SCIFER to be < 1 keV characteristic energy and to range from 2 to 5 ergs cm−2 sec−1. The electron populations and the resulting arcs were remarkably similar to those observed on the high latitude nightside (poleward of the trapping boundary) but with obviously different source region. There was no persistent 6300 Å [OI] auroral emission observed poleward of the trapping boundary consistent with the particle observations. Hydrogen emissions were associated with the discrete aurora, indicating that the main proton energy flux was poleward of the trapping boundary.

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA [book review

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA [book review

Effect of atmospheric processes on launch decisions

The different phases of space-vehicle mission operations and system analyses are influenced by several dynamic atmospheric parameters, such as thunderstorm, precipitation, cloud ceiling, etc., which are interpreted as atmospheric constraints for the launch operations. An atmospheric parameter is a random variable which attains either a permissible (GO) or a not permissible (NOGO) outcome, and in repeated observations these outcomes are not usually independent. The purpose of this paper is to construct analytical models supported by the theory of Markov chains and the theory of runs. Probabilistic models incorporating dependence structure of the Markovian type are analyzed. The underlying theory could be used to predict a GO-NOGO decision in the different phases of a mission. Finally, we present numerical examples of how the developed methods can be used to predict different configurations of GO and/or NOGO outcomes pertaining to thunderstorm activities using 33 years of atmospheric data for Kennedy Space Center.

A Comparative Study of Product Launch and Elimination Decisions in UK and US Companies

Investigates approaches to product launch and elimination decisions in samples of UK and US companies, which is a gap which was identified in the literature. Identifies different approaches to tackling each of the decisions, and different approaches within each sample. There are also differences between the countries. These results provide new insights, as well as support for some previous empirical results. Discusses directions for further research.

TheChallenger launch decision: case and teaching note

The following is a brief reconstruction of the major events preceding the launch of the Space Shuttle Challengeron January 28th, 1986, based upon testimony offered at the hearings of the Presidential Commission (1986).

Poker Flat improvements

The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee approved on September 14 a $10.8 million upgrade to University of Alaska Fairbanks Poker Flat Research Range pending full House and Senate approval. The funding will provide for building design, scientific program planning, and initial road and foundation construction. Senator Ted Stevens (RAK) said, “It is an important recognition of the roles Poker Flat, the Geophysical Institute and this university play in the international science area,“ that the Senate approved the money in a time of budget pressure.Poker Flat's facilities include rocket assembly and launching capabilities, telemetry receiving stations and ground‐based diagnostic systems needed for launch decisions for space, aeronomy and atmospheric science experiments.

Coordinated Viking and sounding rocket studies

The Aureld-VIP sounding rocket and EISCAT campaign was carried out in the fall of 1986 in close conjunction with Viking. Two payloads performed measurements in auroral structures simultaneously traversed by Viking and the real time auroral images from the satellite were used to take the launch decisions. Both flights took place close to magnetic midnight. The first payload, Aureld-VIP-High, was launched on 4 November during a magnetic storm. It went into an inverted V structure connected to the evening side boundary plasma sheet. Simultaneously EISCAT performed measurements above the rocket trajectory using a special Aureld-VIP program. In addition several other measurement campaigns were being conducted in northern Scandinavia and on Svalbard utilizing ground based as well as aircraft mounted instruments. There is very good agreement between the different data sets. The convection pattern seems to have been very distorted, allowing Viking to pass both the morning and the evening convection cells. The second payload, Aureld-VIP-Low, was launched on 12 December into the most equatorward arc of the auroral oval. The equatorward edge of this arc marked the boundary between the central plasma sheet and the ring current. Results from studies based on data from these two evenings are reviewed.

Alternate Mode of Operation Program

The increasing complexity of the launch support equipment and the narrow launch windows of the Saturn IB and Saturn V missions require that methods be developed to minimize any delay attributable to launch support equipment failures. Since even short delays cannot be tolerated for Saturn manned missions, it is necessary to develop a method to prevent the occurrence of these delays. The Alternate Mode of Operation (AMO) concept, an analytical methodology, can be used to achieve this goal. The AMO Program is an engineering analysis of launch support equipment consisting of three phases. a. The design analysis phase which consists of performing the analysis as soon as the preliminary design is completed and constructing failure isolation logic diagrams. b. The operations analysis phase which consists of validating the failure isolation procedures, making launch decisions prior to the countdown which may result in built-in holds, and establishing repair plans prior to the countdown for personnel familiarization. c. The implementation phase which consists of instantly displaying the failure isolation logic and launch decisions for use by personnel in case of equipment failure during the countdown. The Alternate Mode of Operation Program provides: a. Launch support equipment capable of meeting launch windows. b. Optimized failure isolation procedures. c. Predetermined launch decisions in case of launch support equipment failure during the countdown.