Latin American Presidentialism Research Articles

Structural adjustment, economic performance, and electoral volatility in presidential elections in Latin America

AbstractDrawing upon the Latin American Presidential and Legislative Elections database and our own original data set, we assess the effects of structural adjustment and other economic factors on presidential electoral volatility in 24 Latin American countries in 1982–2016. The results of our study indicate that both structural adjustment and inflation have a positive association with Type B presidential electoral volatility (the volatility generated from changes in the vote shares of established parties). Economic growth appears to have only a weak negative association with overall presidential electoral volatility. Type A presidential electoral volatility (the volatility associated with the rise of new parties) is mostly determined by demographic factors and the electoral system for the presidency. As with legislative volatility in Latin America, Africa, and postcommunist Europe, explaining stable party presidential volatility appears more challenging than explaining party replacement presidential volatility. Overall, several of the findings about legislative volatility are echoed in this study, but presidential electoral volatility is notably higher than legislative volatility in Latin America.

Assessing Electoral Personalism in Latin American Presidential Elections

Assessing Electoral Personalism in Latin American Presidential Elections

The Bureaucratic Perils of Presidentialism: Political Impediments to Good Governance in Latin America

In the face of poorly performing bureaucracies, public management specialists and policy experts have been quick to suggest administrative reforms. Yet, since governance lies at the nexus of politics and administration, reforms limited to the administrative dimension are likely to fall short without concomitant political change. This essay argues that in contemporary Latin America, certain political-institutional arrangements or institutional traits are more likely to produce (in)effective governance than others. Specifically, Latin American presidentialism creates several “perils” for governance, including: the rigidity and short time horizons of presidentialism; multipartyism under presidentialism; weakly institutionalized party systems and non-programmatic parties; an imbalance of power between strong presidents and weak legislatures; the plebiscitarian nature of presidentialism; and democratic backsliding and the centralization of power in the presidency. These institutional traits incentivize patronage, promote myopic policymaking, and weaken bureaucratic autonomy. To illustrate how they manifest themselves in public policy, the paper uses evidence from the region’s responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, then concludes by suggesting political reforms that may help to improve governance in the region.

The Role of International Factors in Electoral Volatility in Latin America: An Examination of Structural Adjustment

Does structural adjustment increase party system instability in Latin America? We employ the Latin American Presidential and Legislative Elections (LAPALE) database ( http://www.lapaledata.com ) and our own original data set for structural adjustment to assess the effects of structural adjustment and other economic, social, and political variables on legislative volatility in 18 Latin American countries during the period of 1982 to 2016. The results of our study indicate that structural adjustment results in higher levels of within-system electoral volatility and support a broad version of economic voting theory. Extra-system electoral volatility is driven primarily by institutional and demographic factors. Our findings also highlight the importance of disaggregating electoral volatility as within-system volatility and extra-system volatility appear to be largely driven by different factors, or in different ways by the same factors.

The politics of vice-presidential selection in Latin America

It has become common for presidential candidates in Latin America to pick running-mates from outside of their own political parties in the form of political independents or politicians from other parties. As witnessed in several recent cases, this has added a new dynamic to Latin American presidentialism, not least in situations of political crisis. Drawing on a new database, the present paper enquires into the factors that may lead prospective presidents to select such “external vice-presidents”. The findings show that the logics behind selecting either a politician from another party or a political independent as running-mate differ. While the size of the presidential candidate's own party explains the decision to select vice-presidential candidate from another party, the choice of an independent is determined by the fragmentation of the party system. Furthermore, there is evidence that previous experiences of vicepresidential succession makes the selection of an independent running-mate more likely, possibly as a attempt to guard against challenges to the future presidency. Generally, presidential hopefuls tend to pick external running-mates who lack a strong political following, which also indicates that electoral logic is often mitigated by concern for the stability of the eventual presidency.

Strategic Debt and Unified Governments: Evidence from Latin American Presidential Transitions

Strategic Debt and Unified Governments: Evidence from Latin American Presidential Transitions

The form of government in modern Chile: a case of balanced latin- american presidentialism

This paper deals with the form of government existing in the Chilean Constitution, in the light of Latin American presidentialism, as a dogmatic category of comparative law. It is intended to prove that the Chief Executive has significant counterweights in the legislative function, given by the existence of constitutional organic laws and their subsequent mandatory preventive control by the Constitutional Court that, in short, will moderate the Chilean government regime. To prove such a question, we will resort to comparative law, to the revision of national doctrine, while we will analyze judgments of mandatory preventive control of constitutional organic laws. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21017/Rev.Repub.2019.v26.a58

Oversized Governments in Latin American Presidential Democracies: A Lesson from Brazil

Oversized Governments in Latin American Presidential Democracies: A Lesson from Brazil

Control parlamentario y convergencia entre presidencialismo y parlamentarismo

It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation. The idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make difficult mechanisms of political responsibility, but certain devices of oversight could be enough to achieve checks and balances.

Hacia una teoría ideacional de la difusión institucional. La adopción y adaptación del presidencialismo en América Latina durante el siglo XIX

Diffusion theories have paid little attention to the dissemination of political institutions, so far. Moreover, they have offered better explanations of processes of adoption than adaptation ones. The creation of political institutions in Latin America after the wars of independence provides an excellent opportunity for theory-building while correcting these biases. The USA presidential model was adopted by Latin American countries during the xix century, but with certain adaptations, in the sense that the “copies” had fundamental differences from the original paradigm. Latin American presidentialism grants the president a significantly greater role in the dynamics of government than the American one. Ideational factors explain not only the initial choice for presidentialism; but they also contribute to explaining the meaning and intensity of the deep mutation experienced by the Philadelphia model.

Presidencialismo y Revocatoria de mandato presidencial en América Latina

La revocatoria de mandato es un mecanismo de participación y control ciudadano enmarcado principalmente en la tercera ola de la democratización y las reformas políticas y constitucionales de los ´90 en Latinoamérica. Forma parte de las innovaciones incorporadas por los gobernantes como respuesta a la crisis de representación. Su adopción abre interrogantes más profundos sobre: la metamorfosis de la representación moderna (un cierto acercamiento al “mandato imperativo”), las transformaciones del régimen presidencial (flexibilización, cuasi-parlamentarización), las nuevas formas de caídas presidenciales y de resolución de crisis, y la democratización del gobierno (al habilitarse otra instancia de votación orientada a la destitución de funcionarios electos). En tal sentido, el trabajo tiene dos objetivos: analizar conceptualmente la revocatoria de mandato y, específicamente, la revocatoria presidencial (existente sólo en Venezuela, Bolivia y Ecuador); y vincular a este mecanismo con el debate sobre el presidencialismo latinoamericano (pues se considera que produce modificaciones potenciales en el sistema presidencial), con la teoría de los tipos de sucesión constitucional y con la teoría de las interrupciones presidenciales (ya que la revocatoria constituye otro de los dispositivos de destitución disponibles en casos de crisis institucionales). Se trata, por tanto, de un estudio teórico que pretende conceptualizar un tipo determinado de revocatoria de mandato y enlazarlo con otros desarrollos teóricos de los cuales ha estado ausente. Ésas y otras implicancias, teóricas y de ingeniería institucional, motivan este artículo, para dilucidar las potencialidades y los efectos directos e indirectos que la incorporación de este mecanismo plantea para las democracias presidenciales latinoamericanas.

La función parlamentaria de control a caballo de parlamentarismo y presidencialismo

Es posible comparar presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en los controles parlamentarios. Sin control parlamentario, no puede existir democracia representativa, tampoco en el presidencialismo. Las normas constitucionales y de los Reglamentos ya reflejan esa tendencia en Iberoamérica. Esta conclusión lleva a que el clásico debate sobre ambos sistemas de gobierno deba contemplarse de una manera distinta. Hay una pluralidad de tipos presidenciales y semipresidenciales de confusa diferenciación en la realidad. El presidencialismo originario estadounidense es antiguo y difícilmente exportable. El presidencialismo iberoamericano contemporáneo se ha ido parlamentarizando. Existe actualmente un continuum en el binomio presidencialismo/parlamentarismo con diferencias de grado más que cualitativas. Se advierten tres tendencias: la presidencialización del parlamentarismo europeo, la parlamentarización del presidencialismo iberoamericano, e influencias recíprocas entre los Reglamentos parlamentarios. Pluripartidismo extremado, representación proporcional, y un entendimiento absolutista de la separación de poderes presidencial, que impida los controles parlamentarios, son rasgos incompatibles. La solución más fácil está en abandonar ese entendimiento absolutista que no garantiza bien constitucional alguno. La duración fija del mandato presidencial y la idea de que el Presidente debe responder de forma diferida y directa ante el electorado hacen imposible mecanismos de control-responsabilidad política de su figura, pero puede bastar con reforzar los de control-fiscalización para construir checks and balances y representación política en el Parlamento.*

El régimen presidencial en Chile: algunos elementos para su interpretación

This paper will discuss the presidential regime in Chile through the criteria offered by the Latin American presidentialism. Through referral to the Chilean constitutional history, it is intended to account for the dynamic and diverse of our system of government, issues to be considered in the interpretation of the presidential regime in the current Constitution.

Los gobiernos de coalición y su incidencia sobre los presidencialismos latinoamericanos: el caso del Cono Sur

<span style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: xx-small;"><p>Este trabajo se propone realizar una actualización de las teorías de las coaliciones aplicándolasa los presidencialismos latinoamericanos. Para ello se concentra en las experiencias del Cono Sur y trata de demostrar que las coaliciones inciden en la gobernanza y el quehacer político, al tiempo que conducen a un reordenamiento sustantivo en los sistemas partidarios</p></span></span>

Presidents, Parties, and Referenda in Latin America

Over the past two decades the use of referenda has spread throughout Latin America, and 39 referenda have taken place since 1990. For some observers, referenda can improve accountability, promote participation, and reduce corruption. For others, given the strong tradition of Latin American presidentialism, referenda can be manipulated by populist presidents attempting to bypass unpopular representative institutions such as congresses or to bolster their popularity. This article provides a more nuanced view of referenda, arguing that presidents cannot always manipulate referenda to increase their power. The effect of referenda on executive power varies depending on the scope of the referenda, that is, whether they aim at institutional change or, alternatively, at policy change. Moreover, the agenda-setting process and the role of political parties in referenda campaigns also mediate the effect of referenda on executive power. Although referenda do not necessarily enhance executive power, the risks of presidential manipulation are strong, and thus referenda should be carried out taking sufficient precautions.

Why Primaries in Latin American Presidential Elections?

In a context where primaries are not mandated, why do some parties use them to select presidential candidates? In this paper, we argue that the use of primary elections is likely to reflect the existence and intensity of divisions within political parties. We focus on several characteristics of political parties and party systems that are often associated with intraparty divisions. We find that these characteristics are correlated with the decision of Latin American parties to use primaries in selecting their presidential nominees. In particular, we find that coalitions and large, centrist parties are more likely to hold primaries, whereas primaries are less likely in institutional settings that facilitate exit from existing parties.

Reducing the Perils of Presidentialism in Latin America through Presidential Interruptions

Apresidential regime is defined by the independent origin and survival ofthe chiefexecutive and the legislature. The fixed electoral terms of the two popularly elected institutions led Linz to argue that presidentialism is a rigid regime that often creates political conflicts that the regime's institutions are unable to handle. Based primarily on Latin American evidence, Linz argued that such conflicts would cause the breakdown of democracy.' Since the third wave of democratization there have been twenty interrupted presidencies in Latin America and several more failed attempts at interruption.2 A presidential interruption is an incident in which the president leaves, or is forced to leave, the presidency before the end of the constitutional term. This article discusses the political crises and the presidential interruptions in Latin American third wave democracies. It does not seek to explain the occurrence of the political crises that ended in presidential interruption, but rather to provide a new interpretation of the interruptions and make descriptive inferences about their consequences for Latin American presidentialism.3 First, the interrupted presidencies should not be indiscriminately lumped together as one type of cases. To paraphrase Ragin, what are the interrupted presidencies cases of? 4 Aside from constitutionally prescribed elections, five different procedures for removing a democratic government have been successfully employed in the third wave democracies in Latin America: coups, impeachment, declarations of presidential incapacity, resignation, and resignation by calling early elections. Second, interrelatedly, the way the many political crises in the region have been handled demonstrates that presidential regimes in Latin America are more flexible than previously thought.5 The cases of presidential interruptions exhibit a mitigation of one of presidentialism's most serious flaws: fixed terms or rigidity. This flaw is reduced by the many presidential interruptions in Latin America because presidential survival is no longer independent from legislative and popular will. This presidential flexibility is a result of a changed practice within formal structures that have not changed. Latin America is still, and will remain, constitutionally presidential.6 The discussion of the interrupted presidencies will be related to Linz and Valenzuela's arguments.7 Even though there have been many statistical tests of Linz's argument (with diverging results), the logic of his argument is still persuasive.8 If the argument presented

Bloodless Coups

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán's Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America examines the most important trend in Latin American presidentialism over the past 25 years. As any careful observer will have noted, the region's militaries have been unable, or unwilling, to seize control of the state and govern since the Cold War's demise. The military coups that long punctuated the governing cycles of many countries in Latin America have virtually disappeared. In their wake, however, we do not necessarily find a succession of stable governments, ceding power, one to the next, according to schedules and processes set down by constitutions. Instead, crises of confidence in presidents and in their governments, among citizens or other institutional actors, have frequently been resolved by the president's premature removal from office by the legislature, or at least with its assent. These government crises have not toppled the institution of civilian government per se, yet their characteristic improvization may erode the mutually reinforcing expectations about the rule of law on which stable democracy depends.